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Abstract 
 
 
 
Today, the ideas of Carl von Clausewitz are employed almost ubiquitously in 
strategic studies, military history, and defence literature, sometimes at length, at 
others only in passing.  Certain of his central insights have suffered distorting 
representations in recent years.  This study is an attempt to analyse Clausewitz’s 
central theoretical device for understanding war – the ‘remarkable trinity’ of 
politics, chance, and passion.  It aims to present a more accurate conception and 
one which is truer to Clausewitz’s intentions.   
It seeks to achieve this through an in-depth analysis and reinterpretation 
of the text of On War and Clausewitz’s other writings, conducted through the 
prism of the trinity and in the light of contemporary research on war.  It draws on 
and synthesises many excellent existing studies, but argues that there is room for 
further clarification.  It presents fresh perspectives into certain aspects of 
Clausewitz’s thought and emphasises elements of his theory that have been 
neglected. 
The interpretation is founded on three central approaches which place 
Clausewitz in historical context, considers critiques of his ideas, and recognises 
that the trinity cannot be understood in isolation, but rests upon ideas found in 
Clausewitz’s wider work. 
The trinity is a uniquely powerful framework for understanding the 
phenomenon of war.  It cannot hope to answer all the strategic problems we face 
today – that was simply not what Clausewitz intended – but rather constitutes a 
mental guide for anyone interested in the subject, from commanders to university 
students.  It focuses attention on the central underlying forces of war in their 
endlessly complex interaction.  Once allowances are made for abstruse 
terminology and irregularities given the unfinished nature of On War, it is hoped 
that this thesis will underscore the timelessness of the trinity. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
Introduction 
 
 
Writing in the early nineteenth century, Carl von Clausewitz (1780-1831), a 
Prussian general, produced what is perhaps the most famous book on the nature 
and theory of war.  Indeed, Bernard Brodie wrote that his masterpiece On War, 
‘is not simply the greatest but the only true great book on war.’1  Harry Summers 
wrote that in ‘military science…On War is still the seminal work.’2  Christopher 
Coker describes Clausewitz as ‘the greatest phenomenologist of war.’3  His book 
is ‘often mentioned, occasionally quoted, but little read.’4  We might also add to 
that list, frequently misunderstood: a fact that has engendered ‘misinterpretations 
of enormous consequence.’5  Studies employing or drawing upon purportedly 
Clausewitzian insights, that demonstrate little evidence of deep familiarity with 
the text, continue to proliferate.  
Clausewitz is mentioned almost ubiquitously in strategic studies and 
military historical literature and often in an extremely instrumental fashion.  His 
ideas are utilised in a very selective and cursory manner, so that he appears 
everywhere but often only in passing.  The real Clausewitz is often lost in a mass 
of fleeting references, most of which are misleading or do not fully convey the 
complexity of his arguments.  Many modern popular works on war deploy 
supposedly Clausewitzian ideas which are almost unrecognisable to anyone with 
a moderate acquaintance with his work, or which present such crude, often 
derivative, representations as to appear almost satirical.  Most striking is the 
disproportion between the towering status of his name and how little he appears 
to have been read in any great depth.  As is often the fate of great works, they 
are scavenged for ideas to lend gravitas to spuriously related arguments.  
                                                          
1
 Bernard Brodie, ‘The Continuing Relevance of On War’, in Carl von Clausewitz, On War, 
trans. and ed. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (New York: Everyman’s Library, 1993), p. 58. 
2
 Harry Summers,  On Strategy: The Vietnam War in Context  (Honolulu: University Press of the 
Pacific, 2003), p. 4. 
3
 Christopher Coker, Waging War Without Warriors? The Changing Culture of Military Conflict 
(London: Lynne Rienner, 2002), p. 54. 
4
 Christopher Bellamy, Knights in White Armour: The New Art of War and Peace (London: 
Pimlico, 1998), p. 25.  This is a quote which itself is often mentioned, but one suspects, rarely 
acted upon. 
5
 Beatrice Heuser, Reading Clausewitz (London: Pimlico, 2002), p. x. 
Introduction 
 9 
 
It has been written that, in order to avoid such endless misunderstanding, 
On War ‘has to be studied repeatedly, seriously, and in depth.’6  The irony that 
this was written by one of Clausewitz’s most mistaken interpreters should not 
detract from the wisdom of the injunction.7   Most crucially, Clausewitz must be 
studied in context; as Peter Paret notes: ‘Every theory that outlasts its creator 
tends to be reinterpreted unhistorically…Clausewitz’s writings have suffered the 
attendant distortions more than most.’8  Also, Azar Gat has stressed that the 
‘obscurity of Clausewitz’s text has continually left room for conflicting and 
unhistorical interpretations.’9  Of course, secondary interpretations are inevitably 
subjective, however this does not prevent us from recognising where some are 
clearly superior to others.  The prominent sources of forgivable 
misinterpretations are well-known: the unfinished text, the inherent difficulty of 
some of the ideas, the use of outdated concepts, and problems associated with 
translation.  The only means of overcoming these potential interpretative pitfalls 
is through a detailed reading of On War and Clausewitz’s wider work, 
attempting to understanding the man himself, and situating his ideas in the time 
they were written, as well as drawing upon a range of secondary analyses, which 
are themselves based on rigorous research.     
To guard against mistaken readings of On War, a key aim of this study is 
to provide a thorough analysis of Clausewitz’s central theoretical device: his 
‘remarkable trinity.’  The trinity can be seen as the apotheosis of his theorising.  
His brief description of the trinity comes at the end of Book 1, Chapter 1 – the 
only chapter we know he considered complete10 – and is presented under the 
subheading, ‘The Consequences for Theory’11 (see Appendix I for full text).  In 
this respect, the trinity represents Clausewitz’s central analytic framework for 
comprehending the nature of war; in some respects it can be viewed as all eight 
                                                          
6
 Martin van Creveld, ‘The Eternal Clausewitz’, in Michael I. Handel (ed.), Clausewitz and 
Modern Strategy (Abingdon: Routledge, 2005), p. 36.  
7
 Creveld’s analysis and interpretation in his ‘The Eternal Clausewitz’ article is accurate, clear, 
and sympathetic.  It is his later work which somewhat incomprehensibly misrepresents 
Clausewitz’s ideas. 
8
 Peter Paret, Clausewitz and the State: The Man, His Theories, and His Times (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1985), p. 8. 
9
 Azar Gat, A History of Military Thought: From the Enlightenment to the Cold War (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2001), p. 202. 
10
 In an undated note he states that, ‘The first chapter of Book One alone I regard as finished.’  
Clausewitz, ‘Unfinished note, presumably written in 1830’, in Clausewitz, On War, p. 79.  
11
 Clausewitz, On War, p. 101. 
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Books of On War condensed into five paragraphs.  Christopher Bassford rightly 
states that ‘the Trinity is the concept that ties all of Clausewitz’s many ideas 
together and binds them into a meaningful whole.’12   Read in isolation, the 
trinity can, and has, led to as much confusion as clarity, because, on first 
reading, it can appear decidedly simplistic, imprecise, and, perhaps, somewhat 
odd.  As Hugh Smith observes, though Clausewitz ‘nowhere discusses passion, 
reason, and chance at length, these elements permeate his entire work.’13  It 
might be even more accurate to state that he does discuss those elements at 
considerable length, but rarely explicitly in direct reference to the trinitarian 
framework itself. 
It should also be noted that the trinity might appear to some as distinctly 
cold and analytical – a description of the nature of war which fails to reflect the 
awfulness of the subject.  Yet, Clausewitz never lost sight of the ‘horrible reality 
of war’ 14  and he certainly was no militarist, 15  even if he saw war as an 
occasional necessity, and, moreover, one which may entail great bloodshed.16  
War, he believed, ‘is no pastime; it is no mere joy in daring and winning, no 
place for irresponsible enthusiasts.  It is a serious means to a serious end.’17  
Nevertheless, he stressed that, ‘It would be futile – even wrong – to try and shut 
one’s eyes to what war really is from sheer distress at its brutality.’18  Clausewitz 
was not deluded about the reality of his subject, but war, as only a soldier could 
understand, is more ambiguous in its meaning and impressions than those who 
have not experienced it may believe.19  Clausewitz had witnessed the heart-
                                                          
12
 Christopher Bassford, ‘The Primacy of Policy and the Trinity in Clausewitz’s Mature 
Thought’, in Hew Strachan and Andreas Herberg-Rothe, Clausewitz in the Twenty-First Century 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), p. 75. 
13
 Hugh Smith, On Clausewitz (New York: Palgrave, 2005), p. 116. 
14
 Brian Bond, The Pursuit of Victory: From Napoleon to Saddam Hussein (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2006), p. 53. 
15
 Ibid., p. 56. 
16
 ‘Kind-hearted people might of course think there was some ingenious way to disarm or defeat 
the enemy without too much bloodshed, and might imagine this is the true goal of the art of war.  
Pleasant as it sounds, it is a fallacy that must be exposed: war is such a dangerous business that 
the mistakes which come from kindness are the very worst.’  Clausewitz, On War, p. 84.  If 
Coker is correct, this perhaps reflects the general ancient Greek conception of war, which did not 
glorify it, but ‘accepted that it was inevitable; it was part of the human condition.’  Coker, 
Waging War Without Warriors, p. 17. 
17
 Clausewitz, On War, p. 98. 
18
 Ibid., p. 84. 
19
 Joanna Bourke quotes a soldier in World War I who wrote, ‘It is all the most wonderful fun; 
better fun than one could ever imagine’.  During the first Battle of Ypres the soldier also 
remarked that, ‘I’ve never been so fit or nearly so happy in my life before; I adore the fighting.’  
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rending crossing of the Berezina by Napoleon’s retreating armies and was 
moved to write that, ‘If my feelings had not been hardened it would have sent 
me mad.’20  He also understood that war could be an intensely life-affirming 
activity; as Coker notes in reference to Clausewitz, war ‘teaches us – and it is a 
severe teacher – a great deal about ourselves…[it is] the ultimate existential 
experience.’21  War could also be intensely enjoyable: Clausewitz often wrote to 
his wife about his great excitement with regard to a forthcoming battle.22  In 
sum, war for Clausewitz was an emotionally and morally complex phenomenon, 
at once dreadful, necessary, and exhilarating.23 
Who was Carl von Clausewitz? 
Adventure, learning, and love – the young Clausewitz: 1780-1806 
Before moving on to outline the objectives of this study, it is necessary to 
introduce the man and his life.24  Carl Phillip Gottlieb von Clausewitz was born 
in June 1780 in the country town of Burg seventy miles southwest of Berlin.25  
His father was a retired lieutenant from the Seven Years War who had barely 
                                                                                                                                                            
Joanna Bourke, An Intimate History of Killing: Face-to-Face Killing in the Twentieth Century 
(London: Granta Books, 1999), p. 140. 
20
 Quoted in Andreas Herberg-Rothe, Clausewitz’s Puzzle: The Political Theory of War (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2007), p. 161.  In reaction to the same event he also commented that 
‘he would never be free from the impressions of this terrible spectacle.’  Quoted in Janeen 
Klinger, ‘The Social Science of Carl von Clausewitz’, Parameters, Spring 2006, p. 81. 
21
 Christopher Coker, Waging War, p. 30. 
22
 Prior to the battle of Auerstedt in 1806 Clausewitz wrote to Marie: ‘The day after 
tomorrow…there will be a great battle, for which the entire army is longing.  I myself look 
forward to this day as I would to my own wedding day.’  Roger Parkinson, Clausewitz: A 
Biography (New York: Stein and Day, 1979), p. 58.  
23
 Experiences of war are of course highly subjective, but history certainly reveals as many 
instances of those who have found it great fun and a worthy pursuit, as those who have deplored 
it or thought it the most despicable of things.  As Robert E, Lee commented, ‘It is well that war 
is so terrible; we would grow too fond of it’ and Genghis Kahn could state that ‘Happiness lies in 
conquering your enemies, in driving them in front of you, in taking their property, in savouring 
their despair, in raping their wives and daughters.’  Quoted in Gwynne Dyer, War: The Lethal 
Custom (New York: Carroll & Graf, 2005), p. 154.  Gray notes that, ‘It is all too human to 
organize to fight and even to enjoy combat (especially vicariously).’  Colin S. Gray, ‘Clausewitz 
rules, OK?  The future is the past – with GPS’, Review of International Studies, Vol. 25, 1999, 
p. 181.  
24
 For an overview of the military aspects of the Revolutionary and Napoleonic period, see 
Appendix II. 
25
 Unless explicitly referenced, the following brief biography is drawn from two principal 
sources: Paret, Clausewitz and the State, and Parkinson, Clausewitz.  Other potted biographies 
can be found in much of the general literature on Clausewitz. 
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managed to retain his claim to noble status.  Clausewitz grew up in a house 
frequented by officers.26  He received a fairly mediocre provincial education.  As 
was common at the time, just prior to his twelfth birthday Clausewitz was 
accepted into the 34th Infantry Regiment commanded by the brother of the late 
Frederick the Great, Prince Ferdinand. 27   After missing the momentous 
cannonade at Valmy in 1792, 28  within months Clausewitz enthusiastically 
received his first taste of war when his regiment was deployed to take control of 
the Rhine from French revolutionary forces in early 1793.  Clausewitz took part 
in the series of operations that culminated in the liberation, in July, of the 
strategically important garrison town of Mainz.29  The army then marched south 
to the Vosges Mountains where, due to being ‘fragmented into tendrils of 
outposts and detachments’,30 it primarily conducted a series of limited raids and 
ambushes until the Peace of Basel ended hostilities between France and Prussia 
in 1795.   
These experiences of combat undoubtedly ‘provided the impulse…to his 
early studies and his first theoretical speculations’31 which were given time to 
germinate in the relative period of calm Clausewitz spent garrisoned in the 
mundane town of Neuruppin between 1795 and 1801.32  Despite the somewhat 
prosaic nature of this tour of duty, Clausewitz nevertheless both benefited from 
the pedagogical reforms and enlarged curriculum introduced by the regimental 
commander Freidrich von Tschammer and his intimate experience of Prussian 
military society and institutions.33  Indeed, his reformist and modernising ideas 
                                                          
26
 In his ‘Observations on Prussia in Her Great Catastrophe’ Clausewitz notes that in his parents 
house he saw no one but officers, ‘and not the best educated and most versatile at that.’  In Carl 
von Clausewitz, Historical and Political Writings, ed. and trans. Peter Paret and Daniel Moran 
(New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1992), p. 40. 
27
 Paret notes that 85 out of 130 Prussian Generals from Clausewitz’s generation began their 
careers between the ages of twelve and fourteen.  Paret, Clausewitz and the State, p. 19. 
28
 This great artillery battle saw the French Revolutionary forces repel the Prussians and 
Austrians forces commanded by the Duke of Brunswick. 
29
 In June, Mainz was subjected to a relentless bombardment by allied artillery, to which Goethe, 
who was present, responded: ‘Every heart was burdened with sadness.’  Parkinson, Clausewitz, 
p. 25. 
30
 Paret, Clausewitz and the State, p. 30. 
31
 Ibid., p. 35. 
32
 Just prior to the period in Neuruppin, Clausewitz spent a few months on leave living with a 
farmer’s family in the county of Taklenburg, where he was able to ride to the nearby town of 
Osnabruck and obtain a number of political and religious books.  Later he wrote, ‘There with one 
stroke the vanity of the young soldier became a great philosophical ambition.’  Parkinson, 
Clausewitz, p. 28. 
33
 Paret, Clausewitz and the State, pp. 36-55. 
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were probably inspired by the obvious contrast he drew between his actual 
experience of battle and the formalistic, ceremonial character of the manoeuvres 
performed at Neuruppin.  As Clausewitz noted, ‘even a modicum of reflection 
on these exercises…was bound to lead at once to the realisation that none of this 
had taken place in the war that we had fought.’34   
It was not until Clausewitz’s admission to the Berlin Institute for Young 
Officers in the summer of 1801 that he could effectively begin to develop his 
intellect and expand his education.  The institution was under the directorship of 
the Hanoverian, reformist minded, Gerhard von Scharnhorst who soon became 
one of Clausewitz’s closest friends and, essentially, his surrogate father. 35  
Scharnhorst emphasised the development of the students’ intellect, powers of 
judgement, and independence of thought, whilst not forcing upon them any 
particular theory of war.  Here, under the guidance of Scharnhorst, Clausewitz 
became acquainted with some of the fundamental issues he would later expand 
upon in his mature works, such as the relationship between theory and practice, 
the importance of history and sociology, and the philosophic method taught 
primarily by the lecturer Johann Kiesewetter – a populariser of Kant.36  (Also, 
towards the end of this period, in December 1803, Clausewitz met his future 
wife, Marie von Brühl, lady-in-waiting to the Queen Mother). 37   Initially 
struggling to keep up in lectures, Clausewitz graduated at the head of his class in 
the spring of 1804 and secured a regular appointment as adjutant to Prince 
August.38  With this appointment he was brought into increasing contact with 
groups attached to the imperial court, yet usually as something of an outsider.39  
After much fumbled, vacillating diplomacy and ill-advised strategic 
manoeuvring Frederick William III’s Prussia once again found itself on a 
collision course with a formidable France under the leadership of the now 
Emperor Napoleon Bonaparte, and as Clausewitz prepared to go to war he 
                                                          
34
 Quoted in Paret, Clausewitz and the State, p. 45. 
35
 Clausewitz referred to Scharnhorst as ‘the father and friend of my spirit.’  Quoted in Paret, 
Clausewitz and the State, p. 75. 
36
 Ibid., pp. 69-71. 
37
 They would be married in December 1810. 
38
 Prior to this, in 1803, Clausewitz was seconded as temporary adjutant to Prince August, son of 
the youngest brother of Frederick the Great.  Peter Paret, Understanding War, p. 201. 
39
 King Frederick William, in particular, viewed Clausewitz unfavourably.  Paret, Clausewitz and 
the State, pp. 109-10. 
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prophetically wrote that Prussia’s situation was ‘infinitely wretched.’ 40   In 
September 1806 his regiment began its journey to the battlefield of Auerstedt. 
Soldier, teacher, and reformer – Clausewitz comes of age: 1806-1815 
Clausewitz’s introduction to the Napoleonic form of warfare was a dramatic one.  
Clausewitz was positioned on the right flank of the Prussian army at the Battle 
of Auerstedt41 and in the midst of the fighting he had to take charge of an entire 
battalion, managing to command a reasonably orderly fighting retreat. 42  
Subsequently, in late September, Prince August and Clausewitz were cut off 
from the main force, captured by French forces, paroled near Berlin, and then 
transferred to France where they were interned under ‘easy conditions’43 for ten 
months until the treaty of Tilsit, in July 1807, permitted their repatriation.  
Before returning to Germany they spent a number of intriguing weeks at the 
Château de Coppet by Lake Geneva, exile home of Napoleon’s great literary foe, 
Madame de Stäel, whom Clausewitz befriended along with other members of 
her ‘camp’ such as August Wilhelm Schlegel and Benjamin Constant. 44  
Between Clausewitz’s return to Prussia and the war of 1812, Clausewitz became 
an integral member of the Military Reorganisation Commission headed by 
Scharnhorst at the new War Department,45 charged with modernising the army, 
or as Scharnhorst put it, the ‘internal regeneration of the military system, alike in 
respect of formation, promotion, practice, and especially spirit.’46  The reforms 
entailed not only measures internal to the military institution, such as discipline, 
equipment, and tactics, but also changes which would have far-reaching 
                                                          
40
 Paret, Clausewitz and the State, p. 118. 
41
 Prince August commanded a grenadier battalion and was accompanied by Clausewitz. 
42
 This was the only occasion of his direct command of troops in battle. 
43
 They were officially termed ‘guests of the government’ rather than prisoners.  Paret, Clausewitz 
and the State, p. 130. 
44
 Parkinson describes how life at Coppet in those weeks was filled with ‘dinners, rehearsals, 
performances, excursions on the lake, rides, music, romances and endless talk.’  Parkinson, 
Clausewitz, p. 92. 
45
 This was based in Königsberg in East Prussia where the court and government had moved 
following the Treaty of Tilsit of July 1807 and were to remain until December 1809.  The 
official creation of the Ministry of War in March 1809 was a crucial development as it replaced 
the old numerous, overlapping, and conflicting departments which had contributed to the 
confusion evident in the failure of 1806.  Clausewitz was never a full member of the 
Commission but worked very closely with Scharnhorst – appointed as his aide upon promotion 
in 1809 – describing himself as the chairman’s ‘literary agent.’  Parkinson, Clausewitz, p. 97. 
46
 Ibid., p. 101. 
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implications for Prussian society;47 most notably plans for ending the nobility’s 
monopoly of officer corps commissions and the introduction of universal 
military service.  By the end of this period Clausewitz had risen to become head 
of Scharnhorst’s office whilst he was also appointed as lecturer at the new 
Allgemeine Kreigsschule where he taught a class on ‘Small Wars’, became 
military tutor to the Crown Prince, and was placed on the board of the 
commission responsible for drafting new tactical and operational guides for the 
infantry and cavalry.  This was a period of intense intellectual development for 
Clausewitz and also provided him with a wealth of experience regarding the 
inner-workings of military administration and policy. 
Clausewitz’s intellectual endeavours were once again put on hold when 
the battlefield beckoned for the third time in 1812.  Outraged by Prussia’s 
submission to Napoleon’s designs in the 1812 alliance,48 Clausewitz resigned his 
commission in the Spring so he could serve with the Russian army.49  In this 
capacity he took part in the dramatic Russian retreat including the momentous 
battles of Smolensk, Borodino, and the fall of Moscow in 1812 – all so movingly 
depicted in Tolstoy’s War and Peace in which Clausewitz briefly appears.50  
During the subsequent reversal of fortunes and Napoleon’s retreat over the 
winter – including the dreadful crossing of the Berezina – he played an 
important diplomatic role in the Convention of Tauroggen, which ensured the 
defection of General von Yorck’s Prussian forces who were at that time fighting 
                                                          
47
 As such, these reforms were strongly resisted by conservative elements in Prussian society and 
politics. 
48
 According to the French alliance Prussia was to provide 20,000 men and provide for the 
supply of the Grand Armée as it marched into Russia.  Also, Berlin was occupied.  Clausewitz’s 
fury at the turn of events were vented in his Bekenntnissdenkschrift or ‘political declaration’ of 
February 1812, in which he denounced the ‘childish hope of taming the tyrant’s anger by 
voluntarily disarming, of winning his trust through craven submission and flattery…[and that] 
this drop of poison in the blood of the nation is passed on to posterity, crippling and eroding the 
strength of future generations.’  Clausewitz, Historical and Political Writings, p. 290. 
49
 It is interesting to note that this meant Clausewitz would not only be fighting against Prussian 
troops, but against his two brothers who remained in that army.  Parkinson, Clausewitz, p. 136. 
50
 Leo Tolstoy, War and Peace, trans. Rosemary Edmonds (London: Penguin, 1982), p. 920.  
Prince Andrei is quite scornful towards the Germans in his midst (Clausewitz and Walzogen), 
and fulminates against Germany for handing ‘all Europe over to him [Napoleon], and now they 
have come here to teach us.’  This is unfair towards the real Clausewitz as he of course rejected 
the policy of surrender to Napoleon’s designs.  Andrei is particularly bitter about Clausewitz’s 
(fictional) idea of widening the war to wear out Napoleon.  His criticism appears to be an 
emotional one, given the threat such a course posed to civilians and that his own family might 
become victims; something which a foreigner can blithely ignore (‘He doesn’t care about that’).  
Again, perhaps this is unfair.  Clausewitz actually advocated the same policy in his own country 
in 1813. 
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for the Grand Armée.  Subsequently, Clausewitz and Yorck returned to East 
Prussia and coordinated the raising of a militia of 20,000 men – the Landwehr: 
an act that did much to persuade Frederick William III to finally declare war on 
France in March 1813.  Still in Russian uniform, due to the King’s refusal to 
readmit him to the Prussian army, Clausewitz served as Scharnhorst’s assistant 
at the Battle of Grossgörschen51 in May where the latter was fatally wounded 
much to Clausewitz’s dismay.  During the Leipzig campaign in the autumn, 
which drove Napoleon out of Germany, Clausewitz was far from the main 
theatre of operations near the Baltic coast serving as chief of staff to the Russo-
German Legion.  Only on 11 April 1814 did he finally receive a commission as 
colonel in the Prussian infantry.  During the ‘Hundred Days’ of Napoleon’s 
return in 1815, Clausewitz served as chief of staff to the 3rd Corps which fought 
a difficult holding battle at Wavre and kept Marshal Grouchy from reinforcing 
Napoleon at Waterloo.52 
Reflection, study, and writing – the mature Clausewitz: 1815-1831 
After the war, Clausewitz was assigned to Gneisenau’s headquarters at Coblenz 
on the Rhine as chief of staff.  From this time on, Clausewitz devoted much of 
his spare time to intensive research and prolific writing, including the early 
drafts of On War.  In 1818 he somewhat reluctantly accepted his appointment as 
director of the Berlin War Academy which came with his promotion to major-
general.  In this administrative role Clausewitz advocated a number of 
suggestions for reform of the curriculum of the College, but the assassination of 
August von Kotzebue in 1819 by extremist students led to a conservative 
backlash and resistance to change.  Clausewitz devoted much of the 1820s to 
historical and theoretical study and remained in Berlin until a new appointment 
as commanding officer of the 3rd Inspection of the Artillery entailed his move to 
Breslau in Silesia in September 1830.  However, before having time to settle into 
his new appointment, upheavals spread throughout parts of Europe in 183053 and 
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prompted the mobilisation of part of the Prussian army – with Clausewitz as its 
chief of staff – in response to these events and, specifically, the Warsaw 
insurrection in late November.54  After initially being stationed in Berlin, where 
Clausewitz had increasing influence amongst the high command, in March 1831 
he left for Posen with his great friend Gneisenau, then commander-in chief of 
the army.  An encroaching cholera epidemic from the east meant Clausewitz was 
entrusted with organising a cordon sanitaire on the Prussian frontier and, after 
the headquarters at Posen was disbanded, Clausewitz returned to Breslau on 7 
November and was joined by Marie two days later.  They were able to spend 
eight days together before Clausewitz contracted cholera and died on the 
evening of the 16th at the age of fifty-one.  The book he had been working on 
prior to his eastern posting remained unfinished, but it is to that work and, in 
particular, its central theoretical device – the trinity – that we now return. 
Introducing the trinity 
So, what exactly is the ‘paradoxical’ or ‘remarkable trinity’?55  The trinity is 
essentially a succinct expression of ideas composed of a number of central 
concepts held together by a deeper unifying and integrative logic.56   Bassford 
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describes it as an ‘amazingly compressed summation of reality.’ 57   In 
formulating the trinity, Clausewitz simply wanted to argue that war is made up 
of three central elements, or dominant tendencies.58   War, is ‘comprised of 
primordial violence, hatred, and enmity, which are to be regarded as a blind 
natural force; of the play of chance and probability within which the creative 
spirit is free to roam; and of its element of subordination, as an instrument of 
policy, which makes it subject to reason alone.’59  These elements are variously 
condensed into short-hand versions such as ‘violence, chance and politics’, 
‘hostility, chance, and purpose’60 or even ‘irrational, non-rational, and rational 
factors.’61  This thesis will generally, though not exclusively refer to them as 
passion, chance, and policy/politics.62 
The three tendencies can be understood as variously embodying a 
number of Clausewitz’s most important ideas and insights that are found 
throughout the text of On War and his other work.  For instance, Clausewitz’s 
important concept of ‘friction’ is strongly associated with the tendency of chance 
and probability.  Many authors have chosen to concentrate on a detailed analysis 
of any one of these various subsidiary concepts,63 usually either to consider its 
contemporary relevance or to add weight to a certain argument.  Importantly, 
however, this is not to suggest individual concepts simply relate neatly to any 
one tendency: often they span the trinity’s conceptual divides.  Clausewitz’s 
understanding of ‘moral forces’, for instance, applies in some measure to all 
three elements, but perhaps principally to passion and chance.  There is nothing 
inherently wrong with an approach that focuses on particular concepts, yet 
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Clausewitz was at pains to stress the importance of maintaining an accurate 
conception of the whole whilst considering its various parts. 
Each tendency – passion, chance, and policy/politics – of the trinity is 
(mainly) manifested in a corresponding subject within society: respectively, the 
people, the commander and his army, and the government.  The former of these 
sets of three elements constitutes, what in this study will henceforth be termed 
the ‘primary’ or ‘objective’ trinity, and the latter, the ‘secondary’ or ‘subjective’ 
trinity.  In addition to these two central conceptual levels is the often overlooked 
level of context (not itself comprising a trinity).64  As we will show, this partially 
hidden level of the holistic framework serves a vital theoretical role with regard 
to the way it helps explain change at the secondary level.  Failure to recognise 
the importance of contextual change can seriously detract from the intended 
flexibility of the trinity.  Context might usefully be considered a ‘tertiary’ level 
in Clausewitz’s theory.  So, pulling these strands together, the complete 
trinitarian framework is composed of three levels: 
 
• Primary: passion, chance, and policy/politics. 
• Secondary: people; commander and army; government.65 
• Tertiary: context. 
 
To avoid confusion it is important to note how these levels relate to the structure 
of this study.  The ontological foundations of the trinity, discussed below, and 
Chapter 2, which examines the theoretical foundations of Clausewitz’s approach, 
do not themselves constitute levels in the framework, nor relate specifically to 
any particular level: they underlie the entire framework.  Chapter 3 explores the 
tertiary level of context.  The primary tendencies are the principal subject of 
Chapters 4, 5, and 6, although historical examples, properly understood, relate to 
the secondary level.  Chapter 7 draws the analysis together, seeking to reveal 
how all the levels relate to one another.   
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The ontological foundations of the trinity 
The trinity, whilst complete in itself as a description of the nature of war, is built 
upon a number of central ontological suppositions which are not explicitly stated 
in the paragraphs in which the trinity is presented, but that are deemed by 
Clausewitz as fundamental to any understanding of war and are examined in 
other parts of On War.  Three central foundations are suggested here: the human 
element; war’s interactive nature; and the centrality of fighting.  Together they 
underpin Clausewitz’s opening definition that ‘war is thus an act of force to 
compel our enemy to do our will’,66 so we will examine them here. 
A human social activity 
Underlying all of Clausewitz’s thoughts on war is the human element; the 
behaviour and interaction of humans in their social environment.  Of all of war’s 
dimensions, the humanistic element is the most enduring; it is always and 
everywhere an activity conducted by and between human groups.  Clausewitz is 
ever at pains to emphasise this essential, but easily overlooked reality.  As David 
Lonsdale notes, ‘On War presents us with a vision of war that is dominated by 
the human element.’ 67   Of course, Clausewitz was well aware that humans 
throughout history have possessed radically different preconceptions, attitudes, 
and views of the world shaped by such things as cultural tradition, religious 
practice, and social norms: as he states, ‘the human mind is far from uniform.’68  
Nevertheless, Clausewitz believed that underlying these forms there has always 
been, and always will be, a common nature to man from which derives the 
‘human condition’, and which can help account for noticeable continuities in the 
behaviour of societies over time and across geographical and ethnic divides. 
This perspective is easily and often overlooked because it is war’s 
material and technological character that is perhaps most striking to the observer 
and captures the minds of military practitioners.  Many theorists of war prior to 
and since Clausewitz have failed to adequately ground their theories in the 
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reality that it is a human-centric activity.  In modern times, this tendency has 
been exacerbated by the extent to which technology in its various forms – with 
perhaps its apotheosis in nuclear weapons and high-tech information technology 
– appears to dominate the conduct of war.  The effect can be almost blinding in 
its capacity to divert attention from the basic fact that it is still humans that 
ultimately wield and employ such technology.  Following Clausewitz, Gray 
reminds us that ‘the human element is the greatest of continuities in the long 
bloody history of warfare’69 and as Knox notes, it is ultimately, ‘individuals – 
with their ambitions, vanities and quirks – [that] make strategy.’70  Most telling, 
however, is the remark by North Vietnamese General Vo Nguyen Giap – one 
extremely well placed to assert this point: ‘In war there are two factors – human 
beings and weapons.  Ultimately, though, human beings are the decisive factor.  
Human beings!  Human beings!’71   
Emphasising ‘the human’ in war and politics places Clausewitz in a 
tradition of thought most notably represented by such historical thinkers as 
Thucydides and Machiavelli.72  It may well be this central concern with human 
nature that explains the underlying similarities in their works.  Thucydides 
hoped that his work would be ‘judged useful by those who want to understand 
clearly the events which happened in the past and which (human nature being 
what it is) will, at some time or other and in much the same ways, be repeated in 
the future.’ 73   Machiavelli, who rediscovered the human element in war 
following centuries of medieval providentialism,74 stated that, ‘Everything that 
happens in the world at any time has genuine resemblance to what happened in 
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ancient times.  This is due to the fact that the agents who bring such things about 
are men, and that men have, and always have had, the same passions, whence it 
necessarily comes about that the same effects are produced.’75  As Gat has noted, 
Machiavelli held that, ‘despite historical change, man and society remained, ‘in 
essence’, the same at all times and cultures, because human nature was 
immutable.’76  Like both Thucydides and Machiavelli, the implications derived 
from ‘the human’ in war are rarely spelt out directly by Clausewitz, but rather 
allowed to reveal themselves throughout the text so that the reader becomes a 
‘participant in the process of achieving conviction.’77 
The focus on the human factor in war also explains Clausewitz’s 
persistent concern with psychological and moral factors in war, not to mention 
the influence of personalities.78  These forces pervade all aspects of the trinity in 
differing forms.  In his historical works, Clausewitz was often at pains to delve 
into the unique psychology of individual commanders and, as Thucydides had 
done, of ordinary soldiers, as this could explain much about the conduct and 
course of war.79  The trinity can in some respects be understood as reflecting 
fundamental aspects of human nature: the capacity to reason and judge the most 
appropriate means for given ends; the ability to imagine, create, and take action 
in the face of an unpredictable and uncertain future; and the proclivity for 
humans to be greatly influenced by deep-seated emotional impulses, irrational 
forces, spurious fictions, and psychological pressures.  It is this fact which helps 
explain the trinity’s profound realism regarding the nature of war, anchored as it 
is in the underlying nature of those who conduct it.  It also reminds us, as Gray 
comments, that ‘Time and again we humans demonstrate our willingness to do 
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quite literally anything.’80  Furthermore, Clausewitz recognised that not only is 
war a human activity, it is also always a human social activity; it is waged 
collectively – as Gray notes, ‘individuals, as individuals, do not wage war.’81  
This idea feeds into to the following foundation of the trinity: the interaction of 
social entities in war.  
Interaction – the duel 
A saying has it that, ‘It takes two sides to make war. It only takes one side to 
make a massacre.’82  Likewise, Clausewitz was adamant that war is never simply 
the unilateral use of violence.  Clausewitz perceptively, and somewhat 
counterintuitively perhaps, held that defence is the first true act of war, because 
without it the use of force is conquest without resistance:  
 
War serves the purpose of the defense more than that of the aggressor.  It 
is only aggression that calls forth defense, and war along with it.  The 
aggressor is always peace-loving (as Bonaparte always claimed to be); he 
would prefer to take over our country unopposed.  To prevent his doing 
so one must be willing to make war and be prepared for it.83 
 
Resistance thus lies at the heart of the idea of war and ‘total nonresistance would 
be no war at all.’84  War, he describes, at the beginning of On War is comparable 
to a duel; it is violence met by violence.  Yet, as Alan Beyerchen has noted, the 
analogy is more complex than the image of the aristocratic duel.  The term used 
by Clausewitz is Zweikampf, which literally means ‘two-struggle’ and which he 
illustrates by the example of two wrestlers: this form of struggle is altogether 
more unpredictable, ‘generating positions and shapes that neither could possibly 
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create alone.’85  It becomes clear when reading On War that it is the fundamental 
reality of this complex interaction which accounts for so much that is unique 
about the phenomenon.  War, for Clausewitz, is a violent conflict of wills, a 
‘collision’86  or ‘conflict of living forces’87  that, upon interaction, create new 
political and military realties that neither side fully controls.  This has important 
implications for all tendencies of the trinity: it feeds into his discussion of the 
chance and uncertainty created as opponents act and react in unpredictable 
ways;88 it accounts for the passions created through mutual hostility and fear; 
and it shapes the complex political relationships between belligerents, allies, and 
other third parties in war. 
Clausewitz criticised earlier thinkers for their underestimation of this 
crucial aspect of war.  They had developed dogmatic and prescriptive theories 
which purportedly offered near certain success if followed, forgetting that, any 
prescriptive theory in war inevitably runs up against an unavoidable and 
intractable problem: what happens if the enemy adheres to the same principles? 
In such cases surely the supposedly war-winning principles lose all meaning.  
Clausewitz wanted to emphasise that, ‘In war, the will is directed at an animate 
object that reacts.’89  For the practitioner this must constantly be borne in mind 
because, as Clausewitz warns, ‘war is not waged against an abstract enemy, but 
against a real one who must always be kept in mind.’90   There are further 
implications deriving from the importance of the interactive and dialectical 
nature of war which are explored throughout this study. 
The centrality of fighting 
Contrary to what his famous dictum – ‘war is merely the continuation of policy 
by other means’91 – might suggest, war, Clausewitz held, must ultimately be 
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defined by its basic means, not by its purpose, because it is its unique means 
which distinguishes it from any other activity.92  For him, the means of war is 
fighting or combat, essentially, organised violence: war is an act of force.  The 
possible political contexts and purposes of war can be endlessly varied, but at 
the heart of the concept is the act of physical violence, however it may be 
applied.  This should not be seen as detracting from the importance of the 
political view, but Clausewitz was at pains to determine what distinguished his 
subject from any other.  Echevarria describes fighting as the central feature of 
the Clausewitzian universe of war, just as Copernicus described the actual 
universe in terms of his heliocentric system.93  This point is made abundantly 
clear when Clausewitz notes that, ‘Essentially war is fighting, for fighting is the 
only effective principle in the manifold activities generally designated as war.’94 
This point is repeated in other sections of On War. 95   Even where 
political factors appear to be prominent in the course of a given war, often their 
importance rests upon expected military implications. 96   This might apply 
because of the changed calculus of relative strength implied, the superiority 
gained by new allies, the perceived futility of further resistance given changed 
political conditions,97 and so forth.  In such cases, ‘action is undertaken in the 
belief that if the ultimate test of arms should actually occur, the outcome would 
be favourable.’98  Clausewitz is at times brutally specific in his articulation of 
this point in order to ensure that there is no confusion: ‘War is a clash between 
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major interests, which is resolved by bloodshed – that is the only way it differs 
from other conflicts.’99 
Clausewitz’s emphasis on fighting is not to say that he believed decisions 
or political outcomes could not be achieved without fighting, but that such 
outcomes were ultimately based on the perceived threat or expected effects of 
the use of force.  So his thinking is appropriate to such forms of war as 
deterrence 100  or coercion where force is simply threatened: results can be 
produced ‘by the mere possibility of an engagement; the possibility has acquired 
reality.’101  This point is made clear when Clausewitz notes that,  
 
Combat is the only effective force in war…That holds good even if no 
actual fighting occurs, because the outcome rests on the assumption that 
if it came to fighting, the enemy would be destroyed…All action is 
undertaken in the belief that if the ultimate test of arms should actually 
occur, the outcome would be favourable.  The decision by arms is…in 
war what cash payment is in commerce…regardless how rarely 
settlements actually occur, they can never be entirely absent.102  
 
Fighting, however, can only be understood as part of the totality of war, 
even if it ultimately defines the subject: war, of course, encompasses much more 
than fighting.  There are many ancillary activities that either facilitate, are 
preparatory to, or support the act of fighting, battle, or other forms of 
engagement. 103   We might include here marching, logistics, intelligence, 
diplomacy, propaganda, command, and so on.  However, the idea of fighting – 
the contest of wills through both physical and psychological means – has to be a 
universal feature whether latent or actual, otherwise the whole subject begins to 
lose its defining character: ‘Fighting is the central military act; all other activities 
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merely support it.’104  Terrorism and insurgency, whilst often overwhelmingly 
political in character, are distinguished from other forms of political resistance, 
subversion, or activism by the violent nature of the means employed.105  David 
Galula, in his classic text on insurgency, states the formula that, ‘A revolutionary 
war is 20 per cent military action and 80 per cent political’106 – whilst that might 
be the case, the former figure cannot be dismissed as unimportant.  As 
Clausewitz states, ‘Everything that occurs in war results from the existence of 
armed forces.’107  The use of force may be sporadic, intermittent, and limited, 
but it is the fact of the threat or use of such violence, employed towards some 
political object, that lends such conflicts their particular form and makes them 
comprehensible within the theoretical framework as presented in the trinity: 
whether peacekeeping108 or major war, fighting is the ‘strand that runs through 
the entire web of military activity and really holds it together.’109 
The status of the trinity today – a war of ideas 
Colin Gray has written, ‘I believe neither that Clausewitz wrote the last words 
that are needed for a fully satisfactory theory of war, nor that some of his 
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analysis could not stand some improvement.’110  In fact, there is evidence that 
Clausewitz himself would sympathise with this statement – as Paret suggests, he 
sought to develop a theory that was ‘capable of growth, of constant accretion.’111  
His theory, in common with the German philosophical tradition, gained its 
strength from, as Rudolf von Caemmerer put it, ‘its capacity for further 
development.’112   Bassford has noted that ‘Clausewitz represents not an end 
point for speculation about war and its history but a solid foundation for further 
investigation’ 113  or as Michael Oakeshott once wrote, a ‘theorem is not an 
unconditional terminus; it, also, is an understanding waiting to be understood.’114  
 Most commentators, whether critical or sympathetic, broadly agree that 
‘few writers have grappled with the sort of fundamental issues so astutely 
dissected by the great Prussian’115 or that, ‘although the international body of 
literature on defence studies is vast, general theories are distinguished by their 
extreme rarity.  There are not even many incompetent imitators of 
Clausewitz.’116  Brian Bond notes that, ‘Few students of military history and 
strategy…dispute Clausewitz’s status as the outstanding theorist of war.’117  So, 
whilst many have attempted to breach the Clausewitzian edifice from any 
number of angles, few have launched an all out offensive in order to impose 
their own distinctive general theory of war.  In the absence of any general theory 
to replace that of Clausewitz, unconnected and disparate attacks on his work 
may lead to strategic thinking typified by incoherence and miscomprehension.  
This study seeks neither to postulate an alternative to the trinitarian theory, nor 
argue that Clausewitz ‘got it right’.  Rather, the central hypothesis lies 
somewhere in between these two poles, albeit with a bias towards the latter.   
On the one hand, Clausewitz has endowed us with an unsurpassed 
general theory, which we would only abandon to our loss.  Admittedly, our 
praise must not obscure the fact that Clausewitz was writing in a context 
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significantly different, and in a time far removed, from our own.  It would be 
expecting a great deal of his theory for it to carry the burden of two centuries of 
turbulent history and rapid change without weakening at the knees somewhat.  
As Howard notes, ‘It remains the measure of his genius that, although the age 
for which he wrote is long since past, he can still provide so many insights 
relevant to a generation, the nature of whose problems he could not possibly 
have foreseen.’118  In this respect, Clausewitz is to war as Darwin is to evolution 
or Smith to laissez-faire economics: all pioneers and visionaries whose insights 
remain the standard against which subsequent theories are judged and, despite 
great strides in methodological techniques and the proliferation of detailed 
analysis in sub-fields, no holistic theories have successfully usurped their titles 
as subject defining theories.119       
 However, we should not cling dogmatically to any theory that can no 
longer sufficiently explain its subject in the light of rapid and significant change.  
Blind faith in anything is of little worth when evidence points in the opposite 
direction.  Furthermore, in matters concerning war and strategy, more than in 
any other sphere of human affairs, save perhaps medicine or environmental 
science, resistance to alternative thinking resulting from a dogged belief in one 
perspective may ultimately cost human lives or even the existence of entire 
communities.  Such a view is expressed by Stephen Metz who writes: ‘Like 
adoration for some family elder, the veneration heaped on Clausewitz seems to 
grow even as his power to explain the world declines.’  He claims that ‘it is time 
to hold a wake so that strategists can pay their respects to Clausewitz and then 
move on.’120  In this respect, commentators emphasising profound changes in the 
global social, political, and economic environment, and the concurrent 
transformative impact on the nature of war, are crucial in keeping us alive, both 
literally and figuratively, to the possibility that, put simply, ‘things change.’ 
So, in recent years, an evident schism has emerged in the field between 
what may very broadly be termed, ‘Clausewitzians’ and ‘anti-Clausewitzians.’  
Ironically, the study of war, as Skinner has remarked about political thought, has 
‘been disputed in a manner more reminiscent of the battlefield than the seminar 
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room.’ 121   The specific reasons given for anti-Clausewitzian arguments are 
numerous and varied.  Some claim that we have entered into an era of so-called 
‘new wars’ in which, due to the impact of globalisation and the rise of identity 
politics, war has undergone a fundamental change in its nature – war, for 
instance, is fought for economic gain by actors who wish to sustain the conflict 
rather than seek victory.122  Others claim that the rise of non-state warfare, in the 
form of irregular conflict, insurgency, guerrilla warfare, and terrorism renders 
obsolete a theory formulated in an age of major state warfare.  From a somewhat 
different direction, some commentators argue that great changes in war’s 
material aspects – in the form of new information technologies and stand-off 
precision weaponry for instance – occasions Clausewitz’s irrelevance as a high-
technology-led ‘Revolution in Military Affairs’ promises to dissipate his famous 
‘fog of war.’   
Some anti-Clausewitzians such as John Keegan, Martin van Creveld, 
Ken Booth, and Jan Willem Honig believe – albeit for different reasons – that 
the continued adherence to Clausewitzian notions of war is cognitively 
blinkering,123 strategically harmful,124 or even poses a threat to civilisation.125  
Jan Willem Honig has argued that Clausewitz stands at the root of a putative 
modern strategic crisis.126  All these critiques are united in their belief that, for 
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whatever reason, Clausewitz is no longer, or never really was a reliable guide for 
understanding war.  Also, it should be noted that a particular irony encountered 
in anti-Clausewitzian works is that they often – after rejecting Clausewitz – then 
make arguments that are fundamentally Clausewitzian; this makes critiquing the 
critiques a somewhat awkward and knotty task.127 
Devotees of Clausewitz generally deny either the depth or extent of the 
changes recognised by anti-Clausewitzians commentators – hence the continued 
relevance of On War – or believe that critics base their arguments on unfounded 
conceptions of Clausewitz’s theory.  Nevertheless, even those who claim 
contemporary relevance for Clausewitz have adopted mistaken interpretations of 
Clausewitz’s trinity.  These thinkers are potentially more harmful to our 
understanding of Clausewitz than anti-Clausewitzians, as the history of the 
reception of Harry Summers’s conception of the secondary trinity confirms.128  
More recently, in an otherwise excellent and timely book by General Sir Rupert 
Smith, The Utility of Force, a similarly misleading presentation of the trinity (as 
people, army, government) runs through the work.129  Whatever its deserved 
popularity, it raises the prospect of new generations of students taking away 
partial and inaccurate conceptions of the Clausewitzian trinity.130  This is not to 
say such interpretations of On War are completely wide of the mark – just as 
with many anti-Clausewitzian writers, they do get some, even many things right, 
and it is clear that parts of On War ostensibly support such representations.131  
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Crucially, the true worth of his theory only becomes fully apparent with an 
accurate conception of the whole. 
A road to reconciliation 
So, commentators feel increasingly compelled to situate themselves in either one 
or the other camp and this has tended to generate overstated representations of 
aspects of Clausewitz’s thought.  This thesis suggests there is perhaps room for 
something of a theoretical reconciliation, or at least a narrowing of the apparent 
scholarly schism.  Any putative reconciliation rests upon the belief that studies 
on either side of the divide contain a great deal of value in their substantive 
contributions and that, taken together, we can perhaps progress towards a clearer 
understanding of the nature of war.  The two camps appear to talk past one 
another, when in fact there is potentially great room for mutually advantageous 
dialogue.132 
On the one hand, most writers who set themselves up as anti-
Clausewitzian do so based upon limited and mistaken conceptions of Clausewitz 
(often based on popular secondary analyses which are themselves mistaken).133  
Their studies could benefit from greater historical perspective and a more 
thorough understanding of the theorist they grandly proclaim to be passé.  On 
the other hand, Clausewitzians have perhaps been too resistant to the magnitude 
and scale of change in war since Clausewitz wrote or too unwilling to consider 
alternative theses.  At the root of this particular problem lies the conception of 
the trinity, as this often serves as the central platform for both perspectives.  It 
appears that the only potentially effective way forward is to return to the trinity 
itself and consider the arguments of the two camps based upon a more rigorous 
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understanding of its deeper meaning.  This of course may prove inconclusive.  
Anti-Clausewitzian commentators may cling to their interpretations and 
Clausewitzians may doggedly refuse to abandon their faith in their master.  
There is considerable cause for pessimism about the prospects of such a 
reconciliation.        
Objectives of the study 
This study contends that a theoretical framework based firmly on a thorough 
understanding of the Clausewitzian trinity, may be capable of accommodating 
aspects of war that have emerged as a result of transformations in war’s multiple 
contexts to alter the subjective manifestation of the three primary tendencies in 
the trinitarian framework.  
The thesis does not purport to discover anything profoundly original in 
the nature of war.  Nor does it engage in a detailed empirical analysis of 
contemporary conflict: modern scholarship is replete with highly erudite 
explorations into the multiplicitous aspects of modern war and strategy. 134  
Whilst some reference will be made to recent studies and debates in the field, the 
modest object of the research is to transport Clausewitz’s theory in to the 
twenty-first century as it faces increasing attacks upon its integrity.  To achieve 
this, the study focuses on overcoming a number of central barriers to accurate 
comprehension of the trinity such as its ostensibly simplistic and misleading 
presentation, abstruse conceptual terminology, and complex substantive content.  
These areas all require clarification based upon a thorough conception of the 
methodological underpinnings, underlying foundations, and assumptions of the 
trinity.  Also, the structure of the whole framework needs to be elucidated, both 
                                                          
134
 See in particular: Gray, Bloody Century; Bellamy, Knights; Smith, The Utility of Force; 
Wesley Clark, Winning Modern Wars: Iraq, Terrorism, and the American Empire (New York: 
Public Affairs, 2004); Michael Ignatieff, The Warriors Honor: Ethnic War and the Modern 
Conscience (London: Vintage, 1999) and Virtual War: Kosovo and beyond (London: Vintage, 
2001), Kaldor, New and Old Wars; Colin McInnes, Spectator-Sport Warfare: The West and 
Contemporary Conflict (Colorado: Lynne Rienner, 2002); William Shawcross, Deliver Us From 
Evil: Warlords and Peacekeepers in a World of Endless Conflict (London: Bloomsbury, 2001); 
Lawrence Freedman, The Transformation of Strategic Affairs, Adelphi Paper 379 (London: 
Routledge, 2006); Herfreid Münkler, The New Wars (Cambridge: Polity, 2005); and Mark 
Duffield, Global Governance and the New Wars (London: Zed Books, 2002). 
Introduction 
 34 
 
with respect to its three primary elements and the other various levels of war it 
encompasses; namely war’s subjective manifestations and its multiple contexts.   
So, the emphasis of the thesis is not on modern warfare per se.  This 
interpretation may prove to be more accommodating to an understanding of 
modern war, but this thesis does not attempt to provide anything approaching 
proof in that respect.  Also, it suggests that, even if students of Clausewitz 
consider and then reject certain substantive elements of his thought, 
Clausewitz’s approach to his subject can serve as a shining example to any 
student of war.  His commitment to historical study, the importance he placed on 
developing accurate and clear concepts, his struggle to walk the tight-rope of the 
particular and the universal, and his high standard for ensuring that all 
propositions in theory must closely reflect the reality of war – all contributed to 
the inherent worth of his work, and stand as testament to his status as a deeply 
profound thinker. 
The thesis contests that war remains, with qualification, true to 
Clausewitz’s original trinitarian conception.  As Clausewitz taught us, ‘all wars 
are things of the same nature’,135 the ‘forms’ of war are diverse and changing, its 
‘spirit’ is universal.’136  Whilst it is unarguable that the contexts within which 
wars are fought and the character of wars have changed considerably since 
Clausewitz wrote, this thesis suggests that war’s deeper objective nature has not 
undergone any profound transformation.  Perhaps, when considering the more 
extreme pronouncements of ‘new wars’ theorists, we should listen to Thucydides 
who commented that, ‘Any novelty in an argument deceives you at once, but 
when the argument is tried and proved you become unwilling to follow it; you 
look with suspicion on what is normal and are the slaves of every paradox that 
comes your way.’137  As Clausewitz stressed, there is an ever-present danger of 
treating one’s own time as best, final, or most important138 at the expense of 
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historical perspective and expressions of universal value. 139   A number of 
excellent studies have already been produced along the lines proposed in this 
thesis, but they have generally only been of article or chapter length.140  These 
works provide an excellent foundation, but a more extensive and detailed 
analysis is required.  
Method 
The analysis in this thesis is premised on a number of central methods.  One that 
is of course fundamental to the study is a close interpretation of Clausewitz’s 
work.  In this sense the thesis is a textual analysis which critiques On War and 
from this analysis adds to a greater understanding of the correct nature of 
Clausewitz’s thinking.  It rejects claims such as J. F. C. Fuller’s that On War is 
just ‘a mass of notes, a cloud of flame and smoke.’141  There is a basic logic to 
the work and its central arguments can be comprehended with a close reading of 
the text.  To bolster this interpretation of Clausewitz and to achieve the 
objectives set out above, this thesis adopts three overarching approaches: holism, 
contextual analysis, and critique.  (In addition to these three central areas the 
analysis will also draw upon some measure of deductive reasoning, historical 
study,142 and the analysis of an extensive and rich body of secondary literature).   
Holism 
It is vital to understand that the concepts that comprise the trinity, and their 
unity, embody a whole range of insights which belies their seeming simplicity.  
They carry the weight of hundreds of pages of analysis – in On War and 
Clausewitz’s other works – and a lifetime of study: the trinity can only be truly 
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understood from this holistic perspective.  Or, put differently, the ideas that 
comprise the trinity do not stand alone; they are inextricably dependent on a 
whole range of subordinate ideas and arguments.  As Christopher Bassford has 
argued, this is why any ‘discussion of the trinity is so difficult to confine within 
tidy boundaries: any comprehensive examination must lead to every major issue 
in On War.’143 
Of course, a great many pages of On War are given over to tactical and 
operational matters, many of which ostensibly have little relevance to modern 
war, at least in substance if not in form.144  Such issues have greater relevance if 
read, as Paret rightly suggests, as serving a theoretical function, rather than as 
prescriptive rules: they provide concrete instances of abstract phenomena and 
illustrate concepts which otherwise remain vague or ephemeral.145  Nevertheless, 
reading On War is somewhat analogous to panning for gold: a difficult process 
of separating insights of timeless quality from those of primarily historical 
interest – a process complicated by the fact that some nuggets remain ensconced 
in worthless stone,146 whilst other seemingly pure specimens turn out to be little 
more than fool’s gold. 147   This study is predominantly concerned with 
Clausewitz’s insights on the nature of war, rather than more specific, practical 
military strategic or tactical matters.148  The trinity is much more than simply the 
sum of its component concepts and cannot be viewed in isolation; as a total idea 
it represents Clausewitz’s most original and lasting contribution to the study of 
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war: his ‘final synthesis.’149  To consider the trinity without a broader reading 
and understanding of its genesis can engender significant misinterpretation, 
which in turn creates fertile ground for mistaken critiques.150   
Clausewitz in context 
The interpretation of historical texts is far from unproblematic and raises 
important methodological issues.  Such issues have generated a large literature – 
of which we can only scratch the surface here – and there exists a diverse range 
of opinions as to the most appropriate exegetical approaches.  These issues 
reflect general issues in historical methodology which have come to the fore in 
recent decades, particularly in response to the rise of post-modernist critique.  It 
is useful to briefly consider what might be considered the extreme poles in the 
debate, before considering the crucial influence of the Cambridge School in the 
history of ideas.  This brief overview provides a means of situating the method 
adopted in this study.    
 At one extreme, traditional hermeneutics is associated with the kind of 
positivistic empiricism propounded by Comte in the nineteenth century.  In this 
view, the interpretation of historical texts presents no significant problems other 
than that of simply rereading texts until the meaning becomes clear.151  This 
reflects the rationalist strain in historical scholarship – most famously associated 
with Sir Geoffrey Elton152 – which essentially holds that the facts will speak for 
themselves if one becomes a ‘servant to the sources.’153  As Skinner states, it has 
often been held that ‘there is nothing very problematic about the business of 
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anatomising the contents and arguments’154 of certain texts.  Certainly, a close 
reading of On War is deemed essential here, but this does not unlock the full 
meaning of some of the concepts and ignores crucial methodological problems – 
such as the relationship between the subject and the object of enquiry – many of 
which have been dramatically exposed by postmodern critics on the other 
extreme of the debate. 
 Postmodernist theorists have defended a form of interpretative ‘hyper-
relativism’ in which ‘interpretation is everything’,155 the language we employ 
embodies an ‘infinite play of significations’,156 and texts change their meaning 
every time they are read.157  In this view, the search for objective meaning in 
history is futile, and this has ‘deepened scepticism about the traditional humanist 
project of interpreting texts.’158  The extreme subjectivity of post-modernists 
suggests that even attempting to situate earlier thinkers in historical context is 
pointless because it is mistaken to believe we can ever arrive at ‘true’ readings; 
all interpretations will be ineluctably shaped by the interpreter and all outcomes 
only amount to spurious ‘reality effects’159 containing little more objective truth 
than literary fiction.160  Whilst this study rejects such extreme relativism, these 
theories have nevertheless usefully opened our thinking to critical notions about 
the nature of historical knowledge and prompted a move away from a naive 
realism.161 
Postmodernism has undeniably encouraged greater self-reflexivity and 
the active consideration of the relationship between a text, the author, the 
interpreter and their various contexts, all of which are essential to rigorous 
historical scholarship and which rigid empiricist approaches ignore at their 
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peril.162  It has also taught us to approach texts with greater care and caution.  
Yet, contrary to what post-modernists assert, not all interpretations of a text are 
equally valid and the influences of the particular perspectives of the interpreter 
need not entail the complete distortion of the evidence.  There are grounds for 
assessing the integrity and the probable accuracy of an interpretation (whilst not 
necessarily arguing for its final truth).163  As Evans argues, the words of a text 
are not capable of an infinity of meanings.164  For instance, some interpretations 
of Clausewitz have clearly been based on a limited and narrow reading of On 
War.  Whilst we might never be able to finally determine the ‘real’ Clausewitz, 
we can however progress to more accurate understandings of his work and the 
concepts he employs.  The Cambridge School of hermeneutics represents a 
fruitful way forward to achieve such understanding without falling into the worst 
methodological pitfalls of either extreme outlined above. 
 In the 1960s Quentin Skinner, drawing on the work of other important 
scholars, 165  developed an influential methodology (principally in relation to 
political thought, but with implications for the interpretation of texts more 
generally) which primarily sought to treat texts as historical events in 
themselves, embedded in their own unique historical contexts.  This, Skinner has 
argued, would help scholars avoid the various mythologies of doctrines, 
coherence, and prolepsis in historical exegesis, each generated by ‘setting’ a text 
within distorting preconceived paradigms and present-day categories. 166   To 
achieve this Skinner advocates a methodology focused on authorial intentions – 
an analysis of what the author was ‘doing’ in writing what they did – which 
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requires, amongst other things, a detailed understanding of the linguistic 
conventions within which the author wrote.167 
 This study essentially adopts a Skinnerian approach, 168  but does not 
entirely subscribe to the strongly relativistic stance which Skinner defends.169  In 
essence, Skinner can be seen to have recovered meaning from the 
postmodernists, but in so doing largely denies any timeless relevance to the ideas 
in the historical texts we study.170   Contrary to Skinner’s conclusion in this 
respect, this approach need not entirely negate the relevance of ideas for the 
present, provided we are mindful not to let our present concerns excessively 
dictate our interpretation of past thinkers.  As Joseph Femia has argued, an 
historicist approach does not necessarily deny that certain issues and problems 
recur in different contexts;171 the forms of the questions and issues may change, 
but their essential nature persists, thus past thinkers can perhaps contribute to our 
thinking about present problems.172  Borrowing from Skinner, we will consider 
concepts in the light of Clausewitz’s times, whilst also employing traditional 
historicist contextual methods of exploring the wider social, cultural, and 
political landscape of the period to draw out the central meaning of the text 
(which, it is argued, is capable of transcending Clausewitz’s immediate context 
and informing contemporary debate).  Certainly there may be limitations to the 
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application of Clausewitz’s ideas imposed by the nature of the times he lived in, 
but this does not entail total irrelevance. 
The analysis in this thesis adheres to the belief that ideas are formed as a 
result of the various experiences of, and dominant influences on the thinker in 
question, and can only be truly comprehended based upon a firm knowledge of 
such factors.  If we are to comprehend the meaning of Clausewitz’s ideas in 
order to shed light on contemporary debates we must first seek to understand 
Clausewitz historically.  This will provide us with a firmer basis upon which to 
take the trinity forward.  The trinity did not spontaneously appear, but was the 
product of a deeply encultured man living in a world far removed from our own.  
The meaning of the concepts comprising the trinity will become clearer if we 
can determine what inspired them. 173  As Gat rightly states, ‘what people think 
cannot be separated from the question of how they think, or from the 
circumstances in which they operate and to which they react.’174 
No simple categorisation of Clausewitz’s thought into any one 
intellectual tradition is possible – for instance, he admired the Romantics’ 
emphasis on the inner world of the individual but did not share their invocation 
of a ‘surrender to emotion.’ 175   His intellectual sympathies appear to have 
fluctuated significantly throughout his life as he digested a great variety of 
literature, history, and philosophy, at times adopting certain ideas, whilst at 
others rejecting them.  It should also be stressed that it was in the nature of the 
way Clausewitz worked to draw ‘scraps of ideas at second and third hand from 
his cultural environment.’176  Also, Raymond Aron is right to assert that On War 
arose from Clausewitz's own conception of things.177 
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Critique and a new interpretation 
Analysis of the trinity will be further strengthened if we consider its central 
philosophical claims and propositions in the light of critical or antithetical ideas.  
Over the years since the publication of On War, a number of commentators 
have, both wittingly and unwittingly, developed arguments that challenge some 
of the fundamental ideas contained in the trinity.  By exposing the trinity to such 
alternative perspectives our understanding will be significantly heightened, as 
we will be forced to justify why Clausewitz reached the conclusions he did and 
why we should continue to value them.  The study will primarily refer to a 
handful of authors, books, and articles which directly challenge Clausewitz’s 
ideas, and that are judged to be based on more than a passing acquaintance with 
On War.  These criticisms will not be considered in isolation; rather their ideas 
will be woven into the thesis where relevant.   
As noted, given the tendency to axiomatise and universalise Clausewitz, 
we must remain open to serious and reasoned critiques: as Thomas Carlyle had 
it, ‘The greatest of faults, I should say, is to be conscious of none.’178  This study 
does not suggest Clausewitz is without blemish or flaw.  We must remain alive 
to potential shortcomings in Clausewitz's ideas and thus listen to constructive 
critique attentively: we should not view On War as ‘Holy Writ’179 and, as Che 
Guevara noted of his Guerrilla Warfare, ‘we offer an outline, not a bible.’180 
War’s nature versus strategy 
It must be made clear what the trinity purports to explain and what it does not.  
The trinity explains war in its entirety.  It should not initially be approached 
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within the modern conventional mindset, which divides the subject into quite 
neat, if often misunderstood, conceptual categories or ‘levels’ of war from the 
political-strategic to the tactical.  Approaching the trinity with such a mindset 
may lead to more confusion than clarification.  This is not to deny the 
importance of such concepts for understanding war, particularly with respect to 
the practical art of strategy – indeed, Clausewitz was an important figure in 
developing the meaning of some of these terms – and the trinity has important 
implications at all those levels. 
In modern works, the trinity is frequently invoked to explain strategic 
behaviour and outcomes, such as in Rupert Smith’s recent The Utility of Force.  
Whilst this is not necessarily mistaken, and doing so can be a highly valuable 
exercise, this study holds that the trinity should principally be understood in a 
broader philosophical light.  At its primary level, it is an exploration into the 
fundamental nature of war, considered as a whole, and in relation to other areas 
of social reality.  It is not intended as a strategic model.  That the conception of 
the nature of war has direct consequences for strategic planning or analysis goes 
without saying: practical strategy cannot escape the phenomenon of which it is 
part.  This is not to say that to be successful strategically one requires an 
understanding of the nature of war – sometimes pure luck may suffice – but we 
can only assume it would help a great deal.  As some scholars have argued, the 
way we perceive the nature of war can strongly shape strategic approaches.181  
Clausewitz’s trinity explains something more fundamental than strategy: it 
considers the ‘universe of war’ in which strategy operates.     
Strategy can be viewed as an ever-present element of war, in so far as 
wherever there is war there will be strategic outcomes – political consequences 
of the use of force – even for actors not consciously adopting any particular 
strategy.  But strategy is only one of the permanent aspects of war and is not 
coextensive with its holistic nature.  Of course, strategy, properly understood 
and as masterfully explained by Gray, encompasses all levels of war to the 
extent that it owes its existence to policy, whilst being entirely dependent on the 
tactical elements that ‘do’ strategy.182  In this sense, strategy is ‘fundamentally 
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continuous and indivisible: continuous through peace and war, indivisible from 
the actions of the squad leader to those of the highest command authority.’183  
Whilst entirely accepting these propositions, we hold that the trinity seeks to 
explain not just the nature of strategy, but the nature of war as a whole.  The 
trinity draws upon insights derived from those engaged in the sharp-end of war, 
to the commanders in charge of campaigns, to the politicians in the capitals, to 
the ordinary citizens in the towns and villages, and incorporates all these 
perspectives within war’s eternal and shifting contexts.  War’s nature, 
Clausewitz believed, can only be understood through consideration of all its 
dependent and inter-connected elements. 
Overview of the thesis 
This thesis is divided into eight chapters.  The second chapter deals with 
Clausewitz's theory and method, serving as a basis on which to explore his 
substantive ideas.  The third chapter considers the vital subject of context in 
relation to the trinity.  The subsequent three chapters – four, five, and six – deal 
explicitly with each of the primary elements of the trinity: politics, chance, and 
passion.  These form the core of the thesis and all follow a similar logic 
composed of three main sections: background, influences, and precedents; 
explorations; and implications.  The penultimate chapter – ‘interactions’ – draws 
these separate strands of analysis together, and considers the trinity as an 
integrative whole.  The eighth and final chapter offers some conclusions and 
reflections. 
It must be stressed that the decision to divide the chapters in this manner 
is motivated primarily by the need for analytical clarity rather than a belief that 
war is in reality so neatly divisible; indeed it is important to stress the interplay 
that defines the relationships between the tendencies.  For this reason, no matter 
how these issues are approached or divided for analytical purposes, an element 
of repetition is unavoidable.  Nevertheless, it is helpful, and indeed, correct to 
emphasise a strong measure of separateness between the elements of the trinity – 
as the structure of the thesis indicates – not only because there are clearly three 
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distinct and differentiated elements in the trinity, but, moreover, Clausewitz 
specifically wanted to draw attention to the unique nature of each of the areas of 
human social reality he had identified as comprising the nature of war, whatever 
their overlap in reality. 
Questions of definition 
Definitions of war are extremely problematic.  This thesis, while not trying to 
side-step the problem does not provide a definitive definition because, in 
essence, the entire study is an analysis of precisely that.  Nevertheless, a few 
words can be noted on the matter.  The key dilemma facing the theorists is to 
establish a definition which is neither too broad nor too narrow.  A definition 
that attempts to stretch the strategic imagination to include every possible social 
activity that could potentially be described as some form of ‘war’ runs the 
serious risk of engendering an extremely diluted theory based upon the lowest 
common denominators that connect such a broad array of unlike activities.  A 
good example of this is the attempt to squeeze organised crime and counter-
narcotic campaigns into a definition of war – such activity uncomfortably 
straddles the boundaries between law enforcement and organised conflict.184  
Another example might include the decision of the U.S. administration, in the 
wake of the 11 September terrorist attacks of 2001, to declare a ‘war on 
terror.’185  Certainly, the American response has involved the use of force – 
including two significant campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq – but terrorism is a 
tactic of warfare, and it is not possible to wage war on a tactic.   
In a slightly different sense we must be careful to stress the reciprocal 
nature of war or we run the risk of conflating what are in principle, two very 
different types of socially organised violence; one can be seen as a gross 
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violation of human rights, where only one of the belligerents possesses violent 
means, and the other being war.  War presupposes two or more social actors 
both who have the means to use force.  This reasoning precludes acts such as 
genocide from our definition of a state of war – such acts represent massive 
human rights violations or war crimes.  Thus, while such acts may take place 
within war or take the form of a particular means of waging war, the use of 
violence against unarmed civilians in itself does not constitute war.  This, as we 
have seen, reflects Clausewitz’s foundational belief in the interactive nature of 
war. 
On the other hand, our definition must not be too narrow so that 
important instances of organised armed violence are left out of our analysis of 
war.  In this sense, the definition of war as armed conflict between states is far 
too parochial; with a stroke of the pen it discounts perhaps the vast majority of 
instances of conflict in the modern era such as civil wars, insurgencies, terrorist 
campaigns, and armed secessionist movements.  It is clear that war can take a 
number of forms that do not necessarily involve states, or where states are only 
one of the belligerents.  Our definition must be able to incorporate such 
organised violence waged for political objectives.  
The basic definition of war this thesis adopts is the classically 
Clausewitzian definition of war employed by Hedley Bull.  For him, war is 
‘organised violence carried on by political units against each other.  Violence is 
not war unless it is carried out in the name of a political unit; what distinguishes 
killing in war from murder is its vicarious and official character, the symbolic 
responsibility of the unit whose agent the killer is.’186  Defining war in reality, or 
what Bull terms ‘material war,’ 187  is more difficult.  At this point it is 
appropriate to refine our definition to incorporate not simply the use of force but 
also the threat of the use of force.  Gray offers a useful definition which captures 
this important aspect: ‘war is organised violence threatened or waged for 
political purposes.’188  It is also important from the outset to stress the point that 
war is a social phenomenon and ‘can only be performed in and by societies.’189  
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But, ultimately, perhaps Clausewitz’s own pithy definition is to be preferred: 
‘war is an act of force to compel our enemy to do our will.’190 
 
In an unfinished note written in 1827, towards the end of his life, Clausewitz 
drafted the prophetic statement that, ‘If an early death should terminate my 
work, what I have written so far would, of course, only deserve to be called a 
shapeless mass of ideas.  Being liable to endless misinterpretation it would be 
the target of much half-baked criticism.’191  This fact constitutes one of the chief 
obstacles impeding Clausewitz’s modern appreciation, whilst simultaneously 
explaining his ‘reputation as a profound thinker’ because, due to the difficulty of 
discovering his ‘true meaning’, he ‘could never have been wrong or less than 
profound.’192  This thesis rests on the assumption that problems of analysis not 
only derive from the fact that Clausewitz’s work is unfinished and intellectually 
hard to master, but simply because the subject – war – is so vast, endlessly 
complex, and can be approached from so many possible angles.  As Clausewitz 
states, those who realise ‘how many vitally important matters are involved in 
war will understand what unusual mental gifts are needed to keep the whole 
picture steadily in mind.’193  Nevertheless, Clausewitz has provided students of 
war with an invaluable platform from which to commence a journey into the 
heart of the phenomenon.  This study is motivated by a desire, like Clausewitz, 
to delve ‘beneath the surface of strategy and tactics to explore the phenomenon 
of war itself, to study its structure, its internal dynamic, its links with other 
elements of social existence’194 and our ‘aim is not to provide new principles and 
methods of conducting war; rather, we are concerned with examining the 
essential content of what has long existed, and to trace it back to its elements.’195 
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CHAPTER TWO 
Theoretical Foundations 
 
 
Not what we have argued but the manner in which we have argued may,  
we believe, benefit theory. 1 
Carl von Clausewitz. 
 
 
Before proceeding to a detailed analysis of the separate elements of the trinity, it 
is first necessary to explore the methodological and theoretical foundations on 
which Clausewitz constructs his concept of the trinity, and to determine where 
his work stands in relation to the broader historical development of military 
thought.  After presenting the central concepts of the trinity, Clausewitz explains 
that to ensure a dynamic theoretical balance between the tendencies, an 
appropriate approach to the subject is required.2   As will become clear, the 
methods he employs to fulfil his intellectual objectives significantly shape the 
outcome of his work and an appreciation of these foundations is vital for 
understanding the trinity.  Also, knowledge of his approach is valuable not only 
for the added insight it provides, but also as a model of rigorous methodological 
endeavour for students of war attempting to come to grips with such a vast and 
complex subject. 
 This chapter is divided into two main sections.  The first provides a 
general background to the cultural and intellectual environment in which 
Clausewitz worked, and from which he drew many of his methodological 
devices.  It assesses the influences of the Enlightenment spirit of rational and 
scientific enquiry, the German Movement, and the historicist school.  The second 
section examines Clausewitz’s approach to theory in greater detail.  It considers 
Clausewitz’s views on the purpose and limits of theory and the various methods 
he employed.  It examines in some detail a number of the central theoretical 
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problems he attempted to resolve in his work.  The chapter concludes by relating 
all these issues back to the trinity. 
Background, influences, and precedents 
Born in 1780, Clausewitz’s life was to straddle a period in human history during 
which, as described by eminent military historian Michael Howard, the 
‘framework of European society…was shaken to its foundations.’3   In many 
respects Clausewitz was born in the old regime and, upon his death on 16 
November 1831, was laid to rest in the modern world.  From a broad perspective, 
and with the benefit of hindsight, the preceding eighteenth century world would 
appear to historians such as H. G. Wells as nothing more than an ‘interregnum’ 
or ‘political pause’ before the ‘profound social and political forces of 
disintegration’ were unleashed throughout Europe in the aftermath of the 
Revolution.4  Clausewitz not only lived through these turbulent times but was an 
active participant in some of the great events of the era: the Wars of the First 
Coalition against France, the Battle of Auerstedt, Napoleon’s disastrous Russian 
campaign, and Waterloo.  That Clausewitz was witness to, and participant in 
such momentous events undoubtedly contributed to the vitality of his work. 
 As Paret argues, it is difficult to imagine any age lending itself less to 
intellectual expressions of universal value.5  It was all too easy for those living 
through such epoch-changing events to either become overwhelmed by the 
particularities of the age or to claim history had reached its grand conclusion.  
Momentous change and seemingly cataclysmic events often induce declarations 
as to the unprecedented and unique nature of the present at the expense of 
historical perspective.  This is perhaps reflected in the apparent ‘outbreak of 
endism’6 in recent years as popularly manifested in the ‘End of History’ thesis 
proposed by Francis Fukuyama following the end of the Cold War7  and the 
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prospect of an end to ‘major war’ as described by John Mueller.8  It could be 
argued that Clausewitz’s contemporary and, in many respects, great military 
intellectual rival of the time, General Antoine Henri Jomini 9  succumbed 
precisely to such a fate and paradoxically developed a theory so strongly 
influenced by and dependent upon the Napoleonic experience that he failed to 
provide the timeless ‘scientific principles’10  of strategy he professed to have 
unearthed.  There is strong evidence to suggest that much of the content of On 
War is primarily concerned with Napoleonic or ‘major’ warfare – in relation to 
which the importance of the great decisive battle and the destruction of the 
enemy’s armed forces took precedence – and that it was only in his later years 
that Clausewitz developed a more comprehensive and politically astute theory.11 
 Although Clausewitz’s work is inevitably influenced by the character of 
contemporary warfare, his profound sense of history,12 sensitivity to change in 
human affairs, and searching mind loosened the tight grip of the present on his 
thought.  As Howard has contended, ‘Few if any other writers have succeeded as 
he did in transcending the limitations imposed on their insights by 
the…circumstances of their times.’13  If this was true with regard to the events of 
his day, Clausewitz should equally be considered as one amongst a number of 
pioneering thinkers who were beginning to transcend the intellectual hegemony 
of the European Enlightenment.  In the realm of military theory he would be the 
first to truly break free of such mental chains, although the foundations had 
certainly been laid by his predecessors in a number of respects. 
                                                          
8
 John Mueller, Retreat from Doomsday: The Obsolescence of Major War (New York: Basic 
Books, 1989). 
9
 Antoine Henri de Jomini (1779-1869). 
10
 John Shy, ‘Jomini’, in Peter Paret (ed.), Makers of Modern Strategy: From Machiavelli to the 
Nuclear Age (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986), p. 146. 
11
 See Hew Strachan, Carl von Clausewitz’s On War: A Biography (New York: Atlantic Monthly 
Press, 2007), p. 79.  Some have even claimed that Napoleonic warfare is notably absent from his 
work.  Fuller states that ‘it is not a study based on the Napoleonic wars’ and ‘in spite of his twenty 
years of Napoleonic warfare, Clausewitz had but a vague understanding of it.’  J. F. C. Fuller, The 
Conduct of War 1789-1961 (New Jersey: Da Capo Press, 1992), pp. 60 and 75-76. 
12
 As Paret notes, seven of the ten volumes that comprise Clausewitz’s posthumous works are 
principally historical narratives and analyses.  Peter Paret, Understanding War: Essays on 
Clausewitz and the History of Military Power (Princeton: Princeton University Press, New Jersey, 
1993), p. 130.  
13
 Michael Howard, Clausewitz: A Very Short Introduction (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2002), p. 1. 
Theoretical Foundations 
 51
Enlightenment: the spirit of enquiry  
In general terms, late eighteenth and early nineteenth century Germany was a 
place of rich, varied, and profound cultural activity, perhaps comparable to the 
‘golden age’ of Athens in the fifth century BC in terms of the sheer quantity of 
rich artistic, philosophical, and literary output. 14   Such intense activity was 
largely a reaction to the cultural hegemony of the French Enlightenment that had 
held sway over European thought for most of the eighteenth century and, 
subsequently, to the upheavals engendered by the French Revolution.  
Clausewitz was to be heavily influenced by this great cultural backlash, yet our 
exploration into the roots of his approach must begin in the European 
Enlightenment.   
Although the phase in the history of European thought known to us as the 
Age of Enlightenment, or the Age of Reason, should be understood as consisting 
of a confused ‘bundle of attitudes’ – there certainly was no ‘united army of the 
enlightened’ 15  and the figurative ‘republic of letters’ was inhabited only by 
leading intellectuals16 – we can at least draw out some of its major threads.  The 
Enlightenment was, for Kant, the period in which ‘Mankind grew out of its self-
inflicted immaturity.’ 17   In broad terms it can be seen as a reaction to the 
superstition, intolerance, and religious fanaticism of the medieval world-view,18 
and which sought to throw the light of reason upon all manner of phenomena 
through the processes of free thought: the route to truth no longer began with 
‘Authority’ in its various guises, but with doubt.19  It emerged principally from 
the scientific and philosophical revolutions of the mid to late seventeenth century 
– characterised especially by the inductive Baconian method, Sir Isaac Newton’s 
pioneering Philosophiae Naturalis Principia Mathematica of 1687, and the 
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process of systematic doubt so lucidly propounded by Descartes in his Discourse 
on Method of 1637.20   
At the heart of this movement was the optimistic belief in limitless 
progress 21  through rational processes, the accumulation of knowledge – 
epistemology was a central concern of such great Enlightenment minds as John 
Locke and David Hume22 – and the assumption that the ‘rules’ of the physical, 
human, and social worlds could be uncovered through the application of 
scientific observation and methodological enquiry.  Even in the arts, beauty 
became synonymous with neo-classical rules and principles.  Indeed, in all 
disciplines from history to politics, an enthusiasm to understand everything and 
reveal universal truths – typified by the fervent work of the Encycolpedists – 
permeated the European intellectual environment.  ‘Dare to know [Sapere 
aude!]’ 23  implored Kant and, as Diderot exclaimed in his preface to the 
Encyclopédie, ‘Everything must be shaken up, without exception and without 
circumspection.’24  Importantly, as Gat states, ‘All spheres of human culture and 
all natural phenomena were to be subjugated to intellectual domination, and war 
was no exception.’25   
The military thinkers of the Enlightenment strove to produce definitive 
works that would regulate the conduct of military affairs and, as Clausewitz 
observed, ‘Efforts were therefore made to equip the conduct of war with 
principles, rules, and even systems.’26  In the late seventeenth century, Raimondo 
Montecuccoli was perhaps the true progenitor of the system builders, having 
‘searched for a universal paradigm, an integration of all knowledge, scientific, 
military, and political, derived from experience.’27  In his Dell arte militaire he 
stated that, ‘I have done my utmost to discover basic rules on which every 
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science is based…and, having considered the entire range of world history, I dare 
say that I have not found a single notable military exploit which would not fit in 
with these rules.’28  Yet five later thinkers stand out as true exemplars of the 
military-scientific tradition, all of whom we know Clausewitz was familiar 
with:29 Saxe, Lloyd, Guibert, Bülow, and Jomini.   
Maurice de Saxe opened his 1732 Reveries de L’Art de la Guerre with 
what amounted to a self-challenge: ‘All sciences have principles and rules.  War 
has none.’30  He believed that war, ‘like nature whose secrets had just been laid 
bare by Newton, operates in accordance with fixed regularities’,31 but that those 
regularities were, in his time, ‘replete with shadows in whose obscurity one 
cannot move with an assured step.’ 32   His work purported to unveil those 
regularities in the form of principles which, if followed, would lead to victory.  
However, his analysis was confined largely to the immediate tactical concerns of 
the period.  The French officer, littérateur, and philosophe Jacques Antoine 
Hippolyte, Comte de Guibert, published his highly influential Essai tactique 
générale in 1772 which aimed to be a grand system of war covering the whole 
subject.33  Gat notes that Guibert ‘appeared to have incorporated into his military 
treatise as many ideas of the Enlightenment as possible.’34  In his Essai he argued 
that most of the principles formerly developed were rendered obsolete by 
changed circumstances – the task of his work – his ‘science of all times’35 – was 
to apply scientific methodology to tactics in a way that, like mathematical truths, 
people from opposite ends of the world would have to agree on the principles so 
formulated.36  Another prominent author, Henry Lloyd, in his ‘Reflections on the 
General Principles of War’ of 1781 stated that ‘this art, like all others, is founded 
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on certain and fixed principles, which are by their nature invariable.’37   He 
believed mathematical principles could be applied to fortification, artillery, 
marching, and battle formations.38   
Adam Heinrich Dietrich von Bülow’s Spirit of the Modern System of War 
published in 1799 was based on geometrical and mathematical principles 
concerning an army’s relation to its base, its objective, and the ‘lines of 
operations’ connecting them39 – the latter being a term borrowed from Lloyd.40  
As Creveld notes, his work resembles ‘nothing so much as a textbook in 
Euclidean geometry…the entire art of strategy was reduced to a single, simple, 
geometrical formula’ 41  and Howard has described it as ‘rococo absurdity.’42  
Clausewitz derided Bülow’s ‘geometrical system, to which – as all charlatans are 
wont to do – he ultimately gave a veneer of mathematical elegance.’43   
Jomini, most notably in his book The Art of War, published in 1836, was 
also concerned with discovering a system for the art of war, which, like Bülow, 
relied heavily on concepts – some original, most borrowed44 – such as ‘base’ and 
‘lines of operations’ although his analysis did extend to political considerations 
too.  In particular, Jomini drew attention to the importance of operating on so-
called ‘interior lines’ in the ‘zone of operations.’45  Also, in contradistinction to 
earlier thinkers such as Saxe, Jomini was to insist that tactical matters were 
subject to considerable flux, whilst ‘strategy, particularly, may indeed be 
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regulated by fixed laws resembling those of the positive sciences.’46  Rather, 
Jomini sought his principles of war by ‘abstracting it from its political and social 
context…turning warfare into a huge game of chess.’47  In many respects Jomini 
represented the culmination of the scientific, formalistic, and schematic 
approach, and Howard has neatly explained why this was so: ‘The study of the 
campaigns of Frederick the Great and of the young Bonaparte had revealed to 
him, he believed, precisely those fundamental Newtonian principles of strategy 
for which eighteenth century theorists had sought in vain.’48   John Shy has 
observed that Jomini was almost evangelical in his insistence on the ‘timeless 
verities’ that his science of war would provide.49 
It would be unfair to claim that this was all these theorists contributed to 
the study of war or that Clausewitz was simply reacting against, rather than 
building upon their ideas.50  Their works are more complex and nuanced than 
adumbrated above and we should avoid subscribing to a ‘vague and stereotyped 
image of Clausewitz’s predecessors.’51  For instance, Jomini was aware that there 
was more to war than his formalistic concepts conveyed.  He even admitted that 
‘everything that can be termed the poetry and metaphysics of war will have a 
permanent influence on its results’ and that ‘theories cannot teach men with 
mathematical precision what they should do in every possible case.’ 52   His 
comment in the ‘Second Appendix’ of The Art of War, however, is revealing of 
his general approach.  He states that ‘war, far from being an exact science, is a 
terrible and impassioned drama, regulated, it is true by three of four general 
principles, but also dependent for its results upon a number of moral and physical 
complications.’53  Judging by the language of this remark, there is strong reason 
to believe that Jomini is reluctant to acknowledge the importance of the moral 
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dimension.  The implication is that, with regard to those ‘three or four 
principles’, as Sun Tzu put it, ‘Those who know them prevail, those who do not 
know them do not prevail.’54  In the hands of competent generals with good 
troops they constitute ‘means of almost certain success.’55  Jomini may have 
developed principles that were sometimes valid, but they ‘did not come from a 
comprehensive view of war that integrated historical fact with contemporary 
reality.’56 
So, the essential or overarching feature of these theories, whatever 
qualifications may be advanced, was their emphasis on uncovering scientific, 
quantifiable, or universal principles of war.  Their recognition of other, less 
tangible factors did not greatly alter the regular operation of the principles they 
had purportedly discovered; moral, psychological, or political factors were not 
truly integrated in their theories, but rather presented almost as addendums, after-
thoughts, secondary concerns, or separate, even awkward dimensions of war that 
theory might ultimately ignore.  Clausewitz rejected such ‘fanciful’, ‘one-sided’, 
and ‘pretentious’ theories, accusing them of ‘sham brilliance and sterile 
pedantry.’ 57   Furthermore, those ‘narrow systems’ were accompanied by a 
‘lawless rabble of camp followers’ in the form of ‘jargon, technicalities, and 
metaphors’:58 an observation only too relevant to much contemporary military 
writing.  Their weakness, according to Clausewitz, was a consequence not only 
of their search for unrealisable scientific principles, but also the inevitable 
selectivity such approaches encouraged: their objective could only be attained by 
arbitrarily restricting their inquiries to those phenomena that would yield to 
precise formulae59 – or what T. E. Lawrence would later term war’s ‘algebraical 
elements.’ 60   Clausewitz, by contrast, whilst certainly recognising the 
‘mathematical’ elements of strategy, 61  emphasised the importance of 
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understanding the whole and all the ‘endless complexities involved.’62  Finally, 
of course, Clausewitz recognised that their systems were beset by one 
fundamental failing, as Brian Bond tautly remarks: ‘if strategy was a science 
whose principles could be learnt what was to prevent all the belligerents learning 
them?’63 
 Yet, as John Keegan states, Clausewitz has to be seen as ‘a child of the 
Enlightenment’64 in the sense that he grew up in a Europe still heavily influenced 
by the spirit of reason and the attainment of knowledge, despite the fact that the 
hegemony of the Enlightenment message had passed its zenith by the latter half 
of the eighteenth century.  Natural disasters such as the Lisbon earthquake of 
1755,65 destructive conflict such as the Seven Years War (1756-63), and the 
growing popularity of new thinking – such as that associated with Rousseau and, 
later, Kant – had begun to chip away at the foundations of unbounded optimistic 
thinking.  Additionally, to many conservative observers, the horrors and excesses 
unleashed by the French Revolution had tarnished the image of those supposedly 
acting in the name of reason – for instance, Edmund Burke is famous for his 
vehement attack on the ‘college of armed fanatics’66 who created a government 
which was ‘such a complete breach with the manners and sympathies of Europe 
as to present a serious and palpable threat.’67  Nevertheless, it would be wrong to 
assume that these developments meant the Enlightenment ‘project’ had been 
significantly extenuated or lost a great deal of its cultural dominance by the time 
Clausewitz began to develop his ideas.  It must also be remembered that 
Germany experienced it own unique version of the European Enlightenment: the 
Aufklärung.68  As Tim Blanning notes, ‘It is difficult to comprehend how anyone 
familiar with the Aufklärung can think that it was part of a single 
Enlightenment.’69   The German Enlightenment was altogether more realistic, 
serious, and profound.  It was also less radical, whilst still being preoccupied 
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with shining the light of reason on all manner of phenomena.  Importantly, it was 
not essential to subscribe to the fullest excesses of the French Enlightenment to 
be affected by the spirit of reason. 
 Only a thinker influenced by the paradigmatic spirit of Enlightenment 
inquiry would feel compelled to write of his work that ‘its scientific character 
consists in an attempt to investigate the essence of the phenomena of war…No 
logical conclusion has been avoided.’70  Strachan notes that ‘On War belongs in 
the tradition of the Enlightenment, and is indeed the culmination of its influence 
on military thought.  Clausewitz tells us – through Marie – that it was a result of 
his exposure to the work of the philosophes that he began the process of 
intellectual and spiritual awakening in the second half of the 1790s.’71  Also, as 
Howard notes, Clausewitz was too experienced and wise to underrate or entirely 
avoid the rich vein of thought that emerged from the ‘classical’ school of military 
theorists.72  It is perhaps at least understandable that one commentator writing in 
1835, with respect to Clausewitz’s historical study of the war of 1799, could 
compare him to ‘a professor who leads his students across the bridge to 
mathematical wisdom by demonstrating the Pythagorean theorem for the 
twentieth time.’73  As Paret notes, this was, however, a misreading of Clausewitz, 
foreshadowing over a century and half of misinterpretations.74 
 Equally, Clausewitz did not subscribe to (yet had some sympathy for) the 
views of the so-called ‘antinomians’, led by the arch-sceptic Berenhorst, who 
held that formal theory was inapplicable to war, which is in fact determined only 
by the contingent, exceptional, and unpredictable.75  Rejecting such intellectual 
defeatism, Clausewitz was undoubtedly prone to detached, abstract speculation at 
times76 and was motivated by an ‘intense search for ‘scientifically valid’ methods 
of analysing and interpreting the reality of war.’77  This was particularly evident 
in his early work, such as his article criticising Bülow, published in the Neue 
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Bellona in 1805, in which he states that, ‘We shall apply ourselves to general 
notions…because in the constitution of a science it is to them that we shall above 
all return.’78  Strachan captures this aspect of Clausewitz’s approach when he 
notes that ‘he had read the works of the Enlightenment, and, for all his damning 
comments about certain military theorists, he was determined to develop a theory 
of his own.’79               
However, the intellectual providence of Clausewitz’s thought does not 
end here.  In order to fully grasp what Clausewitz was attempting to achieve in 
his lifetime, we should perhaps view him as the illegitimate heir of a tradition of 
military thought stemming from the French Enlightenment, via the German 
Aufklärers of the 1770s and 1780s, 80  and through to his contemporaries, 
including prominent figures such as Jomini and his influential mentor, 
Scharnhorst.81  This was a lineage united by the search for a general theory of 
war but divided by their contrasting and individualistic approaches.  As 
Clausewitz himself frequently reminds us, he was reacting against what he 
believed to be the mistaken views of excessively rationalist theorists, yet 
importantly, and in a more positive sense, they certainly provided him with a 
guiding vision of intellectual clarity, systematic analysis, rigorous method, and 
objective inquiry, without which On War may never have been conceived.  
Here we must cease discussion of Clausewitz’s indebtedness to the 
Enlightenment lest we overstate the association.  Following earlier 
Enlightenment thinkers, Clausewitz certainly developed a ‘system’, but it was 
more a ‘system of notions and propositions which are linked and which translates 
into ideas the structure of the object.’82  Clausewitz owed more to a tradition that 
represented, in many respects, its very antithesis.  As Paret notes, he ‘rejected the 
popular Enlightenment, with its doctrinaire faith in rationality and progress, and 
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found no difficulty in acknowledging limits to human understanding.’ 83   To 
reduce war to a list of rules was mistaken: ‘the variety and constant change in 
war could never be fully caught by a system.’84  For Strachan, it was perhaps less 
the influence of any ‘new thinking’ or original cultural movement, but rather 
Clausewitz’s own experiences of war and his growing familiarity with military 
history that constituted the ‘reality checks on [his] inclination to abstraction.’85   
An alternative worldview: the German Movement 
Whilst Strachan is no doubt correct, we should equally emphasise the extent to 
which the relative uniformity and predictability of Enlightenment military 
thought, typified by men such as Bülow and Guibert, was beginning to be 
assailed in the intellectual sphere by men such as Berenhorst and Scharnhorst, 
thus opening Clausewitz’s mind to original methods of studying war, whilst the 
pervasive cultural forces of the ‘German Movement’ were revealing a whole new 
perspective on reality to him.  Furthermore, at the time German society was 
experiencing a profound, if underlying, rupturing of established patterns as the 
prevailing ancien régime order was assailed by various competing socio-cultural 
forces.  Clausewitz’s work somewhat reflects this tension apparent in the wider 
social fabric of early nineteenth century Germany. 
In military terms, as briefly noted above, Berenhorst was an important 
counterweight to the rationalist cultural hegemony and his contrarian approach 
would have impressed an open and searching mind such as Clausewitz’s.  
Berenhorst, in his Reflections on the Art of War, published between 1796 and 
1799, argued there could be no fixed, scientific principles in war and instead 
everything was dependent on the operation of individual genius that could be 
neither imitated nor analysed86 – he ‘condemned all dogma.’87  The search for 
immutable laws was wrong-headed in his opinion: ‘What is the use of rules when 
one is covered up to one’s ears with exceptions?’88  War was suffused with the 
unknown, the unpredictable, and the incalculable that no theory could adequately 
                                                          
83
 Paret, Clausewitz and the State, p. 149. 
84
 Peter Paret, ‘The Genesis of On War’, in Clausewitz, On War, p. 6. 
85
 Strachan, ‘Dialectics’, p. 19. 
86
 Howard, Clausewitz, p. 23. 
87
 Paret, Clausewitz and the State, p. 202. 
88
 Quoted in Gat, Military Thought, p. 156. 
Theoretical Foundations 
 61
capture.  Blind chance, the spirit of an army, the moral factors that animate the 
troops: these ‘unknown and uncontrollable modifications of the human spirit’89 
were the true elements of war.  In military terms, Berenhorst was the 
embodiment of the Counter-Enlightenment with its ‘excessive irrationalism’90 – 
indeed, his other writings included critiques of plays by the dramatists of the 
‘Storm and Stress’ movement.91  We will consider other aspects of Berenhorst’s 
thinking in relation to chance and uncertainty in Chapter 5, but for now it is 
sufficient to emphasise his radically sceptical approach to theory.  As Creveld 
suggests, if Jomini and Berenhorst typify, respectively, the extremes of 
rationality and irrationality in war then it was left to Clausewitz to reconcile 
these opposing strands of thought.92   
The influence of Scharnhorst is also vital in this respect, for at a crucial 
time in the development of Clausewitz’s thought, whilst he was studying at the 
Berlin Academy for Young Officers and as a member of the select Militärische 
Gesellschaft, Scharnhorst was beginning to rail against the one-sided theories of 
the ‘systems’ that had emerged at around the turn of the century.  Scharnhorst – 
his great friend and mentor – presented Clausewitz with the possibility of a 
theoretical middle-ground whereby the art of war has two sides: ‘one is 
mechanical and susceptible to theoretical study, the other circumstantial and 
dominated by creative genius and experience.’93   Clausewitz would take this 
precedent introduced by Scharnhorst and develop it so that it would be less of a 
dichotomy and more of an integrated duality. 
Thus, we can begin to understand that Clausewitz’s approach reflected 
the scientific Enlightenment standard principally in terms of his foundational 
methodology and the desire for understanding the phenomena of war and its 
universal aspects.  However, within this broad conception, his theory consistently 
expresses the limits of theory and the reach of rules or law-like propositions in 
the realm of war (in many ways reflecting, and possibly influenced second-hand 
by the manner in which Kant had revealed the limits of human reason).  Thus, 
throughout his work we come across somewhat paradoxical features: for 
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instance, it was his scientific approach which led him to the concrete proposition 
that the ‘uncertain’ in war must be recognised as central to theory.  Clausewitz 
believed it was dangerous to generalise from ideas that have only limited 
validity94 as many of the classical theorists had done and this methodological 
assertion forms the basis of a central theme that runs through Clausewitz’s work: 
the search for an appropriate balance between the universal and the particular.  
Vital to the resolution of such issues would be a robust understanding of history, 
both in terms of its substance and its deeper philosophical meaning. 
Rediscovering history 
In broad terms, history and historical perspective had been somewhat lacking in 
Enlightenment thought with its strong bias towards the future, typified by the 
belief in progress and the boundless potential for perfectibility based upon the 
discovery and implementation of rational principles.  The past was viewed as the 
backward place we had come from, the future the ‘sunlit uplands’ we were 
heading towards.  Indeed, as a number of commentators have held, various 
strains of social utopianism stem from such rationalist, a-historical thinking.95  
With regard to war, such thinking might manifest itself in the belief that it can be 
perfectly understood, controlled, limited, or, indeed, eliminated from human 
social relations. 96   The potential consequences of such thinking is superbly 
described by the political scientist Jeane Kirkpatrick, who notes that, ‘Rationalist 
theories are speculative rather than empirical and historical; rationalist reforms 
seek to conform human behaviour to oversimplified, unrealistic models.’97  
 The utopianism Kirkpatrick recognised in politics, has been just as 
prevalent in the realm of military theory.  This occurs because, as Kirkpatrick 
explains, ‘Thought set free from experience is unlimited by the constraints of 
experience or of probability.  If history is not relevant, then the future is free 
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from the past.  Therefore, theories cut loose from experience are usually blindly 
optimistic.’98  These passages are worth quoting at length because this is exactly 
the kind of thinking that Clausewitz rejected and was reacting against: the 
excesses generated by Enlightenment thought, which had been revealed to him 
practically, in terms of the murderous consequences of the French Revolution 
and theoretically, in the one-sided and limited theories of the rationalist ‘systems’ 
theorists who conveniently banished friction, uncertainty, political conditions, 
and emotions from their work, thus perverting their outcomes.99 
The German Movement that emerged in the late nineteenth century 
signified a dramatic shift away from such a-historical perspectives and 
‘moralising assumptions’ 100  that had typified rationalistic Enlightenment 
thinking.  This shift was strongly evident in its leading proponents’ fascination 
with Homer, folk-tales, and Celtic myth.101  This attitude towards the past was 
indeed symptomatic of the period –and found its greatest expression in the work 
of Johann Gottfried von Herder. 
Herder was a dominant figure in the development of the conception of 
history known as historicism.  The essential premise of this outlook was its 
emphasis on the particularity and uniqueness of historical cultures and societies, 
which could only be truly understood in their own right through empathetic 
analysis of their peculiar characteristics.  This individualising view of the past 
stood in stark contrast with the prevailing Enlightenment conception, with its 
predominantly determinist belief in progress and the universalising, almost 
retrospectively patronising projection of its own values back through history or 
across different cultures.  Herder believed that the ‘Volksgeist’102 or ‘material 
culture of a people’s life, their skills, language and beliefs and artistic and 
literary practices, make up a single self-sufficient and characteristic whole.’103  
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Herder’s concern with the importance of comprehending historical conditions 
was directly imparted to Clausewitz through Scharnhorst, 104  given a more 
theological application in the influential theological scholarship of Friedrich 
Schleiermacher (a personal acquaintance of Clausewitz), and is strongly apparent 
in the methodology of On War. 
Arguably the ‘greatest influence on the development of Clausewitz’s 
historical and theoretical thought,’105  Scharnhorst had emphasised that history 
was at the centre of the study of war.106  As Clausewitz notes in his, ‘On the Life 
and Character of Scharnhorst’ of 1818 – written as a form of obituary following 
the latter’s death in 1813 – he had a ‘great preference and respect for the power 
of historic evidence in all matters that preoccupied him.’107  Although the style of 
their historical work differed in both style and content, the example of 
Scharnhorst is clearly apparent in Clausewitz’s pragmatic, objective, and non-
partisan approach to historical study. 108  Essentially, Scharnhorst taught 
Clausewitz that the only evidence we have about war is historical: in On War he 
notes that, ‘Undoubtedly, the knowledge which is basic to war is 
empirical...revealed to us only by experience.’109 
As Paret notes, Clausewitz had a clear ‘sense of the particularity of 
individuals and societies, which observed their own laws rather than rationalist 
abstractions.’110   Whilst he held that human feelings might have a universal 
nature, ‘their human, social, and intellectual expression was in flux.’111  On War 
is scattered with historical references, short analyses, and methodological 
enquiries into the proper use of history.  However, the extent of his historicism is 
most impressively revealed in his captivating sociological survey of war from the 
‘semibarbarous Tartars’ through to the nineteenth century in Chapter 3B, Book 8.  
He concludes that chapter by stating that ‘we wanted to show how every age had 
its own kind of war, its own limiting conditions, and its own peculiar 
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preconceptions…it follows then that the events of every age must be judged in 
the light of its own peculiarities.’ 112   As Gat rightly points out, it was 
Clausewitz’s acute sensitivity to the diversity of historical experience that 
represented the greatest challenge to his search for a universal theory, whilst also, 
somewhat paradoxically, facilitating it, as we will see.  History was also crucial 
to Clausewitz’s stress on the importance of context in his theoretical framework 
– this subject will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter 3. 
Explorations 
These considerations into the dominant influences on Clausewitz's approach to 
his subject provide the basis for a more detailed examination of the manner in 
which Clausewitz arrived at the trinity, and the theoretical and methodological 
philosophy that underpins it.  What is particularly fascinating about the 
theoretical foundation of Clausewitz’s work, is the way in which it may be 
viewed as a synthesis of the various strands of thought that had developed in the 
decades prior to Clausewitz’s time.  His theoretical work was derivative, but his 
originality lay in the manner in which he combined separate analytic strands and 
applied their integrated force to the issues surrounding war. 113   We might 
visualise Clausewitz as being tied to a number of ropes all pulling him in various 
directions and, whilst at times he seemed to be pulled one way or the other, 
ultimately he managed to keep his balance, control those various influences, and 
utilise their most positive aspects towards his own ultimate purpose.  This was no 
easy task.  At many points the temptation to be drawn towards a particular 
method or viewpoint was strong, and this tension can be sensed in his writing.   
 The following sections consider some of the central themes that emerge 
in Clausewitz’s methodology.  First, Clausewitz’s general conception of theory is 
outlined as well as the most important methodological tools he employed.  
Subsequently, a set of five prominent methodological pairs are presented as 
platforms for examining the prominent aspects of Clausewitz’s approach to his 
subject: art and science; dogmatism versus pedagogy; theory and reality; material 
and moral factors; and the universal and particular.  There is of course significant 
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overlap between these pairs, as many of the ideas are dependent on, support, or 
feed into one another, however this structure provides a useful route into the 
issues that preoccupied Clausewitz in this regard and forms a firm basis for our 
comprehension of the more substantive aspects of the trinity. 
Concepts and method 
Scharnhorst had imparted to Clausewitz the importance of military theory: 
‘through conceptualisation, military theory makes possible the intellectual 
treatment of the factors active in war.’114  This sentiment is clearly reflected in 
Clausewitz’s work.  As he states, ‘this subject, like any other that does not 
surpass man’s intellectual capacity, can be elucidated by an inquiring mind, and 
its internal structure can to some degree be revealed.  That alone is enough to 
turn the concept of theory into reality.’115  Despite his disdain for the ‘systems’ 
of Enlightenment military thinkers, Clausewitz would not follow Berenhorst in 
his theoretical antinomianism: war was susceptible to theoretical analysis.  The 
fundamental task of the theorist was to ‘eliminate the weeds that spring from 
ignorance’ by shining the light of theory on all phenomena.116  Scharnhorst had 
also emphasised, following Montesquieu, that, ‘Correct concepts had to be 
grounded in ‘the nature of things or in experience.’117  This belief is strongly 
evident in Clausewitz’s work.   
 According to Clausewitz, the task of theory was to clarify reality, or more 
accurately to help men clarify it by stimulating their minds: ‘Theory will have 
fulfilled its main task when it is used to analyse the constituent elements of war, 
to distinguish precisely what at first sight seems confused.’118  He also remarked 
that the ‘human mind…has a universal thirst for clarity, and longs to feel itself 
part of an orderly scheme of things.’ 119  Whilst rejecting the idea that war itself 
could be treated as a science, importantly, this did not mean it could not be 
approached in the spirit of scientific inquiry, only that one could not expect law-
like principles to emerge as a result:  
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Anyone for whom this is all meaningless either will admit no theoretical 
analysis at all, or his intelligence has never been insulted by the confused 
and confusing welter of ideas that one so often hears and reads on the 
subject of the conduct of war.  These have no fixed point of view; they 
lead to no satisfactory conclusion; they appear sometimes banal, 
sometimes absurd, sometimes simply adrift in a sea of vague 
generalisation; and all because this subject has seldom been examined in 
a spirit of scientific investigation.120 
 
Clausewitz is perhaps unfair here: earlier thinkers, such as Montecuccoli, had at 
least attempted to examine the subject in the spirit of scientific investigation.  It 
appears that what Clausewitz is actually proposing is simply more of a 
systematic and clear-headed approach, conducted in the spirit of scientific rigour, 
that would serve to ‘clarify concepts and ideas that have become, as it were, 
confused and entangled.’121   
 An essential element, even precondition of reliable theory involves an 
attempt to recognise the defining character of phenomena: he states that, ‘Not 
until terms and concepts have been defined can one hope to make any progress in 
examining the question clearly and simply.’122  His theory would seek to develop 
an understanding of war through a detailed exploration and understanding of its 
constituent elements, so On War begins: ‘I propose to consider first the various 
elements of the subject, next its various parts or sections, and finally the whole in 
its internal structure.’ 123    In this sense, the trinity, as Clausewitz explains, 
enables us to make a ‘differentiation and identification’ of the ‘major 
components’ of the structure of theory.124 
 How was he to achieve this goal?  It is useful to consider the principal 
methodological tools Clausewitz employed in order to resolve the philosophical, 
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epistemological, and theoretical problems he faced.  This subject has generated a 
great deal of debate: was Clausewitz Kantian, Hegelian, or even as argued by one 
commentator, Newtonian 125  in his approach?  It is important to note that a 
definitive answer on this issue is probably unrealisable, primarily because it 
appears Clausewitz himself did not subscribe to any one particular method and 
never absolutely or in the precise way intended by its originator.  What is not in 
doubt, however, is that certain central methodological tools are apparent and the 
evidence of the influence of particular philosophers or traditions is strong: 
foremost amongst these is the method of the dialectic. 
 The use of the dialectical method was a strong feature of German Idealist 
philosophy of the time, and most strongly associated with Hegel and 
appropriated by Fichte.  Since the time of Socrates the dialectic has been a 
powerful means of exploring any given subject and it enabled Clausewitz to 
arrive at some of his most important conclusions.  It appears to have been a 
method that Clausewitz only seriously appropriated later in his life as he 
attempted to deal with issues that involved apparent contradictions and tensions 
in their relationship to one another.126  But, in an important sense, war itself for 
Clausewitz is an embodiment of dialectic processes, a competition between 
opposites which resolves itself into a new unity, peace, which itself constitutes 
the thesis against which new antithetical forces react.   
Where Clausewitz employs dialectical arguments to draw out ideas, the 
aim was to ‘achieve understanding through debate, through point and 
counterpoint; the dialogue is continuous.’127  Through this line of reasoning, a 
thesis and its antithesis leads to a logical contradiction and must therefore be 
resolved in some form of theoretical reconciliation.  The dialectical influence on 
his approach – although not of a strictly Hegelian form128 – is clearly revealed in 
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Book 8 when Clausewitz states that, ‘Up to now we have considered the 
incompatibility between war and every other human interest…that no philosophy 
can resolve.  Now we must seek out the unity into which these contradictory 
elements combine in real life, which they do by partly neutralising one 
another.’129 
Paret has argued that the failure to understand the nature of Clausewitz’s 
method leads to considerable misunderstanding of his theories: ‘The often tragic 
history of the misinterpretation of his works derives largely from the inability of 
his readers to proceed beyond his thesis to its antithesis and to understand that he 
usually locates the truth in the tension between the two…In Clausewitz’s 
work…polarity is a central concept.’130  A similar point is made by Strachan who 
notes that ‘Hegel was interested in the relations between the abstract and the 
concrete, and used dialectics to explore them, even if in Hegel’s case the poles in 
the argument excluded each other, whereas in Clausewitz’s case they tend to 
depend on each other.’131  Aron believed the dialectic is crucial to understanding 
Clausewitz’s thought: he identified three central dialectical pairs which 
Clausewitz grapples with in his work: means and ends, moral and physical, 
defence and attack.  The trinity might be considered as the only point where 
Clausewitz presents the most complete synthesis arising out his dialectical 
analysis.  There is, however, no Hegelian progression to an ‘Absolute Idea’ (this 
should not be confused with Clausewitz’s ‘absolute war’, which is simply a 
logical abstraction – in fact, the ‘thesis’ in a dialectical argument – which he used 
to powerfully convey the contrast with war in reality) and as Bassford notes, the 
text is ‘largely unmarked by clear dialectical sign posts, labelled thesis, 
antithesis, and synthesis.’132 
 So, the trinity represents the culmination of a philosophical exploration of 
war which explains the phenomenon by breaking it down into observable and 
definable concepts; a process that is vital ‘if theory is to serve its principal 
purpose of discriminating between dissimilar elements.’133  In order to explain 
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and determine the operation of those concepts, Clausewitz often employs a form 
of dialectical reasoning, which poses sets of opposites against one another, and 
seeks to explore and determine the nature of their relationship.  In this sense, the 
trinity reveals the dialectical relationship between three competing sets of forces 
in war.  In a broader sense, and quite apart from the various substantive concepts, 
a number of oppositional pairs can be observed in the theoretical realm of 
Clausewitz’s work, each of which we will now explore in turn. 
Art versus science 
Clausewitz frequently drew upon aesthetic theory to help clarify his thoughts on 
theory.  For instance, in Book 8 he explains that a ‘principle that underlies our 
thoughts and actions will undoubtedly lend them a certain tone and character, 
though the immediate causes of our actions may have different origins, just as the 
tone a painter gives to his canvas is determined by the color of the 
underpainting.’134  Likewise he also drew heavily on the physical and mechanical 
sciences to express certain ideas, most memorably in relation to his discussion of 
friction. 
 Clausewitz believed the answer to whether war was an art or science was 
of great significance, even ‘indispensable’ 135  because one’s conclusion 
determined the way in which the entire subject is approached.  This problem of 
course reflects the broad dichotomy that Clausewitz recognised as existing within 
military theory in the early nineteenth century.  Thinkers such as Bülow sought 
scientific precision and ended up with limited, one-sided theories.  Thinkers such 
as Berenhorst believed war was akin to a creative art, entirely dependent on 
individual genius, and ended up belittling the important role theory and 
knowledge could play.  If neither of these approaches would suffice, Clausewitz 
sought the reasons for this.  Book 3, Chapter 3 is taken up with a detailed 
discussion of this issue. 
 Clausewitz’s discussion first seeks to determine the essential difference 
between the two disciplines by centring on the prime objectives of each.  In 
science the object is ‘pure knowledge’ based on inquiry and, in this respect, is 
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principally associated with subjects such as mathematics or astronomy that aim 
at ‘fixed values’,136 the discovery of regularities, and the identification of laws of 
logic, reason, and cause and effect.  Pure science has no goal, no objective other 
than the furtherance of knowledge.137  In art the object is ‘creative ability.’138  Art 
is intended to produce an aesthetic effect, to which end it is necessary to use 
given means.  To combine them is to create; art is thus the capacity to create.  
Unlike science, art is not susceptible to law-like formulas, primarily because it 
aims at effects on the mind.   
 For Clausewitz, these distinctions are misleading.  All arts contain 
‘discrete sciences’ such as the mathematical, geometrical elements of 
architecture, whilst applied science always involves an element of creativity and 
judgement – as Smith notes, science ‘deals with hypotheses formed by the mind, 
and hence requires creativity and experience.’ 139   Thus, it ‘is impossible to 
separate art and knowledge altogether.’140  The distinction is almost completely 
shrouded in the individual, but in their external forms the basic distinction 
between, on the one hand ‘inquiry and knowledge’ and, on the other ‘creation 
and production’ is clear.141  So how does this discussion apply to war? 
 In war, like no other activity, Clausewitz explains that the complete and 
‘total assimilation’ of knowledge and ability is vital.  For the commander, 
whatever thorough knowledge he may have absorbed from so many scientific 
military manuals, all this will be useless unless it can be turned into ‘genuine 
capability’ 142  at the appropriate time. 143   Books may lay down the basic 
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principles of an art but they cannot teach us ‘how to do anything.’144  Even if 
they purport to explain a certain ‘art’ they are not in themselves art, because art is 
about creating, about producing effects with available means.  War is not even 
comparable to a mechanical art or craft, 145  whereby given truths can be 
objectively and impersonally applied to the matter in hand; ‘It is never like that 
in war.  Continual change and the need to respond to it compels the commander 
to carry the whole intellectual apparatus of his knowledge with him.’146  In war, 
knowledge and ability must be alloyed.  It is never enough simply ‘to know’ 
because ‘absolute, so-called mathematical, factors never find a firm basis in 
military calculations.’147  Likewise, effective creative ability is to some extent 
dependent on a knowledge of the relationship of things and the likely effects of 
given actions. 
 So war is strictly neither a pure art nor a pure science.  It will always 
involve a complex interaction of the two, particularly when approached from the 
perspective of the individual commander.  As T. E. Lawrence beautifully put it, 
‘Nine-tenths of tactics are certain, and taught in books: but the irrational tenth is 
like a kingfisher flashing across the pool, and that is the test of generals.  It can 
only be ensured by instinct, sharpened by thought practising the stroke so often 
that at the crisis it is as natural as a reflex.’148  It appears that, were Clausewitz 
forced to make a decision between the one or the other, he would state that war 
will always be more like an art than a science – particularly at its higher levels – 
primarily because of its practical and creative nature;149 a conclusion that even 
Jomini, despite his positivism, essentially arrived at.150  But Clausewitz was not 
content to let the matter rest there.  In fact, he believed that to base analysis on 
the distinction between science and art ‘is misleading in that it has 
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unintentionally caused war to be put on par with other arts or sciences, resulting 
in a mass of incorrect analogies.’151       
 Such analogies are misleading because neither science nor art captures 
the unique nature of war.  Whilst it may certainly involve elements of both, it is 
something altogether different because it ‘deals with living and moral forces’152 – 
it is a ‘conflict of living forces.’153  Previously both the art and science of war 
viewed war as a ‘unilateral activity’ and as ‘nothing but a gradual rise from a 
craft to a refined mechanical art.’154  Clausewitz clearly explains why war is in 
fact unique: 
 
The essential difference is that war is not an exercise of the will directed 
at inanimate matter, as is the case with the mechanical arts, or at matter 
which is animate but passive and yielding, as is the case with the human 
mind and emotions in the fine arts.  In war, the will is directed at an 
animate object that reacts.  It must be obvious that the intellectual 
codification used in the arts and sciences is inappropriate to such an 
activity.155   
 
So, if war is not usefully understood as a science or art, what is it?  War, he 
explains, is ‘part of man’s social existence.’  He suggests a better analogy may be 
commerce, but even that ignores the fundamental reality of war: that it is ‘clash 
of major interests, which is resolved by bloodshed.’156  When these fundamental 
realities are introduced, analogies with art or science lose their force.  War is 
inherently human and social.  It takes place in a climate of danger, fear, exertion, 
and uncertainty.  It is inherently reactive.  Art and science may at times, and to 
some limited extent, display elements of these characteristics, but taken together 
war is something altogether different and unique.  If it reflects any other human 
activity it is politics, because after all, as he explains, that is ‘the womb in which 
war develops – where its outlines already exist in their hidden rudimentary form, 
like the characteristics of living creatures in their embryos.’157  
                                                          
151
 Clausewitz, On War, p. 173. 
152
 Ibid., p. 97. 
153
 Ibid., p. 174. 
154
 Ibid., p. 153. 
155
 Ibid., pp. 173-74. 
156
 Ibid., p. 173. 
157
 Ibid., p. 173. 
Theoretical Foundations 
 74
 This presents problems for theory.  To what extent can theory provide 
laws regarding an activity involving a dynamic interaction of human forces and 
so universally pervaded with chance and uncertainty?  Clausewitz’s speculation 
on the elements of art and science in war, and his conclusion pertaining to its 
unique nature, led him to a particular conception as to the purpose and limits of 
any theory of war.  
Anti-dogmatism versus doctrine 
In 1812 Clausewitz produced an essay entitled, ‘The most important principles of 
the art of war to complete my course of instruction for his Royal Highness the 
Crown Prince’ and is more commonly known as The Principles of War.158  The 
ideas Clausewitz noted down for the young Frederick William159 have often been 
read as a form of ‘executive summary’ of the content of On War and has thus led 
some to accuse Clausewitz of a narrow doctrinaire approach.160  As Bassford 
recounts, one reviewer claimed Clausewitz had condensed ‘all of the principles 
and maxims that he subsequently expanded in On War.’161  This, however, would 
be a mistaken conclusion.  As Bassford notes, ‘Unfortunately, it has often been 
treated as a summary of Clausewitz's mature theory—which it most emphatically 
is not.  Rather, it is only a primitive precursor to his later magnum opus – On 
War.  Its subject matter is largely tactical.’162 
As Strachan has noted, ‘much of On War is written with a forthrightness 
that can easily be mistaken for dogma’163 and Aron has likewise observed that, 
‘It is the systematic character of the Treatise which has sometimes made 
superficial readers confuse it with dogmatism.’164  It is clear from Clausewitz’s 
work that ‘dogmatic’ was precisely the epithet he wished to avoid.  Indeed, a 
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pronounced anti-dogmatic streak characterises his approach.  This is revealed in 
the heading of a section of Book 2, Chapter 2 entitled, ‘Theory Should Be Study, 
Not Doctrine.’  In this section he states that ‘a theory need not be a positive 
doctrine, a sort of manual for action.’165   Theory should be seen more as a 
‘guide’: far from dictating exactly what the commander should do on the 
battlefield, it is intended more to ‘light his way, ease his progress, train his 
judgement, and help him to avoid pitfalls.’166  This sentiment is expressed in one 
of his earlier historical studies on the 1814 campaign in France, in which he 
states that, ‘Of course…here as in all practical matters theory has the function to 
form the practical man and to educate his judgement, rather than to assist him 
directly in the execution of his tasks.’167  Clausewitz emphatically states that, ‘it 
is simply not possible to construct a model for the art of war that can serve as a 
scaffolding on which the commander can rely for support at any time.’ 168  
History’s great commanders did not rely on such doctrinaire guidance: indeed 
‘anyone who thought it necessary to begin the education of a future general with 
a knowledge of all the details has always been scoffed at as a ridiculous 
pedant.’169   
Here Clausewitz differed from his contemporary Jomini who, in the 
conclusion to his work stated that, ‘Correct theories, founded upon right 
principles…will form a true school of instruction for generals.’170  Indeed, as 
Brodie notes, Jomini has been ‘endlessly quoted for the remark: ‘methods change 
but principles are unchanging.’’171  Paret is scathing when he states that Jomini 
‘pursued an arbitrary number of facts and observations through a disorganised 
argument to a dogmatic end.’172  Like Thucydides before him, Clausewitz ‘is less 
interested in telling his readers what to think than in teaching them how to 
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think.’173  This belief also has its direct analogue in the realm of critical analysis 
of past wars and campaigns.  The critic, Clausewitz insists, should not study a 
particular case through a ‘mechanical application of theory’, but rather theories 
are ‘there to be used when needed, and their suitability…must always be a matter 
of judgement.  A critic should never use the results of theory as laws and 
standards, but only – as the soldier does – as aids to judgement.’174  Just as 
‘scientific guidelines’ are inappropriate tools on the battlefield, so they are in 
critical analysis where truths must be grasped ‘through the natural perception of 
the mind.’175   
The earlier tendency of ascribing all detailed knowledge to theory, whilst 
reserving the play of genius for a realm beyond theory constituted a serious 
contradiction with reality.176  Clausewitz, rejecting this idea and borrowing from 
Kant’s aesthetics,177 states: ‘No; what genius does is the best rule’178 – it is the 
source of the rules.179  In other words, theory can never create or produce genius, 
but that genius is an element of the reality of war is confirmed by experience.  
Therefore, theory must acknowledge the importance and scope for ‘special 
talent’180 and not be tempted into ‘simple-minded pedantry.’181  Otherwise, the 
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theory produced would amount to an ‘underworld of ponderous concepts where 
no great commander, with his effortless coup d’oeil, was ever seen.’182   
Clausewitz did not, however, reject the potential for expressing concrete 
propositions where logic and reality, in a sense, forced conclusions on the 
theorist: 
 
If the theorist’s studies automatically result in principles and rules, and if 
truth spontaneously crystallises into these forms, theory will not resist 
this natural tendency of the mind.  On the contrary, where the arch of 
truth culminates in such a keystone, this tendency will be underlined.  But 
this is simply in accordance with the scientific law of reason, to indicate 
the point where all lines converge.183 
 
But, the number of ideas in On War that Clausewitz would allow in this category 
were few and far between.  We might conclude that only the elements of the 
trinity achieved this status, perhaps representing the very keystone that held 
together his many other ideas: the ‘point where all lines converge.’ 
So, it was not Clausewitz’s aim to develop a utilitarian theory, but rather 
one that was predominantly analytic, descriptive, and didactic: theory can teach 
but it cannot prescribe.  On War is a work of analysis not advocacy.184  What was 
the point of producing a theory which genius could laugh at – theory cannot 
dictate rules to genius185 – and that the man of limited ability could learn by rote 
but fail to convert into success in practice.  Aron makes the crucial point that for 
Clausewitz, ‘It is the theory which indicates that the responsibility for decision is 
thrown back on the man of action.’186  This was an approach consistent with 
contemporary German notion of Bildung, or self-direction and autonomous 
judgement. 187   Theory can offer sound insights into the ‘great mass of 
phenomena’ associated with war, but then leaves the mind to ‘rise into the higher 
realms of action.’188   Theory teaches that the essence of genius is that it is 
creative, not imitative; it can transcend existing rules, but in doing so it creates 
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new ones.  Hew Strachan believes that it was precisely this ‘refusal to embrace 
fixed conclusions’ that explains the longevity of On War.189  Brodie contrasts 
Clausewitz approach with the modern inclination, ‘in various army field 
manuals…to encapsulate centuries of experience and volumes of reflections into 
a few tersely worded and usually numbered ‘principles of war’ and concludes 
that, ‘Clausewitz would have been appalled at such attempts, and not surprised at 
some of the terrible blunders that have been made in the name of those 
principles.’190  As the great Union general of the American Civil War, Ulysses S. 
Grant commented, ‘If men make war in slavish obedience to rules, they will 
fail.’191 
 These points are extremely important because they clearly reveal what 
Clausewitz was not attempting to provide through his theory.  Also, it gives the 
lie to those who believe Clausewitz to be the intellectual progenitor of World 
War I.  As Strachan explains, ‘the short term accusation, voiced by Basil Liddell 
Hart, was that his pupils had put the idea of absolute war into practice with 
disastrous effect.’ 192   In affect, he put the blame for the war squarely on 
Clausewitz.  Liddell-Hart, in his The Ghost of Napoleon, called Clausewitz ‘the 
Mahdi of mass and mutual massacre’ and claimed that the generals became 
‘intoxicated with the blood-red wine of Clausewitzian growth.’193  Keegan also 
weighed in, stating in his History of Warfare, that Clausewitz bore ‘weighty 
responsibility’ for the conduct of the War.194  Even if it was the case that certain 
high-profile commanders, such as Ferdinand Foch, took a certain message from 
Clausewitz and let it guide their actions, then they are surely guilty of a wilful 
misreading and misuse of On War.   
 Regardless of the supposed substantive content of his theory (which is the 
subject of later chapters), Clausewitz did not set down hard and fast rules that 
should be followed unconsciously or without regard to unique circumstances.  
This was not just an implicit feature of his work, but manifestly explicit.  Book 2 
of On War almost amounts to a plea not to read his work in that way.  
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Commanders, faced with the problems of the moment will always search for 
direct routes to success, and thus are wont to skate over the sections of a work 
that do not provide such practical, and indeed, psychological comfort.  And here 
is the irony.  The very weakness of the intellectual capacity of commanders not 
imbued with the qualities of natural talent so clearly described by Clausewitz, 
would be precisely those desperate to read their way out of difficult situations, 
looking for the type of principles in On War that Clausewitz would more or less 
reject: he would not provide petty rules to follow because ‘petty things will make 
a petty mind.’195  A petty mind is insufficient for a commander faced with the 
vast complexity of war.      
 This is not to deny that Clausewitz does indeed articulate various 
principles196 or that the weight of his ideas lean towards favouring a certain form 
of warfare.  However, principles in On War always remain conditional.  One 
might accuse him for not being clear enough in this respect, but this is simply not 
supported by the text.  First, the limits to his ‘system’ are repeatedly expressed, 
and often through metaphors that should not escape even the casual readers 
eye.197  Moreover, in almost all cases where Clausewitz expresses some principle 
or another, and no matter how forcibly stated, they are accompanied by 
qualifying remarks.198  As Alan Beyerchen notes, even his ‘most Newtonian-
sounding analogy of a ‘centre of gravity’ becomes swamped in qualifications and 
caveats intended to convey the complexity of war.’199   So, regardless of the 
substantive nuances of his ideas, and even without an appreciation of the 
unfinished nature of On War, the theoretical foundations of the work are enough 
to reveal such accusations as hollow and misleading: they fail to grasp the 
underlying basis, the very purpose of his work.  If this is the case, why the 
accusers seek to find the origins of the ‘total wars’ of the twentieth century in the 
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writings of Clausewitz is unclear.200  That tendency, somewhat perversely, shifts 
the ‘blame’, if we can call it that, from those whose actions directly led to those 
events (even if they were indeed based on a mistaken or shallow reading of On 
War) or even, more impersonally, from the peculiar historical conditions of the 
time, human nature, and pure chance (all of which Clausewitz himself would 
have emphasised).    
 So, Clausewitz does not aim at a positive theory of war: ‘we are far from 
regarding our principles and the results derived from them as absolutes.’201  Laws 
are not applicable in war, as they may be in the sciences, because in war there 
exist numerous subjective and intangible factors that are not susceptible to 
objective laws, yet which are timeless aspects of its conduct.202  He stresses the 
difficulty of developing theory because of the often large distances between 
causes and effects, the continuous interaction of opposites, the impact of 
changing conditions, and the play of intangible forces that theory can never quite 
define.203  Yet, despite these limitations, as Creveld notes, theory ‘can aspire to 
save the strategist from the need to think out everything from the beginning, and 
provides him with a starting point for thought.  In so far as the theory is sound, 
such a starting point is certainly not without value.’ 204   Clausewitz’s anti-
doctrinaire view of what theory should be depended crucially on his contention 
that it should not conflict with the reality of war in all its complexity – it is to 
that issue we know turn.   
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Theory versus reality 
In his panegyric to his late friend and mentor, Clausewitz described the qualities 
of Scharnhorst’s mind which made for such ‘apt and forceful ideas’:   
 
a penetrating intellect that is not joined to a powerful imagination will 
favor theoretical constructs and speculative thought only so far as they 
coincide with reason and with the appearances of this world.  At the point 
where imagination leads the brilliant systematizer beyond specifics, 
Scharnhorst would quietly turn back and direct his energies toward 
reconciling ideas and reality, carefully fusing the two by theoretical and 
historical analysis, as the particular issue demanded…In war mere 
imagination has no creative power at all, while the truth that emerges 
from the congruence of reality and analysis is indispensable.205 
 
This quote, ostensibly about Scharnhorst, lucidly reflects the approach that 
Clausewitz felt was vital for understanding war, whilst simultaneously revealing 
his huge debt to his mentor.206  In criticising such flights of the imagination, 
Clausewitz perhaps had in mind the abstract philosophers associated with 
German Idealism.  Although not unsympathetic towards their general project, 
Clausewitz was adamant than in such a practical activity as war, pure abstract 
theorising would lead the thinker into ‘dazzling and flowery fantasies’207 that 
would have little applicability in reality.  In an essay entitled ‘The Germans and 
the French’, Clausewitz commented on how the German intellect, ‘instead of 
taking immediate pleasure in the correspondence of its ideas to reality…delves 
deeply into the nature of things, into abstractions, and strives for complete 
understanding.’  This he says ‘often damages his usefulness in practical, 
particularly, political life.’208   For Clausewitz, a theory that cannot apply to 
reality is largely useless: ‘Presumptuous philosophy deserves contempt and 
derision when it seeks to raise us high above the activities of the day so that we 
can escape their pressures’ because individual generations ‘do not exist to 
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observe the world; by constantly striving for rational goals they are the 
world…’209  A similar concern is highlighted in On War when Clausewitz asks, 
what is the practical value of ‘obscure, partially false, confused and arbitrary 
notions?  Very little – so little that they have made theory, from its beginnings, 
the very opposite of practice, and not infrequently the laughing-stock of men 
whose military competence is beyond dispute.’210   
 Clausewitz’s practical nature could not but persuade him as to the utter 
futility of speculative notions that conflicted with reality and ‘where the author 
himself no longer knows just what he is thinking and soothes himself with 
obscure ideas which would not satisfy him if expressed in plain speech.’211  
Scharnhorst taught his student to ‘oppose artificial and learned theorising by 
encouraging a certain naturalness of thought, which defeats empty phraseology 
and brings the false conflict between theory and practice to an end.’212  There is 
strong evidence that a great deal of Clausewitz’s approach derives from 
Scharnhorst’s influence.  For instance, consider this summary of the line of 
argument of one of Scharnhorst’s works by Gat:  
 
An inherent interdependence exists between theory and reality.  First one 
needs clear concepts and principles…[that] are necessarily based on the 
nature of things, and there is no knowledge without them.  Then one must 
understand the actual operation of these concepts and principles in action, 
for reason alone is not sufficient for developing reality.  The application 
of the concepts and principles to reality requires judgement, which is in 
turn sharpened by experience and constant exercise, the major means of 
which is historical study.213 
 
This description could almost be mistaken for an outline of the methodological 
approach adopted by Clausewitz.  For instance, Clausewitz states that ‘the 
knowledge basic to the art of war is empirical.  While, for the most part, it is 
derived from the nature of things, this very nature is usually revealed to us only 
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by experience.’214  What abstract, logical theorising there is in On War – and 
there is plenty, particularly in Books 1 and 8 – is always restrained by a forceful 
collision with reality, as Scharnhorst had taught.   
 The way in which Book 1, Chapter 1 sways from the abstract to the 
concrete and back again can be a cause of mental ‘sea-sickness’ for some, but 
that is simply the result of a mind that was never content to rest in the comfort of 
one or the other, preferring instead the challenge of searching out the points at 
which the two meet and cease to contradict each other.  This is why grasping this 
dialectic in Clausewitz’s approach is so important – without it one cannot follow 
the progression of his thought or understand what he was trying to achieve 
through the explication of his concepts.215  In an oft quoted passage, Clausewitz 
held that he never avoided logical conclusions, ‘but whenever the thread became 
too thin I have preferred to break it off and go back to the relevant phenomenon 
of experience.  Just as some plants bear fruit only if they don’t shoot up too high, 
so in the practical arts the leaves and flowers of theory must be pruned and the 
plant kept close to its proper soil – experience.’216   
Clausewitz frequently employed a deductive approach to explore the 
boundaries of theoretical concepts: historical accounts of reality would never 
entirely suffice because, as Scharnhorst had recognised, ‘experience without 
philosophy is devoid of meaning.’217  The use of pure reasoning is most apparent 
in Clausewitz’s later work.  For instance, Book 8, Chapter 2 is an excellent 
example in this respect.  Logically, he states, it would appear that the complete 
overthrow of the enemy should govern all war plans (the actual possibility of 
which was revealed in Napoleon’s campaigns).  That all wars do not reach such 
extremes might be explained by limiting factors inherent in the ‘war-machine’ 
and ‘natural inertia’, but these are insufficient to ‘span the gap between the pure 
concept of war and the concrete form.’  Ultimately, reconciliation is only 
achieved when it is accepted that ‘war and its forms result from ideas, emotions, 
and conditions prevailing at the time’ in relation to which ‘strictly logical 
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reasoning often plays no part at all and is apt to be a most unsuitable and 
awkward intellectual tool.’  The logical absolute retains its usefulness as a 
‘general point of reference’, but reality has its own necessity, not determined by 
abstract reasoning, but by particular conditions that always makes war ‘a matter 
of degree’. All the wars fought ‘since the days of Alexander…down to 
Bonaparte’ cannot be rejected simply because they do not equate to the 
theoretical ideal, rather the divergence must be explained and the antinomy 
resolved.218  In this, as elsewhere, his inclination to speculate led him to ‘illusory 
mental exercises’,219 whilst ultimately he always remained firmly anchored to 
reality: his use of abstract reasoning was not a consequence of intellectual 
pretension, but rather a conscious method of revealing fundamental truths in war. 
So, as the counterweight to pure theory, ‘experience’ for Clausewitz was 
employed as a broad realm that encompassed two central aspects, both concerned 
with what we might term the reality of war: these were history and personal 
experience.220  Following Scharnhorst – and considering his work as exemplary 
in this respect221 – Clausewitz held that history provided the theorist with a vast 
reservoir of experience: ‘Historical examples clarify everything and also provide 
the best kind of proof in the empirical sciences’222 and ‘experience counts for 
more than any amount of abstract truths.’ 223   As Paret and Moran note, 
Clausewitz held that, ‘Without the instrument of history, theory should not be 
constructed… History not only tested and validated his theories, it gave rise to 
some of them.’224  But for Clausewitz, this meant much more than familiarity 
with a few history books.  It wasn’t simply the case, as Livy once put it, that 
history is a ‘record of the infinite variety of human experience plainly set out for 
all to see.’225  As Howard notes, the ‘exercise of history had itself to be an 
exercise in critical judgement.’226  A detailed basis of such critical historical 
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study is masterfully adumbrated by Clausewitz in Book 2 of On War.227  For 
Clausewitz, the critical study of the past presents the theorist with something 
approaching recorded reality, and thus history becomes the starting point for 
theoretical analysis.228  It also serves to confirm genuine advances in cognition. 
The other potential source of observations on war’s reality was of course 
personal, first-hand experience.  It is certainly rare to find thinkers on war who 
combine the qualities required of both the soldier and the philosopher.229  Like 
Thucydides before him, Clausewitz’s own experiences of war greatly added to 
the depths of his comprehension of the realties of war.230  Many sections of On 
War and his historical studies draw upon, albeit often implicitly, his own 
recollections of campaigns and battles in which he fought.231  He also suggests 
that perhaps only those who have experienced war first-hand can truly be in a 
position to emphasise aspects of war that may evade the armchair theorist.  For 
instance, the danger, fear, and friction that affect war so greatly may not be 
directly apparent to the mere spectator: as Clausewitz pithily remarks, ‘in one’s 
library these elements are not known.’232  That these factors play such an integral 
role in his theory owes a great deal, not only to influential forerunners who had 
emphasised these points, but also to his first-hand knowledge of war.  As he 
notes, ‘theorists who have never learned to generalise from experience, are 
impractical and even ridiculous: they teach only what is already common 
knowledge.’233  The difficult task, however, was translating these experiences 
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into theory, and expressing them in the form of coherent and comprehensible 
concepts.   
So, Clausewitz conceived of a near ceaseless interaction between 
reasoning and experience.  They should be in constant dialogue with one another 
as neither is much use to theory in isolation.  The practical soldier in him led to a 
tendency to favour practice, but if theory was to improve men’s understanding of 
the phenomenon then it had to make sense of the reality through philosophy: 
‘Analysis and observation, theory and experience must never disdain each other; 
on the contrary, they support each other.’234  The two are mutually supportive as 
practice requires understanding, whilst theory should not render itself useless by 
becoming detached from reality (the latter being a problem particularly noted in 
recent times in relation to nuclear strategy).235  The importance of resolving this 
tension is revealed in a notably heated outburst in On War when Clausewitz 
states that theory, 
 
only needs intelligent treatment to make it conform to action, and to end 
the absurd difference between theory and practice that unreasonable 
theories have so often evoked.  That difference, which defies common 
sense, has often been used as a pretext by limited and ignorant minds to 
justify their congenital incompetence.236 
 
There is, however, still one area of reality that we have yet to discuss and which 
represents yet another area that theory must be able to encompass if it is to retain 
its relevance.  History not only revealed to Clausewitz the incredible variety of 
wars in the past, but opened his eyes to vast potential of the future.  This 
sentiment is revealed in a section in which Clausewitz is speculating on whether 
the sort of limited wars, common throughout history, will reoccur: ‘Worse still, 
we should be bound to say that in spite of our theory there may even be other 
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wars of this kind in the next ten years, and that our theory [of absolute war], 
though strictly logical, would not apply to reality.’ 237   This reveals that 
Clausewitz was not only concerned about the reality of war recorded in history or 
that he had experienced, but also with that which was yet to come and which 
theory could not ignore. 
Material and psychological factors 
The emphasis that Clausewitz placed on the importance of experience led him to 
another crucial aspect of his theory.  In earlier times, Clausewitz notes how the 
study of war concerned ‘only the total body of knowledge and skill that was 
concerned with material factors.’ 238   As such, war ‘would hardly provide a 
scientific problem for a schoolboy.’239  Previously, most theorists had directed 
almost all their attention to physical matters such as issues of numerical 
superiority of troop numbers, supply, geometry, and even geology.240  These 
theories, he explains, were about as useful ‘to combat as the craft of the 
swordsmith to the art of fencing.  It did not yet include the use of force under 
constant conditions of danger…nor the efforts of spirit and courage to achieve a 
desired end.’ 241   Those thinkers, such as Saxe, Lloyd and, even Napoleon 
himself, had placed significant emphasis on the importance of psychological and 
moral forces, but rather as addendums or only in a haphazard manner.242  For 
instance, in his Reveries, Saxe noted how, in war, ‘the solution lies in human 
hearts’ and that this matter is the ‘most important, the most learned and the most 
profound, of the profession of war.’243  Nevertheless, his general insights on that 
subject are not given a sound theoretical basis, no matter what excuses he gave 
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for the ‘irregularity of the arrangement, as well as the inelegance of the style’ of 
his work.244   
 Progressing beyond these limited systems, Clausewitz emphasised that an 
observation of reality revealed the fact that so-called ‘moral forces’ are 
fundamental to understanding war and must be incorporated in theory: previous 
theories had directed their inquiries predominantly ‘toward physical quantities, 
whereas all military action is intertwined with psychological forces and 
effects.’ 245   Clausewitz argues that, whilst material factors may yield to the 
application of reason, war, as a human social activity is universally bound up 
with intangible factors where the ‘rules dissolve into nothing but vague ideas.’246  
Just as Goethe revealed a man’s physical weakness to be relative by describing 
how he can be ‘so enraged by an insult that he takes on six opponents and 
overcomes them,’ 247  so Clausewitz stressed that analysis of physical factors 
alone was insufficient for understanding war.  Clausewitz emphasised that, ‘All 
these and similar effects in the sphere of mind and spirit have been proved by 
experience: they recur constantly, and are therefore entitled to receive their due 
as objective factors.  What indeed would become of a theory that ignored 
them?’248  It was therefore the task of theory to ‘analyse emotional forces of all 
kinds: the psychology of the individual and the psychology of the group.’249   
 Clausewitz thus developed concepts that he felt best expressed these 
factors, such as genius, passion, morale, courage, military virtues, and so forth.  
We will return to many of these substantive issues throughout this thesis, but 
here it is enough to note that their incorporation into theory was crucial and in 
many respects mirrors what he felt was the existing dichotomy between theory 
and practice (theory had a tendency to focus on material factors, as distinct from 
practice which was inevitably pervaded by moral forces).  Yet, he acknowledged 
this was an enormously difficult task: conceptualisation of these factors would 
always be limited because they relate to values that ‘can only be perceived by the 
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inner eye, which differs in each person.’250  He did not believe that such aspects 
of war could be quantified or calculated, but that they must be recognised as an 
integral element of war and studied as far as these inherent limitations allow.  
 Moreover, what theoretical observations that are made must be based on 
experience: ‘no theorist, and no commander, should bother himself with 
psychological and philosophical sophistries.’251  Perhaps Clausewitz had in mind 
here some of the earlier thinkers, such as Berenhorst, who had over-played these 
psychological and moral factors or emphasised them in a manner that precluded 
sound theoretical insights.  The recognition of such factors should not, 
Clausewitz held, preclude the articulation of clear concepts derived from detailed 
study – he did not entirely reject the possibility of a scientific approach to the 
study of war, even when intangibles were involved.  He admitted that ‘theory 
becomes infinitely more difficult as soon as it touches the realm of moral 
values’252  – and this explains why he held strategy to be less susceptible to 
theoretical principles than tactics, which was concerned mostly with material 
problems253 – but that if astutely analysed they can at least be conveyed in the 
form of appropriate concepts and find their place next to physical aspects in 
theory. 
 Just as theory had to reconcile ideas and practice, so too did it need to 
reconcile material and ‘moral factors.’ 254   Clausewitz held that moral and 
physical forces ‘cannot be separated’ and should be conceived as ‘an organic 
whole which, unlike a metal alloy, is inseparable by chemical processes.’255  
Clausewitz held that moral forces could be the most decisive in war: ‘One might 
say that the physical seem little more than the wooden hilt, while the moral 
factors are the precious metal, the real weapons, the finely-honed blade.’256  
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Napoleon had reached a similar conclusion when he stated that ‘the moral is to 
the physical as three to one.’ 257   One of the principal dangers of abstract 
theorising was its tendency to ignore such intangible, yet often decisive elements 
of war because they do not translate neatly into mathematical formulae or 
doctrinal precepts.  The emphasis on psychological factors only reinforced 
Clausewitz’s belief that theory should not be dogmatic – for instance, what 
theory could actually teach courage in the face of danger.  All theory could do is 
acknowledge their importance.  The trinity fundamentally embodies the play of 
both physical and moral forces – all three tendencies are determined by the 
continuous and complex interplay of these two forces.    
The universal versus the particular 
 Aron has observed that ‘strategic thought draws its inspiration each century, or 
rather at each moment of history, from the problems which events themselves 
pose.’258  And so, the eighteenth century theorists, in their attempts to create a 
timeless science of war, focused too heavily on their own times and 
paradoxically sacrificed universal application to contemporary relevance and 
perhaps social acclaim. 259   The great Napoleonic campaigns of the early 
nineteenth century dominated the minds of all military thinkers in Clausewitz’s 
day, and how could they not?  Those cataclysmic events not only seemed to 
represent a whole new form of war, but for active officers like Clausewitz, 
analysis of them was powerfully linked to action.  Theory, as we have seen, had 
to be closely linked to reality – not only in the interest of methodological rigour, 
but, given the context, also for the sake of national survival.  As Howard notes, 
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Clausewitz ‘had the practical man’s horror of abstractions that could not be 
directly related to the facts of the situation.’260   
 This was undoubtedly so, but Clausewitz was equally concerned, 
particularly in his later years, to establish those aspects of war that were universal 
and immutable.  As Paret states, for Clausewitz, ‘to devise effective strategy and 
tactical measures mattered far less to him than to identify the permanent elements 
of war and come to understand how they function.261  He intended his work to 
last, that ‘it would not be forgotten after two or three years, and that possibly 
might be picked up more than once by those who are interested in the subject.’262  
Furthermore, as Hugh Smith notes, Clausewitz believed there existed ‘a universal 
element in war: common and enduring features that escape change and must not 
be lost from view.’263  The problem of reconciling these two poles, the universal 
and the particular – objective and subjective knowledge – was by no means a 
new problem, it has occupied the minds of many great philosophers throughout 
history and it was ‘inherent in the minds of the military thinkers of the 
Enlightenment.’264   But, as Clausewitz understood, simple recognition of the 
problem was not a sufficient condition for progress toward its resolution.     
 Clausewitz had recognised the dangers of veering too much towards one 
or the other poles.  Too great an emphasis on the universal leads one towards the 
scylla of banal generalities and dull truths.  Too much emphasis on the particular 
led to the charybdis of mindless trivialities and sterile pedantry.  As we have 
seen, his lingering fear of descending into dogmatism restrained him from 
making theoretical claims that were of relevance only to the particular 
circumstances under study and which would cause one to ‘drown in 
trivialities.’265  He was also acutely aware of the limits of theory and that any 
attempt to establish timeless truths in theory was fraught with dangers.  As 
Clausewitz recognised, most military theorists had been over-impressed by the 
Napoleonic period, drawing hasty conclusions from the principles it appeared to 
emphasise: as he warned, ‘Whoever relies purely on the perspectives of his own 
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times is inclined to treat what is most recent as best.’266  In a similar sense, he 
warns of the dangers, yet necessity of employing subjective experiences to 
construct theory.267  
 It could be argued that Clausewitz very nearly fell into this trap of 
particularity and subjectivism.  Two key factors perhaps explain how he avoided 
this pitfall.  First, it would be wrong to view the impact of the events of 
Clausewitz’s times in a unitary fashion.  Rather, the period Clausewitz lived 
through is perhaps best conceived of as being split into two principal stages, both 
with unique features.  As Creveld explains, ‘Born and raised in one set of 
axioms, rules, theories, beliefs, he saw it abruptly shattered by defeat and 
replaced by another superior to it.  It was this fact…which enabled him to 
compare both sets, contrast them, and reflect on their relative merits.’ 268  
Parkinson also draws a distinction between the ‘old forms of war in 1793 and 
1806, and the new in 1812, 1813, 1814 and 1815.’269  This variety of experience 
forced Clausewitz to attempt to reconcile such divergent periods of war and 
consider their differences and similarities, their contradictions and 
commonalties.270  Of course, simply witnessing this transition in the form of war 
was not sufficient to give rise to Clausewitz’s mature theories, as it is clear that 
his contemporaries drew quite different conclusions: that the decisive Napoleonic 
campaign represented the apotheosis of war, and would constitute the norm 
henceforth.271  A wider perspective allowed Clausewitz to avoid this trap. 
 Second, and perhaps most importantly, the historicist outlook, in vogue at 
the time, had emphasised for Clausewitz the particularity of different epochs and 
different cultures.  As we have seen, he had great sympathy with Herder’s view 
that different ages should be assessed in their own right, indeed, so much so that 
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Clausewitz claimed that every age ‘would have held to its own theory of war.’272  
Of course, an extreme version of historicism can lead to a form of dusty 
antiquarianism or a relativist belief that the singularities of unique periods serve 
to make attempts at abstract conceptual generalisations futile.  Clausewitz never 
went this far.  He was not a relativist and did not dismiss the possibility of 
comparison across ages.  He believed that the analyst must liberate himself from 
the fashions and constraints of his own age to discover those elements that are 
comparable, that are present in every war.273  As Smith explains, ‘If each war or 
campaign were genuinely unique, no lesson could ever be taken from one to 
another.  Nor could wars of one era be of any relevance to subsequent eras.’274  
 The historicist perspective acted as a check on the tendency to 
universalise his own present – the Napoleonic experience – and compelled him to 
view it in its own particular context.  His study of history ‘helped him avoid the 
error of defining Napoleonic war as the ‘correct’ war.’ 275   Furthermore, it 
allowed him to value and be aware not only of the vast variety and particularities 
of the past, but also to anticipate the infinite possibilities of the future.  Paret and 
Moran explain that, ‘By opening up the past for us, history added to the fund of 
knowledge that we can acquire directly and also made possible universal 
concepts and generalisations across time.’276  Indeed, the desire to extrapolate the 
universal from the particular was a crucial element of Clausewitz’s historical 
studies, for instance in commenting on Clausewitz’s ‘Strategic Critique of the 
Campaign of 1814 in France’, Paret notes how, ‘To Clausewitz, the manifold 
uniqueness of the episode reveals the working of timeless elements.’277   An 
awareness of the incredible variety of wars throughout history forced the theorist 
to engage in a difficult process of distinguishing what is essential from what is 
merely incidental.    
 The trinity should essentially be viewed as the outcome of this 
intellectual antinomy which Clausewitz attempted to resolve.  This is not to 
suggest that he always managed to successfully bridge the divide.  Creveld notes 
that those sections of On War ‘where he comes closest to offering advice of the 
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how-to-do-it-variety…are most often regarded as hopelessly obsolete.’ 278   
Nevertheless, he was determined to develop a theory of war that was universally 
valid, applicable to his own time as well as others, and that did not offer bland 
platitudes or overtly disagree with experience.  As Beatrice Heuser has observed, 
Clausewitz ‘achieved a substantially greater level of abstraction than most of his 
peers by deriving his conclusions about war from the evidence of 130 historical 
battles which he had studied closely…without allowing himself to become 
bogged down in detail.’279    
The trinity is a conceptual construct that enabled him to discriminate 
between those aspects of war that are objective and timeless and those that are 
subjective and ever-changing.  The former are captured in the idea of the primary 
trinity, the latter in the secondary trinity as shaped by morphing contextual 
conditions.  The primary trinity, in this sense, can perhaps be seen as the pure 
distillate extracted from a lengthy process of reflection and historical analysis.  It 
is this quality which supplies the trinity with its incredible elasticity and wide 
applicability in relation to all historical periods and war’s manifold forms – a 
theory that encompasses wars as temporally distant as Sargon’s campaigns in 
Ancient Mesopotamia and Russia’s invasion of Georgia in 2008, or as different 
in form as modern industrial ‘total wars’ and ‘small wars’ of insurgency and 
guerrilla tactics.  It is apt here to quote at length a passage by Clausewitz that 
supremely encapsulates his thinking on this fundamental issue: 
 
Philosophy teaches us to recognise the relations that essential elements 
bear to one another, and it would indeed be rash from this to deduce 
universal laws governing every single case, regardless of all haphazard 
influences.  Those people, however, who ‘never rise above anecdote,’ as 
a great writer said, and who construct all history of individual cases – 
starting always with the most striking feature, the high point of the event, 
and digging only as deep as suits them, never get down to the general 
features that govern the matter.  Consequently their findings will never be 
valid for more than a single case; indeed they will consider a philosophy 
that encompasses the general run of cases as a mere dream.280    
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Reflections 
In the course of writing On War Clausewitz had to attempt to reconcile all these 
apparently conflicting and contradictory elements of theory.  We have seen how 
Clausewitz explored the extremes of these methodological dualities and sought 
their resolution by appropriating the most valuable aspects of each and fusing 
them to create a theoretical dualism, like a negotiated agreement between two 
conflicting parties.  It is in the trinity that the fruit of these methodological 
labours are to be found.  Clausewitz seeks to provide clear concepts derived from 
both logical reason and experience, which fuse material and ideational forces, 
and that are present in every war, yet manifest themselves according to the 
circumstances of the particular moment.  His central conclusions represent what 
he believed to be the extent of objective knowledge in war and are intended not 
as doctrinal prescriptions, but as guides to understanding.  The trinity thus 
represents the complete integration of the various methodological dualisms.  
Recognition of these points serves to impress upon the reader the underlying 
strength of the methodological and theoretical pillars that support his substantive 
insights. 
 Even if we do not subscribe fully to the content of Clausewitz’s theory 
and denounce many of its prominent insights as excessively influenced by the 
Napoleonic experience, what should not be doubted is that Clausewitz provided a 
standard of excellence in terms of developing a methodology which could enable 
the formulation of a universal theory of war.  It is a methodology that confronts 
the theorist with perhaps the most intractable problems in social science and 
deals maturely with many of the issues that continue to vex the minds of theorists 
today: the nature of the relationship between theory and practice, between the 
material and psychological, between the universal and the particular in human 
social affairs.  It might even be argued that the direct and lucid way Clausewitz 
tackled these problems is superior to the often convoluted language of many 
modern political scientists.   
 Clausewitz had arrived at some of these basic ideas quite early on in his 
intellectual career, many imparted to him through Scharnhorst, yet the full 
implications of these problems for his own work only came later.  In fact, we 
might say he swung between certain extremes of these methodological 
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antinomies before arriving at a more stable balance towards the end of his life.  
In crude terms, his early life was inevitably dominated with the particular 
experience of his times and practical matters relating to the wars he was fighting.  
After 1815 he then perhaps swung too far towards the abstract in a desire to 
determine the universal concept, formulating a logical notion of war that 
conflicted with historical reality.  As Strachan notes, ‘The early Clausewitz was a 
practical soldier, the later Clausewitz was more the scholar.’281  The Clausewitz 
who wrote Book 1, Chapter 1 represented more the compromise between these 
two perspectives.  This is not to argue that he was not always aware of the 
underlying theoretical problems, but that his concerns at different times pulled 
him down different paths.  Also, where these poles (between the abstract and real 
for instance) are presented almost side-by-side in On War, this is usually a 
conscious choice.  The reader is presented with extremes derived from both logic 
and reality, and then their inherent unity and mutual dependence is powerfully 
revealed.  These forays toward extremes – both intentional and unintentional; in 
his work and throughout his life – only served to strengthen the form of his final 
trinitarian synthesis, concerned as it was to bridge these difficult methodological 
divides. 
 This analysis is fundamental for understanding the crucial importance of 
the place of the trinity in Clausewitz’s work because it represents the final 
outcome of years of comprehensive and rigorous study.  This not only explains 
the greater value of those sections written towards the end of his life, but goes a 
long way to explaining the weakness of other, earlier sections.  The fact that On 
War is incomplete not only allows us to witness the development of his 
substantive ideas on war, but also gives us an insight into how he approached his 
subject and employed new methodological tools to overcome apparent 
contradictions in his theory.  Few military thinkers have approached the subject 
with such dedication, commitment, wide-ranging experience, or intellectual 
integrity, all combined with a strong desire to avoid ‘an ostentatious exhibition of 
ideas’ 282  as so often accompanies intellectual vanity.  Clausewitz faced his 
theoretical problems almost with, what at times appears to be a slight sense of 
desperation, as if his life depended upon the successful resolution of some 
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nagging logical antinomy or contradiction between theory and reality.  In some 
senses this was true.  Late in his life Clausewitz grew increasingly aware that he 
would probably not achieve great distinction and lasting renown through 
command on the battlefield.  And so he devoted his final years to the one area 
where perhaps he could achieve lasting influence: theory.  In this, we may 
confidently state that he succeeded.  As is suggested in the opening quote of this 
Chapter – ‘Not what we have argued but the manner in which we have argued 
may, we believe, benefit theory’ – even those who disagree with the substantive 
conclusions of his theory might at least recognise that Clausewitz set the 
standard in tackling a subject that has evaded the grasp of many a great mind. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
Context and Circumstance 
 
 
As water has no constant form there are in war no constant conditions1 
Sun Tzu 
 
As location is the key to property values, so context is, or at least should be, the 
most important variable in understanding war.2 
Colin Gray 
 
 
A cursory glance through any number of military history books reveals that most 
authors feel compelled to say something, whether succinctly or at length, about 
the context within which a particular battle or war took place.  The impulse to 
describe the broad setting in which events occurred is, it seems, an almost natural 
urge.  Return to some of the earliest classical historians and this impulse is 
readily apparent.  Thucydides begins his History of the Peloponnesian War with 
a penetrating account of the political situation that culminated in the conflict 
between Sparta and Athens and The Pentecontaetia provides a comprehensive 
outline of the events that enabled Athens to grow in strength after the Persian 
Wars prior to the conflict with Sparta.  Xenophon represents the opposite of 
Thucydides in this respect.  His A History of My Times opens with the sentence, 
‘Some days later Thymochares arrived from Athens with a few ships, and the 
Spartans and Athenians immediately fought another naval action in which the 
Spartans, under the command of Agesandridas, were victorious.’3  Whether or 
not Xenophon believed he was writing a continuation of the Peloponnesian War4 
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the effect is unsettling, like being lost on a mountain in the mist without map or 
compass.  Or perhaps a parallel can be drawn with Sam Beckett in the television 
series Quantum Leap who, each episode, would be randomly thrown into a new 
situation at some time in the past without prior knowledge of where he would be 
going or why.  Reading the first few pages of Xenophon perhaps evokes a 
reaction similar to that of Beckett after finding himself in a new situation at the 
beginning of each episode: ‘Oh boy’!     
Whilst perhaps none of the excitement and drama is lost in Xenophon’s 
direct approach (indeed, this was precisely what gave Quantum Leap its dramatic 
appeal), meaning and explanation pay a heavy price.  Xenophon assumes on the 
part of the reader considerable knowledge of the broad setting in which his 
history unfolds.  As a result, newcomers feel compelled to study maps and 
consult other accounts to gain a bearing in relation to the text and better 
understand the events described.5  A parallel can be made here with the position 
of the commander in war.  The Xenophons of military commanders are those 
who attempt to use force with little understanding of the environment in which 
they act, who are concerned only with the immediate problem of defeating the 
enemy, and who rarely look beyond the narrow confines of their immediate 
situation.  The shortcomings are of a similar nature, only the consequences are of 
a profoundly different order: the one can be measured in numbers of dissatisfied 
or confused readers, the other in lives lost or political communities destroyed.  
However, these issues are more closely linked than may appear at first sight.  
Sound history can alert commanders to the fact that outcomes in war are 
crucially shaped by the wider conditions in which they take place.  It is the task 
of theory to conceptualise this idea. 
Michael Howard offers some initial clues regarding the importance of the 
concept of context in the introduction to his magisterial history of The Franco-
Prussian War.6  It is worth quoting him at length: 
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Like most neophyte historians…I expected to be able to explain the war’s 
outcome through events on the battlefields themselves; the skill of the 
commanders, the nature of the armaments, the efficiency of the supply 
systems, the discipline and courage of the troops.  But it rapidly became 
clear that these explanations were not in themselves enough…Gradually I 
came to realise…that the outcome of the war was ‘the result not simply of 
faulty command but of a faulty military system; and the military system 
of a nation is not an independent section of the social system but an 
aspect of it in its totality’.  So a study of the war, indeed of any war, had 
to be rooted in a study, not simply of the armies, but of the societies that 
fought it.7     
 
Howard makes it clear that to understand and explain apparently isolated military 
events, we must comprehend how those events are connected to wider forces.  
An account of the former may suffice to describe the course of the war, but 
certainly not to explain it.  Simply observing a particular event, and the elements 
that constitute it, is only a first step, albeit an important one, to understanding.  
The implication is that armies, weapons technology, and supply systems are as 
they are for a reason – they do not exist in a vacuum.  They are all products of a 
certain age, an age with its own unique characteristics at a certain point in time 
and place.  Given this connection, if we fail to inquire as to why things are as 
they are, then our understanding of events will be necessarily limited and 
parochial.  The broader perspective will usually hold ‘the key for a full 
understanding of the fighting.’8  This is a perspective embodied in the ‘war and 
society’9 or ‘New Military History’ school which, as Geoffrey Wawro explains, 
‘does not skimp on technology, generalship or battles, but takes care to place war 
in its larger social, political, economic and cultural context.’10  
These introductory points may come across as mere common sense, but it 
is surprising how often this crucial aspect of understanding war is overlooked or 
neglected, by historians, strategists, and theorists of war.  Clausewitz pointed to 
this evasive inclination in a letter to a colleague with regard to the centrality of 
comprehending the political conditions of any war: ‘That it is essential to see the 
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matter in this way, that the point of view is almost self-evident if we only keep 
the history of war in mind, scarcely needs proof.  Nevertheless, it has not been 
fully accepted.’11  Colin Gray has also noted that, ‘since, following Clausewitz, 
war cannot be approached as an autonomous activity, if it is considered bereft of 
context it becomes literally senseless.’12  So, how are we to conceive of the 
concept of context, how and why does it contribute to our understanding of war, 
and what is the role of this concept in Clausewitz’s trinity?  This chapter 
considers some of these questions and seeks to reveal the pivotal role it plays in 
Clausewitz’s theory of war.  Context is a vital aspect in the framework of the 
trinity as it provides the ‘setting’ in which the three central primary tendencies 
are manifested in reality through secondary level subjects.  In this respect, it can 
be conceived as a tertiary level in the theory, and which is intertwined and 
inseparable from the others.  We therefore analyse this concept in detail before 
moving on to explore each of the separate tendencies in the following three 
chapters.  The chapter begins by considering the various ways in which context is 
understood by Clausewitz.  The following section considers the concept in 
greater detail and offers a clearer articulation of context as a central component 
of a trinitarian theory of war.  The chapter concludes by outlining some of the 
prominent substantive dimensions of context by way of historical instantiation.   
Clausewitz on context 
How are we to understand the concept of context in relation to the trinity?  
Clausewitz engages with this concept in a number of ways and in relation to a 
variety of issues.  These areas present us with differing routes into the subject 
and enable us to reveal how Clausewitz understood and employed the idea.  This 
chapter demonstrates that context can be considered as a ‘hidden’ level of the 
trinity and is central to its meaning.  There is certainly good evidence for this 
proposition within the few passages directly concerning the trinity, but a fuller 
understanding of its place in Clausewitz’s theory, and its precise meaning for 
him, has to be based upon an appreciation of his wider work. 
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That context was an issue of great importance for Clausewitz is 
unmistakable if one explores, in detail, On War and his other writings.  Indeed, 
as Gat asserts: ‘throughout his life…this view of war within the context of its 
particular social and political reality was fundamental to Clausewitz’s historical 
and theoretical outlook.’13  Aron also notes that Clausewitz ‘could not fail to 
discover or observe the diversity of wars according to their times’14 given his 
own personal experiences during the Revolutionary and Napoleonic eras, 
combined with his historical study of war. 
In a general sense, the importance of conditions and circumstances are 
frequently expressed in relation to Clausewitz’s more practical military issues.  
When Clausewitz considers strategic and operational principles, the analysis is 
almost always accompanied by important accompanying caveats.  These 
qualifying remarks – termed by Beyerchen as a ‘maddening maze of 
qualification’15 – amount to a recognition of the importance of unique conditions 
which allow for either the moderation, or even, abandonment of action according 
to given principles.16  As Clausewitz states, ‘Many roads lead to success and they 
do not all involve the opponent’s outright defeat…the choice depends on 
circumstances.’ 17   For instance, Clausewitz explains how a certain style of 
fighting derived from a successful experience fighting one war ‘can easily 
outlive the situation that gave rise to it; for conditions change imperceptibly.’18  
This was a fact devastatingly revealed at Jena in 1806 when Frederick the 
Great’s ‘oblique order’19 proved wholly unsuited to battle against Napoleon: an 
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example of ‘the most extreme poverty of the imagination to which routine has 
ever led.’20  While such operational examples are important and such follies litter 
the history of war (popularly expressed in the aphorisms that generals are always 
fighting the last war or that nothing fails like success), this section will 
concentrate on the fundamental and philosophical grounds for Clausewitz’s 
belief in the centrality of context. 
History and historicism 
The clearest expression of the importance of contextual understanding is to be 
found in Clausewitz’s work which focuses on historical matters, both in On War 
and in his explicitly historical studies.  We have already noted the importance of 
history in Clausewitz’s theoretical approach, but here we need to understand its 
crucial influence in developing his sensitivity towards contextual conditions.  
Clausewitz’s reading of Herder and Möser,21 and other writers of the Historicist 
school, taught him to value and appreciate the individuality of different epochs 
and historical cultures.  It was an approach to the study of the history which had 
at its heart, the idea that past societies should be interpreted on their own terms, 
not simply as earlier inferior stages on the long march toward civilisation, as the 
dominant Enlightenment perspective had it.  Historicism placed emphasis on 
striving to understand the conditions that shaped the culture, politics, and life of 
earlier societies. 
The influence of the Historicist approach is clearly evident in 
Clausewitz’s writings.  Perhaps the best example is to be found in his historical 
survey in Chapter 3B, Book 8.  Clausewitz explains that ‘the Tartars…eighteenth 
century kings…all conducted war in their own particular way, using different 
methods and pursuing different aims.’22  After impressionistically reviewing the 
different periods, Clausewitz concludes by stating that, ‘We wanted to show how 
every age had its own kind of war, its own limiting conditions, and its own 
peculiar preconceptions… It follows that the events of every age must be judged 
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in the light of its own peculiarities.’ 23   These ideas had been apparent to 
Clausewitz in his early twenties, when writing about the Thirty Years War.  
Criticising scholars who saw those wars as nothing but formless and brutish 
struggles, Clausewitz emphasised that the men of the age ‘acted in accordance 
with their economic and technological condition, their political and religious 
concerns, and their psychology.’24  Essentially, Clausewitz is emphasising the 
relativistic point that generalisations with regard to how war is and should be 
fought will always be circumscribed in their universal application by the play of 
changing historical conditions. 
Paret, in an essay considering Clausewitz’s historical method, draws 
attention to these ideas.  He describes how Clausewitz, in his efforts to 
understand the great changes wrought by the French Revolution, felt compelled 
‘to fit the Revolution into the larger processes of European history’ because it 
could be ‘accurately interpreted only if the conditions preceding it were taken in 
to account.’25  Similarly, Clausewitz recognised that the military institutions of 
the ancien régime were rendered almost obsolete because their ‘forms and means 
were no longer appropriate to the changed times and political conditions.’26  In 
On War, Clausewitz explained that war underwent significant changes during his 
life because of the ‘new political conditions which the French Revolution 
created…conditions that set in motion new means and new forces, and have thus 
made possible a degree of energy in war that otherwise would have been 
inconceivable.’27  This sentiment is also expressed in Clausewitz’s ‘Observations 
of Prussia in Her Great Catastrophe’, relating to the massive defeat and 
humiliation suffered by Prussia at Jena in 1806, in which he states that ‘the 
machinery of government was desiccated, decrepit, and entirely unsuited to the 
times.’28  Later in the same piece, Clausewitz returns to this theme: ‘The French 
Revolution had lent a new character to European politics and to war, which 
Frederick the Great had not anticipated, as on the eve of great changes we 
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seldom can predict the direction matters will take.’29  These examples reveal the 
extent to which Clausewitz always strove to explain events – both historical and 
contemporary – in relation to prevailing conditions, as opposed to judging them 
according to some universal standard; a fault Clausewitz recognised in 
alternative approaches to history, in particular those with a teleological bent. 
The dangers of the teleological approach 
In his analysis of Prussia’s defeat in 1806, Clausewitz points to a certain 
mentality that pervaded elite Prussian society at the time, which viewed history 
in teleological terms and that conceived of Prussia as having reached a ‘level of 
civilisation at which the strength of the people was completely excluded from 
public affairs’ – if this was the case in Prussia, as this contemporary popular line 
of reasoning went, so too must it be the case elsewhere.  For Clausewitz, this 
ethnocentric Prussian mentality led to a failure to comprehend or accept the 
changed conditions of European politics wrought by the Revolution and its 
resultant impact on war.  In historical and philosophical terms, Clausewitz 
rejected such dangerous universalising illusions.  There is also a clear strategic 
point here: that those who fail to perceive and adapt to changed circumstances 
are more likely to face defeat in war. 
Paret notes how Clausewitz criticised other writers for their teleological 
view of history.  He states that, ‘History in the service of a philosophic 
worldview as Hegel encapsulated it, for instance, would not serve Clausewitz’s 
purpose.’30  Hegel’s philosophy is a good instance of the radically contrasting 
approaches to history that exist, and underlines the extent to which Clausewitz’s 
historicism and objectivity are by no means default positions (both then and still 
today).  Hegel, in his lectures on The Philosophy of History, seeks to reveal that 
history is essentially comprised of a rational process; the gradual unveiling of 
Reason or Spirit as Freedom, and which had supposedly reached its apotheosis in 
the Prussian state of his times.31  History, is presented as an impersonal process 
that essentially rejects what is not pertinent to its underlying telos, leaving only 
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that which correlates to reason as ‘Actual’.  Even dominant western perspectives 
today contain a large amount of an almost unconscious teleology, based as they 
are on broad Enlightenment ideals of progress and perfectibility.  A modern critic 
of this view of history is John Gray who has attacked both active (those who seek 
to accelerate progress) and passive (those that simply believe such progress 
exists) proponents of this belief in an ‘ultimate convergence in history.’32  
A very similar view – almost the military theoretical manifestation of 
Hegel – is apparent in the work of Clausewitz’s contemporary, Jomini.  He 
considered all earlier periods as merely preparatory to the present; a present 
which had revealed permanently valid principles of war – ‘fixed laws resembling 
those of the positive sciences’33 – as embodied in the campaigns of Napoleon 
(mirroring Hegel’s eulogy to the Prussian state) and can be summarised as: ‘to 
throw by strategic movements the mass of an army, successively, upon the 
decisive points of a theatre of war.’34  Clausewitz rejected this view because he 
believed that such principles were ‘dependent on the circumstances of the 
time…which might not recur under altered conditions.’35  Jomini passionately 
believed, as John Shy has put it, that a ‘reality lies beneath the superficial chaos 
of the historical moment in enduring and invariable principles, like those of 
gravitation and probability.’36  His principles of the ‘decisive point’ and ‘interior 
lines’ were the correlative of the Hegelian ‘Actuality’ embodied in the unfurling 
spirit of freedom.   
This belief would compel Jomini to attempt to discover military 
principles that were not dependent on contextual considerations, or at least only 
in the parochial sense of adapting otherwise extremely rigid principles to 
different circumstances.37  This conception of the impact of conditions is far 
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removed from the fundamental and comprehensive use of the term by 
Clausewitz.  In a manner typical of most teleological approaches, Jomini judged 
past wars (such as Frederick’s campaigns) on the unhistorical basis of principles 
that had been revealed, and which he believed he had identified, in their correct 
and universal form through the campaigns of Napoleon in the present.38  This led 
to a somewhat perverse formula when analysing past campaigns which 
essentially judged them according to how closely they adhered to the Napoleonic 
ideal, and might be crudely reduced to, ‘this is how Napoleon would have done 
it.’  Even if he recognised differences in the character of warfare and that ‘the 
specific application of principles would vary,’39 this did not prevent him from 
judging different periods – ‘from Scipio and Caesar to Napoleon’40 – according 
to one standard derived from the present and reflected back into the past.  Past 
defeats could be explained by a failure to adhere to the principles he had 
revealed, regardless of differing conditions: ‘Le système de L’Empereur 
Napoléon présente une application constante de ces principes invariable.’ 41  
Clausewitz explicitly criticises such approaches when he states that, ‘Whoever 
relies purely on the perspective of his own times is inclined to treat what is most 
recent as best – and he finds it impossible to deal with what is exceptional or out 
of the ordinary.’42 
 This brief examination of Jomini in opposition to Clausewitz clearly 
reveals that the study or use of history does not automatically entail an 
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appreciation or acceptance of the importance of context.  In Jomini’s case, the 
past essentially represented a handy store of examples that could be used to 
prove his principles derived from the present.  History was not to be understood 
in its own terms, but in relation to the principles he had uncovered.  Under 
Jomini’s hand, theory would shape history, rather than history shaping theory.  
Clausewitz, in opposition to Jomini, held to the latter approach and thus 
developed a theory that was more sympathetic to the importance of historical 
conditions and that, somewhat paradoxically, would be more universally relevant 
than Jomini’s supposedly ‘scientific’ system.   
This distinction can be more clearly discerned if we compare two 
statements by Jomini and Clausewitz.  In the conclusion of his The Art of War 
Jomini states that ‘we will apply this great principle [massed force at the decisive 
point] to the different cases of strategy and tactics, and then show, by the history 
of twenty celebrated campaigns, that with few exceptions, the most brilliant 
successes and the greatest reverses resulted from an adherence to this principle in 
the one case, and from a neglect of it in the other.’ 43   Contrast this with 
Clausewitz’s firmly historically inductive approach when he states that, 
‘theoretical results must have been derived from history or at least checked 
against it… A great advantage offered by this method is that theory will have to 
remain realistic.  It cannot allow itself to get lost in futile speculation, 
hairsplitting, and flights of fancy.’44  As Gat has made clear, Clausewitz rejected 
Jomini’s approach because it ‘ignored the living reality of war…and the unique 
conditions of each particular case.’45   
That the Jominian approach to the history of war is not without its more 
modern equivalents is revealed in Liddell Hart’s Strategy.46  In a fashion similar 
to that of Jomini, Liddell Hart – inspired by a moral indignation towards the form 
of ‘total war’ witnessed in World War I and relying on the eighteenth century 
precedent, as opposed to Jomini’s exemplification of the Napoleonic form – 
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prescribed operations on the line of ‘least expectation.’47   As Gat notes, his 
search for the universal principle of the indirect approach as the basis of all 
decisive successes ‘was marred by his unhistorical and naïve disregard for the 
particular conditions…which had shaped each period’s way of doing things.’48  
Strachan notes that of course, ‘the line of least expectation may in fact be that of 
supposed greatest expectation.’49  Again, deductive theory was allowed to lead 
inductive and critical historical analysis, perverting historical truth for its own 
ends.50    
Context in theory and historical method 
Despite, in the previous chapter, having discussed Clausewitz’s approach to 
theory and history it is worth exploring these ideas further, because contained in 
relevant sections of On War are valuable clues with respect to the importance he 
attached to context.  For instance, in his chapter on ‘Method and Routine’, 
Clausewitz rejects the notion of scientific ‘laws’ being applicable to war ‘since 
no prescriptive formulation universal enough to deserve the name of law can be 
applied to the constant change and diversity of the phenomena.’51  Indeed, it is 
this fundamental idea that explains many of the arguments Clausewitz puts 
forward with regard to the utility, limits, and purpose of theory.  For example, he 
explains that earlier efforts to produce a positive theory of war resulted from a 
‘failure to take adequate account of the endless complexities involved.’52  Theory 
cannot aim to become a commander’s manual for action’ intended ‘to serve as a 
guide which at the moment of action lays down precisely the path he must take’53 
because each situation presents different circumstances; due to changing 
contexts, all theory can hope to provide is a form of intellectual foundation, ‘not 
a model for the art of war.’54  If differing conditions throw up different strategic 
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imperatives then theory, to remain relevant, must be capable of accommodating 
this. 
In his chapter on ‘Historical Examples’ we gain a further indication of the 
centrality of context in his approach to theory.  The relevant section concerns the 
issue of using historical examples as proof for a certain theoretical proposition or 
general truth. 55   Clausewitz notes how some people believe that in using 
historical examples to demonstrate a proposition they can substitute quantity for 
detail: ‘instead of presenting a fully detailed case, critics are content merely to 
touch on three or four, which give the semblance of strong proof.’56  This, in his 
view, is a dangerous method as he argues that ‘an event that is lightly touched 
on…is like an object seen at great distance…it looks the same from every 
angle’ 57  and thus cannot offer conclusive proof.  For this reason, a single 
thoroughly detailed event is to be preferred over a number of limited cases.  This 
was a conclusion he had reached as early as 1812 when, in his written advice to 
the Crown Prince he advised that, ‘The detailed study of a few individual 
engagements is more useful than the general knowledge of a great many 
campaigns.’ 58   The reasoning behind these assertions is revealed when he 
explains why examples drawn from recent history will be more reliable and 
susceptible to considered analysis.   
The problem for Clausewitz is essentially one of context and relates to an 
issue touched upon in the introduction to this chapter.  Clausewitz states that, 
‘not only were conditions different in more distant times…but military history is 
bound with the passage of time to lose a mass of minor elements and details…It 
loses some element of life and colour, like a picture that gradually fades and 
darkens.’59  He goes on to explain that the study of more recent history is to be 
preferred because ‘the conditions of modern warfare…bear a considerable 
resemblance to those of the present day…The further back one goes, the less 
useful history becomes, growing poorer and barer at the same time.’60   
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Clausewitz’s comments are not to be understood as placing the lessons of 
modern history over and above ancient history in an objective sense: all periods 
and wars are intrinsically equally valuable to the formulation of a general theory 
of war, just not to the individual theorist who is inevitably timebound.  His 
concern relates to the fact that the determining conditions of the age under study 
will – by virtue of the lack of available evidence and the theorist’s poor 
understanding of very different times – be improperly grasped and, therefore, 
establishing critical proofs as to cause and effect, making judgements on the 
correct use of means (explained at greater length in the preceding chapter of On 
War), and extracting insights of timeless relevance will be imperfect and next to 
impossible.  The critical historian of ancient warfare is largely presumed to be ‘in 
no position to evaluate the relevant events correctly, nor to apply them to the 
wholly different means we use today.’61  A similar concern explains Clausewitz’s 
criticism of Machiavelli’s writings on war, which he details in an 1809 letter to 
the philosopher Fichte: ‘the art of war of the ancients attracted him too much, not 
only its spirit, but also in all of its forms.’62  
It is this line of argument that helps explain, and essentially reject, a 
criticism that has often been directed at Clausewitz.  This view has it that 
Clausewitz is over-reliant on historical examples drawn only from, what was for 
him, the relatively recent past, and in particular from the Napoleonic period.  
This, it is argued, explains why Clausewitz’s insights are of only historical value; 
the explanative power of On War is largely confined to the period from which 
most of its ideas are drawn.  First, such a claim downplays the extent of 
Clausewitz’s broad historical knowledge.  Second, the above points reveal that 
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the decision by Clausewitz to derive most of his general propositions from recent 
experience was both conscious and to some extent forced upon him, but forced 
only in the sense of someone who has thought hard about the alternatives and 
determined that there is only one credible way forward.  Due to Clausewitz’s 
conviction that meaningful conclusions can only be established based on a deep 
understanding of prevailing conditions, he was not willing to succumb to ‘vanity 
and quackery’ 63  in order to provide a cover of respectability – ‘sheer 
decoration’64 – to propositions that would almost inevitably lack inner-validity 
and truth.  
Context and the trinity 
And so we return to the trinity.  We have seen the numerous ways in which 
Clausewitz places great emphasis on the role of context, in particular with regard 
to its role in historical analysis and the development of theory.  These points 
alone should be sufficient to confirm the centrality of understanding contextual 
conditions in Clausewitz’s theory, but how do these ideas find their final 
expression in the trinity; the apotheosis of Clausewitz’s work.  It would be 
somewhat odd if, after emphasising such issues in his wider work, Clausewitz 
did not incorporate them, in some shape or form, in the trinity.   
The answer is that context is expressed in the trinity, but in a manner that 
does not sufficiently convey the theoretical weight behind the concept.  In fact, 
when the meaning is grasped, it becomes clear that the issue of context is 
presented in the very first line of the trinity: Clausewitz states that ‘war is more 
than a true chameleon that slightly adapts its characteristics to the given case.’65  
This sentence could be mistaken for a throw-away comment or handy metaphor, 
but it in fact embodies much of what has been explained above and helps us 
comprehend the connection of context to the other aspects of the trinity.  
Clausewitz was a master of metaphor and few were included that failed to 
convey true meaning.66  Contrary to popular belief, chameleons do not change 
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colour according to their surroundings, but rather do so as a result of their 
physiological condition; it is an expression of changes in mood or temperature.  
Yet it is clear that Clausewitz has in mind the popular conception of a 
chameleon’s ability to blend with its surroundings.  So what does this apt, if 
scientifically inaccurate, analogy tell us?   
In comparing war to a chameleon Clausewitz is suggesting that war’s 
outer appearance – its character, the ‘face of war’ –  is in constant flux, even 
though its inner nature remains unchanged.  That intrinsic nature relates to the 
three primary tendencies of the trinity.  In this respect, war is ‘more than’ a 
chameleon because he goes on to explain how the three tendencies will 
constantly change in their relationship to one another.  Bassford has pointed to 
this aspect of the analogy when he notes that ‘this metaphor, while pretty good as 
far as it goes, is still insufficient, because war also changes in deeper ways (i.e. 
its nature) according to the circumstances of each real-world case.’67  Here, the 
scientifically correct chameleon would perhaps be a more appropriate analogy.  
Bassford’s excellent translation of the original text expresses this idea more 
clearly: ‘war is thus more than a mere chameleon, because it changes its nature to 
some extent in each concrete case.’68   Nevertheless, taken together the three 
tendencies represent permanent (yet modulating) features of war.  The 
appearance of the chameleon's skin at any one time represents war in the 
‘particular case.’69  This relates to the character of war at a given moment.  Its 
character (colour) may have changed but it is still by nature, war (or in the 
chameleon’s case, a member of the family chamaeleonidae) comprised of policy, 
chance, and passion. 
The change in character – and this is the central point – results from a 
change in the environment in which the chameleon finds itself.  Its surroundings 
exist outside and beyond itself, beyond its control.  Furthermore, if we make the 
assumption that the chameleon changes its colour to survive by camouflaging 
itself from potential prey, then this may also be applied to war in the sense that 
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war can only be an effective instrument if those using force take into account the 
circumstances in which it is employed.70  But this potentially important strategic 
point is not our main concern.  Clausewitz is making the non-prescriptive, 
objective observation that the character of war will always be shaped by the 
general context in which it takes place – the chameleon changes its colour, but it 
does so more or less involuntarily as a result of its environment.  Even 
chameleons that fail to change colour appropriately cannot help but be products 
of their environment and they have no choice but to act in the context in which 
they find themselves (yet, again, they may be more vulnerable).  Just as the 
surroundings of the ‘popular’ chameleon will be in constant flux due to changes 
in the seasons, weather, or the terrain it finds itself in, so too is the context within 
which war takes place constantly changing.  War, in the concrete case, will 
reflect the unique context that is in evidence at a particular time. 
Yet, war is certainly ‘more than’ a chameleon in another sense.  The 
analogy does not properly convey the complex, interdependent relationship 
between, on the one hand, war and those engaged in war, and on the other, the 
context within which they wage war.  As Clausewitz was aware, there is a 
continual, mutual, and reciprocal relationship between the two.  The popularly 
conceived chameleon simply reacts to its surroundings and adapts accordingly, 
but this is not the case with the social phenomenon of war.  The context is, to a 
great extent, formed (however unwittingly) by the actions of individuals and 
groups, and they then act within that context. 
Clausewitz’s analogy of a chameleon is the clearest expression of the 
concept of context in the trinity.  As such, it embodies a whole range of insights 
– outlined above – which are to be found throughout Clausewitz’s works.  The 
importance that context played in Clausewitz’s theory of war as contained in the 
trinity, is neatly summarised by Paret when he states that the elements of war 
(the three tendencies) are ‘not compromised or distorted by being placed in a 
particular historical context, the context allows us to see their essential nature as 
they act and react in a dynamic state rather than as abstractions.’71  To conclude 
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this section, we should return to the final passage of Clausewitz’s historical 
survey in Book 8, Chapter 3B.  The passage is essentially a concise expression of 
Clausewitz’s broad theoretical framework (as embodied in the trinity) and thus 
enables us to clearly determine the place context assumes in it.  Clausewitz states 
that:  
 
The aims a belligerent adopts, and the resources he employs, must be 
governed by the particular characteristics of his own position [the 
secondary level]; but they will also conform to the spirit of the age and to 
its general character [the context].  Finally, they must always be 
governed by the general conclusions to be drawn from the nature of war 
itself [the primary trinity].72  
 
There is thus considerable evidence of Clausewitz’s reliance on the broad notion 
of context – often described by him as ‘conditions’ – in relation to war.  
Furthermore, it is employed in some of the most important sections of his work.  
Its presence in the trinity as a partially hidden, yet central theoretical device has 
also been demonstrated.  However, if we are to reaffirm the place of context in 
our interpretation of the trinity, this concept requires more in-depth analysis.  
Proceeding from this solid Clausewitzian base, we can consider this idea in 
relation to recent scholarship on the issue, in the light of historical experience, 
and through an analytical exploration of the concept.   
Explorations 
Clausewitz certainly takes us quite far in understanding the concept of context, 
and principally by stressing its importance, but a closer consideration reveals a 
number of potential problems with this idea.  Context, no matter how 
commonsensical its inclusion as a vital aspect of a theory of war may appear, is 
by no means a simple idea, nor is it easy to deduce its main outlines in theory.  In 
fact, the idea of context is so diffuse and wide-ranging that fixing on any one 
simple definition or description of its central components is extremely difficult.  
Therefore, the best way to approach the subject is to probe the concept from a 
number of angles, by asking different questions of it, and considering its 
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boundaries with other concepts.  By exploring the concept in this way we will be 
able to develop a more rigorous understanding of context and one that goes 
beyond a simple recognition of the fact that it is important. 
Much of the best modern scholarship – historical, strategic, and 
theoretical – on war stresses the importance of context in a manner reminiscent 
of Clausewitz and, indeed, often in conscious emulation of him.  We have 
already noted acclaimed historian, Michael Howard’s recognition of and 
scholarly adherence to the importance of wide contextual knowledge in 
explaining military events.  Colin Gray, a leading strategic theorist and self-
confessed Clausewitzian, has described context as ‘the most important variable 
in understanding war.’73  In his book Another Bloody Century: Future Warfare, 
he asserts that the only way to plausibly discuss future warfare is to embed the 
analysis in war’s multiple contexts.  Indeed, this is a unifying theme in his 
numerous publications on strategy.74  In Rupert Smith’s important book, The 
Utility of Force, his more overtly contemporary and pedagogical thesis is built 
entirely around the idea of contextual change and the work constantly stresses 
this point.75  That modern wars are fought predominantly ‘amongst the people’ in 
contrast to those of the era of industrial war, is a proposition based on the notion 
of fundamentally changed conditions in a number of key respects.  Lawrence 
Freedman’s thesis outlined in his Adelphi Paper on The Transformation of 
Strategic Affairs is similarly dependent on the impact changes in context – 
principally in political conditions – have on strategic choices in the modern 
world.76  
The usual practice is to acknowledge the importance of context and 
perhaps outline its most important dimensions (be they social, technological, 
economic, and so on).  This is to be welcomed, and undoubtedly the substantive 
content of the work of these thinkers is heavily suffused with contextual 
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knowledge, which only serves to enhance the integrity and worth of their 
analyses.  Nevertheless, there is a hidden assumption that we understand just 
what context is.  Perhaps it is necessary to analyse the concept itself (as opposed 
to its substantive manifestations) in greater detail.  As with any analytical 
concept, we need to understand where it begins and ends in relation to other 
concepts.  The concept of context is particularly demanding of such definitional 
analysis, because it has become a greatly overused term which has consequently 
been drained of some of its meaning and explanative power.  This section thus 
seeks to explore the concept by examining it through a number of central 
problematical areas.  
Gray’s discussion of strategic culture in his Modern Strategy offers us a 
useful starting point in thinking about definitions of context.  Gray notes a 
dualism in definitions of context: ‘context can be considered as something ‘out 
there’, typically in concentric circles, meaning ‘that which surrounds’.  
Alternatively…one can approach context as that which weaves together’ (from 
the Latin contextere, ‘to weave together’).’77   The first perspective certainly 
corresponds to typical conceptions of context.  The dictionary defines context as 
‘the circumstances that form the setting for an event, statement, or idea’ and 
suggests, amongst others, ‘conditions’, ‘background’ and ‘scene’ as close 
synonyms.78  The second of Gray’s perspectives is less common but, as explored 
below, is central to a proper understanding of the term. 
The first perspective, of context as that which surrounds, logically entails 
that the concept only becomes truly meaningful when used in relation to a 
particular ‘something’ (be it, as the dictionary definition notes, ‘event, statement 
or idea’).  Understanding the substantive content or form of context only 
becomes possible when conceived in relation to a particular situation or thing.  
We can ask the philosophical question ‘what is context?’, however, one cannot 
plausibly ask in isolation, ‘what is the context?’ without clarifying what it is we 
want to know the context of.  Thus, the first basic point to note is that context 
only has substantive meaning or existence in relation to a particular subject or 
‘thing’.   
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Whilst this must be accepted, context is, to a certain extent, always ‘out 
there’ in the sense that it represents the permanent (yet constantly morphing) 
setting in which events are played out.  So, rather than the notion that context 
requires a subject, this perspective holds that subjects can never escape context.  
The concept as a tool for understanding war is thus universally valid: all wars 
take place in context.  The factors or dimensions that come to be described as the 
context of a particular event are permanently extant.  Those dimensions only 
truly become ‘the context’ of something when that something happens.  Just as a 
stage exists independently of the players that act upon it, that stage has little 
meaning until the play begins.  To describe context as including a vague realm 
existing independently from any particular event certainly puts strain on the 
concept defined simply as ‘that which surrounds’: is it useful to call a stage a 
stage unless someone intends to act upon it?  Yet, despite these definitional 
problems, it is difficult to conceive of context without this broader somewhat 
more ethereal perspective, without an appreciation of its existence independent 
from the immediate event.   
Consider geographical context for instance.  When a war takes place in a 
particular territory, the features which make up that territory represent aspects of 
that war’s geographical context.  Take away the war and those same features can 
no longer plausibly be described as context, but they exist nevertheless – from 
one perspective, they are context waiting to happen.  Whilst certain social trends, 
topographical features, cultural norms, climatic conditions and so on, exist 
independent of particular events, can be analysed in their own right, and are only 
properly termed context when used in relation to a particular event, it is vital to 
understand that such dimensions are the stuff of which context is made.  These 
fairly common-sense observations are further clarified if we consider another 
distinction inherent in the concept: that between context and circumstance.                     
Context versus circumstance 
It will be recalled that the dictionary definition used the term ‘circumstances’ in 
its description of context.  Whilst this is by no means entirely wrong, we must 
tread carefully.  The two terms, often used interchangeably, are strongly and 
intimately linked, however, a more rigorous analysis reveals that in fact they 
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constitute subtly different concepts that describe different things.  If, as noted, 
there is something of a distance between the context and its subject, then the 
concept of circumstance is perhaps a useful mediating device.  Circumstance is 
best understood as the aspect of context closest to the event being described and 
actors involved.  As with context, but in a more definite sense, it only has 
substantive meaning in relation to the specific subject: it still constitutes an 
element of ‘that which surrounds’, but, if we adopt the idea of context visualised 
as concentric circles, then circumstance would perhaps equate to the first or inner 
circle.  Circumstance is more immediate and close; context is more long-term, 
deeper, and detached.  In this sense, circumstance takes up some of the strain we 
noted in the definition of context.  Circumstance is essentially the immediate 
expression or manifestation of context.  From the viewpoint of the immediate 
event at a certain point in time, context essentially becomes circumstance and it 
is difficult to see how the two can be clearly distinguished.  Particular actors 
have to act in certain given circumstances presented by the situation in which 
they find themselves.  Those circumstances were in turn determined by and 
dependent on prevailing contextual conditions, which exist prior to and beyond 
them.   
Context and time – change and continuity 
How does context relate to time and the idea of change over time?  When we 
consider different dimensions of context in more detail below, one point becomes 
clear: that the various substantive dimensions seem to display to the observer 
different levels of change and permanency over time.  As noted, context, as an 
operative concept in the theory of war, is permanent: no actor exists outside of a 
context.  Yet context in its substantive form has the potential for endless change 
over time.  Consequently, this change is reflected in the different circumstances 
actors find themselves in throughout history and, indeed, in the character of their 
own institutions, beliefs, or available technologies.79  Context – in terms of its 
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individual dimensions – can be conceived of on a spectrum allowing for 
extremely gradual change over time (such as geography or certain aspects of 
culture) to rapid or sudden change (such as technological advances or significant 
changes in structures of political power brought about, for instance, by 
revolution).  As a holistic concept context never displays complete stasis: there is 
constant change in some of its dimensions regardless of how gradual they may 
be.  The idea of change is thus inherent in the concept.   
Related to this idea, there is an analytical problem here of distinguishing 
or making judgements on the speed or rate of contextual change.  Which aspects 
of contextual change we emphasise depends on what we are attempting to 
explain.  In a variation on the bureaucratic axiom that ‘where you stand depends 
on where you sit’, how we evaluate a particular contextual dimension (and the 
level of change displayed) depends on what it is we are attempting to explain or 
understand.  It is this issue which makes abstract discussion of context so 
difficult.  Judgements on the extent, rate, and form of contextual change are 
invariably relative and subjective.   
A useful exercise in relation to the issue of context and time is to consider 
the conditions of war in prehistory, before the coming of agriculture about 
10,000 years ago.  There is considerable evidence that early hunter-gathers 
engaged in rudimentary forms of warfare.80  It is interesting to speculate as to the 
rate of contextual change during this period.  For thousands of years wars were 
fought only on land – evidence of the first ships only appears in the seventh 
millennium BC and ‘specialised warships, even ships suitable for war, are 
relatively recent in origin.’81  Extremely rudimentary weapons, limitations on 
language, and the absence of writing would have restricted the extent of social 
and cultural contextual change.  However, this is not to deny that there was 
significant change in this period – as historians, we must be careful not to judge 
the pace of change purely against modern standards and ‘adopt a conception of 
time that is anachronistic when applied to the past.’82  Nor should the idea of 
contextual continuity lead us to presume that individual wars in such conditions 
would not raise entirely new problems requiring great talent, skill, and audacity 
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to overcome.  Recognition of relative levels of change or continuity in context is 
not to necessarily pronounce on the comparative difficulty or ease of strategy – 
that is largely dependent on factors peculiar and inherent to any particular war.  
All that can be said is that more stable conditions allow protagonists to become 
better acquainted with their environment, their opponents, and themselves – this 
may help them understand better what effect certain methods and actions can be 
expected to have.  Still, even marginally different circumstances in the concrete 
case, varying objectives, the constraints imposed by available resources, or the 
unpredictable choices of the opponent can render irrelevant what comfort stable 
contexts may provide.  
Recognition of significant contextual change in relation to war is a 
subject strongly associated with the study of so-called ‘military revolutions.’83  
Historians have identified what they perceive to be major changes in the 
character and conduct of war resulting from or influenced by transformations, 
‘earthquakes’, or systemic changes in politics, society, technology, and 
administration.84  The debates that surround exactly when, where, and why such 
revolutions have taken place is not our principal concern here, but this idea sheds 
light on the nature and potential impact of context in relation to war.  One of the 
most important and far-reaching military revolutions accompanied the formation 
of centralised nation-states in the early modern period, roughly dated to the 
period between 1500 and 1800.  The financial burdens of war resulting from new 
technologies (such as gunpowder weapons, elaborate fortifications, and gunned 
ships) meant only centralised states with bureaucratic machineries and 
sophisticated money markets could generate the economic wealth through 
taxation and deficit financing to maintain, and the socio-political infrastructures 
to organise, effective armed forces. 85   Wealth and resource extraction thus 
became a prerequisite of power, whilst wealth became increasingly dependent on 
military effectiveness in wars that supported mercantilist trading empires.86  This 
period also saw the gradual emergence of recognisably modern, regular, 
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professional, larger 87  armies – from the Spanish tercios, through Gustavus 
Adolphus’s Swedish national army, to Louis XIV’s remarkable royal army88 – 
which replaced the localised feudal levies of the middle ages and the 
unpredictable condottieri companies of the Renaissance.89  Princely power was 
consolidated, medieval ‘private war’ declined, and the modern state with its own 
professional standing armed forces, dedicated to the pursuit and protection of its 
national interest, took shape.  The path to the absolutist, national, and ‘total’ wars 
of the eighteenth, nineteenth, and twentieth centuries lay open.  
Of course, although he didn’t express it in such terms, Clausewitz 
essentially believed he had lived through and witnessed a profound military 
revolution, sparked by the enormous social and political upheavals associated 
with the French Revolution.  Few today would disagree with the basis of his 
observation.     
Context: weaving together 
An important point that might not be clear in what has been written thus far is 
that context should not be seen as wholly external to the actors in war.  The 
concept runs through and within the social entities under observation.  A crucial 
aspect of context relates to a given actors own position: its form, character, 
norms, culture, ideology, as well as those of its opponents, allies, and other 
relevant groups.  Context should not be conceived as a wholly exogenous 
concept.  It will be recalled that Clausewitz employed the analogy of the 
chameleon in conveying the idea of how context impacts on war in the trinity and 
it was briefly noted that this was a useful yet insufficient metaphor; the limitation 
perhaps implied by Clausewitz’s qualifier ‘more than.’  Likewise, the analysis 
presented so far suffers from a crucial weakness.   
Whilst it is right to treat context as something that surrounds war (its 
actors and the course of events), this might convey the impression that context is 
something that exists as an entirely independent realm, like an omniscient and 
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omnipotent God directing the universe, and in which human actions and events 
thus simply follow a preordained pattern.  In fact, context is more analogous to 
the Homeric Greek pantheon, composed of many varying dimensions, extremely 
capricious, and intimately and reciprocally wound up with human affairs.  If we 
are to develop a more robust conception of context then we must understand the 
ways in which context not only surrounds, but as Gray stresses, ‘weaves 
together.’90        
The basic point here is that humans and the societies, nations, and 
institutions of which they are part, constitute an important aspect of the 
conditions of war.  War is a social and political activity, and thus conditions 
relating to societies, political institutions, and cultural forms represent some of 
the most important factors impinging on the conduct of war, and of course, these 
things cannot be conceived of independent from the humans that comprise them.  
It is in this way that the trends and forms of human social conduct produce and 
reproduce the changing contexts within which the same actors conduct their 
wars.  The relationship between war’s context and warfare itself is thus one of 
reciprocal and dynamic interaction over time.  Due to this interaction, there is an 
extent to which, in some cases, powerful actors are able to shape their own 
contexts to varying degrees.   
The totalitarian states of the twentieth century had an unprecedented 
capacity to manipulate and mould their societies according to their own 
ideological prescriptions.  Through sheer force, indoctrination, and mass social 
programming (as so evocatively depicted in such dystopian novels as Huxley’s 
Brave New World, Zemyatin’s We, or Orwell’s Nineteen Eighty Four)91 state 
actors can radically reshape their own social, political, and cultural conditions.  
For instance, the Holocaust was Hitler’s attempt to change the social fact of the 
existence of Jews in Europe.  These represent clear and striking examples of the 
attempts of actors to reshape their environment.  In a less dramatic yet related 
sense, many states will still seek to actively influence the conditions in which 
military operations take place through what are termed ‘shaping strategies.’92 
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As this idea of ‘weaving together’ is perhaps somewhat abstract and 
difficult to conceive it is useful to consider the issue in relation the important 
subject of strategic culture.  The concept refers to the internalised and 
characteristic ideas, patterns, prejudices, and habits of behaviour that unique 
security communities display.  It emerges from socially transmitted ideas, 
attitudes, habits, and preferred methods of operation, which in turn derive from 
collective perceptions and interpretations of historical experiences, as well as 
feeding upon, in some measure, all the dimensions of context discussed below.  
Strategic culture essentially approximates to a form of ‘guide to action’ and can 
be particularly influential in times of crisis and necessity, when cultural instinct 
often kicks in.93  As Black states it is crucial to understand the ‘plasticity or 
changeability’ of the term,94  and that there may be multiple cultures within 
individual nations or groups.  Nor does culture imply a rigid causality between 
ideas and behaviour, tradition and action.  Groups can display ‘counter-cultural’ 
behaviour, but in the longue durée such instances tend to confirm the overriding 
attitudinal environment as they tend to ‘revert to type.’  For instance, the massive 
British continental commitment during World War I did not fundamentally alter 
its traditional maritime orientation.95 
So, generally, when groups go to war, they do so possessed of unique sets 
of assumptions, predispositions, and habits with regard to the use of force.  
Decisions will at least be influenced by prevailing cultural preconceptions and 
social norms of behaviour: ‘the human hosts of strategic culture are inalienably 
part of their own strategic context.’96  This culture may be so deeply ingrained 
that we can begin to talk of a nation’s ‘way of war’ – essentially referring to 
noticeable continuities in the behaviour of certain strategic cultures.  Strategic 
culture represents an important contextual feature for any nation or armed group, 
and one that is inextricably part of its unique history and institutions.  This 
represents a notable way in which the groups engaged in war, their institutions 
and individuals, are to an extent an element of their own context. 
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Context: important, but not decisive 
There is another essential point regarding the concept of context that must be 
clarified.  Clausewitz’s emphasis on contextual understanding is, at heart, simply 
a recognition of its considerable importance as a permanent factor influencing 
war.  This line of argument is not equivalent to suggesting that contextual factors 
are always the major determinants of success or failure in war.  Recognising the 
importance of context does not entail subscribing to any overarching structural or 
deterministic causality: agency still matters.  It does not entail that actors will 
behave in any particular way and it is possible for commanders to achieve the 
defeat of the enemy with little or no comprehension of wider contextual matters.  
Ultimately, events will be decided by facts on the ground, by actions taken and 
not taken, and, as Clausewitz stressed, by pure chance or luck.  As Gray notes, 
‘the mystery of combat performance is by no means entirely the product of 
contextual factors but rather is driven in part by influences integral to war 
itself.’97  
For the commander, contextual knowledge is no silver bullet.  For the 
historian, context cannot explain all.  As Jeremy Black has noted, too much 
emphasis on context ‘removes the sense of uncertainty in which contemporaries 
made choices.’98  For the historian, hindsight is something of a poisoned chalice 
to the extent that it can encourage judgements of inevitability based on analyses 
of prevailing conditions.  Perhaps there was an element of truth in John Adams’s 
observation that the British had lost the American War of Independence before 
the fighting had begun due to the political and geographical context – which 
entailed suppressing a popular uprising at vast distances from home – but this 
conclusion underestimates the Patriots’ difficulties in creating and sustaining an 
effective army and the considerable extent of Loyalist sympathies in the southern 
colonies.99  Nevertheless, we can state with considerable confidence that a firm 
knowledge of context would not only improve a commander’s chances but also 
add significant weight to the historian’s analysis.  Of course, it is perfectly 
possible to misdiagnose context; indeed, contextual comprehension is 
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notoriously difficult and even potentially overwhelming,100 and perhaps in such 
cases we may conclude it would have been better not to try (for the commander, 
leading to mistaken actions, for the historian, mistaken analyses).  Nevertheless, 
as a general rule, careful consideration of context is to be encouraged.  Why is 
this so? 
Context can be viewed as setting the broad parameters within which 
success in war is achieved, or that may equate to what Barry Watts terms ‘option 
sets in possibility space.’101  No actor can escape context or circumstance.  For 
instance, states do not have much say as to where they are located, politicians 
must act in the geopolitical realities of the moment, and commanders have to use 
the armies that they have available to them.  Such facts are the historically 
determined and largely inescapable conditions within which war is waged.  A 
war will necessarily have to be considerably protracted for notable and serious 
contextual change to make itself felt, beyond mere circumstantial alteration.  For 
instance, no leader could have turned Germany from a continental power into an 
island power, no matter how much they may have wished it, and thus solved one 
of that country’s enduring strategic problems (other than perhaps by completely 
occupying the Eurasian landmass and creating a German continental island as 
Hitler so nearly achieved).  Through certain measures humans can attempt to 
solve or mitigate the problems posed by the various conditions in which they find 
themselves, but they cannot escape from context itself. 
For instance, it is largely axiomatic in modern counterinsurgency doctrine 
that winning the allegiance of the people to the government is the sure root to 
success, and many practical implications flow from that basic premise.102  Yet, 
that assumption is heavily context dependent to the extent in which it relates to a 
specifically Western liberal-democratic approach to counterinsurgency.  
Historically, the alternative approach for many tyrannical regimes has been a far 
more direct military, forceful, and repressive approach along the lines of ‘kill 
them all, let God sort them out.’103  John Nagl notes the approach adopted by 
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King William II in suppressing a Welsh revolt in the late eleventh century in 
which he ‘intended to abolish and utterly destroy all of the people until there 
should be alive not so much as a dog.’ 104   Unconstrained by the standards 
expected of liberal regimes and unconcerned by electoral politics, many autocrats 
have suppressed uprisings with calculated and audacious efficiency, if not 
wholesale slaughter.  Where liberal states have resorted to elements of such an 
approach (such as torture, massacres, or forced resettlement), this has usually led 
to local or domestic political turmoil, such as highlighted by the French 
experience in Algeria during the 1950s and 60s.105  In this light, the context of 
democratic domestic politics represents a crucial determinant which makes the 
minimum use of force and winning the support of the population a far more 
expedient, if still hugely difficult approach.  Of course the matter is more 
complex than this, but the example serves to highlight a basic point about the 
delimiting effect of context in terms of possible effective courses of action. 
 From the commander’s perspective, a wilful disregard of context is a 
likely cause of strategic failure.  Certain contextual factors may come close to 
strategically dooming an actor before the act of war itself.  But, again, we can not 
go as far as saying the result is entirely determined, even if the context suggests it 
may be probable.  Again, the impact of contingent factors pervade the whole 
course of war – as examined in Chapter 5 – and make prediction of outcomes 
based on objective conditions impossible.  If such certainty existed we would not 
expect war to occur at all as the outcome would be preordained.  At a minimum, 
contextual knowledge may enable strategists to anticipate likely enemy 
weaknesses that can be exploited, protect against potentially counter-productive 
actions, or prepare more appropriately for future scenarios.  At best, shrewd use 
of contextual knowledge may allow the commander to threaten the use of force 
in a way that causes the enemy’s capitulation before a shot has even been fired.  
Context sets the conditions in which certain strategies and tactics are likely to be 
effective.  It is for belligerents to generate strategic outcomes and to use means 
effectively toward the attainment of specified ends, but the use of those means 
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should be adapted to the context in which they are employed.  This goes a long 
way in explaining why the opponents of Napoleon were unable to defeat the 
Emperor’s forces until they adapted sufficiently to keep pace with the new form 
of war generated by radically altered social, political, and, ultimately, military 
realities.  
From the historian’s perspective, a wilful disregard of context is a likely 
cause of parochial explanations and limited analysis.  Yet we should not be over-
impressed by what context can explain, even if analysis of context makes certain 
outcomes appear inevitable.  Outcomes may have been as much the result of 
great generalship, chance happenings, or decisions taken on the day.  
Nevertheless, at a minimum, knowledge of context enables the historian to 
appreciate why exactly the belligerents are fighting, why they are using the 
weapons they are, why the public is reacting as it is, and so on.  At most, context 
may constitute the most crucial and decisive factor in the explanation of a 
strategic outcome.  Context provides greater meaning to otherwise seemingly 
arbitrary events and enables deeper causal analysis.  Historians are entitled to 
describe events as they happened, but they will make little sense if entirely 
detached from causative historical context. 
The dimensions of context 
Up to this point our discussion of context has taken place at a somewhat abstract 
level in order to determine some of its most important aspects in theoretical 
terms.  Yet, we need to develop a clearer idea of how context is manifested in 
reality and what elements comprise its substantive dimensions.  This section thus 
outlines those fundamental aspects of context that have served to shape the 
character and actions of war-making peoples throughout the course of human 
history.  Yet, just how far can we go in theory on this subject?  Given the 
inherent changeability of context, there is a limit to what can be stated with 
universal applicability other than to outline its most salient features.  As noted, 
detailed description of context is only possible in relation to specific events or 
periods.  In relation to any particular war, some of the major dimensions will 
bear more heavily than others, and some at different stages, depending on the 
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unique dynamics of the conflict, such as its length, location, the character of the 
belligerents, their  objectives, and so on. 
Linked to this, it must be noted why only key dimensions will be 
considered here: of course, it would be theoretically possible to keep widening 
our scope to incorporate all the multifarious aspects of context in their infinite 
variety.  Such an undertaking is far beyond the aims of this thesis and, as Gray 
comments, ‘One can offer too big a big picture.’106  As Knox notes, we – and in 
particular those responsible for making strategy – must narrow our focus to some 
extent because ‘too much complexity makes the mind seize.’107  If one attempts 
to reflect simultaneously on all past wars that have been fought and the contexts 
that shaped them, the result is almost mental paralysis.  The vast complexities of 
the world and the diversity of forms conditions can take, particularly in relation 
to a subject as open and comprehensive as war, is certainly cause for theoretical 
modesty, but even then prominent categories and essential dimensions crystallise 
in our thinking and serve as comprehensible avenues into the almost infinite 
possibilities of reality.  Here we are interested only in the fundamental 
dimensions of context and those that relate, demonstrably and consistently to 
war.  Of course, within each of these dimensions exists the potential for great 
variation with regard to its particular manifestation in historical and real-world 
cases.  Some representative examples are provided simply to make clear the kind 
of factors described.   
In delineating between the various categories of context, the aim is 
simply to draw attention to those dimensions that have impacted on war 
throughout history and are likely to continue to do so.  This categorisation does 
not imply that in relation to any particular war, all dimensions will be equally 
influential.  Analysis of any specific war requires careful study and identification 
of the primary causative contextual factors.  It is likely that at least some 
consideration of all dimensions will be pertinent to specific cases, but the 
following typology need not be followed rigidly and there are various possible 
approaches that may be employed; approaches which may better reflect the 
complexity and interactions between the different dimensions in reality.  What 
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follows is an analytically simplified and idealised typology, not a rigid blue-print 
for critical historical analysis or, for that matter, strategic planning.  
Whilst these divisions are analytically necessary and useful, it must be 
borne in mind that there are considerable interconnections across these 
conceptual divides.  Indeed, as noted in the previous section, context should 
properly be conceived of as a complex web of interacting dimensions which 
continually shape and impact on each other over time and of which the actors 
themselves are constitutive.  As Gray notes, ‘warfare, contains and expresses all 
those dimensions, or contexts, all the time, and they each influence all the 
others.’108  For instance, geography has a powerful influence on political and 
strategic cultures, 109  whilst advances in technology can radically alter social 
relations or power balances.  Below we will consider each of these dimensions in 
some measure of analytical isolation to simply, as Clausewitz put it, ‘elucidate 
the idea we wish to convey.’110 
Historical context 
Context makes little sense without understanding its connection to history or 
historical chronology – in fact, history can be conceived as one of context’s 
prominent dimensions.  What do we mean by this?  From one perspective history 
provides context with its form: social relations do not exist in isolation from 
time, are crucially affected by prior events, and in our analysis of the ‘here and 
now’ the past cannot be ignored.  Because all actors are necessarily located in 
time, they cannot but be affected by what has gone before them, either in the way 
history shapes material realities or through its impact on social and cultural 
forms.  Emphasising chronology may appear to be little more than a nuisance, 
but in fact it can be crucial to proper contextual understanding.  As Gray notes in 
relation to World War II, ‘the 1930s in Germany were, of course, ‘made’ in the 
1920s, which in turn were ‘made’ by the Great War…we see the origins of Nazi 
Germany in the (German) myth of an undefeated army in 1918 and in the 
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Weimar Republic, just as we see the several holocausts of 1945 rooted in the new 
Germany of the 1930s.’111  
Perceptions and understandings of what happened in the past (whether 
true or false) powerfully shapes the ideas and behaviour of those in the present.  
The effects of history can influence events in the most subtle and imperceptible 
ways, as it feeds into the consciousness, assumptions, and beliefs of those acting 
in the present, but where the precise impact is difficult to fathom.  Sometimes, 
however, the contextual impact of history may be more apparent.  Examples of 
the crucial importance of history in shaping the causes and course of war are 
manifold.  For instance, there can be little doubt that the spate of revolutionary 
wars in the third quarter of the twentieth century were powerfully influenced by 
the example of Mao’s successful guerrilla campaign in China112 and the image of 
‘self-consciously hairy-chested’ masculinity embodied in Che.113     
History also feeds into the institutional memory of war-making 
institutions.  In his book European Armies and the Conduct of War, Strachan 
reveals how armed forces developed new doctrines and plans based on their 
earlier experiences of various campaigns. 114   Similarly, the Napoleonic 
campaigns served as a major source of operational lessons for most European 
militaries up until the First World War, as the understanding of them was filtered 
through various interpretations.115  This was particularly so in France where the 
offensive spirit of Napoleonic warfare was emphasised even as technological 
change appeared to point to the importance of the defensive (as tentatively 
revealed during the American Civil War or the Russo-Japanese War).  Earlier, in 
Clausewitz’s Prussia, memory of past successes under Frederick the Great was 
one reason out-dated methods were retained: in this way sometimes history, as 
context, can retard contemporary adaptation to changing conditions. 
History also influences war in more direct (even personal) ways in 
shaping belligerents behaviour and reactions in certain situations. History can 
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inform perceptions about other groups and indeed, one’s own group, based on 
past experiences or historical myth.  The ongoing Arab-Israeli Conflict is a 
notable case in this respect.  This emotionally charged confrontation is pervaded 
by memories of many earlier wars (in particular those of 1948, 1956, 1967, 1973, 
and 1982) which have served to further polarise opinion on either side and 
exacerbate tensions in the region.  The importance of history is noticeably strong 
in the Middle East, where many armed groups name themselves after notable 
dates or key figures 116  and a culture of martyrdom is particularly prevalent.  
History can sometimes lend disproportionate importance to otherwise barren 
territory, inflame hatreds where peaceful coexistence once reigned, or prevent 
resolution of a political problem where common ground might otherwise exist.  
Regarding the latter, if between two peoples there exists a history of conflict and 
betrayal, peaceful solutions to current wars may prove all that harder to achieve.   
Many of the other dimensions of context discussed below, are 
importantly shaped by historical determinants.  History continually weaves 
together political, social, and cultural threads over time, and represents a 
combination of traditions, experience, and inherited beliefs.  Thus, to consider 
cultural context as a static phenomenon, independent of time and history would 
be wholly inaccurate.  We may be able to talk of the particular manifestation of 
culture in relation to a specific event, but the concept is dependent for its form on 
its historical background.  Past wars may be considered the most potent aspects 
of history: particularly if long, involving great sacrifices, or marking important 
turning points in a nation’s history, they can be powerful shapers of attitudes and 
behaviour down the years, even ones fought hundreds of years ago, whether 
victory or defeat.  For instance, the conflict in Kosovo between Serbs and 
Albanians during the 1990s was pervaded by the memory of the Serbian defeat in 
the 1389 Battle of Kosovo Polje.  Tim Judah has even remarked that, in Kosovo, 
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‘history is war by other means.’117  In this way, history becomes inextricably 
intertwined with political realities. 
Political context 
This dimension of context encompasses a wide variety of elements, foremost 
amongst which are the nature of the political tensions between groups, the 
distribution of power in the system, and the political conditions and relationships 
within and beyond states leading up to and during war.  Here we are concerned 
with prevailing power dynamics, be they local, domestic, regional, or 
international in scope.  The political context is fundamentally characterised by 
persistent change and is inextricably intertwined with other contexts from 
economic power, technological sophistication, or religious or ideological values, 
all which feed into the power constellations, which surround and run through 
war.  The development and emergence of morphing political conditions over 
time brings forth the precise conditions which lead to conflict between groups 
and serve as basic underlying determinants of war’s character throughout and 
into the subsequent peace.  As Gray notes, ‘The political context is the source of, 
and provides the meaning for, war and its conduct in warfare.’118  The political 
‘womb in which war develops’119 can be comprised of a complex mixture of 
internal and external factors which coalesce to cause a state of confrontation 
between groups over certain issues. 
So, for instance, in his analysis of the wars of his age, it was changed 
political conditions which Clausewitz stressed as the fundamental determinants 
of their cause and character, both with respect to the internal permutations 
emanating from the political and social consequences of the French Revolution, 
but also regarding the impact of these changes on the wider international political 
order of Europe.  The ideals embodied in the new republican French state 
represented a serious ideological threat to the cherished traditions and social 
patterns of the conservative states of Europe (propagandised by the activities of 
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anti-revolutionary émigrés), whilst – as Edmund Burke powerfully argued120 – 
the subsequent Empire building of Napoleon threatened the unwritten, yet 
powerful stabilising norm of the balance of power on which relations between 
ancien régime states had been based for at least a century or more.121 
Also, domestic political conditions constitute powerful forces on war.  
For instance, following Napoleon’s exile to St Helena most of Europe became 
predominantly concerned with domestic political instability and fears of 
insurrection, thus post-Napoleonic armies were generally limited in size and 
conscription was abandoned in many states, primarily because rulers had to 
ensure soldiers were loyal in order to face revolutionary insurgents.122  Only with 
the rapid rise of nationalism in the late nineteenth century were the domestic 
political conditions in place for the ‘total wars’ of the twentieth.  The impact of 
internal political conditions is particularly apparent in relation to the wars 
conducted by modern liberal democratic states.  With their free media, civil 
society, and frequent electoral cycles, leaders in wartime are faced with profound 
political and military conundrums.  This is particularly noticeable in Western 
‘wars of choice’ due to the difficulty of explaining the necessity of intervention, 
justifying mounting casualties, and resisting pressure for precipitate ‘exit plans’ 
when often the overriding strategic requirement is the will to stay the course and 
prove to populations that they will continue to provide security.123 
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Socio-cultural context 
In an essay on ‘The Germans and the French’ written in 1807 Clausewitz notes 
that ‘the character of a nation, even insofar as its original, fragile nature may be 
affected by changing customs, is not as easily reshaped as philosophers and 
moralists seem to think.’124  This idea is presented in a discussion of the potential 
impact of national character on war and conveys the importance he attached 
between socio-cultural conditions and war.  Written soon after the disaster of 
1806, he notes that, ‘I cannot conceal it from myself how far the German national 
character has contributed to our present condition.’125 
Prevailing social forms, cultural norms, taboos, attitudes, traditions, 
ideologies, religious beliefs, and values are all crucial factors influencing the 
complexion of war.   Even popular culture such as works of fiction might impact 
on war in important ways. 126  Whereas traditional approaches tend to focus on 
material features, Black stresses that it is ‘far from clear that variations…in 
‘cultural’ factors, and related norms, should play a smaller role in the history of 
war than weaponry.’ 127   As noted, these elements of context are strongly 
connected to history in the way such forces are moulded and refashioned over 
time by events, interaction with other communities, and the impact of changing 
material conditions.  Socio-cultural change may be gradual or subject to more 
rapid transformation, often due to war itself, 128  enforced cultural change, 
religious conversion, economic trends, or the spread of new ideologies.     
Cultural factors may constitute crucial determinants of behaviour, 
shaping decision makers perceptions regarding strategic alternatives.  If, for 
instance, we can speak of a modern Western ‘way of war’, it is strongly shaped 
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by prevalent socio-cultural forces.  Jeremy Black has identified a number of 
prominent trends in this respect.129   He points to a ‘Revolution in Attitudes 
towards the Military’ influenced by the spread of democratisation, human rights 
discourse, individualism, hedonism, changed gender relationships, and a 
burgeoning human rights discourse,130  which – although the trends from one 
country to the next may be highly variable – have contributed to a decline of 
civic militarism, societal debellicisation, and a general reliance on 
professionalised forces.131  Martin Shaw subsumes these changes into the notion 
of an emergent Western ‘post-military society.’ 132   Consequently, Western 
publics demand that collateral damage and both civilian and military casualties 
are kept to a minimum, particularly in wars of choice where losses are deemed 
unnecessary.133  This in turn has contributed to a reliance in Western military 
operations on precision air-power and technological virtuosity, 134  as well as 
‘force protection.’135  This is of course just one general example.  It is important 
to keep in mind the vast possibilities encompassed in this dimension, be it 
manifested in the culture of glory and imperial ambition of Rome, the religious 
fanaticism of the European middle ages, or the secular religions of the nineteenth 
and twentieth centuries.   
Another important aspect of this socio-cultural context is the state of 
attitudes on the ethics of the use of force, which may create significant problems 
of legitimacy for political leaders where the use of the military instrument runs 
up against widespread moral concern.  In modern times, public attitudes 
regarding the morality of war have become greatly entangled with legalistic 
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interpretations, so that the two have become almost indistinguishable in 
rhetorical terms.136  This brings us to the legal dimension of context. 
Legal and ethical context 
Clausewitz ostensibly downplays the importance of the law, custom, and ethical 
considerations in war; a position consistent with many classical realist 
thinkers. 137   Famously, in the opening chapter of On War, he states that, 
‘Attached to force are certain self-imposed, imperceptible limitations hardly 
worth mentioning, known as international law and custom, but they scarcely 
weaken it.’138  Yet, we must recognise that this point is made as he is progressing 
toward his abstract discussion of absolute war.  Thus, he is wanting to stress that, 
logically, such factors do little to limit the inherent escalatory dynamic of war.  
Nevertheless, Clausewitz’s overall attitude is certainly one that downplays the 
role of law or morality, and which views the use of force in the prevailing 
realpolitik conception whereby necessity entails that states are deemed to have a 
natural, general right to use force to secure their interests.  In true Machiavellian 
style,139 Clausewitz remarks that ‘mistakes which come from kindness are the 
very worst’ 140  and ‘Woe to the government, which relying on half-hearted 
politics and a shackled military policy, meets a foe who, like the untamed 
elements, knows no other law than his own power!’141   
However, a closer analysis perhaps reveals a more inclusive conception.  
It is apparent that Clausewitz would at least have been aware of the potential 
influence of such factors, as even the extreme exponent of realpolitik, 
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Machiavelli recognised before him. 142   As Howard notes, ‘He knew very 
well…that the conduct of war was subject to considerably greater and more 
perceptible limitations in his own times than it had been in the days of, say, 
Genghis Kahn.’143  Personally, Clausewitz’s internment under ‘easy conditions’ 
following his capture at the Battle of Auerstedt in 1806 owed a great deal to the 
conventions of the time.144  Also, his dismissive tone in the opening chapter is 
balanced somewhat by the emphasis he places on the importance of social norms: 
for instance, that armies in the eighteenth century did not generally plunder and 
lay waste to the enemy’s land largely owed to ‘the spirit of the times.’145  Whilst 
most limitations in war he attributed to practical objective considerations, the 
balance of power, 146  or the more effective and intelligent use of force, 147 
Clausewitz did not entirely reject the potential importance of law and ethical 
considerations – they were rolled up with general social norms, which vary in 
their relative form and influence throughout history.  Nevertheless, particularly in 
the light of modern history, we need to acknowledge the insufficient attention 
Clausewitz devoted to this subject. 
It is important to note that the laws of war (understood both in the sense 
of unwritten cultural norms and as positive law, both crude and sophisticated) 
and ethical traditions of war, both concerning when war is justified (jus ad 
bellum) and what is permissible during war (jus in bello), have exerted varying 
levels of influence on war throughout history.148  From the customs of primitive 
tribes and Roman Fetial Law, to Chivalric codes and the Geneva Conventions, 
societies have sought to establish when war is justified and what is deemed 
acceptable behaviour in war, in particular with regard to the treatment of 
prisoners, the rights of non-combatants and the wounded, and the weaponry 
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employed.  In the last century, the laws have extended further to cover a great 
many other issues.149   For much of history, the laws of war have consisted 
largely of unwritten social understandings, whilst powerful ethical traditions – 
such as that of the Christian ‘Just War’ and its more recent secular juristic 
descendants, which incidentally display continuing vitality and power in modern 
times150 – have importantly shaped public discourse and the decisions of political 
and military leaders.    
The last 150 years has seen the increasing codification of the ‘laws of 
war’ – themselves strongly influenced by the precepts of the Just War tradition151 
– and principally since the late 1850s after the Red Cross and first Geneva 
Conventions were introduced.  Subsequently, numerous important 
developments 152  have further consolidated legal prohibitions on war, whilst 
ethical thinking has tended to converge with such juristic conceptions.153  The 
importance placed on these constraints by states is testified by the legions of 
Western lawyers standing over commanders authorising attacks on individual 
targets in modern military operations.154  Also, the general right of ‘legitimate’ 
sovereign entities to wage war has, principally since 1918, been essentially 
reduced to the right of self-defence, whilst ‘virtual equality before the law’ for 
non-state entities, such as insurgent movements, has been introduced.155   
These are all crucial developments that testify to the remarkable 
developments in this area with all their implications for the conduct of war, even 
if, as throughout history, laws are observed more in breach than observance.  The 
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trinitarian framework must be capable of incorporating these ideas as potentially 
and variably influential contextual factors, and we have shown that there is 
evidence that Clausewitz would accept this, even if he did emphasise, perhaps 
rightly, the limits of law and moral concern in an activity so pervaded by 
necessity.156 
Socio-economic context 
It somewhat easy to forget that, ‘Wars, after all, must be paid for’157 and as 
Strachan notes, ‘it remains helpful to consider the economic constraints on 
military policy as a distinct pressure on the development of war’s conduct.’158  
Troops have to be paid, fed, and supplied, weapons procured, and so on: as Gray 
reminds us, this dimension is ‘fundamental, enduring, comprehensive, and 
inescapable.’159  Throughout history wars have been shaped by what is and what 
is not possible economically.  From a broader perspective, – as Gat and Paul 
Kennedy have demonstrated – economic wealth has, particularly during the early 
modern period, constituted a major factor in determining military superiority and 
the relative power of nations.160  This is, of course not a novel concern: Coker 
suggests one of the principal reasons Carthage was defeated by Rome in the 
Second Punic War (218-201 BC) was because they were less wealthy than 
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Rome.161  In modern times, it has been argued that economic factors attained an 
almost strategic lead role in the two World Wars of the twentieth century.162   
Military operations are often fought to secure resource rich territory to 
further fuel war or simply as a result of acquisitiveness, to fill the state’s coffers.  
For instance, Hitler’s annexation of the Sudetenland in 1938 was partly 
undertaken in order to secure additional important resources to boost Germany’s 
faltering rearmament programme.163  Part of his wider political vision was the 
idea of German economic recovery through territorial expansion and the 
annexation of lebensraum in the East.  Subsequently, important strategic 
decisions were impelled by the need to acquire vital resources, in particular 
‘Operation Blue’ of 1942 intended to capture the Soviet oil fields in the 
Caucasus,164 thus ‘feeding war by war’, as Napoleon had perfected previously.165  
At least since the demise of mercantilism in the eighteenth century, 
prominent commentators have held that the context of increasing global 
economic interdependence and interconnectedness will foster peace, given the 
increasing costs of going to war.  In the 1790s Thomas Paine stated that 
commerce is ‘a pacific system, operating to cordialize mankind, by rendering 
nations useful to each other...If commerce were permitted to act to the universal 
extent it is capable, it would extirpate the system of war.’166  This was a hope 
famously dashed in 1914 and ever-increasing globalisation has failed to curb the 
outbreak of war in recent years, perhaps even exacerbating the tensions that lead 
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to conflict.167  Historian Niall Ferguson has argued that the wars of the twentieth 
century were propelled forward by economic volatility (both in times of decline 
and rapid growth) which intensified socio-political tensions, promoted instability 
in weakening empires, undermined new democracies, and heightened racial 
antipathies.168  In a similar vein, many prognostications of future conflict point to 
the potential for great instability caused by resource scarcity and social ruptures 
caused by economic tensions. 169     
It is common to note that Clausewitz paid little heed to the economic 
dimension of war.  He barely discussed Napoleon’s ‘Continental System’ and 
Knox notes how he was surprisingly ‘mute on the revolution in the mills and 
iron-foundries that had kept Britain fighting until triumph at Waterloo’,170 yet it 
would be mistaken to claim that he did not understand its general importance.171  
Clausewitz notes how, at the end of the seventeenth century the power of states 
‘lay entirely in their treasuries’ as money payments, supported by a more 
efficient administrative machinery, allowed central governments to recruit large 
standing armies.172  Through the eighteenth century the means which states had 
to wage war came to be based largely on the available ‘money in their coffers.’  
Thus, Clausewitz clearly recognised that the financial context was a major factor 
shaping the wars of the age.173         
Whilst the economic dimension of war is important – and has perhaps 
been close to decisive in some modern wars – it is perhaps useful to remember 
Machiavelli’s advice that it is ‘imprudent to accept the common maxim that 
riches are the sinews of war.’174  Economic factors should be viewed as strategic 
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enablers – wars still have to be fought and won at the operational and tactical 
levels,175 and as the Americans in Vietnam learnt, massive economic superiority 
is no guarantee of strategic success.  Also, Richard Overy has dismissed the 
popular thesis that Gross Domestic Product won World War II.176  Economic 
factors, like technology, are best considered as crucial material contextual forces, 
but that do not warrant inclusion as part of war’s inherent nature, as some 
commentators, such as Ian Roxborough and Michael Handel have proposed.177  
As Stephen Biddle argues, material preponderance has been exaggerated and 
states’ relative economic, demographic or industrial strengths are poor indicators 
of military power; they only matter if they can be effectively exploited through 
modern doctrines of tactical force employment.178  Similarly, Paret remarks that 
Clausewitz was too knowledgeable to equate mere wealth with military 
strength.179  Of course, perhaps the principal reason economic power is crucial in 
war, is so that political entities have the ability to invest in, produce, or buy the 
myriad material implements of war.  After all, as Machiavelli stated, ‘war is 
made with steel and not with gold.’180  This brings us to the technological context 
of war. 
Technological context 
A frequent critique levelled at Clausewitz’s conception of the trinity is that it 
fails to sufficiently address the importance of technology as an integral element 
of war.  This was probably due in large part to the fact that the rate of 
technological change had been relatively gradual in the period prior to and 
around the time Clausewitz wrote.  The advances in technology since 
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Clausewitz’s day have indeed been rapid and far-reaching.181  Yet, Clausewitz 
was right not to view technology as part of war’s intrinsic nature, but rather as a 
constant shaping contextual dimension.  As he states, ‘It is clear that weapons 
and equipment are not essential to the concept of fighting, since even wrestling is 
fighting of a kind.’182  Whilst the relationship of technology with all dimensions 
of war is important and complex, it is essential to maintain perspective.  Jeremy 
Black suggests that ‘technology has to be understood as an aspect of an entire 
socio-economic system’ 183  and as Gray notes, ‘Technology is only one 
dimension of warfare, and at that not the most important.’184   Technological 
superiority alone has rarely assured victory and, moreover, in the longer term, 
‘Every new device and mode of war carries the virus of its own technical, 
tactical, operational, strategic, or political negation.’185   
The technological dimension is indeed a vast subject covering many 
subsidiary elements, including weapons, communications, transport, intelligence 
collecting equipment, or even food preservation.186  That technology has, since 
the beginning of human history, constantly shaped and reshaped the waging of 
war in important ways is an unremarkable observation.  Since the 
scientific/industrial revolution, the pace of technological change has certainly 
accelerated and the potential material means available to humans have 
proliferated – there simply is not room here to describe such changes in detail.  
More recently, as will be discussed further in Chapter 5, technology has been the 
driving force behind a so-called ‘Revolution in Military Affairs’, whereby 
precision weapons, numerous high-tech sensors, and information technology 
have been exploited to enhance military effectiveness.  As with the introduction 
of revolutionary new technologies in war throughout history, no doubt the 
character or ‘face’ of war will be transformed, yet, as history again suggests, 
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such technology will not provide independent solutions to strategic problems as 
some commentators predict. 
Geographical context 
Within the geographical dimension of context we include, first, such factors as 
the location, size, and features of political entities and their geopolitical relation 
to one another.  Second, it encompasses the various spatial dimensions within 
which war is fought, which have radically expanded over the last two centuries – 
initially being confined to either land or sea, commanders now have to cope with 
war in the air, space, and even cyber space. 187   These developments – the 
consequences of technological change – have undoubtedly rendered modern 
warfare more geographically diverse and complex.  Clausewitz observes that ‘a 
commander must submit his work to a partner, space…which because of the 
constant movement and change to which he is subject he can never really come 
to know.’188  Third, the physical environment, including terrain, topography, and 
the weather are all geographical factors that greatly impinge on the character and 
course of war.  Clausewitz notes that ‘combat uninfluenced by its surroundings 
and the nature of the ground is hardly conceivable.’189 
The simple fact of a nation’s location can have crucial strategic and 
geopolitical implications: as Gray notes, ‘Geography is destiny.’190  A state’s 
location can greatly shape its strategic culture or tactical doctrine: consider the 
different imperatives faced by a continental state such as Germany and an island 
nation like Great Britain.191  The size of a nation may have crucial implications – 
for example, the vast Russian hinterland enabled resistance against both 
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Napoleon and then Hitler by ‘trading space for time in a protracted defence.’192  
Also, guerrillas and terrorists seek to exploit geography by remaining highly 
mobile and not being tied to specific locations, although of course they cannot 
exist outside of geography and they generally require some form of base, be it 
the jungle hide-out of the Cuban revolutionaries or the inner-city loft-space of the 
F.L.N. during the Battle of Algiers.  Al-Qaeda’s leadership have managed to 
evade being captured or killed by US special forces through exploitation of the 
geopolitical features of the mountainous border area straddling Afghanistan and 
Pakistan, with its cave complexes surrounded by broadly sympathetic local 
Islamist tribes. 
Weather, terrain, and other elements of the environment can be 
‘capricious, disadvantageous, fortuitous, formidable, opportune, problematic, and 
risk-inducing.’193  Of course, for most of history the nature of the seasons, the 
need for soldiers to help with the harvest, combined with the constraints of 
existing transportation, restricted campaigns to a few months of the year, but the 
elements have had a more direct impact on war.  Indeed, weather extremes have 
been responsible for some of history’s most notable events in war: the ‘Divine 
Wind’ which twice denied the Mongols conquest of Japan; Napoleon’s horrific 
crossing of the thawing Berezina River in 1812; General Burnside’s abortive 
‘Mud March’ of 1863;194 and the Russian winter which essentially saved the 
Soviet Union in 1941 – indeed, Hitler believed he might have been victorious 
had he attacked five weeks earlier in May 1941 thus gaining himself longer 
before the snows set in.195  Such environmental factors are difficult to predict 
except in general terms; history certainly suggests commanders should expect the 
unexpected. 196   Some aspects of the topographical context are naturally 
occurring, such as rivers and mountains, whilst others might be man-made, in 
particular in the form of fortifications, barriers, and walls of various 
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descriptions.197  Technology has of course been used to overcome some of the 
more limiting effects of war’s geographical dimensions, whether through 
specialised equipment and vehicles, 198  long-range weapons delivery systems, 
advanced communications, or modern strategic lift capabilities.199  Nevertheless, 
geographical dimensions remain an ever-present influence: ‘time and distance 
and weather still exercise enormous influence on the strategic options and 
capabilities of states.’200  So, as Clausewitz noted, commanders require great 
imagination to be able to comprehend the manifold dimensions of their spatial 
and geographical context.201 
Reflections 
As MacGregor Knox has highlighted, human history in the last few centuries has 
undergone a profound transition from the ‘cyclical quasistagnation of the 
agrarian age to the permanent revolution of science, technology, and industry.’202  
These momentous changes have certainly transformed, and continue to, the 
conditions within which war is conducted at a seemingly accelerating rate.  In 
this chapter we have sought to provide a general theoretical overview of the 
nature, dynamics, and forms that this changeable context can take.  The 
processes are too vast, inherently varied, and endlessly changeable to enable any 
detailed description of its substantive features in the space available, and it is in 
the nature of the concept that it allows of concrete analysis only in relation to the 
particular.  Rather, we have been concerned with grasping its importance at a 
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theoretical level as an overarching, shaping influence on the forms that war can 
take, but which leave the essential nature of war in Clausewitz’s conception 
relatively undisturbed.  We concur with Knox that Clausewitz’s central insights, 
primarily as enshrined in the trinity, have stood the test of the great changes that 
have taken place in all the dimensions of war’s contexts.          
These explorations into some of the prominent contextual dimensions 
have important implications for our understanding of the trinity.  In order to fully 
understand the operation and meaning of the different elements and levels of the 
trinity we need to firmly anchor the concept of context to the theoretical 
framework.  As argued above, the idea of context is already present in 
Clausewitz’s trinity, but in a somewhat diffuse, unclear, and hidden form.  This 
has caused much misunderstanding and a failure to appreciate the important and 
in-built idea of change within the parameters of his theory.  A number of 
commentators have noted the inherent flexibility or elasticity of the trinity, and 
this is best understood when we bring together Clausewitz’s conception of the 
essential nature of war with the idea of context.     
It is through the dynamic play of variable conditions on actors in war that 
explains the infinitely changeable character or manifestation of the three central 
primary elements of war’s nature at the secondary, subjective level.  As Gray 
notes, ‘Naturally…the social, political, and even ethical, contexts are ever influx.  
But…that fact poses no real difficulty for Clausewitz’s theory of war.’203  By 
bringing context firmly ‘back in’, we can better unleash the explanative potential 
in the trinity.  Context might best be conceived as forming a tertiary level in the 
framework.  It needs to be stressed that what is being suggested is not something 
that would have been alien to Clausewitz; in fact, we have already demonstrated 
how the idea of context was integral to his theorising on war and constitutes a 
major feature of the trinity as expressed through the chameleon metaphor. 
Context, as an operative element of the trinity, should be conceived of as 
an ever-present multifaceted web, comprised of a number of differing 
interconnected dimensions that interact over time.  Context surrounds war but is 
also reciprocally and mutually dependent on the behaviour of actors and the 
development of events.  The dimensions of context change over time in myriad 
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ways, sometimes with a profound impact on the conduct of war that may be said 
to amount to a ‘military revolution’.  War itself is a major factor working to 
shape the dimensions of context over time: as Gray notes ‘warfare has to be 
thought of as an integral part of, at least as the major shaping influence upon, 
those contexts.’204   
That Clausewitz emphasised the importance of unique conditions in war 
does not mean that he believed no generalisable insights could be extracted from 
history.  It did, however, certainly play a moderating role in the formulation of 
his theory.  His recognition of contextual particularism protected his theory from 
limited and one-sided conclusions and led him to establish a high threshold for 
those aspects of the nature of war that can be held to be truly universal.  Context, 
properly understood, is not part of the nature of war itself, but that nature, as 
expressed in the trinity, cannot be understood without reference to context, as it 
helps us explain why war’s nature manifests itself in divergent ways throughout 
history.  Or as Gray has put it, although change ‘in the distribution of power, in 
the political culture of key polities, in the technological and economic contexts, 
and so forth – matters, it does not matter to the degree that it can transform the 
nature of the subject.’205  The nature of war can never be considered without 
reference to context because all wars necessarily take place within specific 
contexts, that greatly shape their course, character, and outcomes.  As Clausewitz 
stated, ‘we must face the fact that war and its forms results from ideas, emotions, 
and conditions prevailing at the time.’206 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
Policy: War as an Instrument 
 
 
Politics is war without bloodshed while war is politics with bloodshed.1 
Mao Tse-Tung 
 
No one is forced into war by ignorance, nor, if he thinks he will gain from it, is he kept out by 
fear.  The fact is that one side thinks that the profits to be won outweigh the risks to be incurred, 
and the other side is ready to face danger rather than accept an immediate loss.2 
Thucydides 
 
 
This chapter is the first of the three core chapters of the thesis which explore, in 
turn, the individual elements of the primary trinity: politics, chance, and passion.   
Many commentators suggest that Clausewitz thought war was entirely 
governed by reason and controlled by the dictates of policy or ‘interest’.  
According to Creveld, Clausewitz viewed war as little more than a ‘rational 
instrument for the attainment of rational social ends.’3  Jan Angstrom notes that 
‘Clausewitz asserted that war is a rational and political phenomenon.’4  Booth 
has described a Clausewitzian ‘political philosophy of war’ which is purely 
rational and instrumental.5  Barbara Ehrenreich begins her study of passion in 
war by stating that Clausewitz saw ‘war itself as an entirely rational undertaking, 
unsullied by human emotion.’6  Furthermore, she suggests Clausewitz believed 
policy itself resulted ‘from the same kind of clearheaded deliberation one might 
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apply to a game of chess.’ 7   Even proponents of Clausewitz are guilty of 
overplaying this aspect of his thought, through attempts to transform his insights 
into ‘normative doctrine’8 and overemphasising the role rational policy plays in 
his theory.  
These interpretations contain seeds of truth, but only to a point.  The idea 
of rationality is clearly expressed in the trinity when Clausewitz states that war is 
composed of ‘an element of subordination, as an instrument of policy, which 
makes it subject to reason alone.’9  Regardless of the misleading translation of 
this sentence,10 how could an author who had witnessed first-hand the horrors 
and brutality of war, such as Napoleon’s dreadful retreat across the Berezina, and 
who had seen his government adopt and cling to such misconceived policies, 
come to such a seemingly cold and rigid conclusion?  It is not so much 
answering such questions that is important, but rather revealing the mistaken 
assumptions regarding Clausewitz’s ideas upon which they are based.    
  Undoubtedly Clausewitz stressed the importance of policy and reason in 
war and there is strong evidence to suggest, had he lived longer, these ideas 
would have attained a more prominent role.11  Also, it cannot be doubted that 
Clausewitz thought, in both a moral and didactic sense, that the use of force 
ought to be subordinated to policy.  Yet, these assertions, viewed outside of their 
proper context, would greatly distort Clausewitz’s contribution.  Clausewitz’s 
ideas are more nuanced and complex than any crude depictions of strict political 
rationalism would suggest.  Even a cursory acquaintance with his work would 
reveal the prominent role that emotional and contingent factors play in his 
holistic theory.  With such ideas in mind, no doubt Clausewitz would be in 
sympathy with Spinoza’s view that those who think men ‘can ever be induced to 
live according to the bare dictate of reason, must be dreaming of the poetic 
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golden age, or of a stage-play.’12  Indeed, Clausewitz believed that logic often 
came to a stop in the great labyrinth of war.13  There is no simple explanation of 
the manner in which the political element fits into his theory; no formulaic or 
linear characterisation will suffice.   
Yet, far from simply dismissing the critiques of Clausewitz in this area, 
the counter-arguments must be taken seriously.  Only by considering these 
alternative perspectives can we arrive at a thorough understanding of war’s 
nature.  As this chapter will show, ideas of politics, policy, and reason hold a 
number of differing implications in terms of their relationship to one another and 
their influence on war.  Moreover, the terms under discussion are themselves 
deeply complex and contested.  We must seek to understand better the ways in 
which these ideas developed in Clausewitz’s thought, how he perceived them, 
and the way in which he believed they operated in relation to war.  The political 
aspect of war is vital to his theory and any true understanding of the trinity 
requires a detailed understanding of this tendency and its relation to the whole.   
Part of the reason for misinterpretations relating to this tendency is the 
complexity of the subject itself, combined with its somewhat limited, disjointed, 
and contradictory presentation in On War.  Indeed, Gray has noted that this is a 
major weakness of the work.14  This may be surprising to some given the clear 
importance he attached to the idea, the emphasis placed on it by his critics, and 
the fact that it now usually defines Clausewitz’s modern relevance.  We must 
acknowledge and seek to rectify the somewhat insufficient consideration he gave 
to this subject.15  These deficiencies may in part be due to his untimely death, but 
we must also recognise his work for what it is and accept that it is not wholly 
satisfactory in its explication of this subject.  This is cause for a detailed analysis 
of the text, the logic of his thought on this subject, and the implications of his 
ideas in the light of history and contemporary scholarship.  Regardless of the 
deficiencies outlined above, Clausewitz certainly provides us with a strong 
foundation for further exploration of the subject. 
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In this chapter we consider some of the major influences on his thought 
relating to this subject.  This will provide the basis for a more detailed 
exploration in the second section.  Then we discuss some of the theoretical 
implications deriving from the preceding analysis. 
Background, influences and precedents 
Determining the specific influences that inspired and led Clausewitz to his 
insights with regard to this tendency is a difficult matter, not least due to the 
varied ways in which it can be interpreted.  However, this is not a futile task as 
there are indubitably a number of crucial factors which contributed to 
Clausewitz’s thoughts.  The purpose here is not to propose any direct correlation 
or deterministic causality between these factors and Clausewitz ideas.  Rather, 
we will explore, in a somewhat impressionistic manner, a number of areas and 
suggest ways in which Clausewitz was perhaps guided in his thinking by the 
broad intellectual climate, existing ideas, and his observations on the events of 
the day, some of which he was directly involved in. 
Clausewitz’s precursors 
Given that today the name of Clausewitz is almost synonymous with the idea of 
war as an instrument of policy, it is easy to overlook the fact that a number of 
theorists prior to and contemporary with Clausewitz had contemplated war’s 
connection with politics, often in ways which closely prefigured Clausewitz.  
The notion that war was related to the realm of politics was not an original idea, 
nor one that, at a basic level, was particularly shocking.16  Smith has noted that, 
‘the idea of war as an instrument of policy is most closely associated with 
Clausewitz but was already familiar in the eighteenth century.’17  Clausewitz 
himself explicitly accepts that the idea was more or less common-knowledge 
when he stated, ‘It is of course well-known that the only source of war is politics 
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– the intercourse of governments and peoples.’ 18   Echevarria notes that the 
contemporary Prussian Officer’s Handbook written by August Rühle von 
Lilienstern had it that ‘‘war as a whole always has an ultimate political purpose’, 
it is, in fact, undertaken ‘to realize the political purpose upon which the state 
decided in view of the nation’s internal and external conditions.’’19 
Earlier Enlightenment military theorists had focused almost exclusively 
on strictly military matters, considering war a subject area worthy of study as a 
separate discipline from that of politics – as a discrete and bounded system – yet 
this is not to suggest they were unaware of connections between the two.  
Moreover, some theorists had begun to grasp at the ideas that Clausewitz would 
come to present in a more thorough manner.  In this respect, Clausewitz was 
possessed of a relatively sturdy foundation of thought to draw upon: his ideas did 
not emerge in an intellectual vacuum.  The fact that Clausewitz only truly 
determined the role of politics in war in his final years20 is reason to wonder 
whether he could have reached those conclusions before his untimely death 
without such a foundation of existing ideas.  This is only speculation, and 
Clausewitz’s ideas on the subject were shaped by other important factors.  The 
point, however, is to emphasise that Clausewitz was not working from a tabula 
rasa, even if his ideas would go deeper than existing conceptions. 
A theme which emerges from earlier theories is that war is treated as 
something that arises out of political situations, yet which – to adopt 
Clausewitz’s metaphor of politics as the ‘womb of war’21 – orphans its child and 
leaves it to its own fate.  This perspective allowed thinkers to conclude that 
mastery of the art of war was vital if political interests were to be served, but 
they did not explore how one interacted with the other.  Montecuccoli, for 
instance, thought it vital to develop the science of war because it was of the 
utmost political importance.22  The first book of his Treatise on War was devoted 
to an extensive study of the nature and political context of war and, for him, the 
purpose of war was a favourable peace – an idea common perhaps since 
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Aristotle, in his Ethics, claimed that we ‘make war in order that we may live at 
peace.’ 23   Similarly, Friedrich von Lossau, a reformer and member of the 
Militarische Gesellschaft, of which Clausewitz was a member, held that, ‘Wars 
are therefore the exterior means of states to achieve by violence what they cannot 
achieve by peaceful means.’24 
Of Clausewitz’s contemporaries, Jomini was perhaps the most developed 
in his understanding on this subject.  At the beginning of his Art of War we are 
presented with a typology of war as shaped by distinctive political conditions and 
motives.25  Yet, the extent of Jomini’s observations on the impact of policy was 
that ‘these different kinds of war influence in some degree the nature and extent 
of the efforts and operations necessary for the proposed end.’ 26   Jomini’s 
discussion appears to offer a route into deeper analysis, yet this promise fades 
and the influence of politics is largely absent from his subsequent theory despite 
some partial, oblique, and anecdotal references: the autonomy of the military 
sphere is emphasised.  As Clausewitz held, knowledge of political ‘type’ might 
certainly help us understand individual wars, but is of little use to general theory, 
other than to show that there are indeed many different forms of political 
motivation that give rise to war.  In Jomini, as in the work of earlier thinkers, we 
do not see the same level of depth and intricacy, as regards the relationship 
between politics and war, that we do in Clausewitz. 
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Accepting what is contained in these thinkers works with respect to the 
relationship, they can be clearly distinguished from Clausewitz in three important 
respects: they generally treat war as an autonomous phenomenon capable of 
study in its own right; following from this, they do not explore the nature of the 
relationship and dynamic interaction between the two in any great detail; and 
finally, whilst groping towards the instrumental nature of war they do not explore 
the implications of this insight in terms of broader strategic and military matters. 
Machiavelli and the realist tradition 
Apart from contemporaneous thought on these matters, there was another rich 
vein of thought that had a much deeper lineage and which impressed Clausewitz 
greatly.  This was the broad tradition of, what we now know as classical realism, 
whose pre-eminent figures were Thucydides and Machiavelli, and which 
represented a powerful body of thought within which the use of force in political 
affairs was a principal concern.  Whilst there is no direct evidence of 
Clausewitz’s familiarity with Thucydides,27 his fascination with Machiavelli is 
undoubted.  We will thus explore Clausewitz’s debt to this tradition through the 
prism of Machiavelli’s writings.   
Machiavelli’s belief that war is essentially a branch of politics28 greatly 
impressed Clausewitz.29  The great Florentine, along with other thinkers in the 
realist mould, emphasised the idea that war was an inescapable feature of the 
relations between political communities in a hostile environment which 
resembled the imagined human state of nature, where each was compelled to 
fend for itself in the absence of an overarching authority and where, in the 
interest of security and self-preservation, others must eternally be considered as 
potential threats.30  Likewise, Clausewitz – in a way which clearly distanced him 
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from the idealist Kantian conception of Perpetual Peace 31  – ‘firmly 
believed…that the international arena was dominated by the behaviour of 
sovereign states guided by considerations of raison d’etat in which power played 
the major role.’32  This was the basic reason for Clausewitz’s ‘affinity with a 
writer who insisted that, above all, the state was an institution created and 
maintained by the realistic use of force.’33   In Machiavelli’s writings war is 
presented as an instrument; one of the occasionally vital means which states 
employ to attain their ends. 
Machiavelli wrote at a time of great political and military turbulence – 
somewhat akin to that faced by Prussia in the early nineteenth century – when the 
established patterns of Italian politics were under threat from both internal and 
external forces. 34   For both Machiavelli and Clausewitz the priority for the 
government was positive action to ensure the security of the state and stability in 
its relations with other states, which could only be achieved through a 
combination of astute political manoeuvring and maintaining military 
effectiveness.  Although Clausewitz did not follow Machiavelli in his somewhat 
brutal principles for consolidating domestic authority,35 he certainly accepted that 
governments must be prepared to use force (involving any means necessary) to 
ensure their security and independence when threatened by external forces.  
Machiavelli, drawing on classical texts, held that military success was greatly 
dependent on political conditions: a democratic civil society could produce a 
citizen army – as opposed to a professional mercenary force – with superior 
morale and spirit, hence increased battlefield effectiveness (a vital precondition 
for the security of the state).  Citizens’ experience of fighting for the community 
would, in turn, strengthen the virtuous bonds of civic republican unity.  For 
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Machiavelli, the good of the state and military effectiveness, politics and war, 
were intricately entwined in a virtuous dialectical relationship.36   Clausewitz 
strongly sympathised with the idea that politics and war could be mutually 
supportive in this way.37 
What is fascinating, is that in juxtaposing Machiavelli and Clausewitz we 
have a diplomat profoundly interested in military affairs and a soldier profoundly 
concerned with political issues.  This powerfully conveys the necessary 
relationship between the two: that two of the most penetrating minds of the last 
five hundred years felt the need to master both subjects regardless of their 
professional position, tells us a great deal about their inherent connection: one 
cannot fully comprehend one without an grasp of the other. 
The classical realist tradition certainly provided the broad intellectual 
parameters in which Clausewitz’s more detailed exploration of the nature of the 
relationship between war and politics could coalesce.  Reading the works of such 
thinkers allowed him to conceive of war from the perspective of politics and to 
contemplate its implications.  In particular, Machiavelli provided Clausewitz 
with profound insights into, not only why war is an inescapable feature of 
relationships between independent groups, but of the more subtle 
interconnections between civil and military affairs.  Yet, whilst war had been a 
central concern of such thinkers, there was a limit to their thought on the subject.  
Their emphasis had been on the political conditions which make war an 
inevitability and why it should be seen as a necessary instrument of policy.  
Despite Machiavelli’s extensive writing on military affairs – most significantly 
in The Art of War – he treats the actual conduct of war in a largely autonomous 
manner and his emphasis was on the political implications of military affairs.  
Clausewitz’s analysis approached the subject from the reverse perspective: he 
endeavoured to understand how politics impacted on war. 
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Events of the day, experiences, and historical analysis 
That political factors were a running concern for Clausewitz can partly be 
attributed to the ideas contained in some of the existing works on military theory, 
but additionally we cannot discount Clausewitz’s own experiences and his 
interpretations of the events of his lifetime as important influences.  As Brodie 
observes, in this sense he certainly ‘had some bitter and extraordinary personal 
experiences to help him along the way.’ 38   Combined with his historical 
analyses,39 Clausewitz began to see more clearly the nature of the interaction 
between war and politics.  From his earliest studies to On War, Clausewitz had 
always recognised the importance of politics, but the final prominent place it 
would attain in his theoretical framework occurred only later. 
From an early age Clausewitz had seen how military effectiveness could 
be fatally undermined without the correct political basis.  At thirteen he 
witnessed the failure of the First Coalition to follow up the successful siege of 
Mainz 1793 due to ‘Prusso-Austrian political arguments’,40 he observed the timid 
and irresolute Frederick William II pass up the opportunity of joining the Second 
Coalition,41 and later, in 1805 Clausewitz saw the new sovereign, King Frederick 
William III, cling to his neutrality while Napoleon, in the campaign culminating 
with Austerlitz, defeated Austria and Russia.  Finding himself facing Napoleon 
alone, the king could not accept the Emperor’s new demands and foolishly 
declared war.  If the king had read the political situation correctly, timely action 
in union with Austria and Russia may have averted the calamity of 1806.  But, 
the political failure ran deeper than that.  The inadequacies that would be 
revealed on the battlefields of Jena and Auerstedt in 1806 were not purely 
military, but resulted from a failure to recognise changed political conditions and 
adapt appropriately.  Prussia did not fully appreciate the nature of the political 
and military consequences of the Revolution in France, particularly with regard 
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to the new vigour and energy it instilled in its armed forces.  Prussia went to war 
with an army perhaps suited to a form of limited Frederickan war, yet entirely 
unsuited to facing the ‘untrammelled’ war practised by Napoleon.42  Clausewitz 
asks ‘would a purely military view of war have enabled anyone to detect these 
faults and cure them?  It would not.’43 
More generally, over the course of Napoleonic period, Clausewitz could 
observe how the states of Europe had individually and repeatedly failed to 
achieve anything like the political unity and cohesion that could have delivered 
strategic success.  Meanwhile, Napoleon had certainly provided Clausewitz with 
a master-class in employing the instrument of war to secure political power, and 
of reading the intentions and interests of his enemies to play them off against one 
another.  Yet, paradoxically, it was Napoleon’s ultimate strategic failure, 
culminating in Waterloo, which provided Clausewitz with the clearest example 
of the importance of politics.  His stunning military victories may have allowed 
him to dominate vast swathes of Europe, but his ultimate failure was political.44   
Napoleon’s battlefield victories were never politically decisive enough to 
lay the foundations for a lasting peace.  Regardless of his military genius, his 
policy objectives were unrealistic and he failed to understand that peace must be 
accepted by the military defeated, otherwise there always remains the potential 
for renewed resistance.  As Clausewitz stated, the ‘defeated state often considers 
the outcome merely as a transitory evil, for which some remedy may still be 
found in political conditions at a later date.’45  Napoleon refused compromise 
settlements46 and he never grasped that it was insufficient to simply dictate peace 
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terms, 47 short of imposing a ‘Carthaginian Peace’ on his enemies.48  European 
statesmen came to realise that coexistence with Napoleon was impossible; he had 
to be defeated by politically united military action.49  So, embedded in his great 
military victories were the seeds of his own downfall.50  Clausewitz could of 
course contrast the Napoleonic performance with the example of Frederick the 
Great who was capable of extreme vigour when necessary, but was then content 
to revert back to ‘a state of calm oscillation, always ready to adjust to the 
smallest shift in the political situation.’51  This led Clausewitz to conclude that an 
essential element of military genius was a ‘thorough grasp of national policy’ 
whereby the commander ‘is aware of the entire political situation’ and also 
‘knows exactly how much he can achieve with the means at his disposal.’52 
Recognition of the importance of politics is also reflected in Clausewitz’s 
historical works from an early age.  His scholarly professionalism and desire for 
objectivity compelled him to always trace events back to their prominent causes; 
to follow the threads of action back to their original motive.  In Book 2, Chapter 
5 of On War he notes that ‘a means may be evaluated, not merely with respect to 
its immediate end: that end itself should be appraised as a means for the next and 
higher one…In many cases, particularly those involving great and decisive 
actions, the analysis must extend to the ultimate objective, which is to bring 
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about peace.’53  Consequently, his numerous campaign analyses were inevitably 
drawn away from tactical matters toward fundamental political problems, and he 
always kept the political elements basic to every conflict steadily in view in all 
his strategic historical analyses.54   Through this process of intense historical 
study, Clausewitz would time and again be forced to contemplate the extent to 
which military events, engagements won and lost, or issues pertaining to military 
administration were often decided or at least influenced by political 
considerations.  These analyses provided Clausewitz with a rich empirical basis 
on which to develop his ideas in a more theoretical fashion. 
Explorations 
So, through the ideas of earlier theorists, his own direct experiences, historical 
analysis, and his reading of the events of the age, Clausewitz came to understand 
that politics was inextricably intertwined with the use of force, and that their 
connection could not be overlooked in theory: but how exactly were they related?  
His theoretical antecedents had grasped at the linkages, but failed to follow them 
through or adequately incorporate them into their systems.  From an early age, 
Clausewitz had, sometimes in extremely personal ways, come face to face with 
the interaction between politics and war, and expressed his personal political 
views on the pressing concerns of the day in forcible terms.55  But, how did 
Clausewitz take these ideas forward in his theoretical work, what concepts and 
methods did he employ to tackle the subject, and what were the precise meanings 
he attached to these issues?  The following sections will explore these problems 
in more detail. 
The overriding focus of Clausewitz’s studies was, of course, that activity 
to which his whole professional life had been devoted: war.56  This fact, as with 
other military theorists, often precluded detailed study of subjects seemingly 
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beyond those of a distinctly military character.  The closest Clausewitz came to a 
political appointment was his ultimately unsuccessful campaign to be appointed 
Prussian minister to the Court of St James in London57 and his only diplomatic 
experience being the part he played in the Convention of Tauroggen, which 
successfully facilitated the defection of General Yorck from the French at the end 
of 1812.  Nevertheless, Clausewitz could not help but be repeatedly drawn 
towards political issues and problems.  As we have seen, this emanated in part 
from the crucial impact that political factors had on the military events of the 
day.  Albeit a military man through and through, Clausewitz had a profoundly 
political mind, nurtured by a combination of factors: extensive study, discussions 
with knowledgeable acquaintances, detailed reflections on contemporary events, 
innumerable historical analyses, and deep involvement in both political and 
military affairs. 58   This is not to mention the simple fact of his ‘abiding 
fascination with political issues and questions of foreign policy.’59  If there was 
ever anyone well placed to explore the crucial relationship between war and 
politics, it was Clausewitz.60 
Politics and war in Clausewitz’s thought 
Any investigation into this subject requires a broad consideration of the place of 
Clausewitz’s discussion of political matters in the text and the manner or method 
by which he arrived at his final conception.  The actual structure of On War 
distorts our comprehension of this subject: there is no separate section devoted to 
politics and it was an aspect of war he intended to weave into the whole work 
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had he lived to revise the text.61  However, Gat has provided us with an near 
definitive account of the development of his thought in this respect, so the matter 
will only be outlined in brief here. 
As Paret has emphasised, the importance of politics was apparent in a 
rudimentary form in Clausewitz’s earlier works, but it was not fully integrated in 
a more coherent manner until later.62  Gat argues that the crucial turning point 
came in 1827, basing this contention on the evidence of Clausewitz’s note of that 
year.63  In the note, Clausewitz introduced two related ideas: first, the idea of war 
being of two types, politically unlimited or limited, and second, that war was a 
continuation of policy by other means.64  At the heart of the ‘crisis’ of 1827 was 
Clausewitz’s need to reconcile his old conception of war – the ‘annihilation of 
the enemy’ – with the fact that, in reality wars do not always conform to this 
extreme.  Initially, Clausewitz did not want to abandon his earlier concept, thus 
in Book 8, various factors alien to the nature of war are presented as explaining 
why war does not realise its true character65 and there is a ‘orientation towards 
the absolute form.’66  Although at this point war is seen as a continuation of 
politics67 and cannot be viewed as autonomous, politics is still not seen as part of 
the nature of war.  However, Clausewitz realised that if politics was so important 
then the idea of absolute war appears to lose much of its point: the reality of the 
diversity of war conflicted too greatly with the absolute concept.   
Book 1 attempts the reconciliation of this philosophical antinomy.  Here, 
war that does not reach its extreme is no longer seen as a negative form and war 
does not rule of its own independent will; the aim of war is no longer necessarily 
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the total overthrow of the enemy, but rather that demanded by policy.68  Thus the 
reconciliation takes the form it does in Books 1 and 8: war ‘as a political and 
multi-faceted phenomenon is the unity that fuses the pure nature of war [absolute 
war], which constitutes merely a partial understanding of reality, with the 
political conditions and requirements.’69  Limited wars are no longer deemed less 
genuine and there is no necessity for the escalation of force in every case.70  Only 
by viewing war in this way – as politically conditioned – Clausewitz concludes, 
can all wars be conceived as things of the same nature, and this is ultimately 
expressed through the ‘remarkable trinity’. 
Gat’s analysis is an invaluable resource with which to begin our analysis 
of Clausewitz’s ideas on this subject, but it is now our task to explore 
Clausewitz’s final conception in greater detail because its substantive elements 
are not fully explained in anything yet said.  First, we must be clear as to the 
nature of the terms we are concerned with.  This exploration of the dimensions of 
power and politics will also allow us to see more clearly how some 
commentators have misconceived what Clausewitz was trying to convey through 
this tendency.  
Power, politics, and policy   
As Bassford rightly points out, ‘telling students that war is an expression of X, 
without defining X, gets them nowhere.’71  Politics can mean different things to 
different people and it is true that Clausewitz never explicitly supplies a 
workable definition or firm guidance as to when and where he is differentiating 
between, what in English we would term, politics and policy, but which in 
German is covered by the single term, politik.  This can lead to considerable 
confusion in our understanding, therefore it is necessary to provide more 
concrete conceptions of these terms.  As Clausewitz believed, ‘Not until terms 
and concepts have been defined can one hope to make any progress in examining 
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the question clearly and simply.’72   Clausewitz perhaps used the term ‘quite 
freely’ and it certainly conveys different, albeit often closely related meanings in 
different parts of the work.  Understanding these distinctions is vital for grasping 
the meaning of politik as contained in the trinity and in its relation to other 
Clausewitzian concepts. 
Politics, at base, is about relative power.  The concept of power has 
become so overused as to almost render it devoid of meaning and it is too 
sensitive to be encapsulated by any succinct definition.73  An excellent starting 
point however is provided by Howard who states that, ‘Power, in itself, is 
something morally neutral, being no more than the capacity of individuals and 
groups to control and organise their environment to conform with their physical 
requirements or their code of moral values.’74  Politics is best conceived as a 
constant relational process whereby power is distributed within and between 
social groups.  This process determines relative levels of influence that different 
actors have over others: it is the capacity to get others to do what you want and 
prevent them from doing what you do not want.  As Bassford notes, it is in the 
nature of politics for it to be in constant and dynamic flux, ‘always involving 
give and take, interaction, competition, and struggle.’75  This process can take 
many forms: it can be either predominantly material or psychological, coercive 
or persuasive, conflictual or consensual, or any mixture of these.76  For instance, 
power can be secured through brute force, cultural values, religious edict, 
traditional authority, or established processes.  In relations between politically 
sovereign groups – or international politics77 – true political authority is rarely 
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present, but this does not preclude peaceful, cooperative, or consensual forms of 
interaction. 78    
Politics itself, understood as a ceaseless, multilateral, and changeable 
process of the distribution of relative power, is not a rational process in the sense 
of necessarily being geared towards some overall end, although it is comprised of 
individual actors seeking to achieve ends rationally.  In terms of its application, 
power can be separated into those actions which seek to compel another to do 
something they otherwise would not have done or to deter them from doing what 
they would liked to have done.79  Various tools can be used to achieve these 
results such as a combination of so-called ‘sticks and carrots’, and these can take 
more active or passive forms.  So, power can be secured, generated, or expressed 
in countless ways, be it economic, diplomatic, legal, demographic, ideational, 
cultural or indeed, military.  All elements of power are inherently intertwined and 
any realistic analysis must consider these factors simultaneously.80   
Whilst some elements of power are material and obvious, such as military 
hardware, others are deeply psychological and intangible.  Estimations not only 
of others’ power, but of one’s own is fraught with difficulties.  War is an activity 
which distributes power primarily through physical coercion, although effective 
military power, as Clausewitz well knew, is often reliant on non-material factors 
and complemented by other forms of power simultaneously.  The quality of 
command, morale, doctrine, all greatly contribute to measures of actual 
capability. 81   Power can also be greatly bolstered by other factors such as 
political alliances, personality,82 and credibility based on past behaviour, or even 
                                                          
78
 In modern liberal democracies, the power to shape the domestic context is secured through 
legitimate peaceful electoral contest.  Such power is said to possess true ‘authority’ in the sense 
that others willingly comply and it is not reliant purely on force to maintain itself, whereas 
tyrannies are generally (though not necessarily always) characterised by an absence of authority, 
properly understood, to the extent that they depend on coercion to sustain their rule.  Authority is 
primarily dependent upon the perceived legitimacy of the individual or institution holding power. 
79
 Brown, Understanding, pp. 90-91. 
80
 Particular political situations are differentiated by the extent to which they are about some of 
such factors more than others. 
81
 These points are argued in detail by Stephen Biddle in his Military Power: Explaining Victory 
and Defeat in Modern Battle (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004).  
82
 Wellington remarked that Napoleon was worth a whole 40,000 men in the field.  Peter 
Browning, The Changing Nature of Warfare: The development of land warfare from 1792 to 
1945 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), p. 32.  The personality, or perhaps more 
accurately, the reputation of the commander can add to an army’s own strength by instilling 
courage in the troops or subtract from the enemy’s by inducing fear.  Modern examples might 
include Robert E. Lee during the American Civil War or Erwin Rommel in the North African 
desert during World War II.  
Politics 
 168
asymmetric sources of strength such as diplomatic and military surprise or the 
adoption of a defensive posture.  Politics is thus a necessarily multifaceted, 
changeable, and complex phenomenon: a view strongly apparent in Clausewitz’s 
work.  
Even if one could freeze time and examine a particular group in isolation, 
no conclusive quantification of power would be possible.  Moreover, it is 
precisely the relational nature of power that is most important – the attributes 
mentioned above have little meaning other than in relation to those against which 
it is directed.83  These caveats do not render power any less real, they simply 
reveal its dialectical, mutable, and intangible features – all which help explain the 
complex and contingent nature of politics in general.  This is particularly the case 
for entities in conditions of anarchy where, compared to an ordered domestic 
political context, the stabilising effect of law, legitimacy, and morality is less 
apparent.  In the international arena, or when domestic political structures 
disintegrate, the use of force often becomes an ever-present possibility, if not a 
permanent reality and as Clausewitz recognised, ‘certain self-imposed, 
imperceptible limitations hardly worth mentioning, known as international law 
and custom’ scarcely ameliorate this condition.84 
Policy can be viewed as a particular actor’s subjective orientation within 
this wider political realm.  The two overlap where actions based on a particular 
policy become part of a political process by way of their interaction with other 
actors.  Thus, while policy only truly has meaning in relation to wider 
circumstances, it also describes something particular by virtue of its being 
‘unilateral and rational’ and to the extent that it represents ‘a conscious effort by 
one entity in the political arena to bend its own power to the accomplishment of 
some purpose – some positive object, perhaps, or merely the continuation of its 
own power.’85  Policy can of course, be ‘at odds with politics’86 to the extent that 
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it often adopts courses of action ill-suited to prevailing political circumstances; 
indeed, the use of war by policy may be a wholly ineffective course of action.  
Policy does not necessarily read political situations correctly, but nevertheless, it 
is an inextricable part of the wider political process and in implementation it 
creates new political realities, which it and others responds to in turn. 
Whilst policy is unilateral we must be mindful not to view it simply as a 
rigid ‘given’, a static statement of intention, or an immovable reality such as a 
written manifesto.  Behind the concept of policy are real people, reacting to 
events, considering sacrifices made, and risks to be weighed.  Importantly, policy 
implies action: it is the will that sets the group on a particular course, it 
determines movement along new bearings, and has the potential for adaptability 
and change.  Whilst we may be able to identify a pre-eminent overarching 
objective, policy itself can be plural – it can be comprised of multiple 
simultaneous or subsidiary ends or ‘interests’, some of which may prove 
incompatible with others; just as individuals can be driven by numerous and 
competing impulses and motives.  So, policy relates to the ends of a community 
but, it must also be seen as a more dynamic, multifaceted phenomenon, actively 
shaping parameters of action, determining resources to be employed, and 
generally acting as a conscious force which orients and drives political 
collectivities in various directions. 
Problems with policy in Clausewitz’s work 
In the light of this brief discussion, some immediate problems in relation to 
Clausewitz’s ideas arise.  Three issues in particular require consideration: policy 
is presented as an unitary and unproblematic thing itself; the term policy has a 
strong association with the state which potentially limits its wider meaning; and 
there is an underlying assumption of policy rationality and reasonableness.  We 
will examine each in turn.   
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First, it is true that in On War Clausewitz treats policy in a distinctly 
unitary fashion, largely skating over the fact of the political processes internal to 
its formulation.  He states that it is the ‘aim of policy is to unify and reconcile all 
aspects of internal administration as well as of spiritual values…it is simply the 
trustee for all these interests against other states.’87  This reflects Clausewitz’s 
paternalistic view of politics, common at the time, 88  which saw the state 
leadership as the natural repository for political decision in the interests of the 
nation, 89  the ‘corporate soul’. 90   Clausewitz even describes policy as ‘the 
intelligence of the personified State.’91  Policy was something determined and 
shaped by the state leadership, and which – following, in broad respects, the 
Hegelian ideal of the political ‘unity, disinterest and supreme expression of 
society as a whole’92 – helps account for Clausewitz’s unitary conception of 
policy.93  Policy reflected an organic harmony of interest, and its purpose was not 
to reconcile contending political interests. 94   Clausewitz thus somewhat 
downplays the hard-fought political battles that exist at all stages of policy 
formulation – prior to and during the course of war – and between various groups 
or bodies in society (not least between the military and civilian institutions).95   
Yet, as Paret explains, Clausewitz did not subscribe to the extremes of the 
idealists, and did not ‘consider the state as an agent in the service of an ultimate 
purposeful scheme for humanity, dominated by universal historical and ethical 
principles.’96  During his career Clausewitz himself ‘bitterly opposed the political 
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aims and even the declared policy of the king’ 97  and, given these personal 
experiences, must have been aware that political contention over state policy 
meant decisions were by no means predetermined by any organic process.98  In 
reality there is no certainty that the various institutions, key constituencies, or 
factional interests within a political entity will naturally subscribe to the designs 
of the political leadership – a fact that can greatly impinge on the course and 
conduct of war.  Indeed, in 1812 Clausewitz left the service of the Prussian 
military precisely because he vehemently disagreed with the policy of the king.  
Clausewitz was well aware of these problems, yet perhaps chose to bypass them 
in the interest of analytical simplicity. 
The dynamics of policy formulation may be crucial to understanding war 
as they can powerfully shape the ends, choices, and behaviour of belligerents.  
The history of the last two centuries has displayed countless incidents of internal 
strife between civil and military institutions and members of coalitions, mutinies, 
revolutions, and military coups.99  Whether alliance, state, tribe, or insurgent 
group, we can usually observe complex internal political processes taking place 
in relation to the formulation of objectives.100  Potentially, the outcomes of such 
internal power struggles can completely alter the complexion of a war (a good 
example being the Bolshevik take-over in Russia in 1917 and its impact on the 
course of the First World War).  The fact of internal politics occupying the 
concerns of policymakers can also often lead to operations conducted for reasons 
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almost entirely dissociated from the military situation – indeed, this can be a 
major motive for war in the first instance. 
Wars can of course display a complex interaction between various armed 
groups simultaneously.101   This fact does not undermine the integrity of the 
distinctions between internal politics, policy, and external politics.  The precise 
locus of decision-making in relation to the use of force can be extremely blurred, 
overlapping, or confused, yet basic theoretical distinctions help us recognise 
what we might call ‘the realm of war’: political battles certainly takes place 
within groups, but war is conducted between at least partially unified entities 
whose policy involves the threat or use of force directed at others.  In this sense, 
Clausewitz’s assumptions about a single dominant policy may not be as 
misleading as some have held; we must just be aware that it shrouds underlying 
conflicts of interest that continually shape resultant policy directions.  In many 
cases, internal divisions develop into outright conflict, which greatly alter the 
complexion of the war as a whole.102 
The second and potentially more damaging criticism to consider relates to 
the very use of the term policy itself.  The term has strong associations with the 
modern state.  Yet, policy need not be understood in a strictly Eurocentric or 
historically confined sense of the political decisions of the modern nation-
state.103  Some commentators adopt parochial conceptions of policy as solely the 
preserve of states, and so by extension attribute to Clausewitz the mistaken 
conclusion that his dictum ‘means nothing more or less than that [war] represents 
an instrument in the hands of the state.’104  Yet, as Paret notes, ‘It goes without 
saying that political energy is created not only by the state, and military power is 
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often associated with other political interests or factions.’ 105   Of course, 
Clausewitz had the modern state at the forefront of his mind (its actions and wars 
were the focus of his personal experiences and historical studies), yet he was well 
aware that other war-making peoples have existed – from empire to roving 
horde106 – that possessed nothing like the level of institutional sophistication of 
modern states, yet that nevertheless identified objectives and interests and 
conducted war in pursuit of them.   
  Collectivities that possess the means of force can take the form of highly 
hierarchically structured, territorially bound entities such as modern states.  They 
can be expansive entities based on armed might, such as the Mongol Empire, or 
on religious faith, such as the Holy Roman Empire.  They can be unstructured, 
fragmented, territorially disparate ‘agglomerations of loosely associated 
forces’107 – as Clausewitz put it – such as was often the case in Europe during the 
Middle Ages, or as might pertain to a modern global terrorist group such as al-
Qaeda.  The potential forms are endless, yet we do assume some measure of 
agency on behalf of the group possessed of the means of organised political and 
military power.   
Even if we conclude that Clausewitz was too attached to the state, we 
should, as Bassford claims, be concerned with what is useful, not what is ‘true’ 
in Clausewitz’s ideas, in order to improve our understanding of war.  The 
terminology is arguably restrictive in this case, although any synonym runs the 
risk of generality.  ‘Purpose’, for instance, is vague and can encompass many 
things that are not related to issues of power or politics.  Phrases such as 
‘political purpose’ or ‘political objective’ are acceptable, but policy is a useful 
shorthand for the political objectives of any organised social group, whether 
modern state or not.  Mike Smith cites a useful definition that does not imply any 
strict association with any particular historical political entity: policy is ‘a 
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planned line of conduct in the light of which individual decisions are made and 
co-ordination achieved.’108 
Third, in the relevant sentence of the trinity, war is said to be subject to 
reason because it is an instrument of policy: the implication being that policy is 
somehow the natural repository of reason.  What is Clausewitz suggesting when 
he states that war will be subordinate to ‘pure reason’?109  As Bassford notes, the 
adjective ‘pure’ need not unduly concern us as it is largely formulaic, reflecting 
the contemporary philosophical idiom.110  At base, reason relates to the use of the 
human mind, the intellect, or the ‘cognitive faculty’ as Kant had it.111  Reason is 
a mode of thought that is peculiar to humans due to their ability to speculate and 
form logical judgements.  In practical contexts, reason is associated with 
rationality; that is, behaviour that seeks to tailor means to ends.112  We therefore 
generally speak of rationality when humans coherently identify objectives, define 
aims to achieve, determine methods to follow, and develop criteria to judge 
achievement of objectives.  Importantly, neither eventual success nor the precise 
nature of the objectives are vital conditions of rationality: rather it is the form of 
the behaviour, not its outcome or character that defines its rationality. 113  
Rationality appeals to a certain independence of mind in determining actions to 
be undertaken, uninfluenced by factors external to the problem at hand.114  From 
where the ends derive – whether called into being by reason, emotion, or cultural 
influences – is largely irrelevant to the notion that once purposes are established, 
actors seek to fulfil them through employing available means. 
So, an essential precondition for rational action is purpose.  Indeed, at the 
heart of this tendency lies Clausewitz’s foundational belief that humans are 
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purposeful beings: he refers to hostile intentions as ‘the universal element.’115  
War will contain an element of reason in so far as it is a social phenomenon 
resulting from conscious thought and action directed toward some aim.  That 
humans sometimes fail to achieve their ends, either because they were 
objectively unattainable or because they apply inappropriate means, does not 
necessarily negate the existence of purpose, reason, or rationality. 
We must be mindful not to apply narrow standards of rationality 
dependent on hindsight, or because we ourselves would not countenance such 
ends or employ such means in a given situation.  Whilst we shudder at Hitler’s 
terrifying ends and the often gratuitous means he employed – this does not 
necessarily imply they were wholly irrational.  We may claim it was irrational for 
Hitler to invade Russia in June 1941 or for Japan to attack Pearl Harbour, yet 
those decisions were geared toward specific ends: establishing lebensraum in 
Eastern Europe or a Japanese ‘Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere’; 
moreover both had good reason to believe they had the means to achieve those 
ends.116  Although there may be good reasons to claim that they may have been 
objectively irrational decisions. 117   Rationality can only be realistically 
understood as being strongly subjective and context dependent.  Clausewitz’s 
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aim was not to measure behaviour in war against some perfect standard of 
reason.  His association of reason with policy derives from the fact that it is 
ultimately policy – ‘the original motive for the war’118 – which establishes the 
ends of the group, and importantly, whether to employ force to achieve those 
ends.  Where a conscious policy exists a necessary corollary is action in pursuit 
of that policy, which will be rational to the extent that it is intended to attain that 
purpose.  Clausewitz is certainly not suggesting that all groups always behave or 
act perfectly rationally: he was well aware of the frequently devastating follies 
which leaders commit, which are often, as Howard argues, due to a 
‘superabundance of analytical rationality.’ 119   In accepting an association of 
reason with policy Clausewitz is not claiming that all policy is necessarily 
correct, sensible, or reasonable: we must be careful not to confuse rationality 
with wisdom in policy.120  As Clausewitz knew well, policy ‘can err, subserve 
the ambitions, private interests, and vanity of those in power.’121 
Creveld describes the idea that war must always be for some purpose as 
the ‘original sin’ of modern strategic thinking, due primarily to the influence of 
Clausewitz: ‘namely the idea that war consists of the members of one group 
killing those of another ‘in order to’ achieve this objective or that.’122  War for 
Creveld cannot be rational because ‘it is absurd for a person to die for somebody 
or something else’ and ‘to die for one’s own interest is almost equally absurd.’123  
He concludes that people must fight ‘only to the extent that they experience war 
itself and everything pertaining to it as an end.’124  Although Creveld’s depiction 
of Clausewitz probably derived from the ‘liberal reduction of Clausewitzian 
theory to rationality’ 125  which principally occurred with the publication of 
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important studies in the 1970s, this analysis is misleading in a number of 
respects. 
First, Creveld’s conclusion rests upon the contention that individuals 
entering upon war expect that they will die.  If this is not necessarily the case – 
reflected in the ‘it won’t be me mentality’126 – then it surely can be rational to 
risk death for certain objectives; that risk may be judged acceptable given the 
potential consequences of inaction.  Whatever motives are found to be behind the 
minds of individuals entering into war, far from constituting things to die for,127 
they can equally be, and often are, things to live for: there is not necessarily an 
assumption of imminent death, even if this may preoccupy the minds of many.  
Second, Creveld underestimates individuals’ conception of themselves as part of 
a wider group: that humans will fight to defend their primary kin-group because 
they are subliminally aware of their own weakness without its protection.  This 
has deep evolutionary origins and helps explain why the survival of the gene, or 
perhaps ‘meme’ 128  pool as embodied in the tribe, nation, and so forth, can 
become synonymous with individual ‘interest’ or survival: this may involve 
risking death or even sacrificing oneself for the good of the community.129  The 
concept of survival is not necessarily purely individualistic.  As Aristotle held, 
the individual is crucially dependent on the community: ‘man is by nature a 
political animal’ – he has a natural impulse toward association – and therefore 
the ‘state is prior to the individual.’130 
A third linked point is that Creveld’s is a predominantly individualistic 
argument for an activity that is collective by definition.  The reasons why any 
individual decides to fight131 are likely to differ from those of the social group 
(although they certainly may approximate).  That the purpose of a war does not 
make sense to the individual, does not entail that the war is not being fought for 
some real interest of the group.  That war becomes an end in itself for some of 
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the individuals caught up in it, even the leadership, does not imply that war as a 
collective phenomenon is best conceived of as an end itself. 132   The 
individualistic perspective certainly raises important psychological and cultural 
questions, but does not seriously jeopardise Clausewitz’s conception of war as 
collective purposeful behaviour.133  We must now consider this latter important 
point, as formulated by Clausewitz, in greater detail. 
War’s subordination as an instrument of policy 
That war is an instrument of policy has become something of a truism, almost to 
the point of cliché, in Western strategic literature, regardless of how well the 
implications and complexities of the idea are actually understood.  The ubiquity 
and prevalence of the idea can in large part be attributed to Clausewitz: often 
direct reference is made to On War whenever this principle is outlined, whether 
in historical, strategic, or International Relations literature. 134   The idea is 
commonly used out of the context which Clausewitz intended, thus draining it of 
much of its meaning. 135   Also, the idea is often mistakenly presented as 
representing the totality of his theorising on war.136  Its most common modern 
usage is as a prescriptive device; one especially suited to liberal democracies 
where the subordination of the military to civilian control is deemed a vital 
component of a properly constituted modern state, particularly in the nuclear age.  
The complexities of the concept are often diluted in the interest of doctrinal 
precision and pedagogical clarity: we are expected to unquestioningly accept the 
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idea as fact with little deeper justification.  Creveld is correct that, ‘if only 
because its very ubiquity tends to conceal its meaning, it deserves serious 
analysis.’ 137   Given the profusion of critiques in relation to this aspect of 
Clausewitz’s thought, this situation will not suffice.  Strachan and Herberg-Rothe 
state the problem directly: 
 
[if] we believe that war is always waged to fulfil political objectives, is it 
any more than a truism to say so?  And does it make the truism any more 
true if we put Clausewitz’s name alongside it?…[It] does not become 
either more or less true because of what Clausewitz believed about the 
relationship between the two.138   
 
The point is that it is not sufficient to defend this aspect of Clausewitz’s 
thought through insistence: by simply repeating it in the face of 
counterarguments. 139   If anything, such insistence casts greater doubt on its 
veracity.140   We must seek to reveal why it is mistaken to assume that this 
conception was simply ‘invented’, but is indeed a universal element of war.141  A 
more robust explanation is required; what is actually meant by the notion that 
war is an instrument of policy?   
At a basic level, Clausewitz is making the point that the use of military 
force is a means to a higher end, and the end in question is the political object: 
war is a tool which policy utilises to achieve its objectives, and as such has a 
measure of rational utility.  To make this claim may appear ‘ruthless, cold-
blooded, militaristic and abhorrent’.142  Yet, from the outset we should be clear 
that, as Howard and others have demonstrated, Clausewitz is describing an 
evidential fact about the world: his assertion that war is an instrument is 
descriptive, not prescriptive.143  This is confused by the fact that Clausewitz often 
draws prescriptive conclusions on the basis of this observation, and the two 
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perspectives are often presented close together in the text.  It is indeed somewhat 
ironic that, what can at first sight appear to be a morally repugnant statement – 
because it seems to suggest Clausewitz viewed the resort to force as an ‘entirely 
routine extension of unilateral state policy’ as if the ‘policy of a state is 
incomplete unless war is one of its instruments’144 – actually leads Clausewitz to 
conclude that war ought, in a practical and moral sense, to be subject to policy 
otherwise it becomes ‘something pointless and devoid of sense.’145 
So, what are the implications of insisting that war is subordinate to policy 
as an instrument?  It is useful to explore the extreme boundaries of what this 
conception, taken alone, entails.  In this light, just as the form of any instrument 
will be determined by the purpose for which it exists, so too will war be shaped 
by its overriding purpose: as Clausewitz explains, war ‘is controlled by its 
political object’,146 which ‘will set its course, prescribe the scale of means and 
effort which is required, and makes its influence felt throughout down to the 
smallest operational detail.’147  So, the purpose for which the use of force is 
intended will be the major determinant of the course and character of the war.  
This idea is clearly reflected in Clausewitz’s work where he discusses the 
relationship between purpose, aim, and means.  These discussions set up 
distinctly rational chains of action and feedback which establish a purpose to be 
achieved, a military aim that will best serve the purpose, and finally the selection 
of means most appropriate to attainment of the military aim. 
Through this hierarchically structured logic, we can expect the means 
used in war to remain firmly under the control of policy.  We should essentially 
be able to explain, in broad terms, the actions of the individual soldier – where he 
is, what he is attempting to achieve, and why – by the overarching demands of 
policy, because all parts will stand in logical relation to it.  The control of policy 
might manifest itself in, for instance, setting geographical limits to an army’s 
movements, determining appropriate targets, or establishing the appropriate 
moment to seek a negotiated settlement.  This perspective does not necessarily 
downplay the importance of military considerations; war ‘is entitled to require 
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that the trend and designs of policy shall not be inconsistent with these 
means.’ 148   Policy must understand the capabilities, limits, strengths, and 
weaknesses of the instrument it employs (as is the case for any rational 
behaviour), yet the crucial point is that all military action is ultimately geared 
towards political objectives: military concerns ‘will never do more than modify 
them.’149  One might use the analogy of cogs in a machine: the movement of 
even the smallest cogs is determined by the master cog of policy; when it turns 
all others turn in relation to it.150 
In this pure conception, all action in war perfectly and rationally relates to 
the given purpose.  When, for instance, the stated object is achieved one would 
logically terminate the war, or where the sacrifices become too great in relation 
to the purpose, when policy is clearly no longer being served, one would seek a 
settlement or capitulate: the value attached to the political object rules, not 
military success.151  As Clausewitz notes, because ‘it is policy that has created 
war’ it is only natural that it remains subordinate to the ‘guiding intelligence that 
brought it into existence.152  In one of his most rationalistic passages, Clausewitz 
notes that ‘the value of the object must determine the sacrifices to be made for it 
in magnitude and also in duration.  Once the expenditure of effort exceeds the 
value of the political object, the object must be renounced and peace must 
follow.’153  So, the use of force is in a constant hierarchical relationship with 
policy: the latter setting the terms and conditions for the former.  The assumption 
is that those leading the war have chosen what they believe to be the most 
appropriate means to attain the desired end, and the latter will remain the 
principal criterion of the efforts to be made and resources employed.  The 
particular militarily solution will depend on circumstances and the object in 
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question: as Clausewitz notes, there are many potential roads to victory to choose 
from and a ‘prince or general can best demonstrate his genius by managing a 
campaign exactly to suit his objectives and his resources, doing neither too much 
or too little.’154 
The description above, whilst capturing the essence of the issue, by no 
means represents the extent of Clausewitz’s ideas.  If it did, no doubt accusations 
of pure rationalism would be justified.  The idea of a rational process does feed 
into the concept of war as subordinate to policy, but only to an extent.  Where 
Clausewitz discusses purpose and means, or war plans, his intention is clearly 
more prescriptive and represents an ideal strategic construct whereby all parts 
would gel seamlessly into a rationally directed whole, in which practitioners 
would always be asking, as Brodie notes, ‘what any war existing or impending is 
really about and what it is attempting to accomplish.’155  This perspective is most 
clear in Book 8 where Clausewitz states that: ‘War plans cover every aspect of 
war, and weave them all into a single operation that must have a single, ultimate 
objective in which all particular aims are reconciled.’156   
Undoubtedly, this idea is practically seductive and perhaps reflected the 
diligent state servant in Clausewitz, motivated by a desire to solve the strategic 
problems faced by Prussia.  Clausewitz’s intention in the trinity was to describe 
the nature of war as it manifested itself in all its rich variety in reality, yet this did 
not prevent him from, elsewhere, passionately promoting his ideas on how war 
should be fought.  These perspectives sit together uneasily in his work and we 
must be careful to distinguish between the two, whilst also accepting their 
interaction (much of what Clausewitz believed ought to be done, stemmed from 
his recognition of what war is).  Yet Clausewitz stressed the great difficulties that 
he knew, in reality, intervened in such theoretically neat, logical relationships.  
He could not be more clear on this point: 
 
The degree of force that must be used against the enemy depends on the 
scale of political demands on either side.  These demands, so far as they 
are known, would show what efforts each must make; but they seldom 
are fully known… Nor are the situation and conditions of the belligerents 
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alike.  This can be a second factor…Just as disparate are the 
governments’ strength of will, their character and abilities…These three 
considerations introduce uncertainties that make it difficult to gauge the 
amount of resistance to be faced and, in consequence, the means required 
and the objectives to be set.157 
 
This reality, Clausewitz persists, means that any strictly logical answer to 
the problem is out of question; indeed such reasoning may prove to be ‘a most 
unsuitable and awkward intellectual tool.’158  Rather, what is required is intuitive 
judgement ‘to detect the most important and decisive elements in the vast array 
of facts and situations’:159 which requires decisions and behaviour not strictly 
derived from rational processes or abstract principles.  Clausewitz certainly did 
not hold that any superlative standard of rational behaviour, which would always 
maximise the interests of policymakers through the use of force, was humanly 
achievable. 
The form of instrumental logic described above will, Clausewitz held, be 
apparent in any war, but the extent of its control will be extenuated by many 
factors, some associated with the nature of instrumentality itself.  Instruments, of 
course, can be used for purposes other than those that they were originally or 
ostensibly designed for, they may be ill-suited to the tasks asked of them, or be 
employed by the user ineffectively.  Stating that war is an instrument does not 
necessarily entail it will always have utility in relation to all political objects or 
that it will be used efficiently and effectively.  Clausewitz knew this to be the 
case, as he had seen how ineffective the Prussian instrument of war was when it 
faced Napoleon’s Grand Armée on the battlefields of Jena-Auerstedt in 1806 – 
yet it was employed by the state as an instrument nevertheless.  Instrumentality is 
more complex than may be assumed. 
Also, as Clausewitz emphasises, the subordination of war to policy in his 
conception by no means entails complete control.  This point is made in section 
23 of Book 1, Chapter 1.  Subordination, he explains, ‘does not imply that the 
political aim is a tyrant.’160  Just as a subordinate commander can disobey orders 
and follow their own inclinations, so too can war in relation to policy.  Policy, he 
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states, ‘will permeate all military operations, and, in so far as their violent nature 
will admit, it will have a continuous influence on them.’161  As Echevarria states, 
‘contrary to what many scholars have maintained, Clausewitz placed some 
significant limits on policy’s control over military operations.’162  Clausewitz 
could not be clearer in his assertion that, even though the political aim will 
remain the ‘first consideration’ because the ‘prime cause of its existence will 
remain the supreme consideration in conducting it’, war – more than any other 
instrument – can often escape the control of its user.  However, he argues, war 
usually lasts long enough for policy to maintain some control over its instrument; 
for it to ‘remain subject to the action of a superior intelligence.’163   
The concept of war’s subordination to policy causes us to focus on an 
important and integral aspect of war.  This relates to the extent to which in war, 
from the perspective of the groups involved, there is a constant interaction 
between ends and means, purpose and instrument, at all levels, and which 
ultimately relate back to the highest end; to policy.  This provides a unity to all 
action in war and weaves a thread of reason through the whole, however much 
this may appear to be absent in some wars.164  This conception does not of course 
preclude multiple distinct actors all operating according to their own purposes: 
this often has the effect of making the whole look more complex and chaotic, but 
war’s rational element relates to the purposes and designs of the individual 
entities involved.   
Recent critiques, such as outlined by Creveld,165 that have denied war’s 
instrumental nature and rationality point to the cultural determinants of action 
that seem to discredit it.  Such studies are misleading in two principal respects: 
first, although the basic argument is often not wholly flawed itself, they are 
mistaken in their reading of Clausewitz.  Second, they appear to state their case 
too strongly.  No doubt, for instance, Creveld is right to reveal the diverse ways 
in which war develops its own peculiar culture and how this culture can be 
antithetical with respect to achieving stated ends, but overemphasis of this point 
can distract us from essentials.  All rational behaviour naturally takes place in 
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culturally conditioned environments, for no actor operates outside of culture.  To 
posit that rational action must be action unaffected by culture is to deny the 
potential for rational human action in any circumstances.   
Moreover, many cultural forms, supposedly indicative of irrationality, 
can be explained in instrumental terms, even if this is not to deny that cultural 
practices can sometimes lead to deleterious practices.  Indeed, taking the longer 
view, specific strategic and military cultures are largely reflections of a 
community’s success in war, the consequence of adaptation to challenges.166  But 
the critiques are mistaken at a more basic level in their depiction of Clausewitz.  
He certainly wanted to reveal the element of reason in war, but, he also explicitly 
and forcefully exposes its limits, given the eternal play of chance, emotion, and 
irrationality.  He also had a strong feel for the way the unique character of 
different societies (that Clausewitz often subsumes under the term ‘politics’, but 
which we would best understand as culture) affects decisions and action in war.  
In drawing attention to war’s instrumentality, he was not suggesting that all 
activity in war is rational, perfectly geared towards objectives, or even that policy 
was right to employ force in the first place.167 
The clear lesson of such interpretations of Clausewitz is that we must be 
careful not to confuse appearances with substance.  In describing war as a ‘mere 
instrument’ he appears to treat war in purely rational terms, when in fact, upon 
close analysis, the substance of the concept incorporates complexity, 
contradiction, and nuance: as soon as one breaks the surface of the dictum, a 
more qualified and realistic meaning is revealed.   Prescription is confused with 
objective reality, pure instrumentality with the limits to practical rationality, and 
subordination with complete control. 
Bringing ‘the other’ back in – the unity of policy and politics 
Our analysis of war’s relationship to politics has so far concentrated on its 
element of subordination to policy – defined as the unilateral objectives of the 
individual political entity – and has thus brought us to a critical juncture in 
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relation to Clausewitz’s thought.  Ceasing the analysis here would ignore a 
crucial idea which he wanted to convey: indeed, mistaken interpretations often 
stem from a failure to explore beyond policy into the more complex realm of 
politics.  As Clausewitz stressed, war is a multilateral phenomenon, so how can it 
be simply described as the instrument of one (or both) actor(s)?  This introduces 
a problem in relation to the trinity: at first glance, this tendency does appear to 
rely on a purely unilateral perspective.  To answer this we must return to the text 
and reveal the way in which policy must be always be understood as part of a 
multilateral whole.  (The following analysis is premised on the belief that use of 
the terms ‘policy’ or ‘politics’ in translation of the German politik is broadly 
correct in the Howard/Paret edition of On War).  
At the beginning of Book 8, Chapter 6B, Clausewitz provides one of his 
clearest expressions of the relationship between war and politics.  Over the first 
five paragraphs the context of his discussion is clearly about the total political 
situation, as distinct from unilateral policy.  He explains how war is a ‘branch of 
political activity’, that the ‘source of war is politics – the intercourse of 
governments and peoples’, that it is a ‘continuation of political intercourse, with 
the addition of other means, that ‘war itself does not suspend political 
intercourse’, that war ‘cannot be divorced from political life’, and that all the 
salient factors that make up war are political, or ‘so closely connected with 
political activity that it is impossible to separate the two.’168  The final sentence 
of the fifth paragraph has it that war, ‘cannot follow its own laws, but has to be 
treated as some other whole; the name of which is policy.’169  This reversion to 
the term ‘policy’ appears to represent a change in Clausewitz’s argument, which 
is borne out by the following paragraph which is more obviously concerned with 
the perspective of the individual actor and the way in which policy makes use of 
war.170  The rest of the chapter is more explicitly concerned with the unilateral 
perspective; which is natural given that Clausewitz is dealing with war plans, 
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which can only be sensibly considered from a subjective perspective. 171  
Clausewitz variously refers to policy, ‘political decisions’, and ‘political 
objectives.’  The discussion also morphs into more prescriptive statements 
regarding civil-military relations, although there are some references to the 
importance of political conditions.172 
So, Clausewitz is certainly keen to draw attention to the importance of the 
political situation out of which war arises.  The idea of instrumentality emerges 
so seamlessly out of the idea of interactive politics that the transition from one to 
the other is almost missed.  As natural as that may have seemed to Clausewitz, it 
has caused a great many problems for students of his ideas.  The seamlessness of 
the transition, however, is an initial clue as to his belief in the indissoluble 
connection between the two perspectives; that the one is naturally implicated in 
the other.  This idea is clarified by turning to Clausewitz’s discussion in Book 1.  
Here policy and politics are even more intertwined: they are everywhere treated 
together.  Crucially, in section 23, Chapter 1, Clausewitz states that, ‘When 
whole communities go to war…the reason always lies in some political situation, 
and the occasion is always due to some political object.  War, therefore, is an act 
of policy.’173  Here, policy is presented as an intrinsic element of the political 
situation.  The discussion then continues largely from the perspective of policy.  
The instrumental nature of war is reaffirmed in section 24, but here the 
connection with politics is stressed: ‘We see therefore that war is not merely an 
act of policy but a true political instrument, a continuation of political 
intercourse, carried on with other means.’174     
Where does this analysis leave us in relation to the trinity?  In the trinity 
we are presented with the unilateral policy perspective alone.  Yet, policy in 
Clausewitz’s work is almost nowhere presented as independent from the wider 
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political situation: war as a continuation of political intercourse.  Indeed, the 
interactive perspective nearly always precedes discussion of war as viewed from 
the policy perspective.  From an objective viewpoint, as a whole, war emerges 
from a political situation between belligerents and does not suspend that 
intercourse but carries it on with different means.  To switch abruptly to the 
policy perspective is natural because the political situation is essentially 
comprised of the interaction of the individual policies of the belligerents.  War is 
at one and the same time a continuation of the political situation and the 
instrument employed by the groups that comprise that situation. 
So, in the trinity, whilst we are primarily observing war from the 
unilateral perspective, the idea of war as a continuation of political intercourse, 
of politics in its multilateral and interactive sense, is integral to the meaning.  
This idea also makes it clear why the purpose of any war cannot be anything but 
fundamentally political, because it, by necessity, relates to a situation of contest 
over relative power with other groups.  This perspective allows us to resolve the 
apparent problem in Clausewitz presentation of the concept in the trinity, but it 
also raises further implications and enables us to see why the concept (war as an 
instrument of policy) is more complex than supposed.  Once we acknowledge 
that the idea of ‘war as a continuation of politics’ is inextricably embodied in the 
concept of subordination, the elements of chance and passion enter more 
powerfully into the equation and we move further from the ideal of pure reason 
and controlled instrumentality.  Politics as a process is not rational in itself, thus, 
if war is a continuation of that process, neither is it, as a whole, a rational 
phenomenon.   This reveals the extent to which the tendencies of the trinity 
cannot be considered in isolation.  Although we still hold that belligerents in war 
can be expected to reason, judge, and act according to their objectives, potential 
gains, and probable future losses, this occurs in a multilateral, interactive 
environment pervaded by external uncontrollable political dynamics, chance 
occurrences, and the inescapable influence of rising passions.  War is shaped not 
purely by the reasoned policies of each actor, but also by the non-linear nature of 
the political relationships that their interaction produces, which will be inherently 
unpredictable and non-rational.          
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War as a continuation of politics – non-autonomy 
To state that war is a continuation of politics is to make a point beyond that of 
war’s instrumentality.  We need to explore the implications of these ideas further.  
Continuation powerfully conveys the idea that war is itself a form of political 
behaviour, and thus, even if subjective policy loses control of the instrument, the 
lines that run through war remain fundamentally political in nature.175  This idea 
cannot be overstated and represents one of the crucial ways in which 
Clausewitz’s thought stands out from earlier thinkers.  The importance of this 
perspective, beyond that of its subordination as an instrument, is emphasised by 
Clausewitz: the latter view alone may encourage the belief that war is something 
entirely different to politics because,  
 
it is apt to be assumed that war suspends that intercourse and replaces it 
by a wholly different condition, ruled by no law but its own… war in 
itself does not suspend political intercourse or change it into something 
entirely different.  In essentials that intercourse continues, irrespective of 
the means it employs.  The main lines along which military events 
progress, and to which they are restricted, are political lines that continue 
throughout the war into the subsequent peace.176 
       
To clarify his position Clausewitz provides a powerful metaphor: whilst 
war might have its own unique grammar, the underlying logic of war is always 
political.177  Naturally, all armed groups must decide how best to achieve the 
defeat of the enemy based on military operational realities, somewhat in isolation 
from political concerns. War’s grammar alone, as Clausewitz conveyed through 
his absolute concept, tends to gravitate towards the annihilation of the enemy.  
The idea of subordination does not suggest war is entirely governed by political 
considerations; commanders must be free to use their professional judgement to 
determine how best to achieve the military aim demanded by policy. 
So, war is a means and it has its own peculiar character – the dynamics of 
fighting – that distinguishes it from typical political behaviour, but, as the idea of 
continuation emphasises, at heart war is political behaviour.  War substitutes the 
use of force for ‘speech or writing’ and represents a different expression of the 
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thoughts of politicians. 178   Just as diplomacy is political behaviour through 
negotiation, so war is political behaviour through the threat or use of force.  The 
importance of this point is expressed by Bernard Brodie, who states that, ‘the 
usual conception…stops far short of that understanding.  It is preoccupied almost 
exclusively with the winning of wars, as though the latter were conceived to be 
something comparable to athletic contests – with, to be sure, an added ingredient 
of seriousness.’179 
The concept of continuation serves to underline why war should never be 
viewed as something autonomous, as representing a unity in and of itself.  The 
idea of subordination enables us to conceive of a strong relationship – that war is 
not independent because it ultimately derives from a political purpose.  Yet, the 
idea of subordination alone may be misleading as it can imply a complete 
substitution of political behaviour by military force.180  The idea of continuation 
goes further, emphasising that war’s complete autonomy is impossible because 
war itself is a form of political behaviour.  Subordination encourages the 
conception that where politics ends war begins, as something simply employed 
by policy, whilst continuation implies, as Clausewitz puts it, their ‘indissoluble 
connection.’181   Politics and war are both social forces which determine the 
distribution of power amongst groups, even if the peculiar means of war – its 
grammar – is distinctive and, is possessed of its own peculiar dynamics and 
principles.182   The instrument of war may take many forms and serve many 
different purposes, but its universal essence can be grasped when we understand 
that policy is inherently embedded in the perpetual realm of the political, within 
which the use of force is but a continuation of that form of interaction with 
altered means: it is in this regard that Clausewitz could state that ‘all wars are 
things of the same nature.’183 
Even if this idea is understood, there is still considerable room for 
confusion because history reveals countless examples of occasions when this 
conception has been wholly rejected by both practitioners and theorists alike.  In 
fact, it might be stated that the default position has been one that clings to a clear 
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separation between the two: the belief that once war begins, politics ends and that 
military matters should be approached autonomously, resolvable by military 
solutions alone, which generally implies the destruction of the enemy.184  This 
conception is mistaken for it confuses a necessary relationship with a mere point 
of view.  As noted, by extolling war and battle, Napoleon was able to secure 
repeated military victories, whilst simultaneously generating a political situation 
fundamentally inimical to the survival of his Empire: war will have political 
consequences however much practitioners may believe or desire otherwise.  War 
may be an instrument, but if it is to prove an effective one it must be deftly 
handled – often alongside other tools of policy – otherwise politics has a habit of 
delivering its own verdict on events.  War cannot escape political reality. 
The clashes between Bismarck and Moltke ‘the Elder’ during the Austro-
Prussian and Franco-Prussian Wars sheds light on these issues.  Moltke 
essentially believed that upon war being declared ‘the soldiers were autonomous 
in their operations against the enemy until they presented the head of government 
with the victory that would enable him to conclude an advantageous peace.’185  
Thus, against Austria in 1866 Moltke desired a total victory and a punitive 
peace 186  and toward the end of the Franco-Prussian War he advocated the 
complete destruction of the French Army regardless of potential political 
consequences – in 1871 Moltke spoke of a ‘war of extermination’187 – whereas 
Bismarck demanded restraint to ensure the political situation following war did 
not shift unfavourably against Prussia.188  As Gat notes, it would be wrong to 
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claim that Moltke did not believe there was a connection between war and 
politics, yet his conception of the nature of war was certainly contrary to the 
mature views of Clausewitz.189  Moltke, along with many other commanders, 
mistakenly believed that there are purely military operational solutions to 
strategic problems.  As Clausewitz importantly noted, ‘War does not contain in 
itself the elements for a complete decision and final settlement.’190  It was only 
thanks to Bismarck’s interventions, that Prussia was able to successfully fight 
two ferocious campaigns ‘but for specific limited political objectives.’191 
Any particular commander or leader may fervently subscribe to the 
notion that military considerations should be approached in their own right – that 
military victory represents an autonomous standard – and that war should be 
fought regardless of political imperatives.  Indeed, we do not deny that people 
have thought this way; it is revealed in history and current practice.192  Yet, this 
does not alter the fundamental fact that all military activity is inherently political, 
regardless of what any particular actor may believe.193  The Moltkean position is 
perfectly understandable, but essentially irrelevant from an objective perspective, 
and simply reveals the way in which the instrument – war – can potentially be 
mishandled due to subjective factors, but the effects – the outcome – of such a 
mishandling will always ultimately be political (manifested in changed power 
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constellations).  Outright military victory à outrance may be the most 
appropriate way of achieving one’s object, but history shows that, equally, and 
frequently, it may not.  Often the idea of the superiority of overwhelming force – 
the ‘decisive or annihilation battle’ – has prevailed where acceptance of the 
inherent relationship between politics and war is less well appreciated in the 
dominant strategic culture.194  As some modern counterinsurgency operations 
reveal, the use of overwhelming force may prove enormously strategically 
counterproductive.195  As the proverb has it: war is too important to be left to the 
generals. 
The two types of policy 
So, Clausewitz believed that, because war was not an autonomous phenomenon, 
to a considerable extent, ‘the nature of the political aim, the scale of the demands 
put forward by either side, and the total political situation of one’s own side, are 
all factors that in practice must decisively influence the conduct of war’196  In 
what way exactly?  The answer is difficult to determine and Clausewitz never 
completed his ideas on this subject.197  When one surveys the historical record 
one is struck by the vast possibility of the forms that political objectives can take 
and, as Clausewitz noted, ‘The possible purposes…are too diverse to be 
enumerated.’198  A further difficulty arises when we consider how difficult it 
often is to determine the true motives behind a given purpose (often not even 
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perfectly understood by the actor in question).  Indeed, Clausewitz notes that, in 
war ‘the facts are seldom fully known and the underlying motives even less 
so.’199  For these reasons, there is little value in developing a schema of possible 
political purposes (which are almost endless): the problem is one of explaining 
and generalising about political behaviour and war, rather than providing a 
comprehensive classification of all its potential manifestations. 200 
Partly to overcome this problem Clausewitz began to develop a 
conceptual tool which allowed him to distinguish between two types of war 
according to the nature of their overriding purpose.  In his note of 1827 he stated 
his intention to develop the idea that wars can essentially be either unlimited201 – 
those  fought ‘to overthrow the enemy’ and dictate terms: the ‘terrible 
battlesword’202  – or limited – those fought for objectives to be achieved by 
negotiation or settlement: ‘the light, handy rapier.’203  In reality the two types 
encompass a enormous variety ‘ranging from a war of extermination down to 
simple armed observation’ 204  dependent on the particular circumstances that 
brought them into being (and so might best be conceived as points on a spectrum 
rather than two distinct types).  In presenting the two types, Clausewitz did not 
deny that ‘between these two extremes lie numerous gradations.’205  Also, the 
concept is not intended as a rigid deterministic device, implying purpose alone 
imposes a certain form on any particular war.  Nevertheless, the dual concept 
serves to clarify a vast diversity in reality.  His basic contention was that wars 
fought on the basis of one or the other type would be pervaded by significantly 
differing imperatives.  
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Wars fought for unlimited objectives, Clausewitz believed, will tend to 
encourage extremes.  For Clausewitz, the campaigns of Napoleon were examples 
par excellence of this type.206  Of course, whether the rise to extremes actually 
occurs is a matter of circumstance: in some cases the opponent may rapidly 
succumb – with the harsh penalties that is likely to entail – but if the enemy 
chooses to resist, which can often be expected where survival is at stake, war will 
have a tendency to approach Clausewitz’s absolute concept.  The sacrifices 
demanded of the opponent are total and so, if it wishes to prevent the loss 
entailed, only a correspondingly extreme effort will suffice.207  In unlimited wars, 
where the motives for war are ‘more powerful and inspiring’ the ‘closer will war 
approach its abstract concept, the more important will be the destruction of the 
enemy.’208  In such cases, the war may appear more military than political, but 
this is only due to an elision where policy is seemingly effaced by the military 
aspect and the overthrow of the enemy essentially becomes both political 
purpose and military aim.  Nevertheless, both unlimited and limited wars are 
equally political.209 
Instances of politically limited wars are endless. 210   The wars of 
eighteenth century Europe are often presented as classic examples, being greatly 
restricted in their aims for various contextual reasons, and which Clausewitz 
caricatured as ‘a somewhat stronger form of diplomacy, a more forceful method 
of negotiation.’211  Limited aims do not necessarily mean large battles will not 
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occur or that they will be fought without ruthlessness.212  Indeed, a modest aim 
may best be served by a short unforgiving campaign to rapidly compel the enemy 
to negotiate.213  Nevertheless, when engagements do occur they will generally 
tend to be restrained and there will be a greater proclivity on all sides to open 
negotiations when possible.  Clausewitz states that, ‘Once this influence of the 
political objective on war is admitted, as it must be, there is no stopping it; 
consequently we must also be willing to wage such minimal wars, which consist 
in merely threatening the enemy, with negotiations held in reserve.’214  Where 
the object is slight it can be expected that both sides will be quicker to seek 
terms; even the victor in battle will generally prefer a favourable peace to risking 
further losses.  In limited wars, ‘the less will the military element’s natural 
tendency to violence coincide with political directives…the conflict will seem 
increasingly political in character.’215 
The central point Clausewitz wished to establish was that the type of the 
political aim of each belligerent will be a powerful factor in shaping the character 
and conduct of war.  However, understanding the objectives of either side – itself 
fraught with difficulties – is necessary but not sufficient.  From an objective 
viewpoint, the policy of one side is not sufficient to determine the scale and 
magnitude of war.  War, as Clausewitz repeatedly reminds us, is akin to duel, 
with competing sides creating a dynamic whole.  Thus, the political object as a 
‘standard of measurement’ only makes sense in the ‘context of the two states at 
war.’216  For instance, whilst one side may have only limited aims, there is no 
assurance that the enemy will follow and that ‘the half-hearted war does not 
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become a real war after all.’217  The true character of any war only results from 
the interaction of the opposing purposes of the belligerents: it thus takes two to 
fight a limited war.  It is the manner in which purposes interact that is the true 
determinant of the character of any war.218   
The idea of politically limited war enabled Clausewitz to explain why 
wars rarely reached the extremes suggested by logic, where extraneous factors 
such as friction could not fully account for limitations in reality.  Whether we 
fight on, sue for peace through negotiations, or surrender will be strongly 
determined by the object of the war and the value attached to it – it will remain 
the ultimate arbiter over each side’s decisions whether the fight is worth the 
continued sacrifices and effort.  The interaction of these considerations on either 
side will be the major determinant of the continuation, scope, and magnitude of 
hostilities.  As Clausewitz notes,  
 
Suppose one merely wants a concession from the enemy.  One will only 
fight until some modest quid pro quo has been acquired, and a moderate 
effort should suffice for that.  The enemy’s reasoning will be much the 
same…Thus interaction, the effort to outdo the enemy, the violent and 
compulsive course of war, all stagnate for lack of real incentive.  Neither 
side makes more than minimal moves, and neither side feels itself 
seriously threatened.219     
 
It is important to note that Clausewitz did not see policy as the sole 
determinant of war’s character.  We have already seen how war’s own 
‘grammar’ exerts a powerful influence on developments as the necessity of 
military victory often shapes the behaviour of armies, sometimes to the detriment 
of policy.  Lawrence Freedman notes that, ‘Military methods must be geared not 
only to the political stakes but also to the capacities and methods of the 
adversary.  The political pressures may be towards minimum force but the 
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military pressures may point in the opposite direction.’220  Furthermore, because 
war is pervaded by probabilities rather than necessity, belligerents may be 
compelled to sustain hostilities beyond what policy would rationally dictate in 
the hope of some future favourable turn of events, perhaps in the form of 
salvation through the entry of new allies or a debilitating split in the enemy 
alliance.221  Yet, uncertainty is often the ally of peace where ends are limited: we 
dare not risk further fighting when the outcome is uncertain and continuing 
hostilities may be a worse option than surrender on terms, particularly if the 
enemy only demands limited sacrifices from us.   
Moreover, the passions roused by war can lead to an intensification of 
war where policy would suggest otherwise, even when the odds are stacked 
against us or the original ends were minimal.  As Clausewitz notes, such 
conditions are crucial, as ‘the same political object can elicit differing reactions 
from differing peoples, and even from the same people at different times.’222  
Elsewhere he states that ‘war and its forms result from ideas, emotions, and 
conditions prevailing at the time.’223  Limited wars are not immune from the play 
of passions: ‘Between two peoples and two states there can be such tensions, 
such a mass of inflammable material, that the slightest quarrel can produce a 
wholly disproportionate effect – a real explosion.’224  Thus, the impact of the two 
types of policy cannot be properly conceived in isolation from the other 
tendencies of the trinity.  Still, Clausewitz believes policy remains the chief 
arbiter in this regard: passions are unlikely to be aroused to the extent of a true 
explosion where there is ‘not a policy of proportionate magnitude.’  Unlimited 
objectives tend to arouse and engage emotions much more so than limited ones: 
if policy aims are limited ‘the emotions of the masses will be little stirred.’225  
Furthermore, it is likely that, in such situations, ‘a policy of maximum exertion 
would fail because of the domestic problems it would raise.’226  
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The character of war generated by the nature of the purpose is somewhat 
relative and can be manifested in many different ways – it is not just a matter of 
casualty figures or the size of battles, and is contingent on a host of factors, 
nevertheless deriving principally from the basic political object.  Unlimited aims 
will tend to produce wars recognisable in the fact of laws and norms 
contravened, extremes of brutality, attacks on civilians, and ‘the gloves are off’ 
approach to defeating the enemy.  In limited wars such extremes are much less 
likely because the value placed on the object is much smaller, the passions less 
aroused, society less caught up in hostilities, negotiation or resolution much more 
probable, and the use of excessive force potentially counterproductive. 
From a strategic perspective, it is vital for those conducting war to 
understand the extent of the opponent’s object because if the enemy aims at your 
destruction then plans for war would require very different considerations than if 
they were limited.  A large part of the American failure in Vietnam, was the 
inability to understand that even though it may have believed it was fighting a 
politically limited war,227 its Vietnamese enemy certainly was not.  Vietnamese 
forces were willing to sustain enormous casualty levels to ensure their political 
independence, whereas mounting US casualties turned opinion against a war that 
was deemed by large segments of the population as politically and strategically 
unnecessary. 
The political web of war  
A major implication of the assertion that war is a continuation of politics is that 
the panoply of perpetually shifting relations within, between, and beyond 
individual groups will impact on and shape the course of war.  The political web 
within which war takes place can greatly influence the types of policies adopted, 
decisions taken, and actions initiated in war: as Echevarria notes, war and ‘policy 
is shaped by the processes and conditions within which it is developed, in a word 
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by politics.’228  This fact – perhaps underrated by Clausewitz, at least explicitly 
in On War – helps account for many otherwise inexplicable events and 
developments in past wars.  Indeed, sometimes, action which makes sense 
militarily – perhaps as embodied in the standard principles of war – is apt to be 
entirely subverted by politics. 
This is particularly relevant with respect to the manifold effects arising 
from internal politics.  Decisions taken will not always be geared towards 
strategic or military imperatives, but might be dictated by industrial concerns, 
electoral politics, inter-service rivalry, or bureaucratic considerations. In such 
cases, ‘Political considerations that override the grammar of war may run counter 
to the accomplishment of policy aims.’229   A prominent instance of domestic 
politics driving military decisions is the phenomenon of external wars begun by 
states to stave off an impending domestic insurrection or to strengthen national 
unity.230  Such domestic political interests feed into the use of military force at 
various levels and at different times.  In peacetime, debates between separate 
services over the allocation of limited defence budgets shapes the size, 
composition, and structure of the military instrument, which as a consequence 
may or may not be suited to actual strategic exigencies. 
Such political dynamics compound the difficulty of arriving at a clear 
political purpose or in ensuring military operations are conducted according to 
achievable and realistic objectives.  Where extraneous political concerns impinge 
on strategic decisions, soldiers can find themselves being sacrificed for the sake 
of a politician’s position in office, the profits of industrial contractors, or the 
continuance of amicable relations with allies (perhaps to ensure cooperation in 
other areas of interest wholly unconnected to the ostensible purpose of the war).  
It is important, however, to note that apparently extraneous political concerns 
may serve an important strategic purpose or one that is deemed important enough 
to override purely military concerns.  During the American Civil War the Union 
launched arguably militarily wasteful campaigns to ensure Lincoln was re-
elected, driven by the belief that victory could only be ensured with him at the 
helm. 
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Wars, or events within war, are often utilised as political tools for 
objectives that differ from proclaimed objectives.  Whatever the form of such 
hidden motives, these simply reflect the political web in which war takes place 
and from which it cannot be isolated.  These motives give policy its particular 
character, but they do not supplant its basic overarching relationship to war, 
which we have outlined above.  War’s instrumentality is not necessarily negated 
when the character of the policy changes or if the precise character of the 
political imperatives are different to those publicly stated.231  This web of politics 
is something within which policymakers and commanders are inevitably 
entwined and have to face even as military events unfold.  Developments in these 
areas can have a decisive impact on strategic outcomes. The cynical reasons for 
which force is often employed might degrade the purity of policy, but it remains 
policy nonetheless – warts and all – and will impact on war, potentially 
detrimentally. 
Implications in theory 
Based on these explorations we are now in a position to outline the central 
attributes of Clausewitz’s conception of the relationship.  A number of central 
implications arise and will be dealt with below. 
The boundaries of  policy and reason – the unstable instrument   
This chapter has sought to underline the somewhat paradoxical impact of politics 
on war.  On one level, policy provides war with a rational structure, whereby 
belligerents seek to attain their ends through the reasoned use of force.  On the 
other hand, precisely because war is inherently political, it is embedded in what 
we have termed the ‘political web of war’, and this constitutes one of the greatest 
barriers to purely rational behaviour in war.  As Echevarria neatly puts it, ‘The 
influence of policy is…limited by the existing political conditions, in a word, by 
politics.’232   It is ensconced within and impacted on by the whole range of 
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political conditions beyond the manipulation of actors – a substance ‘removed 
from means and purpose that can be steered by the will.’233 
As noted, the primacy of policy has been overstated in the literature, with 
the result that some scholars, particularly during the Cold War, believed 
Clausewitz’s theory presented a doctrine which, if followed, would allow for the 
limitation of war – the use of force could be restricted ‘to a scale that is no 
greater than necessary to achieve the objectives at stake.’234  This interpretation 
has clouded Clausewitz’s true meaning and has focused too heavily on 
subordination over continuation.  War is an instrument, but it is a notoriously 
‘unstable instrument.’235  Clausewitz’s choice of the term ‘instrument’ is thus 
perhaps unfortunate.  As Echevarria notes, ‘Politik must…understand that its 
instrument…is a dynamic one.  War involves living forces rather than static 
elements; thus, it can change quickly and significantly in ways the logic of policy 
may not expect.’236  War is an uncertain, unsteady, and dangerous instrument that 
can often have effects entirely unintended by its users and is an activity that is 
very difficult to keep within rational bounds.  Often the thread of reason may be 
only very thinly woven through the whole structure; the tapestry hands together 
loosely. 
How much policy dominates in any particular war at a particular time is a 
matter of circumstance.  War, as Clausewitz wrote, only has an ‘element of 
subordination’ to policy.  Policy is never tyrant: war has its own imperatives, 
requirements, and dynamic.  Also, Echevarria is correct to remind us that war’s 
grammar ‘places as many restrictions on policy as grammar does on language.237  
In other words, policy must understand the limits of its instrument when 
determining objectives. 
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Dynamic feedback 
The analysis so far has treated the relationship between politics and war in a 
predominantly static and linear fashion to elucidate the basic ideas.  As Alan 
Beyerchen notes ‘the conventional approach…envisions a compartmentalisation 
of politics and war in a linear sequence – first comes politics/policies, then war, 
then politics/policies again to make or maintain peace.’ 238   The concept of 
‘subordination’ paints a picture of a one-way relationship whereby policy sets the 
goals for war to achieve and remains the chief consideration throughout, until the 
objective is either attained, lost, or some other marginal outcome is reached 
following hostilities.  This is not the image which Clausewitz intended to convey 
and in fact there will be a constant, dynamic, and nonlinear interaction between 
politics, policy, and war: they interact in a permanent and complex feedback 
process.  This tendency is not static in Clausewitz’s conception: as he notes, ‘the 
political situation can change from year to year.’239  Elsewhere, in an important 
sentence, Clausewitz notes that ‘the original political objects can greatly alter 
during the course of the war and may finally change entirely since they are 
influenced by events and their probable consequences.’240  
Because the major lines that run through war are political, military 
developments will have political effects, which will impact on the decisions and 
calculations of political leaders.  Thus, in war there is a constant interaction and 
interplay between politics, policy, and military developments, objectives and the 
use of force, ends and means.  The incredibly complexity this observation 
encompasses in any particular case means that, in theoretical terms, all we can 
hope to achieve is to draw attention to the prominent characteristics of this 
interplay. 
The concept of ‘continuation’ revealed more strongly that the interaction 
of belligerents continually creates new political realities.  This idea becomes 
apparent when we consider developments in war and their wider political impact, 
which in turn can feed into military developments.  Because new power 
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relationships are created during the course of war, the interests of third parties, 
domestic factions, and local populations might prompt them to intervene or react 
in one way or another – with all the political consequences such moves entail. 241  
This is often the case when the military successes of one side encourages others 
to support its cause, confident in the belief they are backing the winning side and 
that they will gain politically as a result.  Consider for instance, the Patriot’s 
victories during the American War of Independence at the Battles of Saratoga in 
1777 which brought the French into the war on their side, thus tipping the 
military balance greatly in their favour.  Or consider the importance of the 
Union’s victories in 1864 in prompting the British to abandon the idea of 
supporting the Confederates. 
In this way, military developments may impact on political dynamics and 
feed back into policy choices, and they can do so in endlessly varying ways.  It is 
important to remember that behind the abstract notion of ‘policy’ there are 
human decision-makers, whatever the institutional guise they may adopt.  Those 
responsible for setting policy do not disappear at the outbreak of hostilities, but 
rather will have to respond, adapt, and reassess in the light of changed 
circumstances during the course of conflict.  (Of course, stasis or paralysis are 
not excluded here as possibilities).  Just as during the build up to war, if 
diplomacy fails to resolve the political dispute then policy may decide on war, so 
in reaction to events in war policy may seek a negotiated settlement with the 
enemy, decide to stay the course, forge new alliances, or take the war to other 
groups.  Policy responds actively or passively to the effects of its instrument, 
whether threatened or employed.242 
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Ambiguity  
Clausewitz believed that the influence of policy on war was essentially 
ambiguous in relation to the rise to extremes.  This point is also implied in 
Gray’s assertion that, ‘The political context is by far the single most important 
factor in promoting or restraining the outbreak and conduct of war.’243   By 
stressing this tendency’s ambiguity we simply mean that the political purpose 
neither necessarily causes a rise to extremes or limits war, but that it is the 
central, though not only, determinant of both.  We should be careful not to 
mistake war’s subordination to policy for the limitation of war, as some 
commentators have been wont to do.  As Clausewitz observes, when policy 
requires an extreme effort, war will follow precisely because of its element of 
subordination.  He states that, ‘the closer…political probabilities drive war 
toward the absolute, the more the belligerent states are involved and drawn into 
its vortex.’244  Whilst in his final conception, absolute war is a logical fantasy, 
war in reality can nevertheless approach such extremes, as he believed he had 
witnessed during the Napoleonic Wars.  Clausewitz’s dialectical argument in 
Book 1, Chapter 1 is intended to demonstrate that both limited and unlimited 
wars are politically determined, whatever appearances may suggest.245 
But, as noted, the matter is more complex than this as war often develops 
its own dynamics.  Wars that begin for limited objects on either side, may rapidly 
create their own political dynamic disproportionate to the original cause of the 
war.  In some cases, policy may simply lose control over its instrument and the 
military may pursue the defeat of the opponent regardless of political 
imperatives.  The magnitude or scale of any war in reality, Clausewitz believed, 
is determined by forces other than the political object, such as the effects of 
friction, uncertainty, passion, social and cultural norms, that can cause the use of 
force to be modified.  Even in wars where the political object is extreme, ethical 
norms and legal prohibitions should not be dismissed.  As Echevarria puts it, ‘the 
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forces of violence, chance, and hostility can influence Politik to such a degree 
that policy may have to increase or reduce its aims.’246  Nevertheless, in most 
cases, policy and the dynamics of the political interaction between belligerents 
will likely be the major determinant.  In wars where policy essentially becomes a 
struggle for existence, those extraneous forces inhibiting extremes of violence 
are wont to be marginalised and only the inherent friction in war might serve to 
limit its ferociousness. 
Also, policy does not necessarily exert a positive or negative effect in 
terms of strategic performance.  The fact that Clausewitz firmly believed war 
should be subject to the guiding intelligence of policy, was not to say that policy 
is always wise or a positive strategic force.  For instance, policy can be unclear, 
make unrealistic demands on the military, or the policy itself may be wrong.  On 
the other hand, sensible and reasoned policy can have a greatly positive impact 
on strategic effectiveness – clear objectives provide the military with a firm idea 
of the kind of operations they need to undertake. 
Reflections 
Clausewitz believed that a rational thread, derived from the overarching direction 
of policy, ran through war, connecting the activities of individual combatants to 
the higher aims of the war.247  The extent to which this clear-headed influence is 
present greatly depends on unique circumstances and the character of the 
belligerents, but Clausewitz held it was mistaken to conceive of war as ever 
being conducted without some guiding purpose, even if it be shallow or vaguely 
articulated.  Groups attempt to achieve their ends through the use of military 
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means, yet, this is a highly problematical undertaking given the difficulty of 
translation between the two realms,248 the uncertainty surrounding all decisions, 
the unstable nature of the military instrument, and the unpredictable effects that 
any use of force entails.  He did not, as some have maintained, believe that war 
could always be employed in purely rational ways in pursuit of purely rational 
objectives.  The relationship between policy and war is certainly not linear, one-
way, or narrowly deterministic, but rather reciprocal and dynamic in nature: there 
is a continual interplay between policy and war.  Even if policy is definite about 
what it intends to achieve, the interactive dynamic of war can cause objectives to 
radically change during hostilities and the extent to which policy remains in 
control is highly contingent.   
Placing emphasis on the political nature of war focuses our attention on 
the fundamental forces which underlie the use of organised force: the logic of the 
distribution of relative power between groups.  Power may be manifested in 
radically different forms, but at heart it is about the ways in which social actors 
attempt to shape the context of their existence.  Regardless of the precise motives 
involved, the use of force is political at least as far as change is resisted by 
others.  When force is employed, the logic of politics does not cease at the 
outbreak of hostilities; it continues in its most potent, unpredictable, and complex 
manifestation.  Sometimes the main political lines in war will be clear and 
distinct, at others they will be barely perceptible or shrouded by the brute clash 
of military forces.  Often the political complexity can appear overwhelming, 
particularly when war is composed of myriad actors each pursuing divergent 
agendas; yet this simply reflects the reality of the complexity of political 
relationships.  In war, the scales of political power are constantly weighed and 
re-weighed: victory is rarely final, and apparent military success can be promptly 
displaced by political failure.249 
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War is an instrument of policy, but not only that.  It is also a continuation 
of the complex, contingent, and unpredictable web of political interactions 
through the medium of force.  So, a paradoxical situation is apparent whereby 
war is imbued with rationality through its subordination to policy, whilst 
simultaneously deriving much of its uncertainty and instability from its nature as 
a continuation of wider political interactions.  War, employed as a rational 
instrument, inevitably impacts upon power constellations at a variety of levels, 
over time, in endless ways which no leader can entirely control.  Moreover, 
wider political considerations encourage decisions which do not correspond 
directly with objectives or do not make sense from a military perspective. 
Here the connection with the other tendencies of the trinity must be 
emphasised.  When policy employs war as a means, around every corner stalk 
war’s fellow elements of chance and passion.  Not only is pure rational action 
impossible in war, but everywhere, attempts to achieve rational outcomes can be 
thwarted by the play of chance and the influence of passions and irrational 
impulses.  War is an instrument that can easily slip from the hands of those that 
wield it or, whilst solving some problems, can create others where least expected.  
Those contemplating war as a means to achieve their ends must understand the 
nature of their instrument and attempt to read the political landscape to ensure 
force is employed as to produce the desired effects, whilst limiting adverse or 
unexpected developments.  Sometimes the alternatives may be stark – ‘fight or 
die’ – but even in such circumstances, when the decision is taken to fight, actors 
must make reasoned decisions in order to survive, as much as passion and 
desperation may dominate their behaviour. 
In recent decades, Western states have struggled to employ their 
militaries as effective instruments of policy,250 primarily due to complex political 
conditions rather than any major military tactical or operational shortcomings.251  
Particularly in situations of insurgency and terrorism – the pre-eminent forms of 
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warfare currently faced by the West – politics is central: as Paul Cornish has 
recently argued, counterinsurgency ‘must be political first, political last, political 
always.’252  Force can be an extremely blunt instrument in dealing with such 
forms of organised violence and care is required to avert unintended 
consequences: the use of overwhelming force may not be the most suitable 
solution.  This Clausewitz recognised in an era dominated by the annihilation 
battle – as exemplified by Napoleon – and it is testament to his searching 
intellect that he saw beyond dominating impressions to comprehend that, in war, 
politics is ‘the first, the supreme, the most far-reaching’ consideration.253 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
Chance: The Realm of Uncertainty 
 
 
Never, never, never believe any war will be smooth and easy, or that anyone who embarks on 
that strange voyage can measure the tides and hurricanes he will encounter.  The statesman who 
yields to war fever must realise that once the signal is given, he is no longer the master of policy 
but the slave of unforeseeable and uncontrollable events…always remember that however sure 
you are that you can easily win, that there would not be a war if the other man did not think he 
also had a chance. 
Winston Churchill 
 
Think, too, of the great part that is played by the unpredictable in war: think of it now, before 
you are actually committed to war.  The longer a war lasts, the more things tend to depend on 
accidents.  Neither you nor we can see them: we have to abide their outcome in the dark. 
Thucydides 
 
We do know of certain knowledge that he [Osama Bin Laden] is either in Afghanistan, or in 
some other country, or dead. 
Donald Rumsfeld 
 
 
This tendency of Clausewitz’s trinity concerns ‘the play of chance and 
probability within which the creative spirit is free to roam.’1  War takes place in 
a climate of uncertainty as each belligerent attempts to overcome the other: 
neither side can be entirely sure of their opponent’s next move, and it may even 
be doubted whether either side knows what its own will be.  Clausewitz explains 
how war, like ‘no other human activity is so continuously or universally bound 
up with chance’ and that ‘there is an interplay of possibilities, probabilities, good 
luck and bad that weaves its way throughout the length and breadth of the 
tapestry.’2  For Clausewitz, it was principally the commander and his army that 
must operate in this climate of danger, uncertainty, and friction.  The 
commander must attempt to limit the effects of fear and chance through the ‘play 
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of courage and talent.’  It was Sun Tzu who famously commented that ‘if you 
know others and know yourself, you will not be imperilled in a hundred 
battles.’3  Clausewitz would have sympathised with the sentiment expressed in 
this aphorism, but was profoundly pessimistic about the possibility of achieving 
the measure of certainty on which it depends. 
This provides us with a sense of the meaning of this tendency, yet, as 
with the other elements of the trinity, it carries a great deal more weight than this 
basic introduction would suggest.  This tendency of ‘chance and uncertainty’ 
draws upon many other important ideas in his work – such as those concerned 
with strategy, the engagement, genius, or military virtues – and as with other 
insights, may appear to be little more than an expression of Clausewitz’s 
‘common-sense bordering on wit’,4  however this ignores the fact that others 
have denied, ignored, or overlooked its inclusion in theory as an essential 
element of the nature of war.  Earlier thinkers had either marginalised its 
importance or subscribed so fully to its force that they abandoned all hope of 
producing concrete theory.  Moreover, rejection of this element is by no means 
confined to theorists of Clausewitz’s era.  Indeed, its anticipated negation 
represents the basis of an entire school of thought in modern Western military 
circles, primarily in the US, which contends that rapid technological 
developments have engendered a so-called Revolution in Military Affairs 
(RMA) that tantalisingly promises to dispel Clausewitz’s fog of war.5   Gray 
usefully reminds us that, ‘commonplace though emphasis upon the role of 
chance in war may appear, such emphasis is highly unusual among strategic 
theorists.’6 
Humans often like to feel in control of their environment, to be the 
masters of their fate,7 and may consequently feel uncomfortable when fortune, as 
Machiavelli suggested, appears as a fiendish Goddess wanting to be ‘mistress of 
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all human affairs,’8 when things have to be left to chance, or the course of events 
cannot be reliably predicted.  Worse, some refuse to accept that anything is left 
to chance.  Such thinking can lead to dangerous forms of strategic myopia, 
historical myth,9 and misunderstanding of war’s true nature.  Clausewitz’s work 
forces us to confront reality (in both theoretical and strategic terms) and to 
emphasise the demands chance and uncertainty places on human action, will, 
and creativity.     
So, have changes in warfare since his time rendered his insights 
obsolete?  How does this tendency reveal itself through the various actors in 
war: was he right to claim that this tendency concerns mainly the commander 
and his army, or should we conceive of a more inclusive conception?  To answer 
such questions, we need to develop a rigorous understanding of this element of 
the trinity.  Its precise meaning, connection to the other elements of the trinity, 
and form of its manifestation in reality are all contested and complex issues that 
thus require detailed analysis and clarification. 
The chapter will begin by considering some of the influences, 
precedents, and experiences that contributed to Clausewitz’s thought on the 
subject and shaped the ultimate form it would take.  It will then move on to 
combine textual interpretation of Clausewitz’s work with secondary 
interpretations, historical evidence, and modern scholarship to develop a 
comprehensive conception of this tendency, and one that retains its relevance in 
the light of modern warfare.  Finally, it will consider some of the theoretical 
implications of this analysis. 
Background, influences and precedents 
As Daniel Moran has noted, it is extremely difficult to speak with confidence 
about the exact intellectual influences that contributed to Clausewitz’s 
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conception of the role of chance and probability in war.10  The origins of the 
ideas are certainly somewhat opaque and diverse: aspects of Clausewitz’s own 
experiences and contemporary events merge with imagery reflective of 
Romantic literature; humanistic renaissance philosophy finds its place next to 
concepts drawn from the mechanical sciences and physics.  Yet, despite this 
eclecticism, the following analysis draws attention to three areas for which there 
is strong reason to believe that they contributed importantly to the development 
of his ideas: these are, precedents in existing military theory; Machiavelli; and 
Clausewitz’s own experiences of war. 
Chance and uncertainty in existing military theory 
Clausewitz adamantly believed that earlier Enlightenment theorists had not 
devoted enough attention to the concepts of chance and uncertainty.  Rationalist 
theorists preferred to emphasise those aspects of war that were tangible, 
controllable, and susceptible to concrete laws, or that dealt with mathematical, 
algebraical and geometrical factors.  However, this does not mean such thinkers, 
who, like Clausewitz, had often experienced war first-hand, were completely 
blind to the existence of chance.  Rather, it was the nature of their theoretical 
approach that precluded the incorporation of these factors in their systems: a 
form of ‘methodological determinism.’11  As Gat states, ‘The Enlightenment 
thinkers were quite aware of the factors of uncertainty but focused on what they 
considered to be suitable for intellectual formulation.’12  Clausewitz explicitly 
attacked such views when he stated that those thinkers aimed at ‘fixed values; 
but everything in war is uncertain and calculations have to be made with variable 
quantities.’13  Whilst some thinkers accepted that chance impacts on war, they 
failed to formulate such ideas into clear concepts and integrate them into theory, 
which ultimately led to a significant disconnect between their ideas and reality.  
As Clausewitz noted, such factors were vital because they were ultimately what 
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differentiated ‘real war from war on paper’14 and which therefore theory must 
tackle if it is to remain relevant.  As Alan Beyerchen comments, ‘Facing up to 
the intrinsic presence of chance, complexity, and ambiguity in war is imperative.  
For Clausewitz, this is preferable to the risk of being blind-sided by the strictures 
of a theory artificially imposed on the messiness of reality in the name of 
clarity.’15 
The Enlightenment theorists’ failure to seriously consider and analyse 
chance as a central element of war mirrors a disposition, common amongst 
Ancient philosophers such as Aristotle,16 which marginalised those aspects of 
the world seemingly unsusceptible to scientific explanation, and treated them as 
phenomena beyond laws of cause and effect.  As philosopher of science, Henri 
Poincaré noted, ‘the ancients distinguished between the phenomena which 
seemed to obey harmonious laws, established once for all, and those that they 
attributed to chance, which were those that could not be predicted because they 
were not subject to any law.’17  This ontological position might be characterised 
as a form of intellectual denial – the refusal to contemplate that which you 
cannot control or systematically explain.  Theory would only concern itself with 
that which was explicable through observable laws.  Both Ancient and 
Enlightenment thinkers, for comparable reasons (although Enlightenment 
thinkers generally believed in universal cause and effect), exhibited a similar 
reaction to chance: theoretical denial, or what today we might term ‘cognitive 
dissonance.’18  
Early Enlightenment military theorists, who were determined to reduce 
warfare to a system of rules, began by focusing on those areas which were most 
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susceptible to precise calculation.  They tended to start from ‘the bottom up’, in 
the sense of developing systems directed mainly at tactical matters or ‘fields 
where the enemy’s independent will did not have to be taken into account’, 
rather than at the more complex and intangible problems associated with 
strategy. 19   Foremost amongst these was the science of siege warfare. 20  
Although an almost permanent feature of war from the time of Jericho,21 siege 
warfare had become an increasingly dominant feature of the western experience 
of war22 and, indeed, by the eighteenth century, warfare appeared to be little 
more than an ‘interminable succession of sieges.’23  For a variety of reasons, 
during this time armies were usually kept close to heavily fortified positions.24  
The study of siege warfare encouraged the belief that theory could confine itself 
to mathematical prescriptions that would leave almost nothing to chance.25  In 
the seventeenth century, Louis XIV’s celebrated military engineer, Marshal 
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Sébastien le Prestre de Vauban was hugely influential in systematising the 
theory of fortification and siegecraft in this manner.26   
In the realm of fortification Vauban believed he had banished uncertainty 
– he purported to have ‘discovered an infallible method of defending a fortress, 
but never disclosed what it was’27 whilst also (somewhat paradoxically) claimed 
to have devised a plan for the besieging army, offering ‘an almost certain 
breakthrough with little bloodshed.’28  Although Vauban was not simply a gifted 
military engineer – he also considered the role of fortresses as part of the larger 
strategic picture29 – the selectivity of his theory is clear and thus, the extent to 
which uncertainty in war could be eliminated through application of his theory 
would necessarily be limited. 30   Indeed, Henry Guerlac suggests there is 
evidence that Vauban himself, toward the end of his life, doubted the strategic 
importance of fortification vis-à-vis the main army.31  The case of Vauban leads 
us to emphasise the fundamental Clausewitzian, and indeed modern point, that 
chance pertains to war in all its diverse dimensions; being master of one’s fate in 
a single, or even many particular fields does not preclude the continued play of 
chance when war is considered holistically. 
Following Vauban’s precedent, theorists such as Count Turpin de Crisse 
developed operational plans based on a spatially enlarged version of Vauban’s 
siegecraft which he claimed, if followed, would make success almost certain.32  
Later theorists such as Guibert and Bülow, although army officers by training, 
had little experience of command in war33 and were thus in a poor position to 
appreciate the existence and effect of chronic uncertainty.  This is reflected in 
Bülow’s concentration on geometrical lines of operation, whereby elaborate 
strategic preparation and planning well before battle would serve to reduce ‘the 
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element of pure chance that Frederick [the Great] had feared in it.’34  Armed 
with such principles he believed that planning could become ‘more fruitful, 
prediction somewhat more possible, warfare more of a ‘science.’’35  So, chance, 
by default, was virtually absent from these theories.  
Nevertheless, it would be inaccurate to claim that all previous thinkers 
had not recognised the difficulties that chance presented for theory, even if they 
continued to display the ancients’ proclivity for intellectual side-stepping by 
recognising the problem and then proceeding to ignore it, like sweeping rubbish 
under the carpet.  For instance, Jomini did recognise uncertainty as ‘one of the 
chief causes of the great difference between the theory and the practice of war.’36  
As Echevarria notes, Jomini did not ‘necessarily assume a world without 
friction.  Instead, his underlying assumption is that if a commander were to hold 
fast to the proposed principles, and use them as guidelines, he would succeed in 
the face of the confusion and chaos of battle.’37  Furthermore, Jomini makes the 
point that if success was achieved by chance, then it would be chance action in 
line with principles, nothing else.38  Clausewitz believed theorists like Jomini 
directed their principles towards ‘unilateral activity’ and considered only factors 
that ‘could be mathematically calculated.’ 39   They thus formulated wholly 
‘lopsided principle[s] that could never govern a real situation.’40  
Before both Jomini and Clausewitz, Raimondo Montecuccoli, who, 
despite the fact that he had ‘hoped that his axioms would make the conduct of 
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operations predictable’41, at least recognised the difficulty of his objective and 
held that ‘it was impossible to calculate all factors in advance and some matters 
‘should be left to fortune,’ because in war ‘he who worries about everything 
achieves nothing; he who worries about too little deceives himself.’42  Also, the 
qualities Montecuccoli believed a commander should possess reflected the 
attributes Machiavelli associated with virtù, such as courage, fortitude, energy 
and determination:43  all characteristics that largely presume the existence of 
uncertainty, chance, and danger in war.  Likewise, Saxe recognised that often 
outcomes will be ‘dependent upon the favor of fortune, which sometimes is very 
inconstant’44 and that, as a result, commanders require courage and intelligence, 
‘a talent for sudden and appropriate improvisation’, and the ability ‘to see the 
opportunity and to know how to use it.’45 
Yet Montecuccoli and de Saxe failed to grasp or sufficiently articulate, as 
Clausewitz subsequently would, the critical implications of these insights for 
theory.  Chance could not simply be viewed as something incidental to theory, 
but was in fact central to it.  As Daniel Moran notes, when it comes to 
formulating theory, even those who might be fully aware of war’s uncertain 
nature, 
 
might feel that the surest path to clarity requires that incidental 
difficulties be ignored, in the same way that a scientist seeking a constant 
pattern or signal within a mass of data is entitled, indeed required, to 
ignore the ‘noise’ that surrounds it.  For Clausewitz it was unrealistic to 
adopt such an attitude to war, in which the effects of chance are so 
profound that they become the signal, the central reality, and not an 
exogenous variable to be discounted.46 
 
Given these theorists’ tendency to marginalise chance in their theories it 
is hardly surprising that detailed discussions of the qualities of genius are largely 
absent from their work or only mentioned in passing.  Previous thinkers either 
devoted little attention to this subject or situated it in a ‘sublime’ realm 
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presumed to be ‘beyond’ theory.  When war is deemed to be determined by 
rational laws, what role is there for genius when presumably the enemy will 
submit following the application of logical principles?  Such wars would be 
decided by superior algebra rather than creative genius.  This characteristic of 
rationalist theory led to a curious position, which Clausewitz would later mock, 
whereby anything not clearly explicable through ‘correct principles’ must be due 
to the workings of sublime genius which is able to spurn the rules: such 
transcendental talent was deemed unfathomable.  As Echevarria states, 
‘Enlightenment writers tended to place genius outside the realm of what could 
be understood scientifically.  They regarded genius as a rare, inexplicable, and 
therefore inconvenient phenomenon.’ 47   So, it was primarily the failure of 
rationalist thinkers to fully accept or work through the implications of chance, 
that entailed a highly distorted conception of genius, and which Clausewitz 
would seek to rectify. 
However, at the other extreme, the increasingly dominant Romantic 
world-view depicted war as ‘the sphere of clashing wills, rising emotions, 
uncertainty, and confusion…diverse complexity and endless confusion; [that] 
could only be mastered by the general’s practical genius and iron will.’48  The 
Sturm und Drang writers emphasised the play of chance in their works, as well 
as the subjective creative will that must overcome it.  This is a dominant theme 
in Schiller’s Wallenstein49 which was one of Clausewitz’s favourite works.50  
That Clausewitz’s own inquiries into the psychological and intellectual faculties 
of great commanders – such as a Gustavus Adolphus, Frederick the Great, or 
Napoleon – often stressed character and spirit over education or cognitive 
ability, betrays a debt to this Romantic spirit. 51   
Also, in the vein of Romantic thought, Berenhorst’s work articulated a 
view of war determined purely by the contingent, exceptional, and 
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unpredictable. 52   As Katherine Herbig notes, he ‘threw up his hands at the 
expanded scope for chance generated by new technologies and declared that all 
war was chaos.’53  He held that, ‘far from being scientific, war was anarchic, 
dominated by accident…Efforts to control, let alone abolish, this primeval 
wildness were absurd.’54  Aspects of this tendency of the trinity certainly suggest 
Clausewitz was at least sympathetic to the causes of Berenhorst’s despair.  Yet, 
whilst appreciating the importance of these factors, Clausewitz would not follow 
Berenhorst in his Romantic submission to the caprice of fortune and, as 
Echevarria notes, Clausewitz’s conception of genius differed from that of the 
Romantics.  For instance, where ‘Goethe’s genius acted spontaneously… 
Clausewitz’s genius took action only after correctly assessing the overall 
situation.’55  Clausewitz’s was an altogether more serious, balanced, and cerebral 
genius, that a true Romantic would perhaps have scorned.  The teaching of 
Scharnhorst may have been crucial in shaping Clausewitz’s ideas in this respect.  
Paret notes that, even though the Berlin Academy was still teaching the 
Enlightenment dogma that sound theory could eliminate chance, Scharnhorst, its 
new director, had long since rejected this notion and was encouraging his 
students to consider the more realistic notion of ‘the ability of theory to help 
men deal with surprise, to help them exploit the unforeseen.’56   
So, in general terms there was either a perceptible avoidance of the 
subject of chance in existing theory, or where it was considered, it was marked 
by an overemphasis on the uncontrollable, chaotic nature of war, or an overly 
sentimental conception of genius.  Nevertheless, some of the ideas that 
Clausewitz would ultimately develop are detectable.  Building on these 
precedents, and encouraged by Scharnhorst, Clausewitz would emphasise the 
operation of chance in theory and develop a conception which represented 
neither a capitulation to fortune nor an overoptimistic belief in theory’s ability to 
overcome it.  It appears Clausewitz had to reach further back in time to find a 
thinker – Machiavelli – more in tune with his own ideas, who had appreciated 
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more fully the importance and implications of chance in war, and was less 
inhibited by the blinkering strictures of Enlightenment theoretical standards.  
Clausewitz was to formulate a conception of chance which was strongly 
Machiavellian in form and indeed, was greatly influenced by the Florentine’s 
ideas. 
Fortune and virtue in Machiavelli 
We know that Clausewitz was an avid reader of Machiavelli57 and believed that 
‘his judgement in military matters is very sound.’58  It is perhaps commonplace 
to associate the two thinkers for their pronounced political realism, yet another 
important common feature deserves attention.  Machiavelli’s rendering of 
fortuna and virtù – which pervade all his major works59 – furnished Clausewitz 
with the conceptual keys to his analysis of chance and genius.  As such, these 
ideas form a common thread running from Seneca and Plutarch60 to Machiavelli, 
and from him through Montecuccoli and Scharnhorst to Clausewitz.61  Fortuna 
for Machiavelli held a similar meaning to the ‘chance’ employed by Clausewitz, 
in essence referring to the incalculable and the fortuitous, although there was 
probably more of a cosmic element in Machiavelli. 62   Machiavelli, like 
Clausewitz, believed that, ‘The continued existence of struggles and 
uncertainties patterns the character and the methods of war: there is no safe 
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course.’63  Neal Wood notes that for Machiavelli, ‘In no other human situation 
are chance, accident, and uncertainty…so prominent as in the peril and hardship 
of military encounter.’ 64   Clausewitzian and Machiavellian conceptions of 
chance also correspond in the essential ambiguity they ascribe to the concept: in 
Machiavelli’s ‘Tercets’, fortune has two faces, one fierce and one mild.65  
In the penultimate chapter of The Prince Machiavelli notes how many 
people in his own times, because of ‘the great variations and changes, beyond 
human imaginings’, had come to believe that ‘there is no point sweating over 
things, but that one should submit to the rulings of chance.’  Machiavelli does 
not subscribe to this fatalistic view, but instead proposes a compromise that 
allows for the operation of human will: ‘fortune is probably arbiter of half the 
things we do, leaving the other half or so to be controlled by ourselves.’66  
Machiavelli did not share the widespread contemporary belief that man is 
entirely in the hands of Fortuna.67   
This amalgam of chance and human will broadly reflects the duality that 
Clausewitz proposes, for instance when he states that ‘with uncertainty in one 
scale, courage and self-confidence must be thrown into the balance.’ 68  
Furthermore, Machiavelli explains how fortune is not a wholly overpowering 
force; like a violent raging river, one can still take precautions to control its 
power.69  Here, both share the belief that in order to face the vicissitudes of 
chance, men must be able to adapt to changing times because ‘fortune is 
changeable whereas men are obstinate in their ways, men prosper so long as 
fortune and policy are in accord, and where there is a clash they fail.’70  Those 
who learn how to handle fortune can reap great benefits.  In what Quentin 
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Skinner describes as an ‘erotic twist’,71 Machiavelli declares that ‘fortune is a 
woman’ and as such one can only ‘command her with greater audacity.’72   
The key for Machiavelli is acting at the right time, when fortune favours 
you – what we might term opportunism.  As he states, ‘Nothing is of greater 
importance in time of war than knowing how to make the best of a fair 
opportunity when it is offered’73 and that ‘it is better to try fortuna while she is 
still favourable than to try nothing and allow her surely to destroy you.’74  This 
idea is also found in The Prince, where Machiavelli explains that outstanding 
princes ‘do not seem to have from fortune anything other than opportunity.  
Fortune, as it were, provided the matter but they gave it its form; without 
opportunity their prowess would have been extinguished, and without such 
prowess the opportunity would have come in vain.’75  So, Machiavelli’s insights 
helped Clausewitz develop a conception of chance which was, if not an 
unambiguously positive force, at least malleable in the hands of great ability. 
The qualities that enable men to face fortune and make the most of 
opportunities are encapsulated in Machiavelli’s concept of virtù.  Here there is a 
striking parallel with Clausewitz’s discussion of genius.  These similarities are 
noted by Neal Wood in his superb introduction to The Art of War, which 
concludes that Clausewitz’s, 
 
treatment of the moral factors in war provides the most striking parallel 
to the precepts of Machiavelli.  The analysis of the qualities of 
generalship and of military virtue can be interpreted as an illuminating 
commentary upon Machiavelli’s concept of virtù.  Since war is 
conceived of by Clausewitz as a ‘perpetual conflict with the unexpected,’ 
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two qualities in the general are needed above all: a ‘lucid intellect’ and a 
‘great moral courage,’ reminiscent of Machiavelli’s prudenza and virtù.76 
 
The attributes associated with virtù in Machiavelli’s work are strikingly 
Clausewitzian: ‘boldness, bravery, resolution, and decisiveness’ combined with 
‘endurance and firmness, the necessary resilience, [and] the power of sustaining 
a course of action until the end is achieved.’77  Virtù is associated with ‘vital 
creative energy’78 which closely resembles Clausewitz’s notion of the ‘creative 
spirit’ presented in the trinity, but virtù for both thinkers is never simply the 
Romantic notion of ‘unruly energy, unbridled ferocity, and rapidly exhausted 
boldness.’79  Intellect and knowledge serve to direct and control the bold creative 
urge.  Also, Pitkin explains that if Machiavelli ‘confronts fortune with virtù, it is 
not to inure men against her blows but to ward off or control those blows 
through active contention.’80  Whilst the personification of chance is not evident 
in Clausewitz,81 this idea of proactive and energetic exploitation, as opposed to 
passive mitigation, permeates On War.  Machiavelli’s personification usefully 
conveys the idea that fortune is something that can be confronted given 
sufficient activism and shrewd decisions: importantly, he emphasises the 
‘mutability of fortune under the impact of effort and ability.’82   
So, in both thinkers works fortune and chance are not simply reasons for 
despair, but nevertheless are powerful forces that cannot be ignored or avoided.  
As Paret notes of Clausewitz, ‘to exclude or deny chance was to go against 
nature…Despite its constant power, chance was more than danger: it was a 
positive force to be exploited.’83  Fortune rules mostly where men lack virtù or 
genius – attributes which in both thinkers works apply, albeit in different 
measures, to all actors involved in war, from statesmen to individual soldiers.84  
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The dominant Enlightenment outlook of a strict dichotomy between a realm of 
necessity and an unfathomable, untouchable realm of chance left little room for 
human creativity, hence the concomitant relative disregard for the attributes of 
great talent.  As Coker notes, ‘Space, time, mass, force, and momentum, the 
terms of mechanics, took the place of…Machiavelli’s fortuna.’ 85   In both 
Machiavelli and Clausewitz a more dynamic and dependent relationship exists, 
whereby the active human element is integral to shaping one’s own fate in the 
face of the unknown.  The parallels suggest Clausewitz was heavily indebted to 
Machiavelli’s concept of virtù as the natural counterpart of fortune, which 
undoubtedly reflects Clausewitz’s close reading of Machiavelli’s works and an 
intellectual affinity with many of his ideas.  The two thinkers closely correspond 
in their understanding of this subject, even if their ways of expressing it differed.  
Clausewitz’s experiences  
In Chapter 2 we noted how Clausewitz believed the best proofs in theory are 
personal and historical experience.  Clausewitz’s diverse experience of war and 
his observations of contemporary events contributed greatly to the ideas 
contained in this tendency.  Perhaps most crucially in this respect was the way in 
which experience emphasised to him the enormous distance that separated 
existing theories and his actual confrontation with actual warfare.  Existing 
theory presented neat, precise, and sterile principles, but how could these be 
reconciled with the confused and messy reality he had experienced?  What was 
the element in theory that kept it so divorced from war’s reality?  Quite early in 
his studies Clausewitz recognised that the vital link was to be found in the 
uncertainty, unpredictability, and friction of war.  Following the Wars of the 
First Coalition, whilst based at Neuruppin, his regiment was endlessly drilled in 
antiquated methods 86  and Clausewitz would later recall his disdain at the 
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‘formalistic, ceremonial character of these maneuvers’ 87  when, as he stated, 
‘even a modicum of reflection on these exercises…was bound to lead at once to 
the realization that none of this had taken place in the war that we had fought.’88  
The challenge, however, would be to explain such ‘missing’ factors in a 
theoretical manner, using clear concepts, and to reveal their interaction with 
other aspects of war.   
Clausewitz concluded his lectures on ‘little war’ between October 1810 
and June 1811 with the following modest statement to his students:  
 
As little combat experience as I have, it is enough to give me an accurate 
view of the way most episodes in war unfold, as well as the numerous 
chance incidents, which touch everything, and of the numerous 
difficulties that inhibit accurate execution of the precise plans that theory 
tends to formulate.  We might term these the friction of the whole 
machinery, which, as is the case with any other friction, can be 
recognised only through experience, and which so many authors ignore 
completely.89   
 
This paragraph contains ideas that would be developed in On War and are 
encapsulated in the trinity.  It underlines the extent to which a proper 
understanding of these concepts can only be gained by first-hand experience of 
war and reveals how Clausewitz was struck by the omnipresence of chance 
events in the wars in which he had taken part; perhaps none more so than during 
the disastrous twin defeats at Jena-Auerstedt.   
The Prussian campaign, as Clausewitz observed in his Nachrichten, was 
dogged by every kind of friction from divided command, indecision, 
insubordination, disorder, and confusion.90  The defeat of 1806 was also partly 
caused by the failure of Prussian intelligence.91  Clausewitz’s dismissive views 
of intelligence may well derive from this experience and Napoleon’s skilful use 
of deception and operations security may have persuaded Clausewitz of the 
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difficulty of ever accurately determining the enemy’s actions.92   It has been 
suggested that Clausewitz was somewhat ignorant of the importance that 
intelligence played in Napoleons campaigns. 93   Yet, Rosello notes that, 
‘Clausewitz’s evaluation of intelligence may be interpreted as criticism of what 
he perceived to be the existing and dismal state of organisational and technical 
incapability to penetrate the fog of war, rather than a denial of the usefulness or 
general need for intelligence.’94 
Perhaps also Clausewitz was compelled to emphasise this tendency of 
war due to the extent to which the character of the wars of the Napoleonic era, in 
which he fought, were more suffused with chance and uncertainty than those of 
the eighteenth century and even those of the First Coalition, as ‘rules and 
geometric calculation gave way to passion, massive friction and uncertainty.’95  
The French Revolution made possible mass conscription, which necessitated far-
reaching changes in the organisation, supply, discipline, and training of the new 
armies, which in turn would greatly increase the ‘tempo and range of operations’ 
– the wars of this period would become ‘more complex and less predictable’ 
than before.96        
These personal experiences, combined with his detailed analyses of 
various campaigns revealed how often outcomes were decided by chance events, 
how the detailed plans of commanders rarely survived contact with the enemy, 
and how mistaken information and reports on the strengths or dispositions of the 
enemy often were.  The fact that his insights were greatly derived from his own 
experiences have led some commentators to question the general relevance of 
his opinions, arguing that they may apply to Napoleonic warfare, but – 
particularly in the light of rapid technological change – no longer suffice to 
describe the nature of modern warfare.  We will tackle such concerns later in the 
chapter. 
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Explorations 
Now we have some idea of the various sources and influences on Clausewitz’s 
thought with regard to the ideas contained in this trinity, we can move on to 
explore the subject in greater detail.  To this end, we will consider some of the 
central concepts that relate to this tendency and then draw these ideas together 
later in the chapter to consider their implications in theory. 
The various concepts of chance, uncertainty, probability, friction, the fog 
of war, and genius are all strongly related and interconnected.  For instance, 
Herbig points to the inherent connection between chance and uncertainty: 
‘Something happens by chance, that is, an inexplicable or random event takes 
place whose cause is either inapparent or unconnected to its effects.  This 
provokes uncertainty, the psychological state of discomfort from confusion and 
lack of information.’97  Nevertheless, Clausewitz meant something very specific 
in his use of all these individual concepts; they do not simply represent 
synonyms for a single phenomenon, therefore it is important to explore the 
distinguishing features of each in some detail.98  Equally, though not constituting 
a single phenomenon, the various concepts clearly constitute a coherent family 
of ideas connected by a common thread, which Clausewitz subsumed under the 
shorthand concept of ‘chance and probability’.  Modern interpreters often 
emphasise the integration of these concepts, employing generic terms such as 
‘general friction’, which encompasses danger, exertion, uncertainty and 
chance.99   Such generic approaches are welcome, but only if based on a solid 
grasp of the individual concepts that comprise them, and which can best be 
understood in isolation. 
                                                          
97
 Herbig, ‘Chance and Uncertainty’, p. 104. 
98
 This is a task made more difficult by the fact that Clausewitz often discusses them in terms of 
their interactions, rather than as distinct ideas.  Even where a separate chapter is devoted to 
friction, the play of chance is intimately implicated in the analysis, despite being analytically 
distinct ideas. 
99
 See Barry D. Watts, Clausewitzian Friction and Future War (Washington: National Defense 
University, 1996). 
Chance 
 229
The intruder: chance 
The concept of chance employed by Clausewitz is intended in its pure form, 
conceived of as ‘arbitrary and incalculable’ 100  events, or what we might 
commonly understand as ‘sheer random chance’101 characterised by an absence 
of cause, predictability, or regularity in the sequence of action and its antecedent 
conditions.102  Chance in war is the ‘intruder’ that ‘makes everything uncertain 
and interferes with the whole course of events’103 – it renders war the ‘domain of 
the unexpected.’104  As Strachan puts it, due to the play of chance, events have ‘a 
tendency to work against the grain of expectation.’105  It is the play of chance 
that Clausewitz explains makes war a ‘relentless struggle with the 
unforeseen.’ 106   One can perhaps understand the ‘cognitive dissonance’ 
displayed by both the Ancients and Enlightenment theorists given that chance 
represents the negation of the very order and uniformity they sought to reveal in 
their theories.107  It is a feature of war recognised by commanders throughout 
history; so, for instance, early in the American War of Independence, after the 
failure to take Québec, General Washington remarked that, ‘hence I shall know 
the events of war are exceedingly doubtful, and that capricious fortune often 
blasts our most flattering hopes.’108 
Chance is something that can only be vaguely prepared for, because, as 
Seneca had it, ‘it is impossible to make preparations for what is 
undetermined.’109  The very nature of something that happened by chance is that 
it was unforeseen – we did not expect it to happen.  Therefore, we can prepare 
for chance only in the general sense of anticipating its probable existence, as 
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something we know will occur, but we are ignorant as to the precise form it will 
take.110  It was recognition of this fact that compelled the elder Moltke to claim 
that there was no point in devising detailed schemes beyond the deployment 
phase.111  Clausewitz explains how war is ‘rich in unique episodes.  Each is an 
uncharted sea, full of reefs.  The commander may suspect the reefs’ existence 
without ever having seen them; now he has to steer past them in the dark.’112  
Chance events in this respect are those that cannot be mathematically predicted 
or are not ‘statistically tractable’.113  Thucydides had observed this about war 
centuries earlier when he remarked that ‘it is impossible to calculate accurately 
events that are determined by chance.’114  In war, because chance is ever-present 
and inescapable – Clausewitz argued this ‘element is never absent’ – it 
inevitably plays a large part in outcomes.  Success or failure rarely accrues 
simply from the skill or incompetence of the commander, but is greatly 
determined by the play of chance, good luck, or misfortune.  Although this is not 
something humans like to accept – Clausewitz describes the tendency to explain 
success as the result of genius alone as a ‘gratifying assumption’115 – that even 
‘successful commanders leave to chance what cannot be controlled is the 
ultimate acknowledgement of chance’s centrality in the nature of war.’116  
The unplanned battle for Nasirayah in late March during the 2003 Iraq 
War represents an excellent example of how even a technologically advanced 
force can be caught out by the classic sources of chance: the weather, 
unforgiving terrain, and the unexpected actions of the enemy.  In late March 
fedayeen forces mounted an unforeseen resistance and, in scrambling to meet the 
threat, US forces took wrong turnings in the darkness and swirling dust and 
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suffered serious casualties; rescue forces got bogged down in soft ground, took 
further wrong turnings, were divided and attacked by fedayeen after a vehicle 
was hit on a bridge crossing, and an American A-10 anti-tank aircraft mistakenly 
hit a number of friendly vehicles.117  Keegan sums up the battle as an ‘episode of 
military confusion at its worst.’118   Subsequently, the progress of the 1st Marines 
pushing north was seriously hampered by the onset of a massive dust storm, or 
shamal, which allowed Saddam’s troops to stage a blocking attack. 119   As 
Keegan remarks with respect to this incident: ‘nothing in war is predictable.’120  
As it happened, dust storms would be a much more manageable chance 
occurrence than the unexpected reaction (at least to Pentagon defence 
planners)121 of thousands of Iraqis to the occupation in the months following the 
invasion.  Countless such examples of the unexpected exist in the history of 
warfare and it would be pedantic to attempt an exhaustive list.122  
In addition to this largely unproblematic, standard conception of chance, 
Alan Beyerchen, drawing on the work of Poincaré, has identified two other 
principal forms of chance evident in Clausewitz’s work.  Beyerchen refers to a 
form of chance deriving from ‘analytical blindness.’123  This is perhaps best 
conceived as chance that results from human mental weakness, or as Poincaré 
put it, ‘our frailty and ignorance’ – an inability to comprehend the whole so that 
‘we may happen to overlook circumstances which, at first sight, seemed 
completely foreign to the anticipated fact, to which we should never have 
dreamed of attributing any influence, which nevertheless, contrary to all 
anticipation, come to play an important part.’124  When things do not proceed as 
expected due to causes that lay beyond our mental horizon, such occurrences 
appear as blind chance – as Carr had it, they are ‘the measure of our 
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ignorance.’ 125   This, Clausewitz recognised, was even a significant problem 
when analysing wars in retrospect, because the multiplicity of causes can ‘lead 
to a broad and complex field of inquiry in which we may easily get lost.’126  This 
myopia might also derive from a form of ‘cognitive dissonance’ or ‘intolerance 
of ambiguity’, as noted earlier: the often unconscious way in which humans deal 
with developments that appear discrepant or do not fit with preconceived ideas, 
but that often lead to self-delusion and misperception.127     
A large part of the experience of chance may in fact turn out to be a 
function of this fundamental human weakness.  No human mind is capable of 
comprehending simultaneously the complex whole, its interactions, and the 
infinite relations between cause and effect.  Indeed, as Poincaré remarks, ‘If a 
being with such a mind existed, we could play no game of chance with him, we 
should always lose.’128  With hindsight we may be able to better understand the 
circumstances that led to certain events, but the point remains that, for those 
involved at the time, whether due to sheer incompetence or analytical blindness, 
events were not foreseen and they therefore still warrant inclusion as chance 
factors in war.  We must be mindful, as Clausewitz counselled, not to project our 
knowledge of what we know happened, back on to those who had to make 
decisions at the time.129   
This understanding of chance helps to explain events which otherwise 
appear to occupy a form of ‘grey area’ of events – the ‘seemingly probable’ – 
which we might describe as chance happenings, but which some might argue do 
not really deserve the name.  Here we have in mind those events that appear 
determined by conditions to an extent that their occurrence should perhaps have 
been foreseen, but were not.  To take the above example of the sandstorm that 
hit US troops in Iraq, one might argue that sandstorms are a regular occurrence 
in the central Mesopotamian plain and thus should not have caught American 
forces off-guard.  Yet, even with the most advanced meteorological technology, 
it would have been impossible to predict that the sandstorm would hit precisely 
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when and where it did – that was largely a matter of chance.  Even the best 
preparations for possible, even probable yet unpredictable events, does not 
negate their nature as essentially unknowable (perhaps comparable to Donald 
Rumsfeld’s infamous ‘known unknowns’),130 it just permits a more anticipatory 
approach. 
Another form of chance Beyerchen draws attention to concerns the 
concept of ‘micro-cause’ or which the historian might know as the problem of 
‘Cleopatra’s nose.’ 131   Micro-cause refers to situations in which 
disproportionately large effects result from apparently trifling initial causes.  As 
Poincaré put it, ‘a very small cause which escapes our notice determines a 
considerable effect that we cannot fail to see, and then we say that that effect is 
due to chance.’132  Even if we have a fairly sound understanding of the workings 
of a system, as, for instance, meteorologists have of climatic conditions, 
precisely predicting or judging the course of the weather in any particular 
circumstance is incredibly difficult because the tiniest variations of climactic 
conditions, which can entirely escape our observation, determine whether a 
‘cyclone will burst here or there.’133  Clausewitz draws attention to this problem 
in relation to his discussion of the critical analysis of past campaigns (itself 
dependent on linking effects to appreciable causes); the process is made difficult 
by the fact that ‘in war, as in life generally, all parts of the whole are 
interconnected and thus the effects produced, however small their cause, must 
influence all subsequent military operations and modify their final outcome to 
some degree.’ 134   Furthermore, if such causes ‘happen to be transitory or 
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accidental, history may not have recorded them at all.’135  The great gap between 
infinitely small and ‘inappreciable’ causes and such potentially enormous and 
inescapable effects means we have to leave to chance that which we could not 
hope to explain.  This is not so much a function of human analytical weakness as 
the objective fact of the incredible complexity of certain cause and effect 
relationships – Clausewitz emphasises the ‘vast, almost infinite distance there 
can be between cause and effect.’136  This is particularly relevant to war given its 
huge complexity, the sheer amount of variables, and the openness of the 
phenomenon to outside factors. 
To subscribe to the pervasive existence of chance in war is not to argue 
that ‘everything is possible in human affairs’137 or that ‘existence…has neither 
cause nor reason nor necessity.’138  Emphasis on chance is not to deny that 
things are causally determined – as Carr notes, accident is not an absence of 
causal determination:139  Einstein was adamant that ‘God does not play dice with 
the universe!’  Conversely, nor is to stress the universality of cause to adhere to 
a narrow or restrictive determinism.140  The point here is that causes in war are 
sometimes so incredibly small as to escape our notice and appear detached from 
observable effects or appear so unexpectedly from beyond our conceptual radar 
that they appear as chance.  Put differently, we can maintain that every chance 
event does ultimately have causes, they were just causes we failed to see, 
understand, or predict.  They are nevertheless rightly considered objective, or 
irreducibly ontological, as far as they are both a consequence of the universal 
human condition and the incredible randomness of aspects of reality. 
A final point to note with respect to chance is to be wary of generals who 
retrospectively explain their own failure in war by an appeal to chance.  Just as 
Carr describes how, ‘In a group or a nation which is riding in the trough, not on 
the crest, of historical events, theories that stress the role of chance or accident in 
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history will be found to prevail’,141  so defeated generals will be looking to 
explain away their shortcomings by claiming the Goddess of Fortune was 
against them,142 when in success that same general would no doubt emphasise 
his complete control of the situation throughout.  Chance works both ways.  It 
can contribute to both success and failure, but rarely is it the sole determinant of 
either: both talent and incompetence figure greatly.  One might suspect an 
underlying ineptitude in those who claim all is decided by chance, and a measure 
of undeserved self-assurance in those who deny its existence.  Tellingly, in what 
was perhaps a rare instance of modesty, Napoleon was apparently quoted as 
saying ‘Engage the enemy, and see what happens.’143  For one of the greatest 
commanders in history to pay heed to chance and luck in this manner is a 
remarkable instance of perhaps unexpected candour.       
The ‘shadows of uncertainty’144  
Clausewitz remarked that ‘war is the realm of uncertainty; three quarters of the 
factors on which action in war is based are wrapped in a fog of greater or lesser 
intensity.’145   So, how are we to distinguish this concept from that of chance?  
We have already noted the interrelation of these concepts in the sense that a 
psychological state of uncertainty is often a consequence of the play of chance 
events.  Yet, as Herbig notes, ‘one may feel uncertain for many reasons other 
than chance, and chance does not always lead to uncertainty.’146  To grasp the 
full meaning of this term, we need to take a wider perspective than purely the 
affect of chance.   
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The concept of uncertainty essentially refers to the human reaction to that 
which cannot be fully known or controlled and it concerns the subjective 
psychological condition of those involved in war. 147   As such, uncertainty 
becomes evident as integral to the nature of war as soon as we consider the 
human forces that are central to it.  To ensure that theory does not lose touch 
with reality, Clausewitz stresses that it ‘must also take the human factor into 
account…The art of war deals with living and moral forces.  Consequently, it 
cannot attain the absolute, or certainty; it must always leave a margin for 
uncertainty.’148  War is not only about material factors that can be counted or 
calculated, but is suffused with psychological factors, which are deemed not 
only important in addition to, but as inseparable from, physical factors: unlike an 
alloy, they cannot be separated by chemical processes.149   
All decisions in war must be taken with regard to the consequences of 
action in this moral realm; whether this relates to one’s own forces, government, 
and wider society,150 or those of the enemy and neutral actors.  As Clausewitz 
states, it would be platitudinous to list all such moral phenomena because most 
are commonly known.151  A few examples provide an indication of the kind of 
issues concerned here: the enemy’s intentions and strength of will, the character 
of commanders, morale, and so on.  It is because these factors are inherently 
intangible, incalculable, and unpredictable – ‘they cannot be classified or 
counted’152 – that attaining certainty as to their precise character or ultimate 
effect is necessarily limited, regardless of the quantity or quality of information 
one might have.  Clausewitz explains how similar actions against different 
people, or even against the same people at a different time, can produce entirely 
different effects.  The precise impact of the use of force upon humans is almost 
impossible to predict.153   He notes how, for the commander, ‘Thousands of 
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wrong turns running in all directions tempt his perceptions; and if the range, 
confusion and complexity of the issues are not enough to overwhelm him the 
dangers and responsibilities are.’154 
Also, the extent to which uncertainty and confusion is normative in war 
is revealed by the incredible ‘prevalence and potency of the factor of 
surprise.’155  The enemy will be constantly trying to achieve the unexpected 
arrival of their forces – whether at the strategic, operational, or tactical levels – 
where not expected through the use of deception, 156  secrecy, speed, and 
cunning.157  What Clausewitz describes as the ‘universal urge to surprise’158 can 
have a serious paralysing psychological effect on morale and ‘loosen the bonds 
of cohesion’159 within the force, which makes it one of history’s great ‘force 
multipliers’. 160   Importantly, surprise, as Clausewitz emphasises, is often 
dependent on chance, coincidence, and the mistakes or misperceptions of the 
opponent. 161   Surprise, therefore, has its roots in the weakness of human 
perception and stems from basic uncertainties. 
So, in gauging and evaluating such uncertainties and intangibles, 
Clausewitz extolled the virtues of intuition, the ‘inward eye’,162 and ‘discreet 
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judgement.’163  For instance, when discussing decisions regarding the levels of 
effort to be made and the amount of force to be employed, he states that such 
intangibles ‘introduce uncertainties that make it difficult to gauge the amount of 
resistance to be faced and, in consequence, the means required and the objectives 
to be set.’164  So, the best we can do is to, 
 
examine our own political aim and that of the enemy…gauge the strength 
and situation of the opposing state…gauge the character and abilities of 
its government and people and do the same in regard to our own.  
Finally, we must evaluate the political sympathies of other states and the 
effect that war may have on them.165  
 
The stress on judgement over calculation is a direct consequence of uncertainty 
deriving from the inescapable presence of intangibles.  This point is crucial and 
easily overlooked.  Even for militaries equipped with the most advanced 
intelligence gathering technology, definitively determining potential effects and 
reactions in the sphere of the mind and spirit will remain a unattainable 
chimera.166  As David Kahn notes, ‘not even the most energetic intelligence 
operation can penetrate an enemy’s brain.’167  Moreover, even the enemy might 
not fully ‘know itself the limits of its ambitions.’168 
Lack of proper understanding in this realm of moral factors is often 
exacerbated by distorting forms of ethnocentrism and strategic-cultural myopia, 
which distort accurate assessments of one’s enemies’ (and even oneself or one’s 
allies’) intentions and capabilities, or of the political environment in which one 
is conducting operations.  As Booth argues, this ‘lack of empathy has meant an 
absence of intimate understanding of the feelings, thoughts and motives of 
others: this has prevented an accurate forecasting of likely responses.’ 169  
Clausewitz was well aware of the way such perspectives distort evaluations, 
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which are not only a problem of obtaining objective knowledge, but also 
crucially dependent on the ‘qualities of mind and character of the men making 
the decision’170 – this insight is applicable to any war-making group, from a 
Jihadist terrorist cell to a modern state military.  All actors approach and make 
sense of the world through unique cultural perspectives.  They observe, orientate 
themselves, and act based on assumptions, prejudices, and even illusions about 
the nature of the world.171  It is also easily forgotten that all information (even if 
derived from the most advanced sources) only attains meaning once it is 
digested by human agents and subsequently used as the basis for decisions – 
decisions that will inevitably be shaped by the unique outlook and desires of the 
actor in question.172  The consequences arising from ethnocentric perspectives 
can be serious, exacerbate uncertainty in war, and be highly detrimental to 
operations: for instance, a failure to understand enemy intentions can increase 
the likelihood of political, strategic, or tactical surprise.173  Also, cultural taboos 
may distort clear thinking, so the Western nuclear taboo (non-utility as 
orthodoxy), for instance, might cloud the fact that others may see atomic 
weapons as potentially useful.174   
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Cultural analysis has become a major concern for modern Western 
strategists facing, in al-Qaeda, an Islamic terrorist foe whose ideology, strategic 
outlook, and tactics are so divergent from mainstream Western experiences.175  
Also, faced with complex insurgencies in both Iraq and Afghanistan, the US 
military has even recruited social scientists and anthropologists to work 
alongside combat units in the form of ‘Human Terrain Teams’, tasked with 
mapping social dynamics and local political allegiances – ‘the human 
element’176 – based on rigorous research methodologies not commonly found in 
military institutions.177  Such innovative measures may help to mitigate some 
misunderstandings and contribute to ‘situational awareness’, but the historical 
record suggests cause for considerable scepticism, particularly if such efforts are 
not supported by a wider effective counterinsurgency strategy.  
Information, intelligence, and the ‘fog of war’ 
Regardless of the difficulties of mitigating uncertainty associated with moral 
forces, the information upon which assessments are made in war is, for 
Clausewitz, ineluctably deficient.  Clausewitz is well known for his emphasis on 
the interminable poverty of reliable information in war and his dismissive 
attitude regarding the substance and value of intelligence.  In a notably evocative 
passage Clausewitz states that, 
 
the general unreliability of all information presents a special problem in 
war: all action takes place, so to speak, in a kind of twilight, which, like 
fog or moonlight, often seems to make things seem grotesque and larger 
than they really are.  Whatever is hidden from full view in this feeble 
light has to be guessed at by talent, or simply left to chance.178   
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The general idea of the inadequacy of information in war is expressed in 
many other parts of his work.179  Clausewitz states that, ‘If we consider the 
actual basis of this information, how unreliable and transient it is, we soon 
realise that war is a flimsy structure that can easily collapse and bury us in 
ruins.’180  The ‘nature of war certainly does not let us see at all times where we 
are going’181 because ‘all information and assumptions are open to doubt, and 
with chance at work everywhere, the commander continually finds that things 
are not as expected.’182  At best, and even this may be doubted, Clausewitz 
notes, that the ‘only situation a commander can know is his own; his opponent’s 
he can know only from unreliable intelligence.’183  Moreover, it is likely that the 
enemy will be doing his level best to deny us knowledge of its intentions, or 
even actively attempting to deceive, fool, and surprise us.   
Also, intelligence is often false and inaccurate because fear causes people 
to exaggerate bad news.184  The wide applicability of this insight is revealed in 
the work of the revolutionary guerrilla leader Ernesto ‘Che’ Guevara who noted 
that ‘the harm that can result from exaggerated information which misjudges the 
danger is very great.  It is not probable that danger will be underrated…The 
same magic mentality that makes phantasms and various supernatural beings 
appear also creates monstrous armies where there is hardly a platoon or an 
enemy patrol.’185  Ken Booth has remarked that, ‘Worst-case forecasting is to 
strategic analysis what the ‘god of the gaps’ is to theology: it fills in for what we 
do not understand.’ 186   In conditions of danger, where survival may be in 
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jeopardy, there may be a proclivity for ‘the possible to become thought of as the 
probable.’187   
So, fear, intermixed with chance, 188  numerous imponderables, the 
limitations of accurate observation, the fact that some things will always remain 
secret, and the vast amount of factors involved in war, before which ‘Newton 
himself would quail’, 189  are provided as some of the chief reasons for 
Clausewitz’s scepticism with regard to the reliability of information. 190  
Together, these factors create what Clausewitz memorably termed the ‘fog of 
war.’  However, as Kahn rightly points out, despite this intense scepticism 
regarding information and intelligence – which incidentally he shared with 
Jomini 191  – Clausewitz does not ‘dogmatically maintain that it can never 
serve.’192  Clausewitz takes it for granted that more and better information will 
be sought after.  The potential value of intelligence would be largely dependent 
on the commanders ability to effectively exploit what limited knowledge was 
made available, but perhaps more importantly, to be able to withstand the 
endless torrent of false or contradictory reports.193   Nevertheless, the central 
point for Clausewitz is that a superlative degree of accurate information is both 
an objective impossibility and a dangerously deceptive fantasy.194 
Of course, since Clausewitz wrote, intelligence and information 
gathering techniques have been enhanced by enormous strides in technology and 
institutional specialisation.  Both the potential quality and quantity of available 
information available to politicians, commanders, and troops is vastly superior to 
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that available in Clausewitz’s day. 195   Some of the most high profile 
developments would perhaps include the development of large staff 
bureaucracies and dedicated, permanent, and  professional military and civilian 
intelligence bodies;196 the signal’s intelligence (‘sigint’) of wireless and radio 
technology developed extensively during the First World War,197 along with the 
use of aerial reconnaissance photography used extensively on the Western Front; 
and the more advanced cryptographical techniques associated primarily with 
World War Two.198  In more recent years, intelligence gathering techniques have 
become enormously sophisticated and technologically advanced.   
Yet, as argued, by a number of specialist scholars, regardless of 
technological advances, failures of intelligence are inevitable.  As soon as one 
explores the actual processes and organisational dynamics of the acquisition, 
analysis, and appreciation of intelligence, the potential for failure is 
overwhelming.  The sources of this ‘inevitability of failure’ – particularly at 
strategic levels – have been masterfully studied by Richard Betts, Robert Jervis, 
and Michael Handel.199  They point to such factors as basic human psychology, 
ingrained preconceptions, the nature of the relationships between consumers and 
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producers of intelligence, differences of opinion amongst analysts and decision-
makers, but perhaps most importantly, the ‘wishful thinking, cavalier disregard 
of professional analysts, and…the premises and preconceptions of policy 
makers.’200  Also, one only has to begin to factor in the enemy’s almost certain 
efforts in the realm of counter-intelligence, misinformation, deception, and so on 
– none of which can be definitively negated – and scepticism creeps back in.  
Also, Knox notes that ‘intelligence collection devices obey the same dialectical 
law as weaponry.  Counteraction or evasion or deception may at any point 
surprise even – or especially – those made slothful by seemingly effortless 
technological superiority.’ 201   Whilst perhaps Clausewitz was too stridently 
dismissive of intelligence given the limited nature of the art in his time, it would 
be just as mistaken to be overly impressed by the claims of those ‘information 
warriors’ who stalk the corridors of modern military organisations.  As Keegan 
states, ‘there is no such thing as the golden secret, the piece of ‘pure 
intelligence’, which will resolve all.’ 202   Recent high-profile Western 
intelligence failures – in relation to the 9/11 attacks and Iraq’s putative WMD 
arsenal – only adds credence to these insights. 
Furthermore, in situations of insurgency the type of intelligence required 
may be of a very different quality to that required in conventional military 
operations, and not entirely susceptible to technical fixes; an observation borne 
out by recent American experiences in Iraq.203  Rather, there is often a strong 
need for deep socio-cultural and political understanding; the demands on natural 
intellect, judgement, and perception may be extremely high.  Also, it may be the 
case that ‘the organisation of the standard military intelligence system, 
developed for major theatre warfare rather than counterinsurgency compounds 
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the difficulty’ of evaluating the insurgency. 204   Analysis of intelligence is 
particularly demanding in insurgency, where ‘analysts must understand a 
complex web spun from society and conflict, perceptions and culture, hundreds 
and even thousands of personalities, and relationships between and among key 
personalities.’205     
Lifting the fog – Clausewitz and the Revolution in Military Affairs 
In recent decades a so-called Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) has been 
proclaimed.  Its more extreme proponents believe, it ‘will famously be able to 
lift the ‘fog of war’ and remove Clausewitzian friction and uncertainty from 
war.’206  This idea is centred around the impact of new technologies and is 
principally associated with developments in America.207  Important aspects of 
the RMA emerged during the second half of the twentieth century, especially in 
the 1970s, however, the idea seriously took hold in the 1990s.208  The material 
components of the RMA can be divided into a number of areas or ‘systems’: 
sensors, such as satellites, UAVs,209 and Special Forces; communications, such 
as computers, command centres, and the internet; and advanced weapons and 
munitions, such as smart bombs, precision guidance, and cruise missiles - the 
‘paradigmatic weapon of the RMA.’210  However, it is the complete integration 
of these technologies – the ‘system of systems’ – that represents what is 
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specifically novel.  The associated doctrine of Network Centric Warfare 
(NCW) 211  focuses on the prospect of achieving ‘dominant battlespace 
knowledge’ through comprehensive systems integration in so-called 
‘information wars.’212   It holds out the potential for the seamless collection, 
assessment, and communication of information, allowing force to be applied 
through advanced weapons systems with greater range, lethality, and 
accuracy.213  All this contributes to enhanced situational awareness, improved 
mission effectiveness – encapsulated in the concept of ‘Full Spectrum 
Dominance’214 – and less requirement for large force packages in theatre.  
Yet, despite the objective fact of these far-reaching developments, many 
commentators have emphasised the limitations of these claims.  Indeed, many of 
the problems Clausewitz identified remain: as the cliché has it, ‘new solutions 
spawn new problems’ and new dependencies create new vulnerabilities. 215  
Excessive focus on information operations ignores problems of implementation, 
such as whether tactical units can keep up in terms of logistics and movement.  
This is linked to the problem of potential information overload, whereby 
commanders cannot comprehend the immense ‘noise’ they are faced with:216 as 
Clausewitz put it, ‘we know more, but this makes us more, not less, 
uncertain.’ 217   Once all information has been collected it still has to be 
comprehended, interpreted, and acted upon.  At all stages human fallibility and 
innumerable complications intervene, reflecting the eternal problem of 
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converting information into knowledge and knowledge into action. 218  
Overemphasis on new technologies can also lead to a form of information 
dependence, distracting attention away from crucial intangibles such as morale, 
the orientation of allies, or the state of domestic opinion: such ‘strategic tunnel 
vision’219 potentially downplays the value of human perception of cultural and 
political dynamics. 220  
The deepest cause for scepticism relates to the challenge of converting 
technological superiority into political effect.  If indeed a revolution is taking 
place, it is principally occurring at tactical/operational levels, whereas in strategy 
success is not so narrowly dependent on better weaponry and equipment.  
Freedman notes that, ‘the real difficulty is that military power can only be truly 
judged against the political purposes it is intended to serve.’ 221   Advanced 
systems may enable rapid victories against conventional forces, however this by 
no means guarantees their translation into meaningful political outcomes.222  
This is not to argue that information superiority and so forth is not worth 
attaining, only that it should not be seen as a ‘magical elixir’, particularly at the 
higher political levels of war.   
So, should Clausewitz’s scepticism be viewed as hopelessly time-bound 
or rendered void by technological change?  The weight of professional opinion 
would suggest not.  As Gray succinctly concludes, ‘no technical panacea can 
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eliminate uncertainty altogether.  Technology cannot revoke war’s very 
nature.’223   Technology is perhaps one of those aspects of war that, for the 
outsider looking in or the deeply involved research scientist engrossed in the 
design of new inventions, can appear to offer a potentially decisive instrument – 
like the Byzantine navy’s ‘Greek fire’224 – that must surely open the door to 
decisive success. 
Decision-making and probability 
The paucity of reliable information is only further exacerbated by arguments and 
clashes of opinion amongst decision-makers, at all levels of war, and precisely 
because the lack of information inevitably leaves room for diverse judgements.  
Clausewitz explains how such disputes are often overlooked retrospectively 
because they are ‘seen as the scaffolding that can be removed once the building 
is complete.’225  In other words, when we look back on a successful operation, 
for instance, it is rarely the difficult decisions that led to action that are the focus, 
but rather the action itself and its outcome – this has the effect of downplaying 
the fundamental problem of choice that decision-makers faced, so that ‘what the 
layman gets to know of military events is usually nondescript…[and] it would be 
impossible to guess what obstacles were faced and overcome.’226  It is precisely 
in this way that it is said historians suffer from the vice of their virtues.227  
Clausewitz, however, could not fail to recognise this problem as such paralysis 
in decision-making was in large part to blame for Prussia’s defeat in 1806.  
Probably with such events in mind, he states that, ‘Nowhere are differences of 
opinion so acute as in war, and fresh opinions never cease to batter at one’s 
convictions.’228 
In this respect, if there was ever a suitable subject for counter-factual 
reasoning, then strategic history is surely a prime contender.  This is because 
‘what if’ questions encourage consideration of the problems actors faced, often 
lost in narrative accounts: events are explained with an underlying air of 
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inevitability to them.  Of course, things did turn out as they did for good reason 
and thus lingering too long in this realm of ‘might-have-beens’ can be unhealthy 
– for things to have been different, the causes would also have had to be 
different229 – nevertheless, consideration of alternative futures can impress upon 
the observer the great uncertainty that always accompanies decision makers in 
war.  In his study of the First World War, historian Niall Ferguson encourages 
counter-factual perspectives because he argues that it helps ‘to recapture the 
uncertainty of decision-makers in the past, to whom the future was merely a set 
of possibilities.’230  
Likewise, Colin Gray has noted that ‘what is both interesting and 
important for a practical field like strategy is how and why strategic choices 
were made, given the unavailability of reliable crystal balls.’231   He argues, 
following Clausewitz, that in making any critical assessments of past actions, 
ideally the reader should not know more than the commander knew at the 
time.232   Gray makes this point in relation to his discussion of the nuclear 
strategists of the Cold War.  He argues that in order to sensibly critique their 
ideas today, one has to remember the crucial point that they did not know, nor 
could they have possibly known, that the Cold War would end as it did – all their 
ideas were inevitably shaped by that reality. 233   Theorists must constantly 
impress upon themselves the manifestly contingent futures faced by actors 
during war and not be deceived by the apparent inevitability events attain when 
viewed retrospectively.  One only has to read Andrew Roberts’s masterful 
account of the complex and heated debates which characterised Allied coalition 
strategic planning during World War II to grasp the salience of this issue: how 
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exactly the war in the West was to be fought and won was by no means 
preordained.234 
The negative effects or symptoms of uncertainty often include delay, 
hesitation, and vacillation.  Such effects should not be confused with active 
strategies of delaying or avoiding battle, such as the Periclean235 or Fabian236 
approach, although the latter’s strategy may have derived principally from an 
indecisive psychological disposition rather than considered waiting.  Moreover, 
to those not inured to uncertainty, the psychological consequences of poor 
intelligence can so relentlessly sap confidence as to induce great anxiety, if not 
outright panic and behavioural paralysis237 – consider for instance Ludendorff’s 
nervous breakdown in 1918.238  Clausewitz notes how ‘most generals, when they 
ought to act, are paralysed by unnecessary doubts.’239  As Booth states, ‘to live 
with confusion is both psychologically uncomfortable and intellectually 
unsatisfying.’240   
Irresolution and reluctance to act, Clausewitz notes, particularly harm 
those on the offensive, which generally requires continuous momentum, quick 
decision, and exploitation of the initiative: if the commander demands absolute 
certainty he will inevitably delay until the optimum moment for action has 
passed.  A mind racked by uncertainty will always want that little bit more time 
to weigh up alternatives and to check all available information before acting.  
Much to his consternation, in 1809 Clausewitz had witnessed the strategic 
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consequences of such vacillation when Napoleon was close to collapse against 
the Austrians at Aspern-Essling in 1809 and the Prussian King, Frederick 
William failed to act: his hopeless message to the Austrian leaders was, ‘One 
more victory and I am with you.’241  The instances of such fatal indecision are 
legion.  A notable example is that of Union commander, George McClellan 
during the American Civil War, who refused to take the offensive, even when 
armed with the enemy’s campaign plan and with circumstances favouring 
action.242  Conversely, to take examples from the same war, it was the unfailing 
determination, measured boldness, and decisive action of commanders such as 
Grant and Sherman or, for the Confederates, the tenacious cavalry commander 
Nathan Bedford Forrest, that gained them their reputations as military 
geniuses.243 
Equally, however, uncertainty can also lead to overconfidence, even in 
the face of an enemy’s massive numerical superiority because, after all, fortune 
can purportedly favour the bold.  Clausewitz appears to suggest that a balanced 
reaction to uncertainty is required: ‘While one man may lose his best chance 
through timidity…another will plunge in head first and end up looking as dazed 
and surprised as if he had just been fished out of the water.’244  As Clausewitz 
recognised, it is part of human nature to place confidence in one’s own success, 
deriving from the fact that nothing is certain in war and that some will, as 
Kipling put it, ‘risk it all on one turn of pitch and toss.’245  It was precisely this 
sentiment that lay behind Clausewitz’s thinking in his passionate ‘Political 
Declaration’ of 1812: even against the odds, Prussia could gain courage in 
despair and ‘even the destruction of liberty after a bloody and honourable 
struggle assures the people’s rebirth.’246  ‘It is true that the probability of success 
is against us… How can anyone demand the probability of success!  It is enough 
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that success is not impossible; whoever asks for more contradicts himself.’247  In 
that case, the bold actions of the Allies – perhaps against the odds – finally 
brought about Napoleon’s defeat.     
The overriding consequence of this chronic uncertainty is that almost all 
major decisions will largely be based on ‘probability and inference’ and will be 
shaped by the psychological disposition of and nature of the relationships 
between the commanders and statesmen at the time rather than any universal 
standard.  Clausewitz states that, ‘Circumstances vary so enormously in war, and 
are so indefinable, that a vast array of factors has to be appreciated – mostly in 
the light of probabilities alone.’ 248  As such, Clausewitz is adamant that in war 
reliable prediction is impossible: ‘absolute, so-called mathematical factors never 
find a firm basis in military calculations.’ 249    In a more objective sense, 
considering the course of any war as a whole, it is this unpredictability which 
entails that, as he puts it, ‘no prescriptive formulation universal enough to 
deserve that the name of law can be applied to the constant change and diversity 
of the phenomena of war.’250 
Incidental friction 
If the Enlightenment military thinkers had, in their rationalist, philosophical 
style,251 conceived of military institutions as ‘mathematical reason in action’ or 
as great machines ‘where each part fulfilled its prescribed function, with no 
waste motion and no supernumerary cogs’, 252  then it was Clausewitz who 
shrewdly introduced the logical, adverse corollary of the metaphor, drawn from 
his wider reading of the literature on the physical sciences and the nascent 
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science of thermodynamics,253  through his concept of friction.  Friction was 
notably absent in the military machines envisaged by the military philosophes, 
as if they operated in a vacuum, and Clausewitz endeavoured to correct this 
oversight.  In The Principles of War Clausewitz compares the conduct of war to 
‘the workings of an intricate machine with tremendous friction.’254  In On War 
he describes how, ‘Iron will power can overcome this friction…but of course it 
wears down the machine as well.’255  But as he makes clear in his study of The 
Campaign of 1812 in Russia, compiled in the early 1820s, the analogy does not 
entirely suffice: ‘The military instrument resembles a machine with tremendous 
friction, which unlike in mechanics, cannot be reduced to a few points, but is 
everywhere in contact with chance.’256 
As Barry Watts has persuasively shown, the concept of friction can be 
understood in both its ‘incidental’ and ‘general’ manifestations.  In the first 
instance, friction needs to be understood as a separate phenomenon explaining, 
as chance and uncertainty both do, a particular pervasive feature of war.257  This 
is true regardless of the extent to which the elements of chance and uncertainty 
are intimately bound up with the concept.  Friction should be understood as a 
separate yet interlinked factor that contributes to the ‘family’ of ideas 
collectively referred to in the trinity as ‘chance and probability.’ 
The concept of friction appears fairly early in Clausewitz thinking,258 
was developed in his study of Napoleon’s Russian campaign, and rapidly 
became a favoured concept, and indeed a major theme of On War that he 
believed perfectly described the unique type of problem he had in mind.  This 
incidental friction is for Clausewitz an ‘unseen, all pervading element’ and a 
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‘force that theory can never quite define’,259 but its general features are quite 
clear, particularly when accompanied by the powerful metaphors he provides.  It 
is a factor that reduces the efficiency of the whole and ‘impedes activity’260 
through ‘natural inertia’261 as ‘countless minor incidents…combine to lower the 
general level of performance.’262  Colin Gray usefully describes friction as that 
which ‘can impede cumulatively the smooth performance of anything and 
everything.’263  A defining feature of the concept is precisely its cumulative 
nature, in the sense that a multitude of small ‘difficulties’ leads to much large 
problems.  It conveys, as Beyerchen notes, the ‘amplification of a microcause to 
a macro-consequence, in a kind of cascade of things gone wrong.’264  Clausewitz 
states that ‘difficulties accumulate and end by producing a kind of friction that is 
inconceivable unless one has experienced war.’265     
This cumulative effect results largely from the nature of militaries, which 
like complex and intricate machines, are made up of many individual parts each 
with the potential to produce friction and make, as Clausewitz puts it, ‘the 
apparently easy so difficult’266 or, as he states elsewhere: ‘Everything in war is 
simple, but the simplest thing is difficult.’267  It is these factors that make war 
‘like movement in a resistant element’ and here Clausewitz employs the analogy 
of walking in water: ‘Just as the simplest and most natural of movements, 
walking, cannot easily be performed in water, so in war it is difficult for normal 
efforts to achieve even moderate results.’268  Friction is composed of all manner 
of difficulties that can be experienced in war, whether they be fatigue, command 
incoherence, adverse weather conditions, insufficient provisions and much 
more.269  He states that it would take volumes to cover all such difficulties.270  
The physical exertions required and dangers faced in war contribute significantly 
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to this friction, yet it appears Clausewitz wished to isolate them as independent 
problems comprising the more general friction which we will come to below. 
Clausewitz explains that friction is ‘everywhere in contact with chance, 
and brings about effects that cannot be measured, just because they are largely 
due to chance.’271   In his study of chance, Poincaré refers to the idea of the 
‘theory of errors’ which essentially concerns a number of complex things 
causing errors – one can try to avoid most but, he states, ‘there still remain many 
which, though small, may become dangerous by the accumulation of their 
effects.  It is from these accidental errors arise, and we attribute them to chance, 
because their causes are too complicated and too numerous…each of them 
would only produce a small effect; it is by their union and their number that their 
effects become formidable.’272  This clearly reflects Clausewitz’s discussion of 
friction when he states that, ‘Often we encounter obstacles which were 
impossible to foresee’273 and that you can never know when one of the parts of 
the whole will ‘chance to delay things or somehow make them go wrong.’274  
Friction, like chance, is not something that can be prevented or forestalled – all 
one can do is attempt to limit its effects and be ever mindful of its universal 
presence. 
General friction 
So far we have discussed the prominent concepts associated with this trinity in 
theoretical isolation to arrive at a firmer understanding of their distinctive 
features.  However, as was evident in his earlier The Principles of War, 
Clausewitz also believed that it was possible for these factors to be conceived of 
in a more unitary sense.  All these factors, along with danger – the ‘debilitating 
element’ – and physical exertion, correspond in respect of their ‘restrictive 
effect’ on war and as Clausewitz argued, for this reason ‘can be grouped into a 
single concept of general friction.’275  As a number of interpreters of Clausewitz 
have concluded, the various concepts discussed in this chapter, coalesce to 
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comprise a ‘compound’ concept of general friction.  There are clearly many 
overlaps in relation to the individual concepts discussed above, such as chance 
and uncertainty, but the idea of general friction should be regarded primarily as a 
means to collectively perceive all the various ways in which activity in war is 
impeded everywhere and at every stage.  The basic nature of the force being 
described is essentially analogous to that associated with incidental friction, but 
here it encompasses the whole range of factors inherently associated with action 
in war and is less immediately negative in its effects.  At this general level, war 
is comparable to movement through a resistant element in a more fundamental 
and comprehensive respect than that of incidental friction. 
In Watt’s excellent study, he draws attention to other potential sources of 
general friction, which are identifiable in Clausewitz’s wider work and which 
allow for a more comprehensive conception of the concept and which we have 
touched upon in the course of our discussion.  In particular, he draws attention to 
the political constraints on the use of force and the intractable difficulty of 
matching military means to political ends.276  Whatever factors we include, the 
overarching thrust of the issue is clear, as is the extent to which this friction 
permeates the entire gamut of war, from those determining the political object to 
the individual soldier.  
The idea of general friction can perhaps most usefully serve as a 
descriptive for the family concept of ‘chance’ as presented in this tendency of 
the trinity.  Importantly, we do not need to subscribe to a rigid delineation 
between those dimensions of this tendency: chance, uncertainty, friction, and so 
on.  Rather, this analysis has simply attempted to derive some of the essential 
features of these concepts and to reveal how they combine to form a potent 
aspect of war’s intrinsic nature.  The various elements coalesce to form a general 
friction which serves to distinguish war on paper from war in reality.  Whilst the 
identification of this intrinsically restrictive force in war may seem like cause for 
outright negativity, this would be a mistaken conclusion and one which 
Clausewitz sought to correct.  The friction characteristic of this tendency may be 
objectively restrictive, but – given war’s multilateral and interactive nature – is 
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always necessarily relative.  In this light, it is the ‘frictional differential’277 
between belligerents that is crucial.  We will explore these issues further below. 
Playing the game of war 
War, states Clausewitz, can be compared to a game of chance.  Though most 
decisions in war are based on probabilities, even the use of sophisticated 
probability theory would not suffice to overcome the problems faced.  Rather, 
‘Through the element of chance, guesswork and luck come to play a large part in 
war.’278   In its danger and seriousness war is perhaps most akin to Russian 
Roulette,279 but this does not convey the extraordinary talents required, which 
are perhaps more accurately captured in the analogy with a game of cards, such 
as poker, where it is ‘a matter of skill as well as odds.’280  In the latter, one’s 
fate, whilst still subject to the laws of probability, is more heavily dependent on 
the choices of the player, whilst in the former one’s fate is left purely to chance.  
In his analysis of Napoleon’s 1799 campaign, Clausewitz states that, since war 
‘always has something of the nature of a game, the conduct of war cannot avoid 
this element at every stage, and the commander, who has little inclination for the 
game, will, without anticipating it, be left behind the line and will fall into deep 
debt in the great account book of military success.’281  But in poker, apart from 
the possibility of losing one’s life-savings, rarely can it be said to take place in a 
climate comparable to that of war.  What makes war such a unique game of 
chance is precisely this mixture of uncertainty with ever-present danger, fear, 
physical exertion and, for the commander and policymaker, an enormous burden 
of responsibility: so ‘luck in war’ Clausewitz remarks ‘is of a higher quality than 
luck in gambling.’282  In order to cope in such conditions great talent is required 
and those who rely on rigid principles will most likely fail.   
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In his explication of the trinity Clausewitz argues that it is mainly the 
commander and the army that have to play the dangerous game of war through 
the use of personal courage and talent.  This is no easy task.  Indeed, as Herbig 
explains, much of On War is geared towards arming the commander for this 
‘relentless struggle with the unforeseen.’283  Yet no book of principles alone can 
provide the requisite tools to face such a ephemeral foe.  As Paret explains, 
Clausewitz believed it is ‘the creative employment of intellectual and 
psychological strengths that alone can overcome friction, exploit chance, and 
turn the imponderables into an asset.’284   In this respect, Moran is certainly 
correct to suggest that genius is the ‘intelligence and willpower of the 
commander that moves the machinery of war forward, despite the friction that 
impedes it.’285  The qualities of genius represent the ‘counterweight’286 to the 
effects of chance and uncertainty or, as Clausewitz puts it, ‘With uncertainty in 
one scale, courage and self-confidence must be thrown into the other to correct 
the balance.’287   Creveld is to the point when he writes that the history of 
command in war ‘consists essentially of an endless quest for certainty’ and one 
he concludes that is ultimately futile.288 
Here a definite dualism is apparent.  This tendency fundamentally 
concerns the inherent interrelationship between the condition of chance and 
uncertainty on the one hand and the consequent human reaction to that condition 
on the other: they form two sides of the same coin.  Yet, as presented here so far, 
the relationship may appear somewhat unbalanced, with chance dictating terms 
to the submissive human will: the one leading, the other following and reacting.  
However, a more accurate conception, from a theoretical viewpoint, is one of 
mutual dependence and even symbiosis between the two perspectives.  This is 
explained by the important recognition that it is precisely human creativity, free 
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will, boundless imagination, and choice which is itself a fundamental cause of 
the condition of chance and uncertainty in war.   
Put simply, the fact that the enemy is a living and thinking entity with a 
will of its own is a major source of chance and uncertainty – war is never 
activity aimed at inanimate matter.289  As Gray states, ‘War is a duel and the 
enemy may prove uncooperative.’290  Humans, as Hannah Arendt stressed in her 
political philosophy, ‘are creative…they can bring forward something so new 
that nobody foresaw it.’ 291   The same applies in war, which is itself an 
expression of politics.  Even absent the unpredictability of the physical sources 
of chance, this fundamental reality may appear, almost paradoxically, to be both 
problem and solution.  Consequently, the apparent relationship that emerges 
between chance and creativity is less one of leader and follower and more one of 
‘chicken and egg’, especially when war is viewed properly, as Clausewitz 
insisted it always should be, as an interactive whole.  Uncertainty not only 
derives from human ignorance, but from our more positive capacity for creative, 
unexpected, and counterintuitive behaviour – particularly in activities involving 
competition and confrontation such as politics and war.     
Genius: the creative talent 
As we noted earlier, in his description of military genius, Clausewitz was 
echoing many of those attributes which Machiavelli had identified some three 
hundred years earlier in his concept of vitrù, whilst examining them in a more 
systematic and analytical fashion.  Considering that fact that the science of 
psychology was only in its infancy, as Clausewitz himself acknowledged, his 
penetrating analysis in Book 1, Chapter 3 constitutes one of the jewels of his 
work.  Clausewitz prefaced his discussion with the observation that genius is the 
combination of certain qualities of mind and temperament that are specific to 
war and that may not necessarily be appropriate elsewhere (although he draws 
on artistic genius to explore his ideas).  It is important here to emphasise that the 
‘gifts’ of genius are precisely those which apply to the peculiar climate of war, 
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that of its danger, exertion, chance, and uncertainty.  This serves to underline the 
duality of the two central (‘family’) ideas that comprise this element of the 
trinity: those of chance and creativity.  The peculiar qualities required in war are 
different from those of pure understanding, intellect, or even technical 
knowledge.  Rather, for Clausewitz, genius is a mixture of intellect and 
emotional qualities, ‘a blend of brains and temperament’ is required.292   
As Strachan notes, ‘The romantic in Clausewitz had to embrace the 
military genius, the rationalist had to define him.’ 293   So, just how did 
Clausewitz define genius.  Genius in war, he explained, must be grounded in 
courage.  However, if the old adage confirms that discretion is the larger part of 
valour, then Clausewitz emphasised a form of courage that was not wild, but 
more controlled and educated.294  Courage encompasses such traits as boldness, 
presence of mind (such as dealing with the unexpected or keeping one’s 
nerve),295 strength of will (in the face of anxiety and crushing responsibility), as 
well as the ability to take risks and to trust in fortune.  Purely rational thinking 
would struggle to cope with or even be overwhelmed by the lack of evidence 
and certainty in war, so rather a form of intellectual instinct or coup d’oeil – ‘the 
quick recognition of a truth’296 – reinforced by determination was necessary,297 
and which would enable the commander to turn knowledge into ability.298  The 
military genius would also need to possess adaptability and creativity, combined 
with ‘great strength of character, as well as lucidity and firmness of mind…in 
order to follow through steadily, to carry out the plan, and not to be thrown off 
course by a thousand diversions.’299   All this requires great energy or what 
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Clausewitz terms a spirit of endeavour. 300   Importantly, and recalling his 
indebtedness to Machiavelli, genius is not just about offsetting uncertainty but 
actively exploiting it – after all war is a form of duel and both sides suffer from 
the uncertainty that is part of its nature – thus one can attempt to turn uncertainty 
to one’s own advantage.301   
Individuals of great ability continue to exert an enormous influence in 
war, for instance, consider the enormous influence of the American general 
David Petraeus in recent years. 302   Echevarria also makes the point that 
Clausewitz’s framework of genius is by no means limited to conventional 
military figures303 – for instance, the ideas can be extended to guerrilla leaders 
such as Mao, counterinsurgent masterminds such as Sir Gerald Templer,304 or 
even terrorist masterminds such as Osama bin Laden.305  However, in the face of 
the growing complexity of war, a notable feature of modern warfare has been the 
increasing collegiality of command and the rise of sprawling military 
bureaucracies and planning staffs.306   During the nineteenth century General 
Staffs emerged which increasingly took responsibility for many of the decisions 
that would formerly have taken place in the commander’s mind.307  As a result, 
genius has become increasingly dissociated from the great individual and 
supplanted by considerations of bureaucratic efficiency and consensual decision-
making (particularly in multinational coalition operations).  These changes have 
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primarily been functional imperatives to respond to the expanded dimensions 
and varieties of knowledge required in modern war.  However these 
developments have encouraged practices and behaviour often unsuited to dealing 
with the uncertainties of war.   
In the decades leading up to 1914, war planning became an obsession of 
European staffs, yet, as events were to reveal, brilliant execution of the wrong 
plan can be extremely dangerous.  The French strict adherence to ‘Plan XVII’ 
led to dispositions and movements almost wilfully unsuited to unfolding 
events.308  This is not to argue that detailed planning is unimportant.  Rather, the 
danger is that rigid plans can become confused with future reality, when in fact 
no simulation or blueprint for war, no matter how sophisticated, can entirely 
account for unpredictable events and uncertainties that will inevitably be 
encountered, from the tactical to the political levels.  Dogmatic planning can 
encourage a mistaken belief that victory can be orchestrated in advance: as 
Moltke quipped, no plan survives contact with the enemy and Gray quotes 
Admiral Wylie who stated that ‘planning for certitude is the greatest of all 
military mistakes.’309  In this respect, the genius of the overall commander can 
be the crucial factor preserving the element of coup d’oeil, flexibility, and 
adaptability in the face of failed plans and unexpected occurrences. 
Military virtues 
So far we have concentrated principally on the realm of the higher command in 
war, but we must also consider features evident throughout the whole panoply of 
war, down to the tactical level.  On inspection, it is evident that many iconic 
images associated with war-making institutions are largely functions of war’s 
climate of danger, exertion, chance, and uncertainty.  Indeed, one of the central 
problems in war is how to create soldiers who are willing to risk their lives in 
what Clausewitz calls, ‘this debilitating element’310 and stand-fast in the face of 
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potential death.  As Dyer notes, ‘Soldiers in battle, however stable they may 
appear, are always a potential mob capable of panic and flight.’311  Desertion, 
mutiny, and the collapse of morale are the nightmares of generals.  
Consequently, throughout history, armed groups of all persuasions have 
developed a diverse range of mechanisms (both consciously and unconsciously) 
to overcome such problems, even if they sometimes solidified into cultural 
habits that no longer truly served their original purpose312 – nevertheless, where 
the latter occurred, military necessity, and the requirement to adapt or die, 
generally engendered the discarding or remoulding of out-dated forms.  
Clausewitz discussed such issues – within the broader rubric of moral forces in 
war – through the concepts of ‘military virtues’ and ‘military spirit’, which in 
fighting forces he regarded as the ‘steering quality, [the] refinement of base ore 
into precious metal.’313   
This subject has received great attention throughout history (being as it 
is, central to the effectiveness of any armed force).  We noted how Machiavelli’s 
virtù extended to such issues, drawing on a wide range of sources extending 
back to Ancient Greece and Rome.  Many of the qualities which Clausewitz 
recognised as vital in command are increasingly required by soldiers at all levels 
as closed order formations have been increasingly replaced by more open 
fighting, such as skirmishing or guerrilla operations, demanding the ‘free play of 
intelligence, the clever merging of boldness with caution.’314 
Clausewitz believed that foremost amongst the virtues that can reduce 
friction in fighting forces is simply combat experience or ‘long familiarity with 
danger’,315 and described it as ‘the only lubricant that will reduce the abrasion of 
friction. 316   He noted how, ‘Habit hardens the body for great exertions, 
strengthens the heart in great peril, and fortifies judgement against first 
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impressions.’317  This reflects Thucydides’ belief that ‘the ones who come out on 
top are the ones who have been trained in the hardest school.’318  Also, for those 
militaries without direct experience of war, efforts are often made to provide 
troops with training approaching true battlefield conditions, although, as 
Clausewitz recognised, ‘peacetime maneuvers are a feeble substitute for the real 
thing’.319  Perhaps the most extreme instance of this was the Spartans practice of 
an annual ‘war’ waged against the Helots as part of their training.  During World 
War I ‘realism training’ was advocated by Fuller320 and in World War II, ‘green 
troops’ were put through realistic drills which became known as ‘battle 
inoculation’, intended to familiarise them with the character of the battlefield 
and bolster morale.321  Variations of war-gaming throughout history attempts to 
provide commanders and soldiers with a taste of the problems they may 
encounter in combat, whilst some, such as early medieval tournaments, almost 
amounted to forms of war themselves. 322   Military training aims to instil 
confidence and courage in soldiers, as well as psychologically preparing them to 
kill – US Marines Corp training is notorious in this respect.323  Training also 
seeks to foster bonds of brotherhood, comradeship, and group cohesion, 
underpinned by the imperative to ‘not let one’s mates down.’   
Also, the development of detailed military doctrine has become a central 
means to overcome uncertainty given the complexity and technicality of modern 
warfare.324  Dyer notes how militaries are often criticised for reducing action to 
routines and rules, but ‘all it amounts to in practice, is a desperate and partially 
successful attempt to reduce the immense number of variables [in war].’325  This 
is true, but doctrine can also be greatly counter-productive due to the rigidity of 
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thinking it encourages.  Clausewitz warned that, in war ‘theoretical directives 
tend to be less useful here than in any other sphere.’326  The dangers of such 
‘methodism’ was revealed in Vietnam, where ‘Doctrine became dogma’327 and 
the US army found it difficult to adapt to the very different demands of 
counterinsurgency, being as they were, geared to fight large scale conflicts.  Of 
course, in 1806 Clausewitz had witnessed the ‘most downright stupidity to 
which methodicism ever led.’328  It is little wonder that the new Prussian Army 
Regulations of 1812, which Clausewitz helped draft, placed an emphasis on 
flexibility, initiative, and exploitation of the unexpected.329     
Discipline and drill represent historic practices – systematised foremost 
by the Romans330 – that derive from the imperative to ‘stand fast in the face of 
the enemy…without giving way to the natural impulses of fear and panic.’331  
Clausewitz notes how such practices form an ‘army that maintains its cohesion 
under the most murderous fire; that cannot be shaken by imaginary fears and 
resists well-founded ones with all its might.’332  Strict discipline has often served 
as a substitute where soldiers have been reluctant to fight.  At times, outright 
coercion has been ruthlessly applied: the gruesome image of the soldier 
advancing into battle with a bayonet pressed to his back.  Indeed, the term 
‘decimation’ comes from the Roman punishment of executing every tenth man 
from units who were defeated or otherwise humiliated in battle. 333   Such 
practices have been witnessed in the modern era; for instance, Italian general 
Cadorna reintroduced ‘decimation’ during the World War I.334 
In addition to experience, training, discipline, and doctrine, countless 
other ways of preparing troops for the dangers and uncertainties of war have 
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been adopted.  Aspects of the institutional character of most military 
organisations reflect this.  Strict and formalised hierarchies ensure orders are 
followed in the confusion of war, especially when things do not proceed 
according to plan.  Regiments often serve as substitute families, whilst their 
insignia, flags (or ‘colours’), 335  distinctive uniforms, ceremonies, and 
histories,336 all serve to foster a culture of duty, valour, and group belonging – all 
effective lubricants in conditions of unrelenting danger and disorientating 
confusion.337  Such characteristics are not exclusive to formal Western military 
institutions.  In the brutal conflicts in West Africa during the 1990s, rebel forces, 
such as the RUF in Sierra Leone, wore distinctive American sports gear, were 
branded with tattoos, and adopted nome de guerres.338  Also, guerrilla forces and 
terrorist organisations frequently adopt the nomenclatura and insignia of regular 
militaries.  Clausewitz describes how fighters will ‘think of themselves as a 
member of a guild, in whose…customs the spirit of war is given pride of 
place.’339  Efforts to boost troop morale and courage can take many forms, such 
as inspiring eve-of-battle speeches, attempts to persuade the troops of the 
virtuousness of the cause through propaganda and political indoctrination, and 
measures to encourage the vilification of the enemy.340   For instance, ‘hate-
training’341 during World War II was briefly implemented: encouraging hatred 
was seen by some as the best way of increasing combat effectiveness.342  Again, 
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in Sierra Leone, RUF child soldiers were fed cocaine for courage and sent as 
advanced guards, or ‘bait’, to test the strength of government forces.343 
Also, at a more personal level, if, as Clausewitz stated, ‘what is most 
needed in the lower ranks is courage and self-confidence’, 344  then soldiers 
throughout history have adopted almost infinitely diverse ways of reconciling 
themselves to the dangers and uncertainties of war, such as taking drugs,345 
drinking alcohol,346 saying prayer, singing songs, covering themselves in war 
paint,347 and finding consolation in religion or even Stoic philosophy.348 
All these examples are intended purely as an indication of the extent to 
which the common images and practices we associate with warfare derive 
largely from the inherent nature of war.  But, as Clausewitz believed, none of 
these measures, except experience of war itself, can truly prepare the soldier for 
the emotional intensity and sheer confusion of actual combat.  As he states, 
‘discipline, skill, goodwill, a certain pride, and high morale…have no strength of 
their own.  They stand or fall together.  One crack and the whole thing goes, like 
glass too quickly cooled.’349  Like the best lubricants, they can only reduce the 
friction of war, but not entirely eradicate it.350   
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Implications 
In this chapter we have analysed some of the most important aspects of this 
tendency in the light of the influences on Clausewitz’s ideas to better appreciate 
the continuing validity of Clausewitz’s insights despite great changes in war’s 
contexts.  The analysis could not be exhaustive, however the discussion will 
have revealed some of the most notable manifestations of this tendency as being 
integral to the nature of war.  To conclude it will be useful to consider some of 
the implications of this analysis from a theoretical perspective. 
The externality of chance and uncertainty? 
Bassford argues this element of the trinity is the only one which is exclusively 
concerned with the ‘objective externality’ of war, which for him consists of, 
‘The physical world (including mountains, roads, weather [etc]…in short, 
everything we cannot alter at once by merely wishing) and of the personalities, 
capabilities, hopes [etc]… the human ecology within which the participants’ 
perceptions, plans, and actions must co-evolve.’351  This conception is useful and 
undoubtedly captures a vital dimension of this element.  It forces us to conceive 
of ‘chance and probability’ as something ‘out there’, as characterising the 
conditions within which action takes place in war.  Herbig makes this point 
when she describes Clausewitz’s conception of chance as being ‘out of human 
reach.’352   
Yet, this perspective, important and correct as it is to a point, does not 
suffice entirely.  It ignores the vital complementary aspect to the element which, 
as we have seen, is in fact an internal feature of the actors involved in war, 
namely ‘the creative spirit’ which enables actors to apply means in novel ways 
to produce the desired effects.  Furthermore, we have considered the extent to 
which concepts such as chance and uncertainty are not only a function of an 
external reality, but also exist as a characteristic of actors’ internal predicament, 
intellectual capacity, or psychological condition: it is not so much that the 
objective environment is by nature uncertain, but rather the fact that actors in 
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war experience, or even suffer from, the inner subjective feeling of uncertainty 
that is perhaps most important.  To reduce this tendency to an examination 
purely of war’s external reality would therefore be somewhat mistaken.  
Nevertheless, an external ‘concrete reality’ identified by Bassford is certainly 
implicated in the meaning of the tendency.  It would be somewhat unfair to 
claim that such factors as the weather, disease, or even the actions of the enemy, 
are not fundamentally external manifestations of chance. 
In a imaginary world of God-like omniscient beings the word chance 
would presumably not exist, because all effects would have a definite cause and 
the outcome of any action would be known in advance – in such a world, 
perhaps Creveld is right to suggest that there would be no war (if the result is 
known in advance there would be no point in fighting).353  Yet, war is a human 
activity, with all the intellectual shortcomings, passions, and unpredictable 
behaviour that entails: some events and outcomes will always be unexpected, 
unpredictable, and unknowable.  Whilst Bassford is perhaps correct to present 
chance as an external element of war, because that is how it appears, chance is 
also partly a function of human nature and describes something we experience, 
not only that is simply ‘out there’.  It is also an aspect of war that is only 
overcome through human creative ability, genius, judgement, virtue, and skill; 
the practical endeavour of the art of war.   
Ambiguity and strategic neutrality 
The second central implication to outline here is the inherent ambiguity of this 
tendency when considered as a whole.  Enlightenment theorists prior to 
Clausewitz viewed chance in an almost universally negative light and one’s 
instinct might be to support such a view.  However, Clausewitz developed a 
more realistic and balanced conception of these forces, both in terms of how 
they are experienced by humans and in terms of their objective impact on war.  
Regarding the latter, Echevarria stresses that friction and chance are not in 
themselves forces which do or do not lead to extremes; rather they are the 
medium in which such interactions develop.  Friction cannot itself stop war from 
escalating – ‘at times the forces that drive war are strong enough to overcome 
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inertia or friction; at other times they are not.’354  Whilst it is one of the forces 
that makes absolute war nothing but a logical fantasy,355 in war in reality it is 
utterly ambiguous in relation to escalation (for instance, over-estimation of the 
enemy’s forces may lead to escalation, but equally uncertainty can cause 
vacillation, hesitation, and paralysis). 
From a more subjective strategic perspective, and in a respect somewhat 
comparable to Machiavelli’s concept of fortune, this tendency is neither 
necessarily a strictly positive or negative force.  Chance, uncertainty, and 
friction will invariably be experienced by all sides in any war.  Herbig notes that, 
‘chance remains neutral’ and it is best perceived as ambivalent in terms of its 
particular impact on belligerents.  Handel reiterates this point, stating that 
‘friction, chance, uncertainty (the probabilistic nature of war), luck, etc are to be 
regarded as ‘neutral factors’. 356   Chance events can create possibilities and 
opportunities to be exploited, or equally dash the best laid plans.  It can cause the 
complete failure of a campaign such as the ‘divine wind’ which twice frustrated 
thirteenth century Mongol invasion of Japan,357 or it can decisively support a 
surprise move that one undertakes. 358   Given a rough equality between 
belligerents in relation to these factors, this is where military genius, political 
acumen, effective intelligence techniques, combat experience, superior morale, 
flexible planning, rigorous training, and other crucial factors can play their part 
in facing, taming, or exploiting the uncertain climate of war.   
Friction may never be eliminated entirely, and objectively it may be 
considered a negative or restrictive force, but when considered relative to the 
enemy, if you can reduce the friction of your own side to a greater extent than 
the enemy, great advantages can accrue. 359   Uncertainty may paralyse one 
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commander, but it may appear to another as a world full of possibilities within 
which creative genius can take wing.  The same idea was expressed by 
Thucydides when he stated, ‘That imponderable element of the future is the 
thing which counts in the long run, and, just as we are most frequently deceived 
by it, so too it can be of the greatest possible use to us.’360  Indeed, Clausewitz 
himself could not be clear enough on this subject: ‘we should not habitually 
prefer the course that involves the least certainty…There are times when the 
utmost daring is the height of wisdom.’361  Again, this echoes Machiavelli who 
had a chapter in his Discourses entitled, ‘Results are often obtained by 
Impetuosity and Daring which could never have been obtained by Ordinary 
Methods.’362    
Clausewitz, it appears, was not so concerned with the fact of the 
existence of chance and probability per se, but rather with the resultant demands 
it makes on those faced with such reality: what we might call the ‘psychological 
consequences of chronic uncertainty.’363  His fascination with the creative talents 
such conditions call forth is revealed when he states that,  ‘Although our intellect 
always longs for clarity and certainty, our nature often finds uncertainty 
fascinating.  It prefers to daydream in the realms of chance and luck rather than 
accompany the intellect on its narrow and tortuous path of philosophical inquiry 
and logical deduction.’364  War represents the ultimate testing ground of the 
human creative spirit.  Individual soldiers faced with the fear of death or 
commanders and politicians holding the fate of nations, and potentially 
thousands of human lives in their hands must make decisions in the midst of 
relentless uncertainty and crushing responsibility.  What greater test can the 
human will face?  
Practical activity and the means of war 
Thirdly, and linked to the above point, it is important to note that this tendency 
encompasses and relates largely, but not exclusively, to practical, goal directed 
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activity in war.  It may describe a feature of objective reality (the weather, the 
unpredictable reaction of a population to an intervention), but it does so in 
relation to what that entails for the active participant in war.  Here we are 
referring to such activity in the very broadest sense; such as the use of various 
physical and psychological means, political and diplomatic initiatives, strategic 
decision-making, actual combat, and so on, thus incorporating activity from the 
lowest tactical to the highest political levels.  This tendency is not so much a 
description of the various means of war, but rather an explanation of the nature 
of the conditions in which they are applied and the creative human forces that 
must guide them.365 
Strategy itself is at heart a practical activity that seeks to direct resources 
towards the attainment of certain goals.  It is the activity which policy utilises to 
realise its objects.  In this respect, it is a dynamic activity that inevitably takes 
place in conditions of uncertainty and requires great talent in its execution.  Of 
course, strategy relates to and must take into account all the tendencies of the 
trinity, but here we want to stress the extent to which it will be conditioned by 
the inescapable factors associated with this particular tendency.  In this respect, 
it is perhaps not surprising that two modern authors could define strategy as ‘a 
process, a constant adaptation to shifting conditions and circumstances in a 
world where chance, uncertainty, and ambiguity dominate.’366  Military tactics 
are similarly conditioned by these forces, although the nature of their application 
is different: more direct, immediate, and susceptible to clearer, more definable 
connections between means and ends. 
Reflections 
To conclude this chapter, we might consider the analogy of a professional cyclist 
who attempts to improve performance and overcome friction through new 
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aerodynamic designs and outfits, enhanced training, 367  and psychological 
preparation.  Yet, everywhere friction will remain: in the resistance of the air, the 
road, the parts of the bike, the cyclists’ muscles, and even in terms of mental 
disposition – only so much can be done to reduce these factors.  Moreover, the 
weather might deteriorate, the crowd may be unsupportive, or an unexpected 
crash may suddenly block the way.  Yet, all competitors have to deal with such 
real and potential difficulties, therefore victory will most likely go to the cyclist 
who manages to limit the negative effects of friction, prepares rigorously, and 
deals with or exploits whatever chance events occur on the day of the race.  If 
the analogy is to be even more pertinent to war, then we might note the efforts 
by some cyclists to cheat by taking performance enhancing drugs or hindering 
the performance of others by tampering with their bikes. 
In war, chance and uncertainty should not be conceived as being 
everywhere, all of the time – there are observable linear cause and effect 
relationships, and rational decision-making is also part of war at all levels.  
However, uncertainty is central to the nature of the phenomenon, along with the 
measures humans employ to overcome it.  Modern developments, such as those 
associated with high-tech systems or professional institutional intelligence 
agencies have not rendered these insights obsolete.  If anything, this tendency 
may be even more relevant to the forms of modern warfare which take place in 
multiple dimensions, often amongst civilian populations, using a mind-boggling 
mix of old and new technologies, and which are pervaded by endlessly complex 
political, legal, and ethical dynamics, refracted through omnipresent 24 hour 
mass media, and involve multiple actors, diverse groups, and complex 
bureaucracies.368   
During the Iraq War of 2003, aside from a few speed-bumps en route, 
Coalition forces – armed with advanced networked technology and precision 
weapons, and shaped in their application by detailed doctrine, rigorous training 
exercises, and detailed operational planning – pushed aside what Iraqi opposition 
barred the advance to Baghdad.  Yet, however much these forces managed to 
dissipate the fog of war at the operational level, unforeseen occurrences at all 
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levels and in all of war’s dimensions would, in the years that followed, render 
what immediate gains they had achieved almost meaningless.  In many respects, 
they were a victim of their own operational, technical potency, where over-
confidence bred arrogance and strategic myopia: too few troops were deployed 
to contain the violent insurgency that ensued, itself a manifestation of political 
dynamics ignored by Pentagon planners over-enamoured by technical solutions 
and blinded by utopian scenarios.  The Iraq War underlines the extent to which 
Clausewitz’s analysis of chance and uncertainty as integral to the nature of war 
still pertains.  When war is properly viewed holistically, the scope for chance 
and uncertainty – within which all relevant actors must operate – is vast, 
complex, and inescapable.  Yet, whilst always there, it must be remembered that 
it is also always there for the enemy also.369 
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CHAPTER SIX 
Passion: The Blind Natural Force 
 
 
…there were the savage and pitiless actions into which men were carried not so much for the 
sake of gain as because they were swept way into an internecine struggle by their ungovernable 
passions.  Then with the ordinary conventions of civilised life thrown into confusion, human 
nature, always ready to offend even where the law exists, showed itself proudly in its true 
colours, as something incapable of controlling passion…1 
Thucydides 
 
 
In H. G. Wells’s The Island of Dr. Moreau we witness, through the eyes of the 
shipwrecked Edward Prendick, the attempt to fashion human likenesses from 
animals through the eponymous doctor’s cruel and elaborate vivisection 
techniques on a remote Pacific Island.  Absent the authority held by the ‘Sayer of 
the Law’2 following the murder of their master and creator, the ‘beast folk’ soon 
begin to revert back to their brutish animal natures.  Most ominously, however, 
upon his safe return to civilisation, Prendick is tormented by an inverted fear that 
ordinary people may in fact be ‘animals half-wrought into the outward image of 
human souls, and that they would presently begin to revert, to show first this 
bestial mark and then that’, that ‘the animal was surging up through them,’ and 
that they were perhaps not fully ‘emancipated from instinct.’3  This ingenious 
anthropomorphic tale serves to impress upon the reader the small biological gap 
that separates humans from mere beasts.  It perhaps demonstrates the potential 
ease with which humans can revert to the savagery of their nature and expresses 
a worried doubt about reason’s ability to restrain it.4   
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This tendency is described as being composed of ‘primordial violence, 
hatred and enmity, which are to be regarded as a blind natural force.’5  In the 
following paragraph Clausewitz refers back to this element as ‘passion’.  Wells’s 
fable clearly expresses the sort of primitive, atavistic, and animalistic forces 
suggested by Clausewitz.  Humans, being merely animals who have developed 
the capacity for reason, always retain the potential to display the characteristics 
deeply embedded in their nature,6 whilst that nature, as Wells held, is essentially 
ambiguous in its manifestation, neither intrinsically good or bad: violent passion 
is just one of its potential forms.  Wells gives us a fictitious glimpse into the 
consequences of a world in which instinct rules over reason; yet, whilst pure 
fantasy, the fable reminds us just how fragile, in reality, the power of reason is 
when the rule of law loses its force, when fear and the necessity of survival 
predominate, when basic emotions are aroused, and when perceived obstacles to 
personal gain are removed.  That such experiments were attempted in the 1920s 
in the Soviet Union by Dr Ilya Ivanov (in an attempt conceived by Stalin to 
create advanced soldiers by cross-breading humans and apes) – despite their 
failure – should lead us to question just how far fetched such tales actually are.7 
These primordial aspects of human nature are conceived as things which 
neither science nor reason can fully conquer or control.  If we imagine a world 
without such traits evident, or at least potential, in the human species, then we go 
further than the fictional, yet disturbingly plausible world of Wells’ Island and 
enter the entirely make-believe, the realm of the impossible inhabited by denying 
anthropomorphophobics. 8   To postulate a purely rational world inhabited by 
automatons following the mechanical dictates of reason would fail to capture the 
reality of war; but, moreover, war is precisely the sort of activity in which such 
instinctive and deep-seated characteristics have the potential to influence or 
usurp human behaviour.  As Creveld notes, ‘Nothing is more likely than the 
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terror of war to cause rationality to go by the board, nor is anything more 
conducive to make even the most even-minded start behaving somewhat 
strangely.’9   Likewise, Clausewitz remarks how fighting ‘will stir up hostile 
feelings…That is only human (or animal, if you like), but it is a fact.’10  To 
acknowledge the play of such forces was crucial and warranted inclusion as a 
clearly defined element of the phenomenon of war.   
So, what compelled Clausewitz to incorporate such ideas into his theory, 
what did he really mean when he spoke of a ‘blind natural force’ or of 
‘primordial violence’, does contemporary scholarship and experience support 
these claims, and how exactly are we to understand the operation of this tendency 
in reality?  As we will see, the answers to these questions are by no means 
obvious, and grasping Clausewitz’s true meaning requires detailed consideration.  
This tendency is the one most often neatly side-stepped by commentators, either 
perhaps because they feel its implications are too obvious or it is seen as too 
amorphous a concept to adequately capture in scholarly theoretical work.  We 
must attempt to attain a firmer understanding of what is a vital, if complex aspect 
of war throughout the ages.   
Background, influences, and precedents 
We will be better placed to present an accurate description of the meaning of this 
tendency if we are cognisant of some of the influences that contributed to the 
development of his thought.  This tendency is not neatly and conveniently 
associated with specific aspects of Clausewitz’s intellectual milieu.  Rather, we 
will depict the broad context within which Clausewitz’s ideas germinated, 
developed, and coalesced in relation to the subject, and yet will not hesitate to 
emphasise strong connections between a concept and its roots where apparent. 
Intellectual influences 
We noted in Chapter 2 that Clausewitz’s methodology was heavily indebted to 
the Enlightenment and the broad standards of scientific and rational enquiry that 
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it promoted.  Yet, where the steady ripples of reason lapped up against the shores 
of On War, so the solid ground of the work truly began to rise out of these calm 
waters, giving way to a rugged and powerful landscape more in the spirit of 
Joseph Turner’s Eruption of Vesuvius or the poetry of Wordsworth and 
Coleridge,11 than of rococo formality or neo-classical congruity.  In this respect, 
Clausewitz represents an original page in the history of military thought.12   
By the end of the eighteenth century an oppositional intellectual 
movement to the Enlightenment had emerged, which, in broad terms, was critical 
of the world-view and cultural outlook associated with the ‘mechanistic 
rationality’13 of the Enlightenment.  This so-called ‘Counter-Enlightenment’ – or 
‘the culture of feeling’14 – would be as, if not more diverse than the movement it 
was reacting against.  Its origins have often been traced back principally to the 
thought of Jean-Jacques Rousseau who had resented the marginalisation of 
‘feeling’ due to the ‘cold calculation’ of Enlightenment reason. 15   Rousseau 
arguably sowed the seeds of the cultural and intellectual backlash that would find 
its most striking expression in the output of the German Movement.16  These 
thinkers were Clausewitz’s contemporaries, many of whom he met, corresponded 
with, or at least read: their influence on his thought was significant.     
Immanuel Kant – whom we know Clausewitz was at least familiar with 
through his attendance of the lectures of the Kantian populariser, Johann 
Kiesewetter, whilst at the Berlin War Academy17 – represented a crucial link 
between the Enlightenment and the German Movement.  Following Kant’s 
refusal to accept the objective existence of the ‘thing-in-itself’ – the 
independently existing object – a philosophical tradition emerged in Germany 
which embraced this demotion of the ‘noumenon’ and promoted the subjective 
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self and its mental faculties.18  The element of anti-rationalism in Kant’s ‘critical 
project’ was partly reflected in the influential literature of the men of the Sturm 
und Drang19 movement in the closing decades of the eighteenth century, whose 
leading proponents were Hamann, Klinger, Möser, Lavater, and the early Goethe 
and Schiller.20  As Tim Blanning notes, ‘this was very much an angry young man 
movement against what was perceived as the stultifying rationalism and 
classicism of the older generation.’21  
Their writings expressed the rich, vital, and dynamic nature of human 
reality through the will of acting and charismatic central personalities such as 
Goethe’s Werther22 or the characters in Schiller’s drama The Robbers (for which 
he was imprisoned) and Wallenstein.  In their works they extolled extremes of 
emotion and tormented subjectivity.  The freedom, will, consciousness, and 
wholeness of the self – ‘the boundless potential of the human spirit’23 – was 
revealed through imaginative and empathetic insights into man as a creative, 
individualistic, unique, and feeling being.  Decrying the mechanistic unfeeling 
formality of rationalist behaviour, Goethe’s Werther cries, ‘Ah, you sensible 
people!…Passions! Intoxications! Insanity!  You are so calm and collected, so 
indifferent, you respectable people…passing by like the priest and thanking God 
like the Pharisee that you are not as other men.’24  Clausewitz, as with much of 
German society at that time, was swept up in ‘Werther-mania.’25  Goethe’s Faust 
expresses the desire of the frustrated intellectual to ‘leave behind the cerebral 
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world of mere thought and embrace with all his senses the full human lot’26 by 
making a pact with devil.27 
The impact of the radical message contained in these works is 
unmistakable in Clausewitz’s trinity.  Moving away from the largely ‘dead 
abstractions’ 28  of Enlightenment military thought, Clausewitz strove to place 
living man firmly at the centre of his theory, which would reveal the fundamental 
subjective forces that permeate war at every level.  He notes how, ‘Theorists are 
apt to look on fighting in the abstract as a trial of strength without emotion ever 
entering into it’, when in fact, ‘All these and similar effects in the mind and spirit 
have been proved by experience: they recur constantly, and are therefore entitled 
to receive their due as objective factors.’ 29   The authors of the German 
Movement, and Clausewitz in their train, focused on the real human impulses 
and motives, in all their variety, that drive men to action – be it superstition, 
jealousy, ambition, despair, greed, or revenge – rather than an appeal to more 
noble or strictly rational sentiments. 
In Schiller’s great drama The Robbers we are presented with scenes of 
energetic vigour and violent passion.30  Franz von Moor, the ‘lawless Ego’,31 
revengeful of nature for burdening him with ugliness and jealous of his brother 
Karl, is driven to his cruel acts based on a justification that, ‘might is right, and 
the limits of strength our only law.’32  In a similar vein, Clausewitz did not shy 
away from acknowledging these base instincts and the extent that they can come 
to dominate human behaviour; the ever-present potential for evil in human nature 
which rejects ‘the iron yoke of mechanical laws,’ 33  hence necessitating the 
constant vigilance of would-be victims. 
Such themes were developed and taken to their extremes by the German 
Romantics at around the turn of the century, many of who moved in the same 
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social circles as Clausewitz.34  The final rejection of neo-classicism, the stress on 
feelings, sensations, and thoughts, and the elevation of the spiritually free and 
creative individual, were some of the dominant features of the Romantic poets, 
dramatists, and philosophers such as the Schlegel brothers and Novalis.  Of 
course, Clausewitz would directly witness such forces in the daring exploits of 
that great Romantic hero, Napoleon.35  Given the pervasive and deep impact of 
these writers, and Clausewitz’s intimate association with them, it is accurate to 
assume that the many sections of Clausewitz’s work that emphasise emotional 
and psychological forces owe a great debt to the Romantic outlook.  Yet, Paret is 
certainly correct when he notes how Clausewitz did not follow the Romantics in 
their surrender to emotion36 and Gat states that it is clear that he rejected both 
their ‘idealism and mysticism.’37   
It should also be remembered that not all those whom we might broadly 
designate as ‘Romantic’ subscribed to the extreme ideas of the movement, or at 
least moved away from those extremes in later life, such as was the case with the 
later Goethe and Schiller.  Often such writers were more concerned with the 
interplay of reason and emotion, rather than with any zero-sum espousal of one 
over the other.  Schiller is of particular interest here.  In his more mature works 
he addressed ‘the malaise of modern man, analysing him into his rational and 
sensuous components’ concluding that ‘the seeds of rational perception will 
wither where they fall unless the soil has been prepared by the emotions and 
imagination.’38  As exemplified in the trinity, it is the complex and dynamic 
interplay between reason and emotion that fascinated Clausewitz so much, rather 
than any strict dichotomy between the two. 
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This interplay is apparent at a broader level in the cultural milieu of 
Germany at the turn of the century.  In the face of new forces at work in Europe, 
Germans were presented with a dilemma of how to respond and move beyond 
the restrictive cultural and social structures of the ancien régime.  Germany was a 
place beset by contradiction and internal tension.  This internal conflict is 
reflected in the literature and philosophy of the time: the theme of the warring 
brothers, as depicted in Schiller’s Robbers perhaps conveys the psychologically 
torn state of German society at the time between rationalistic self-interested 
materialism and passionate romantic idealism. 39   
Indeed, returning to Clausewitz’s debt to the Enlightenment, perhaps 
somewhat counter-intuitively we can identify its influence here also.  It is, of 
course, a gross simplification to characterise the Enlightenment as abandoning or 
marginalising all sensibilities in favour of a cold rationalism, and in fact many of 
its leading lights, particularly its earlier representatives, were greatly concerned 
with the place of emotions in their philosophical systems.  Moreover, Clausewitz 
probably owes more to the early Enlightenment than its later more mechanistic, 
positivistic manifestations, perhaps more than to the wild Romantics mentioned 
above.   In one of his notes to a manuscript on the theory of war written around 
1818, Clausewitz acknowledged his debt to Montesquieu, primarily in relation to 
the style of his presentation.  Yet, a deeper affiliation may be posited: as Paret 
notes, Clausewitz ‘must have valued Montesquieu’s skepticism, specificity, and 
recognition of the importance of irrational factors.’40   
Men such as Adam Smith devoted a great deal of their writings to the 
study of emotion and sentiment.41  Smith’s famous invisible hand did not operate 
purely as a result of individual rational calculations, but more due to behaviour 
governed by instincts and emotions; as John Gray has noted, Smith was 
‘suspicious of the intellect when it operated without regard for sentiment.’42  
Such views are inconsistent with classical political economy, just as Clausewitz’s 
conception of war does not correspond with his excessively rationalistic 
antecedents.  Outcomes in war cannot simply be explained by the application of 
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purely rational ideas and methods, but must account for the play of emotional, 
cultural, and individualistic psychological factors that can complement and 
guide, as well as sometimes divert and usurp the dictates of reason.  That 
Clausewitz held such a view is apparent in his analysis of military genius which 
he believed embodied a balance between intellect and temperament.         
The point of these observations is to suggest that we should perhaps not 
think of Clausewitz’s conception of this tendency as corresponding to the 
Romantic notion of a strict dichotomy between emotion and reason, whereby the 
two are fundamentally at odds with one another, but rather as a constant interplay 
between the two.  This insight has three implications worth noting.  First, simply 
because Clausewitz emphasised such emotional forces does not necessarily 
imply a complete subscription to the Romantic outlook – early enlightenment 
thinkers were perfectly comfortable with such ideas.  Second, the existence of 
passions in his theory does not necessarily imply a rigid incompatibility with 
those aspects concerned with the use of reason; the two can, and do compliment 
each other within individuals or groups, and are not mutually exclusive: policy 
goals are often shaped by emotions, like ambition or non-rational influences such 
as religious faith.  Third, perhaps somewhat paradoxically, emotion is something 
which a theory that aims at scientific rigour should not only not ignore, but 
should actively seek to incorporate. 
Events of the day 
In addition to the rich vein of cultural and intellectual influences, we can also 
attribute Clausewitz’s emphasis on such forces of passion and hatred in large part 
to the turbulent events which he lived through and to many of his personal 
experiences of war in the first thirty-five years of his life.  It is first useful to 
contrast the Napoleonic period which dominated Clausewitz’s professional 
career, with the preceding form of war which he partly experienced in the wars 
against Revolutionary France.  Supposedly reflecting the civilised spirit of the 
age, eighteenth century European warfare was typified by its generally limited 
and prudent nature.  Most armies approximated to a ‘state within a state’ in 
which harsh discipline was upheld to ensure troops could perform the intricate 
evolutions required of them on the battlefield, withstand enemy fire at point-
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blank range, and not flee or desert entirely.  In this respect, the emotions of the 
troops had to be reigned in.43  Churchill quipped that in the wars of that age, ‘bad 
temper was not often permitted to intrude.’44  When Clausewitz went to war in 
1793 he did so as part of an army that maintained the formalistic organisation 
and strict disciplinary codes that had enabled Frederick the Great to achieve 
repeated successes in his many campaigns.  Yet, before long, much of this form 
of war would be violently swept away.   
The storming of the Bastille in France on 14 July 1789 heralded a new 
era in which the impulses of ‘the people’ began to affect the behaviour of the 
state as much as the interests of dynastic ‘monarchs, prelates, and aristocrats’45 of 
the old regimes which had dominated Europe throughout the early modern 
period, whilst this new France threatened the existing norms and status quo of 
the European system.  Furthermore, it was the profound internal state 
permutations that would be of lasting impact and that was the central impetus 
behind France’s subsequent behaviour.  Europe would soon ensure a return to 
established principles of diplomacy after the Congress of Vienna, but the popular 
forces unleashed by the Revolution were irreversible.  Clausewitz clearly 
recognised the importance of these changes and their enormous consequence in 
the realm of military affairs. 
The transfer of sovereignty from the monarch to the nation radically 
altered the underlying meaning of the monopoly of legitimate violence.46  In 
France, that monopoly became the preserve of the representatives of the so-called 
‘Third Estate’ – the voiceless class, the masses, the people – led by men who 
were fired by an intense belief in the cause of liberty, equality, and fraternity as 
encapsulated in the Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen.  This 
republican ideology – realised in practice by September 1792 47  – placed a 
premium on people power, democratic sovereignty, and participatory politics, 
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and instituted a form of governance and citizenship that had been absent, in any 
meaningful sense, from European politics for centuries.48  Even if the benign 
ideological rhetoric did not match reality in revolutionary France – a fact soon 
apparent with the onset of the Jacobin Terror led by Robespierre and the 
subsequent gerrymandering of the ‘Directory’49 – this did not change the fact of 
the social and political transformations that occurred during this period.  Despite 
the shift towards ‘the age of dictatorship,’50 which culminated in the crowning of 
Napoleon Bonaparte as Emperor in 1804 and the concomitant decline of popular 
sovereignty, it was already patently clear that the age of demagogic politics had 
arrived.  This would have a far-reaching impact on the character of war.  As 
Clausewitz put it, ‘in 1793 a force appeared that beggared all imagination.  
Suddenly war became the business of the people – a people of thirty millions, all 
of whom considered themselves to be citizens.’51 
The merging of the ‘three great abstractions’52 of state, nation, and people 
gave rise to forces never witnessed before in European affairs.  Supported by the 
influential thinkers of the Counter-Enlightenment,53  the powerful ideology of 
modern ‘centrifugal nationalism’ 54  was unleashed (which by 1871 had 
fundamentally reshaped the territorial boundaries of Europe).  It was Napoleon’s 
ability to draw upon and exploit these new passions that largely explains his 
remarkable military successes in the first decade of the nineteenth century (rather 
than any decisive new weaponry).  He managed to channel patriotic fervour 
amongst the people into the cult of his own person, so that eventually the two 
became indistinguishable: the future of France and the Revolution rested upon 
the continued successes of the Emperor.  The people of France had a new found 
stake in war.      
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This popular political culture had dramatic effects on the intensity and 
magnitude of warfare.  One might empathise with those Frenchmen, stirred by 
the Romantic spirit of the age championing individual freedom and emboldened 
by the blood-curdling strains of the ‘Marseillaise’, who rushed to the defence of 
la patrie en danger, ‘fighting as free men to defend freedom.’55  As Keegan has 
noted, military service became intimately associated with the core values of the 
Revolution (liberty, equality, and fraternity) in the sense that conscription was 
universal regardless of class, it forged bonds of brotherhood between the young 
soldiers of Europe, and where the old armies had been instruments of oppression 
the new ones would be instruments of the people’s liberation from kings.56    
These citizens-in-arms, hastily assembled to defend the revolution, were 
injected with a sense of enthusiasm, commitment, vigour, and ‘high pitched 
morale’57 almost entirely absent from the professional, and largely hired armies, 
which were the dynastic instruments of the old regime.  What the revolutionary 
armies lacked in professionalism and skill they made up for in the vigour of 
necessity.58  Although nationalism was by no means a new concept before 1789 
it had meant little to the masses who were more concerned with eking out an 
existence within their locality, their pays.59   After the Revolution, it became 
evident to these increasingly politicised people that their new-found freedoms 
and rights, however real, depended crucially upon the survival of the nation.  
Thus, the Republic – the embodiment of Rousseau’s vision of the General Will60 
– gave birth to an army of patriots willing to take risks and sacrifice themselves 
for the common good: the individual’s own interest became almost synonymous 
with the Republic’s.61  Such powerful national sentiments were only intensified 
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by the leadership of Napoleon who, in the classical tradition,62 emphasised the 
glory of France as he roused his troops for war.  Through mass conscription and 
war the men of France were ‘turned into Frenchmen.’63 
These were historically unprecedented times in which military expansion 
rode on the crest of the wave of popular enthusiasm.  As Clausewitz observed,  
 
The revolutionary methods of the French had attacked the traditional 
ways of warfare like acid; they had freed the terrible element of war from 
its ancient diplomatic and economic bonds.  Now war stepped forth in all 
its raw violence, dragging along an immense accumulation of power; and 
nothing met the eye but the ruins of the traditional art of war on the one 
hand, and incredible successes on the other.64   
 
When Clausewitz refers to the people’s new found interest in war, it is not in 
some indirect sense such as ‘public opinion’, but largely in terms of their direct 
experience in battle through the imposition of universal mass conscription (also, 
according to the new law, all civilians were to contribute to the war effort in 
terms of arms, provisions, equipment and so forth).65  In Clausewitz’s words, 
‘war was returned to the people.’66  Later, and largely in reaction to the ‘danger 
that France posed to everyone’67 the peoples’ involvement in war was further 
increased throughout Europe in the form of armed liberation movements, as 
famously embodied in the Spanish War, but also in the Tyrolean rebellion after 
1809, the actions of Cossacks against Napoleon’s retreat from Russia, and the 
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extensive civilian forces mobilised to form the Prussian Landwehr from March 
1813.68   
Given the incredible brutality of these ‘people’s wars’, as Gray states, 
‘Not for nothing did Clausewitz…associate violence and passion most closely 
with ‘the people’.69  These developments certainly allowed him to perceive the 
extent to which passion (embodied in militant nationalism or republican 
ideology) can fundamentally transform both politics and warfare.  This, as 
discussed further below, was clearly only one possible – albeit perhaps the most 
potent – way in which passion materialises in war, and quite understandably 
came to dominate his thinking on the subject.  Without Clausewitz’s exposure 
and acute observation of these forces as manifested in the Revolutionary era, it 
has to be doubted whether he would have fully incorporated these ideas into his 
theory or invested them with the importance that he did.          
Clausewitz’s personal experiences 
It remains to briefly note that not only was Clausewitz acutely aware of these 
new passions that had been unleashed across Europe in a historical sense, but on 
a number of occasions he came face to face with them, indeed personally lived 
them, in all their bloody and dramatic reality.  Many of the passages concerned 
with such emotional factors convey a powerfully subjective element, almost as if 
the author is re-living such events.  In the Chapter on ‘Danger in War’, in which 
Clausewitz takes us on a journey with a soldier cautiously entering into the thick 
of battle, there can be little doubt that the soldier is Clausewitz, perhaps 
recounting his first taste of war as a young teenager against the Revolutionary 
armies.70 
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Moreover, Clausewitz himself was stirred by such emotions, or what in 
On War he termed ‘hostile feelings.’  He was, at certain times in his career, 
enthused with a violent and energetic patriotism, which almost threatened to 
usurp the calm and measured side of his personality.  Whilst in exile, in 1807 he 
wrote to Marie that ‘no one on earth feels a greater need for national honor and 
dignity than I do’ and as regards Germany, ‘with whips I would stir the lazy 
animal and teach it to burst the chains with which out of cowardice and fear it 
permitted itself to be bound.’71  Such sentiments are also forcefully revealed in 
his political testament of 1812 – after Fredrick William had signed what 
Clausewitz believed to be a humiliating and dangerous treaty with Napoleon72 – 
in which he states that he would consider himself ‘lucky to die gloriously in a 
noble struggle for the freedom and dignity of the fatherland.’73   
Clausewitz certainly understood, directly and personally, the way in 
which war can induce feelings of patriotic fervour, group belonging, and intense 
enmity towards others: his life-long hatred of the French – magnified after the 
humiliation of 1806, his internment in France, and his being witness to the pitiful 
state Prussia had been reduced to prior to 1813 – is testament to this.74  In his 
essay on ‘The Germans and the French’, perhaps restraining himself somewhat, 
Clausewitz writes: ‘I will say nothing here of the well-known frivolity and 
facetiousness of the French.’75  However much of a rational scholar and detached 
intellectual he was, Clausewitz was certainly not personally immune to irrational 
hatreds and impulsive behaviour.76 
                                                          
71
 The letter continues: ‘I would spread an attitude throughout Germany, which like an antidote 
would eliminate with destructive force the plague that is threatening to decay the spirit of the 
nation.’  Quoted in Paret, Clausewitz and the State, p. 129. 
72
 Napoleon required Prussia’s acquiescence and support for his Russian Campaign in order to 
secure his long and vulnerable lines of communication. 
73
 Carl von Clausewitz, ‘Political Declaration’, in Clausewitz, Historical and Political Writings, 
p. 291. 
74
 Parkinson, Clausewitz, p. 26.  Heuser notes this may also have derived from his wife’s 
influence, whose English mother was swept up in the fervour of hatred toward the French.  
Beatrice Heuser, Reading Clausewitz (London: Pimlico, 2002), p. 2.   
75
 Carl von Clausewitz, ‘The Germans and French’, in Clausewitz, Historical and Political 
Writings, p. 255. 
76
 He also expressed a strong hatred of Jews, although the evidence is slim.  This seemed to be 
primarily manifested in a general sense as he could be on close personal terms with assimilated 
Jews.  In perhaps one of his most controversial and ugliest passages – particularly in the light of 
subsequent German history – in a letter of 1812 he wrote: ‘The whole existence of the Poles is as 
though bound and held together by torn ropes and rags.  Dirty German Jews, swarming like 
vermin in the dirt and misery, are the patricians of this land.  A thousand times I thought if only 
fire would destroy this whole anthill so that this unending filth were changed by the clean flame 
into clean ashes.’  Quoted in Paret, Clausewitz and the State, p. 212.  
Passion 
 290 
Explorations 
Of Clausewitz’s three tendencies, this one of passion is perhaps the most 
intellectually awkward to swallow: to those from supposedly ‘enlightened’ or 
‘civilised’ states, it clashes with norms of military behaviour, perceptions of self-
righteousness, and a progressive belief in the triumph of reason over the 
passions, in particular violent passion or innate tribalism.  Indeed, Coker has 
argued that this is how Western warriors have distinguished themselves from 
others: ‘War was the business of ‘civil’ people not enslaved to their passions or 
pursuing their enemies out of revenge.  Western warriors were rational.’ 77  
Whilst believing that less civilised states, armed groups, rebel factions, or 
terrorists in other parts of the world are often more in the thrall of aggressive 
emotion or primal hatred when they go to war, they claim to do so with a clear 
head, for reasons of state interest, and led by the cold calculation of the mind, not 
the hot blooded command of the heart.   
This tendency of the trinity, they might argue, no longer applies to them – 
war is a rational activity undertaken by responsible leaders elected by a well-
informed public – and whilst chance may still apply, passion has been controlled 
by universal education and the authority of the intellect.  This was a view 
reinforced during the early phases of the Cold War when strategies for potential 
nuclear war were reduced to statistical metrics and mathematical, ‘economic 
conflict’ models.78  Perhaps because the emotional strains of ‘thinking about the 
unthinkable’ would be too much for any sane individual to face, the human 
consequences had to be converted into cold euphemisms such as ‘city 
avoidance’.79  Furthermore, Western depictions of brutal conflicts in the Balkans, 
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Africa, and other parts of the Third World are often explained away as simply the 
‘atavistic eruptions of…incorrigible tribalism’, the actions of savages fired by 
ancient hatreds, who, because of their backward social conditions, are unable to 
conduct war with the restraint shown by Western states.  As Martin Smith 
argues, the concentration on the irrational in these wars represents more ‘a means 
to explain away the essential unwillingness to go through the laborious task of 
understanding such wars.’80  This is not to argue that such deep-seated hatreds 
are not present,81 just that a crude rendering shrouds the political contexts and 
logic of such wars, whilst setting up unjustified and haughty notions of Western 
superiority. 
A closer examination of such modern wars reveals the continued 
workings of rational and strategic behaviour, even where gross crimes against 
humanity, ethnic cleansing, and barbaric acts take place.  Sadly, such awful acts 
often stem precisely from the political logic of such wars.  It is the nature of the 
political issues – such as power struggles shaped by ethnic identity  – over which 
those wars are fought that provides them with much of their brutal character, not 
a mere return to barbarism and primordial hatreds.  It is more an inability on the 
part of Western analysts, due to ethnocentric blinkers, to deduce the rationales 
behind such actions.  This lack of understanding might be deemed surprising 
given that during World War II, the strategic bombing of whole cities, which was 
bound to result in thousands of civilian deaths, was conducted for coldly rational 
strategic reasons by supposedly civilised states.  Thus, it appears that the 
description of massacres and other horrific acts in the Balkans, Africa, and Asia 
as primal and savage stems from racial stereotyping and a lack of empathy.   
As we will see, Clausewitz believed war waged by ‘civilised’ societies 
may show more signs of being controlled by intellect,82 but that that they were 
just as capable as being infused with irrational impulses.  Clausewitz clearly 
rejected the myopic ‘progressive’ Enlightenment perspective.  As noted in 
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Chapter 4, many of Clausewitz’s detractors – and even some of his proponents – 
have interpreted him as the prophet of the complete reverse of that sentiment.83  
These problems make it clear that we require a deeper understanding, not only of 
what Clausewitz did have to say on this subject, but of the meaning intended, and 
why he felt it was such an integral factor for it to be included as a key concept in 
his theory.      
Clausewitz on passion 
Handel comments that, ‘Clausewitz was perhaps the first major strategist to give 
full recognition to the influence of non-rational elements on warfare.’ 84  
References to the emotional aspects of war occur frequently throughout On War 
and in much of Clausewitz’s other work.  Indeed, when contrasted with the 
generally dry, scientific, technical, and anodyne nature of Enlightenment military 
thinkers85 the originality is stark.86  At one point, Clausewitz remarks that ‘in the 
dreadful presence of suffering and danger, emotion can easily overwhelm 
intellectual conviction.’87 Clausewitz refers to a soldier whose heart is moved to 
‘awe and pity’ by the terrible things he sees in battle and that he cannot pass 
through the ‘layers of increasing intensity of danger without sensing that here 
ideas are governed by other factors, that the light of reason is refracted in a 
manner quite different from that which is normal in academic speculation.’88  
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Whilst such passages certainly add to the gripping and powerful character of 
much of the prose (a point often overlooked in relation to Clausewitz’s work), 
the inclusion of such imagery was intended less for aesthetic effect than for the 
higher purpose of analytical and theoretical precision.  Clausewitz was certainly 
no romantic poet89 and he was not even writing for public acclaim in his lifetime, 
but rather for personal intellectual fulfilment and lasting influence.90 
The inclusion of such imagery and drama might appear to be the personal 
sensibilities of a passionate soldier creeping into his supposedly sober objective 
analysis, thus throwing into question its scientific credentials.  Yet, as we 
observed in Chapter 2, quite the contrary is true.  His inclusion of emotional 
factors in theory was, he believed, essential for any ‘scientific’ treatment of the 
subject – such factors were for him inescapable elements of the reality of war, 
not mere side-effects or aspects that the rational observer must see past in order 
to get to the root of the subject, nor elements belonging to some other 
transcendent realm as some previous thinkers had held.   
The references to the kinds of phenomena associated with passion and 
irrationalism appear in different contexts throughout Clausewitz’s work, 
sometimes with varying meanings, and utilised for differing illustrative or 
conceptual purposes.  This makes separation of these ideas a difficult task for the 
student of Clausewitz.  The idea is closely associated with, indeed an element of 
what Clausewitz terms ‘moral forces’ or ‘spiritual factors’ (existing in the 
‘sphere of the mind and spirit’), but not exactly coterminous with them; moral 
forces have a broader application and extend to subjects not properly considered 
in the context of this tendency, such as courage or the psychology of the 
commander.  Emotion is of course powerfully associated with forms of morale in 
the sense that, for instance, hatred of the enemy can greatly inspire armies to 
fight with greater enthusiasm.  Yet morale is certainly dependent on factors other 
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than feelings of enmity towards the enemy, such as the nature of the political 
purpose of the war or the extent of trust in the commander.  Morale is a 
collective psychological state, but as a total concept it is not ideally explained or 
defined by emotion alone. 
These points are intended to emphasise the extent to which it is more or 
less futile to analytically separate elements of passion from other important 
subjects which it feeds into and complements, but which are best covered in 
other sections of this study.  Nevertheless, a close examination yields a fairly 
clear picture of what Clausewitz was intending to convey.  Such an analysis will 
provide us with the foundations to consider the ways in which Clausewitz’s ideas 
may be developed in the light of modern experience and scholarship. 
A blind natural force? The human condition 
Clausewitz’s basic justification for inclusion of this tendency as a distinct 
element of war appears to derive from a belief that it is an inherent element of 
human nature: he describes it as a ‘blind natural force’ and elsewhere as ‘innate’ 
or ‘primordial’.  The inference is that human nature is somehow prone to 
aggressive passions and that these are often expressed at a social level in war.  
How valid is such an assertion?  Can we talk of an instinctive human proclivity 
towards violence and aggression?  If so, then how and why?  If not, then we may 
conclude the inclusion of this tendency in Clausewitz’s theoretical framework is 
questionable or perhaps overstated.  There are a number of potential perspectives 
that can shed light on these questions.  Indeed, it is an issue that taps in to some 
long running debates that cross modern disciplinary divides.  Some of the 
greatest political philosophers, psychologists, and scientists have grappled with 
the subject of man’s innate potential for violence.  The classic presentation is to 
be found in the contrasting philosophical systems of Jean-Jacques Rousseau and 
Thomas Hobbes.  If we follow Rousseau in his A Discourse on Inequality then 
we are perhaps mistaken in assuming a blind natural impulse towards violent 
aggression, and should rather conceive of the pacific, free and equal ‘noble 
savage’ who is corrupted by artificial culture, habits, and institutions.91  Hobbes 
presents us with an alternative conception of humans in a state of nature, where 
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notions of justice, equity, modesty, and mercy themselves, ‘without the terror of 
some Power, to cause them to be observed, are contrary to our naturall Passions, 
that carry us to Partiality, Pride, Revenge, and the like’ and where man is ‘in that 
condition which is called Warre; and such a warre, as is of every man, against 
every man.’92 
The fundamental contrast in philosophical perspectives characterised by 
Rousseau and Hobbes can be recognised in more recent analyses.  Keegan, in his 
A History of Warfare, begins his discussion by asking the question: ‘is man 
violent by nature or is his potentiality for violence…translated into use by the 
operation of material factors?’93  The divide between naturalists and materialists 
that Keegan highlights is one that closely resembles the classic philosophical 
debate.  After considering briefly the evidence from both neurology and genetics, 
Keegan argues that ‘the opponents and proponents of the thesis that ‘man is 
naturally aggressive’ both pitch their case too strong.’94  Aggression, he asserts, 
is certainly part of man’s genetic inheritance, but this aggressiveness is 
moderated by the influence of other parts of the brain and the calculation of risk 
in specific circumstances.  Keegan also notes that science sheds little light on 
how these insights apply to the phenomenon of group violence. 
More nuanced and detailed arguments, but comparable in their 
conclusions, are presented by Gat in his War in Human Civilisation 95  and 
Gwynne Dyer in his War: The Lethal Custom.96  In his multidisciplinary study, 
Gat incorporates many of the arguments that Keegan alludes to but in a more 
systematic fashion and firmly held together by the thread of evolutionary theory 
as a ‘comprehensive interpretative framework.’ 97   After reviewing the 
ethological, archaeological, and anthropological evidence, Gat concludes that 
violent conflict was indeed a feature of the evolutionary human state of nature.98  
Similarly Dyer notes that the ‘lives of our prehistoric ancestors were utterly 
immersed in war.’99  These findings, that simple hunter-gatherers fought and 
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with significant casualties, 100  certainly appears to contradict the Rousseauite 
position of warfare as a later cultural ‘invention.’101  But, more important is the 
question of why this was so?   
Gat offers a plausible and persuasive explanation that centres around the 
notion that aggression is best understood as a tactic – and only one among many 
– for the achievement of primary biological ends.  It is an innate yet optional 
tactic.102  It is innate because of the powerful pressure of selection over many 
millennia.  It is optional because its use is dependent on the ‘continuous intuitive 
assessment of the chances and risks, stakes and alternatives.’103   On such a 
reading, the ‘culturalists’ of the 1960s and 1970s were misguided in attempting 
to search for entirely peaceful hunter-gatherer societies because the fact that a 
society does not fight is not sufficient evidence that warfare is a cultural 
invention, but rather is a function of conditions which mitigate against the use of 
the aggressive tactic (such as the plentiful supply of resources).   
Gat argues that the potentiality for aggression is biologically hardwired in 
humans in order that the basic evolutionary needs of survival and reproductive 
success can be realised in a world typified by scarcity and competition.  Yet, in 
societies where these needs are adequately fulfilled there is no reason why 
humans cannot live in peace.104  Warfare in early hunter-gatherer societies was 
principally conducted between relatively small kin-groups held together by 
shared cultures and it is this sentiment of kin solidarity that lies behind modern 
notions of patriotism and nationalism, as shared-culture groups have expanded 
beyond their original genetic/regional groupings.105  It is useful here to conclude 
with a sentence that neatly summarises Gat’s argument: ‘Although violence is 
evoked, and suppressed, by powerful emotional stimuli…it is not a primary, 
‘irresistible’ drive; it is highly tuned, both innate and optional, evolution-shaped 
tactics, turned on and off in response to changes in the calculus of survival and 
reproduction.’106  
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Not only do Gat’s and Dyer’s conclusions provide us with convincing 
evidence as to the innate aggressive element in humans, but moreover, these 
insights are distinctly Clausewitzian in the sense that war is presented as not just 
the expression of an emotional instinct which can explain seemingly irrational 
eruptions of violence, but is also as dependent on reasoned calculations of risk 
and benefit specific to prevailing circumstances.  Violent passion is expressed by 
Clausewitz in a similar fashion – a force that is sometimes necessary to inculcate 
in groups to improve fighting performance in war.  This idea of a constant and 
complex interaction between reason and emotion in conditions of uncertainty is 
firmly implied in the trinity. 
These observations give credence to a discussion that Clausewitz 
develops in the opening sections of On War.  Clausewitz wants to make clear 
that hostile feelings exist regardless of any supposed level of civilisation a 
society may have reached, and this seems to be based firmly on his belief that 
such emotions are deep-rooted in the human condition.  ‘Savage people’ 
Clausewitz notes ‘are ruled by passion, civilised people by the mind’107  but, 
crucially, ‘even among educated peoples and civilised societies men are often 
swept away by passion, just as in the Middle Ages poachers chained to stags 
were carried off into the forest.’108  Civilised peoples are just as susceptible to 
these forces as are savages, and the extent of their influence will depend on such 
factors as the importance of the ‘conflicting interests’ and ‘on how long their 
conflict lasts.’109  Hostile feelings – ‘the principle of enmity as embodied in its 
agent, man, and in all that goes to make up warfare’110 – can vary significantly 
and the level of hostility exists irrespective of the level of civilisation. 
Reason and civilisation may limit some of the excesses in war – if 
‘civilised nations do not put their prisoners to death or devastate cities and 
countries, it is because intelligence plays a larger part in their methods of warfare 
and has taught them more effective ways of using force’111 – but they are by no 
means obstacles to the extreme use of force, which is logically valid regardless of 
the character of the actors: ‘The maximum use of force is in no way incompatible 
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with the simultaneous use of the intellect.’112  There may indeed be factors – 
social norms and conditions – that mitigate some of the worst excesses, but it 
would be foolish to believe that such states were immune to the escalatory logic 
of violence or to their capture by passions and hatreds, which even if not initially 
present, will inevitably be evoked by the experience of war itself.  The total wars 
of the twentieth century stand testament to the enduring validity of these 
observations.  Civilisation, Enlightenment, and social refinement cannot radically 
alter the basic human condition.  Robert Kaplan has even suggested that it is 
precisely modern taboos against violence, ‘imposed by civilisation that can make 
hatred feel at times like a renewal of virility.’113 
Individual and collective passions 
At the level of personal experiences in war this tendency is perhaps fairly 
uncontroversial and clear in its meaning.  A glance through military diaries from 
any age will confirm this.  Keegan emphasises the importance of these 
‘sensations and emotions’ and how they constitute a ‘powerful…part of every 
human being’s make-up and [are] likely therefore, even when artificially 
stimulated, to affect the novice officer’s composure to an abnormal and 
exaggerated extent. …They touch too upon some of man’s most violent passions; 
hatred, rage and the urge to kill.’114   They are permanent and universal: as 
Michael Dockrill makes clear, the missiles have become much more accurate and 
protective measures…are more sophisticated, but the human frame has not 
changed.  The feelings and emotions of those exposed to firepower, whether as 
civilians and combatants, have remained constant throughout history.’ 115  Dyer 
quotes a World War II veteran who described the psychology of troops in battle: 
‘No man in battle is really sane.  The mindset of the soldier on the battlefield is a 
highly disturbed mind, and this is an epidemic of insanity which affects 
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everybody there.’ 116   The latter point alerts us to a further issue we must 
consider.    
Whilst an individualistic conception of emotion is important to our 
understanding of this tendency, for Clausewitz the forces described are presented 
less as personal than as collective or social phenomena.  For instance, he explains 
how ‘even the most civilised of peoples…can be fired with a passionate hatred 
for each other.’117  Note that the term he employs is ‘peoples,’ not people in the 
singular.  The types of forces described are often referred to as the ‘mood of the 
nation’ or what Hugh Smith terms popular feelings and animosities. 118  
Clausewitz refers to them as being akin to the ‘temper of the population119 – the 
emotions of the masses,’ 120  peoples, and populations.  There is certainly a 
difference between emotions expressed at the personal level to those understood 
at the group level, other than the latter constituting a mere aggregation of 
individual emotions, whilst there are of course definite connections between the 
two.  Was Clausewitz correct to write of such collective passions and, if so, how 
exactly are they to be conceived? 
To clarify the point, let us consider a Nazi Party mass rally in the 1930s.  
Through forceful, energetic, and searing rhetoric Hitler tapped into vague 
individual sentiments of humiliation, desperation, and lingering animosities and 
elevated them to the level of distinct, burning, almost all-consuming hatreds in 
millions of German citizens.  People present at such rallies attest to the 
hypnotising impact of the event.  Indeed, Hermann Rauschning, recounted how 
Hitler proclaimed to him that ‘the masses are like an animal that obeys its 
instincts.  They do not reach their instincts by reasoning... At a mass meeting, 
thought is eliminated.’121  Ehrenreich quotes a British psychologists who noted 
that at Nazi rallies, the people present ‘become fused into a not very intelligent 
but immensely powerful monster…with no judgement and few, but very violent 
passions…The monster became self-conscious of its size and intoxicated by the 
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belief in its own omnipotence.’ 122   The result of such collective emotion is 
something more infinite and all-pervasive than simply the aggregate of each 
individual’s feelings, the resulting whole of which is perhaps felt by each and 
outlasts the particular moment.  It is something more powerful and real, yet 
simultaneously vaporous and elusive to the observer. 
Mass consciousness is dimly perceived but impossibly abstract, perhaps 
somewhat akin to Benedict Anderson’s notion of ‘imagined communities.’123  It 
is a shifting, morphing force, the presence of which may be sensed, but is only 
truly realised through symbolic action or public expressions of violence, like a 
rain cloud made up of millions of tiny droplets blown along together and shaped 
by the wind, which appears to exist as some form of whole, but only reveals its 
true nature and manifests itself as concrete reality when its collective density 
reaches such a level that it results in a sudden downpour or a flash of lightening.  
In fact Clausewitz evokes similar imagery in respect to a people’s uprising 
against occupation, where, if it is to be successful, based on the generalised 
desire to drive out the enemy, ‘the fog must thicken and form a dark and 
menacing cloud out of which a bolt of lightening may strike at any time.’124 
The point of this example is to reveal the way in which collective feelings 
can exist as a kind of independent force, both dependent on the individuals who 
brought them into being, and affecting them in turn.  They can be deliberately 
inculcated by politicians or emerge spontaneously in response to certain events 
and longer-term developments.  The use of the example of a mass rally is at once 
instrumental – to simply clarify some of the operative forces – but also a highly 
pertinent instance of the extremes collective passions can reach.  Indeed, many 
people attest to the great power of ‘the crowd’ and how it can induce emotions 
that otherwise would not exist.  Ehrenreich notes how the crowd ‘leaves 
mundane things behind and transmutes itself into a new kind of being, larger 
than the sum of its parts, more powerful than any single individual’125 and Clark 
comments how ‘Communal enthusiasm may be a dangerous intoxicant.’126 
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The concept is however temporally and spatially flexible and can relate to 
the sense of brotherhood and shared sacrifice felt by a small terrorist organisation 
or extend to the general sentiments of an entire nation, or perhaps, in this global 
age, of enormous supra-national agglomerations in the loose sense of people with 
shared interests and concerns, however geographically dispersed (indeed, it is 
important not to lose sight of the spatial and temporal possibilities this concept 
allows).  Additionally, it must be added that such a collective concept can only 
refer to a generalised aggregate, the dominating characteristics of the whole, 
which will be composed of a vast range of individual, and sometimes conflicting 
emotions upon closer inspection.  For instance, the enthusiasms for war 
displayed in August 1914 were not shared by all, nevertheless it is the scope of 
the enthusiasm that was historically important.127  As Howard attests in relation 
to such emotional forces during World War I, ‘trends like these are difficult and 
sometimes impossible to document, but no study of the war can be complete 
which does not take them into account.’128 
To summarise, this tendency certainly embodies collective passions as 
well as the more personal emotions we commonly associate with war, which as 
we have seen are both innate and evinced in history.  Collective passions are 
dependent upon, inflame, yet transcend individual feelings of animosity and can 
lead individuals to such a pitch of emotion that they lose all grounding in reason, 
as Clausewitz himself experienced at certain intense moments of his life.  The 
individual and collective aspects of this tendency are thus both crucially 
important. 
Passion and the use of force 
We have briefly noted how Clausewitz strongly identifies this tendency of 
violent emotions with the actual physical use of force, although we should be 
careful not to confuse the two.  Here, Clausewitz is concerned with violence as a 
motive force not in the physical use of the term.129  Yet, the former is inescapably 
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intertwined with the latter to the extent that emotions are invariably aroused 
where physical force or violence is a feature of the relationship between human 
groups, whether threatened or actually used.  In Clausewitz’s work a definite 
connection between the act of force and emotion is revealed and they are 
presented as almost inseparable: at one point Clausewitz notes that, ‘Essentially, 
combat is an expression of hostile feelings.’130   
In Book 1, Chapter 1 of On War, Clausewitz discusses the first 
interaction to the extreme – ‘the Maximum Use of Force’ – which can be 
summarised as the logic of force outdoing opposing force in the abstract (in 
relation to the military aim alone): if one side uses force unreservedly, the other 
will be compelled to follow suit or risk being rendered powerless.131  This rise to 
extremes is not necessarily determined by hostile emotions, and the use of 
extremes does not necessarily imply a lack of reason, nevertheless Clausewitz 
holds that emotions cannot fail to become involved and they then often serve to 
intensify the escalatory process.  A crucial feature of this reciprocal action 
towards the extreme is the concept of hostile feelings – expressed throughout the 
section in terms similar to those contained in the trinity.  ‘Hostile intent’ is 
explained as the universal aspect and relates obliquely to the purpose of war,132 
whilst in contrast, hostile feeling – or translated as ‘instinctive hostility’133 in the 
J. J. Graham translation – is not deemed a precondition for war, but an ever-
present feature once it has broken out: there need not be any great feelings of 
hostility between groups for war to break out.134 
Clausewitz states a definite link between these emotional aspects and the 
physical act of fighting by stating that it would be a fallacy ‘to conceive of war as 
capable of ridding itself of passion’, and to do so would imply that fighting 
would be unnecessary: an algebraical comparison would suffice to settle the 
matter if war were purely a matter of the intellect.135  War can never simply be a 
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rational act: ‘if war is an act of force, the emotions cannot fail to be involved.’136  
The idea is also expressed in his use of the phrase, ‘the impulse to destroy the 
enemy,’137 and later in Book 1 he refers to the, ‘brute discharge of hatred and 
enmity of a physical encounter.’138  War, as an act of force, has an inherent logic, 
compelled significantly by, as Daniel Moran has put it, the ‘violent, irrational 
emotions that the use of force could inspire’ 139  whereby, through reciprocal 
actions, it will lead the opposing sides to extremes.  Passion is not coterminous 
with, or the only explanatory factor of, this escalation, but it cannot be 
considered apart from it because the use of force by humans will always involve 
the emotions. 
From Achilles’ all-consuming revenge and relentless fury at Hector for 
the death of Patroclus, these kinds of forces, described by Clausewitz as a 
‘flaring-up of mutual rage’,140 have been powerfully recorded throughout history.  
One recent book turns to Clausewitz in order to express the idea.  In Chris 
Bellamy’s comprehensive history of the gruesome experience of Soviet and Axis 
forces on the Eastern Front during World War II, he stresses the role such violent 
emotional forces played in pushing the fighting perilously close to Clausewitz’s 
abstract concept of absolute war: ‘Violence by one side bred violence on the 
other.  Soviet forces breaking into Germany in 1945 were spurred on by 
exhortations to exact revenge.’141  He goes on to detail the way in which the 
notable absence of legal restrictions gave freer rein to these destructive and 
violent feelings between the two countries.142   
A similar dynamic is highlighted by Ferguson in his book, The War of the 
World.  In a section revealingly entitled ‘Hatred in the Trenches’, which explores 
the failure of socialist hopes of international proletarian solidarity superseding 
national loyalties during World War I, Ferguson describes how ‘as the war went 
on, mutual hatred grew, expunging the common origins and predicaments of the 
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combatants.’143  Many began to regard the opposing soldiers as ‘a sort of vermin 
like plague-rat’,144 hate replaced fear, and, for some, killing became a cathartic, 
even pleasurable, experience.  As in the case of the Eastern Front in World War 
II, reference is made to the fragility of international law governing the treatment 
of prisoners in the face of such escalating front-line animosity and desire for 
revenge.145  In sentences that remind us of scenes from Doctor Moreau, Ferguson 
reveals how the war unleashed ‘primitive impulses’146 and so, ‘Attackers and 
attacked are simultaneously reduced to the level of animals.’147  Strachan also 
records such dynamics of hatred in the War: ‘discipline was undermined in 
battle, as violence begat violence, fighting created hostility and loss of life 
inspired revenge.’148  That such dynamics as explained by Ferguson and Strachan 
were included in Clausewitz’s meaning of this tendency is clear, he states that, 
‘Even where there is no national hatred and no animosity to start with, the 
fighting itself will stir up hostile feelings: violence committed on superior orders 
will stir up the desire for revenge and retaliation against the perpetrator.’149   
Extreme hatred can cause mindless killing and acts of barbarity to 
become a matter of course for those involved, at least while caught in the midst 
of passion, surrounded by others equally entranced in such a violent psychosis.  
So, Achilles, gripped by rage, desecrates Hector’s corpse, and he even ‘outrages 
the senseless clay in all his fury.’150  In modern times, William Polk describes 
how the Croation Ustase rebels, during World War II, became so caught up in a 
whirlwind of murder and destruction against Serbian villages that, ‘Killing 
became a cult, an obsession… Some Ustase collected the eyes of the Serbs they 
had killed…proudly displaying them and other human organs in the cafes of 
Zagreb.’ 151   Sadly human history records far too many instances of such 
impassioned brutality.  A common feature of many terrorist campaigns and 
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insurgencies is the spiral of violence that tends to develop where attacks lead to 
harsh retribution or overreaction by the ruling authorities, which either prompts 
revenge attacks by terrorists or drives more recruits into the insurgency; 152 
further attacks are conducted and the situation descends into a cycle of revenge 
and reprisals – a situation which terrorists often actively seek to create through 
their use of violence against civilian targets.153  These examples are certainly 
some of the most obvious ways in which passions are aroused in war, and as 
primarily expressed in terms of hatred and animosity towards the enemy.  
‘Hostile feelings’ will generally be aroused where violence occurs in human 
social relations. 
Sources of passion and irrationality 
As Clausewitz himself notes, it would be pedantic to try to outline all the various 
ways in which emotional, psychological, and moral factors impact on war.  
Nevertheless, it is perhaps useful, drawing upon some ideas Clausewitz 
discusses, to consider some of the most notable sources of passion in relation to 
war other than those associated with the act of force itself as described above.  
The different conditions created by and characterising any particular war 
accounts for the differing extents to which emotions are aroused or irrational 
influences come to dominate the conduct of war: levels of hostility can fluctuate 
from one conflict to the next, or even multiple times within the same war.154  The 
following discussion considers some of the prominent factors that cause passion 
and irrational behaviour to be prevalent in war. 
Clausewitz believed a major determinant was the nature and importance 
of the political object, the cause being fought for.  Some commentators claim that 
this can be of great strategic significance, to the extent that those fighting for a 
just end are instilled with a sense of moral superiority.  Richard Overy has 
argued this compellingly in his analysis of Why the Allies Won in World War II, 
noting that ‘the Allies ‘fought not only because the sum of their resources added 
                                                          
152
 As Gray notes, government overreaction to terrorism can aid recruitment to the terrorist cause.  
War, Peace, and International Relations, p. 247.  
153
 Alistair Horne, A Savage War of Peace: Algeria 1954-1962 (New York: New York Review 
Books, 2006), p. 500.  
154
 Antulio J. Echevarria II, Clausewitz and Contemporary War (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2007), p. 73. 
Passion 
 306 
up to victory, but because they wanted to win and were certain that their cause 
was just.’155  Similarly, Thucydides noted that the Spartans fought poorly in the 
first part of their war with Athens because of the guilt they felt at having broken 
the treaty that existed between them.156  However, Gray warns about placing too 
much emphasis on such factors when who exactly is fighting ‘the good fight’ is 
not always clear and inherently subjective, even though in some cases the justice 
of the cause might confer ‘notable strategic advantage.’ 157   
Of course, in some wars the emotions of the army or the people are 
actively roused by the leadership in order to drum up enthusiasm, or attain 
support for the operation.158  The deliberate mobilisation of hostile feelings of the 
population or the military by the leadership is common practice: fear may be 
encouraged by exaggerating the threat posed by the enemy, whilst ‘hate training’ 
and propaganda may be employed, or the media utilised to portray ‘the other side 
as vermin, insects, dogs, and other noisome creatures.’ 159   Of course such 
practices often result in contraventions of the laws of war, atrocities, and 
massacres – the enemy is perceived as sub-human and therefore exceptions to 
norms are considered justified, even necessary.160  
The length of hostilities can have a great impact on the play of emotional 
forces, particularly in terms of hostile feelings toward the enemy.161  In Section 
14, Chapter 1, Book 1 of On War – in relation to continuous action in war – 
Clausewitz explains how such ceaseless activity would ‘arouse men’s feelings 
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and inject them with more passion and elemental strength.’162  Of course, time 
may, in some circumstances, have an opposite effect whereby the vigour, 
passion, and enthusiasm displayed in the early parts of a war are dampened by 
the travails of battle and gruesome reality of the ordeal.  Jomini points to this 
phenomenon in relation to wars, such as those of the Revolution, in which human 
passions were ‘excited in a temporary paroxysm, of less duration as it is the more 
violent.’  In these cases, ‘Time is the true remedy’ as the ‘storms soon pass away 
and reason resumes her sway.’ 163   Clausewitz similarly notes how wars of 
national liberation may ‘start out full of vigor and enthusiasm’ but if many 
soldiers and civilians are killed, wounded, or taken prisoner then often ‘such 
defeats would soon dampen its ardour.’164  
Linked to the idea of time is the factor of the cumulative impact of lives 
lost and sacrifices already made, which often serves to justify continued fighting 
for the sake of those already fallen and fuels anger and animosity towards the 
enemy.165  Fighting in such cases tends to be suffused with notions of revenge 
and retribution.166  This constitutes a major instance of the way in which the 
course of war itself can cause military dynamics – the ‘grammar’ of war – to 
escape policy control.  The emotional imperative to achieve victory for the sake 
of those already fallen may inspire continued resistance where there is little 
rational hope of success.  This was a factor which contributed to the slaughter of 
World War I.  As Dyer notes, ‘When sixty million men have been ordered into 
uniform and sent off to risk their lives; when in France, for example, one in three 
of the male population…has been killed or wounded…when the people’s 
willingness to go on making sacrifices has been sustained by hate propaganda 
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that depicts the war as a moral crusade against fathomless evil – then 
governments cannot just stop the fighting.’167 
Perhaps the most potent emotion in war is quite simply fear; the 
anticipation of future pain, danger, or suffering.  There is nothing like fear to 
overwhelm reason and induce behaviour which people ordinarily would not think 
themselves capable.168  Fear may arise from concerns about spies, turncoats, or 
fifth columnists, which can induce widespread paranoia, indiscriminate purges, 
or internal dislocation and paralysis.  This is often a major concern of insurgent 
and terrorist groups; indeed, elements of the Algerian F.L.N. almost destroyed 
themselves this way.169  The effect of fear is particularly noticeable in cases of 
units, armies, or even whole nations that face probable defeat, and particularly 
where capitulation, surrender, or retreat is not a viable option.  Such situations 
may occur either because the enemy will allow no quarter, the sacrifices 
demanded are unconditional, geography precludes falling back, or perhaps the 
leadership has issued orders to fight to the last man and execute ‘cowards’ and 
deserters.  In some cases, the prevailing military culture may be suffused with 
notions of self-sacrifice and no-surrender, such as displayed by the Imperial 
Japanese military during World War II in which fascist militarism merged with 
notions derived from the knightly Samurai Bushido code, which emphasised 
honour until death.170   
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In such situations, desperation can generate great feats of strength fuelled 
by great passion, much as an animal is most dangerous when cornered or on the 
verge of death.  In the section of On War on the ‘culminating point of victory’ 
Clausewitz notes how the commander must assess whether ‘the burning pain of 
the injury he has dealt will make the enemy collapse with exhaustion or, like a 
wounded bull, arouse his rage.’171  On this phenomenon, the seventeenth century 
jurist Hugo Grotius noted that, ‘Even for the stronger party, when flushed with 
victory, peace is a safer expedient, than the most extensive successes.  For there 
is the boldness of despair to be apprehended from a vanquished enemy, 
dangerous as the bite of a ferocious animal in the pangs of death.’172  Such 
responses to fear may enable heroic feats of bravery and survival against the 
odds, yet also it may simply expedite the inevitable; as Seneca put it, ‘That is 
how an animal, struggling against the noose, tightens it’.173  Similarly, at the 
national level, as Victoria Wedgwood notes of Spain in the early seventeenth 
century, ‘a great state in its decline may yet be more powerful than a small state 
not yet arrived at greatness.’174  In Spain’s case, its struggle to forestall its own 
military and economic demise during the Thirty Years War certainly tightened 
the noose.175 
At the tactical level, a classic piece of military wisdom advises to always 
leave your enemy a ‘golden bridge’ to avoid the ferocity with which a cornered 
group is likely to resist, because in a battle for survival ‘anything goes.’  
Tellingly, in his Guerrilla Warfare, Che Guevara refers to the ‘encirclement 
face’ displayed by surrounded troops.176  Some of military history’s most notable 
battles occurred under such circumstances, from the Spartans’ ‘glorious 
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annihilation’ at Thermopylae in 480,177 to the British stand at Rorke’s Drift in 
1879,178 to the Russian defence of Stalingrad over the Winter of 1942-43.179  In 
all such cases the prospect of almost certain defeat prompted displays of infinite 
courage.  Also, in a different yet related fashion, terrorist groups often commit 
their worst attacks when the authorities are closing in on them or when the cause 
looks increasingly hopeless, as displayed in the Real IRA’s Omagh bombing in 
1998 which killed twenty-nine people.180  During the 1980s, the remnants of the 
West German Red Army Faction conducted a spate of pointless murders after the 
failure of the ‘German Autumn’ in 1977.181  Or consider the last-ditch campaign 
of bombings and assassinations launched in the early 1960s by the far-right 
nationalist Organisation de L’Armée Secrète (OAS) to prevent Algerian 
independence following president de Gaulle’s promises of a referendum on the 
issue.182  As Alistair Horne notes in his magisterial account of the conflict, ‘born 
of despair’ the OAS through its appalling acts expedited that which they sought 
to prevent.183 
The factor of fear is closely related to the types of wars that are, as 
Clausewitz puts it, ‘a struggle for political existence.’184  Clausewitz states that, 
‘like a drowning man who will clutch instinctively at a straw, it is a natural law 
of the moral world that a nation that finds itself on the brink of an abyss will try 
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to save itself by any means.’185  Elsewhere he notes that, ‘No nation has ever 
responded to repression by another with anything except hatred and enmity.’186  
Similarly, Jomini warns about engaging in such ‘national wars.’187  He advises 
that to succeed in such difficult wars it is necessary to avoid giving the 
impression that independence is threatened and to ‘calm the popular passions in 
every possible way.’188  Like Jomini, Clausewitz lived through a period in which 
the peoples of countries threatened by emasculation under the Napoleonic 
Empire fought brutal campaigns of liberation.  For a number of years the Spanish 
– supported by Wellington’s British army – fought an intense guerrilla campaign 
against French occupation, itself often described as a consequence of Napoleon’s 
ambition and greed.189  The greater spirit and vigour of citizen-soldiers fighting 
for independence has been apparent since Herodotus proclaimed it to be a crucial 
factor in the Greek victory over Persia.190  Such wars of national survival are 
often typified by great hatreds and, in consequence, great brutality in the form of 
massacres, reprisals, and other contraventions of the laws of war.   
The natural passions aroused by a people when foreign troops are present 
in their country represents a particular problem for modern humanitarian military 
interventions.  Even though conducted for purportedly altruistic reasons, this 
cannot override a people’s sense of dignity and desire for self-governance.191  
This is particularly the case in countries imbued with an intense nationalism, 
fierce independence, or traditions of resistance against occupation.  In such 
conditions there is a strong likelihood of impassioned resistance from some 
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quarters.  As Lawrence Freedman reminds us, ‘Whilst the stakes for the 
intervening powers may be limited those for the local parties are likely to be 
total.’192   Western states, driven by a progressive and idealistic belief in the 
righteousness of their actions can be blinded to the natural impulse of a people’s 
sense of independence, no matter what the putative ‘worthy’ purpose of the 
presence of foreign armies may be (behind which many natives impute designs 
of more permanent occupation, which may not always be wholly mistaken).193   
Clausewitz’s comment – in a piece on ‘The Germans and the French’ – 
that, ‘Love and loyalty need time to take root in the hearts of even the most 
passionate men, but hatred and vengeance can be ignited in an instant’194 might 
be particularly pertinent with regard to the wars in the Former Yugoslavia during 
the 1990s.  In The Warrior’s Honor, Michael Ignatieff draws attention to the 
impact of the related notion of ‘the deadly dynamic of the narcissism of minor 
difference’.195  In Yugoslavia, people from different ethnic groups had coexisted, 
grown up together, and even widely intermarried, but it only took a matter of 
weeks for these bonds to fragment and for great hatreds to arise.196  Indeed, 
Ignatieff notes the paradox that ‘the emotions stirred up within commonality are 
more violent than those aroused by pure and radical difference…[there are] no 
hatreds more intractable than those between the closest kin.’197  It is often as 
though in situations of uncertainty and insecurity the smaller the differences 
between groups the more aggressively they must be expressed and the greater the 
effort (often in the form of propaganda or the peddling of historical myth) that 
must be invested in convincing each other that they are enemies, that the ‘other’ 
does represent a grave and menacing threat.198  In such circumstances humans 
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tend to lose their capacity to reason and become swept up in terrible fantasies 
that can so rapidly lead to the spiral of war, ethnic cleansing, and genocide. 
Such impassioned hatred is a common feature of many wars between 
groups ostensibly divided by minor differences, where political power becomes 
increasingly centred around appeals to, sometimes ‘imagined’ or inauthentic, 
group identities. 199   Consider, for instance, the Rwandan genocide of 1994.  
Although ethnic divisions were not entirely fabricated, conceptions of the 
superiority of Tutsis over the ‘dark agricultural’ Hutu was largely a Belgian 
colonial construct for the purpose of political control, and which would serve as 
powerful basis for later Hutu notions of oppression. 200   Indeed, a common 
Rwandan refrain is, ‘You can’t tell us apart, we can’t tell us apart.’  In this sense, 
Ignatieff describes ethnicity as a ‘mask, constantly repainted’201  In such ways, 
the identities that come to define friend and enemy are often only created through 
the process of war itself.  Helen Graham has noted how in the first year of the 
Spanish Civil War, a common Republican identity was rapidly forged as a result 
of aerial bombing of Madrid and rising death tolls.202  Indeed, civil wars – with 
brother pitted against brother, sometimes literally – are generally marked by an 
intensity of emotion and hatred, where issues are more immediate and personal, 
and where identity, for many, becomes synonymous with survival.203    
To provide such examples as outlined above is not to argue that 
massacres, atrocities, and other such horrors in war are purely the result of 
passionate hatreds.  Indeed, the record of the twentieth century suggests a 
common cause of such acts derive from perverted forms of rationality and cold 
calculation – such as associated with the Holocaust and ethnic cleansing in the 
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Balkans during the 1990s – which makes such crimes all the more deplorable.204  
Nevertheless, it is also clear that hatreds and animosities can cause humans to 
behave in despicable ways.  The worst excesses of World War II tended to 
accompany the clash of armies fuelled by notions of the animal nature of the 
enemy (and which proved particularly effective when the enemy was of a 
different race) – this was particularly apparent in the Pacific theatre of World 
War II.205  Again, this is nothing new.  Seneca powerfully depicted the extremes 
to which passions led in Roman times: ‘Look and you will see cities of greatest 
renown, their very foundations now scarcely discernible – anger cast them down; 
deserts, mile after mile without inhabitant – anger emptied them…look upon 
gathered throngs put to the sword, on the military sent to butcher the populace 
en masse, on whole people condemned to death in an indiscriminate 
devastation.’206 
Other sources of emotion and irrationalism may derive from religious 
belief or superstition, the impact of which can be varied and complex: they can 
constitute a potent cause of war, greatly impinge on how it is conducted, shape 
the conventions under which it is fought, serve as a cynical means of raising 
armies, or significantly bolster the conviction, courage, and morale of a fighting 
force.  Although wars are rarely purely about religious matters, wars fought over 
religious differences, by theocratic states, or as campaigns of conversion have 
been common in human history – from the Muslim Conquests, to the Crusades of 
the Middle Ages, to the Religious Wars of the sixteenth century following the 
Reformation207 – and are commonly distinguished by their ferocity.  Many other 
wars, not ostensibly ‘about’ religion have been greatly influenced, or rendered 
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more intractable, by matters of faith,208 such as in Northern Ireland, Bosnia, and 
the Levant in the second half of the twentieth century. 209   Although wars 
dominated by a religious element waned during the modern period, recently, 
particularly with the rise of Islamic radicalism and the behaviour of an American 
administration run for eight years by an evangelical Christian,210  the role of 
religion in war has returned to centre stage.211   
The precise impact of religion in these respects is uncertain and 
ambiguous, but it is best conceived as an irrational or emotional influence.  Faith 
might induce a hope of salvation where there is none or encourage actions that 
are strategically crippling,212 whilst religious conviction – the belief that ‘God is 
on our side’213 – can greatly contribute to morale (and is often exploited by 
leaders to inspire troops or sow hatred) and convince soldiers that their own 
death will not be meaningless.  Medieval warfare was particularly influenced by 
such notions, where divine providence – as opposed to human tenacity – was 
believed to be the prime determinant of success.  Religious influences, whilst 
often encouraging excesses in war bred of the need to stamp out apostasy or 
forcefully convert unbelievers, may also constitute powerful forces discouraging 
violence and encouraging restraint, pity, or mercy during war – even where such 
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action may not make rational military sense.214  Indeed, the Just War tradition 
(powerfully shaped by the work of Catholic scholars such as Augustine and 
Thomas Aquinas), whilst at times certainly providing a powerful rationale for 
war (often against the wishes of its leading theorists), 215  has been a major 
counterweight throughout history to the notion that ‘inter arma enim silent 
leges’216 – at least with respect to fellow children of God. 
Closely related to the influence of religious faith on war is that of secular 
‘quasi-religious’ or millenarian political ideologies.217  Jomini termed conflicts 
based on such notions ‘wars of opinion’ and noted that wars fought for political 
dogmas ‘are most deplorable…[as] they enlist the worst passions and become 
vindictive, cruel, and terrible.’218  It was, of course, the element of passionate 
utopianism of the Revolutionaries, in particular of the Jacobins, which 
Clausewitz recognised as a major factor enabling the rag-tag French armies to 
first successfully face the professional armies of the European monarchies and 
then to move ‘with such confidence and certainty’ during the wars of the 
following years.219  More recently, an Italian Red Brigade terrorist commander 
could state that, ‘All of us…were drug addicts of a particular type, of ideology.  
A murderous drug, worse than heroin.’220  Yet the ‘depth of feeling’221 associated 
with such wars can equally lead to impossible dreams, hubris, and ultimately 
nemesis as ideological orthodoxy is often maintained at the expense of analysis 
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of strategic realties.222  John Gray, amongst others, has powerfully argued that it 
was such blinding utopianism that largely explains American failures in Iraq 
after 2003.223   
Finally, we should not underestimate the extent to which the state of 
existing technology can impact on the emotional aspects of war.  Clausewitz 
notes how, in ancient warfare, due to the state of existing weaponry, ‘the fighting 
spirit of the individual came from the hand to hand combat to which every battle 
generally led.’224  Yet, the reduced proximity between belligerents engendered by 
rapid advances in weapons development – principally over the last 150 years – 
has raised the possibility of war fought with a minimum of emotion.  Modern 
‘push-button warfare’ is said to be more impersonal, sterile, and thus less 
susceptible to being influenced by the intense emotions of close combat.  The 
apotheosis of this form of warfare supposedly came in 1999 with Nato’s air war 
over Kosovo, fought at 15,000 feet and with zero alliance casualties.225  Yet, 
there are a number of reasons for caution with regard to the supposed limitation 
of emotions in modern technological warfare. 
First, it has been observed that it is often civilians who display more 
hatred toward an enemy than soldiers themselves, perhaps casting doubt on the 
importance of proximity. 226   For actual soldiers, Kaplan suggests that the 
increased distance between a violent act and the perpetrator might actually 
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expand ‘the scope of impersonal viciousness.’227  Second, technology is not the 
only determinant of the emotions soldiers and politicians display.  The political 
context is again vital.  One can perhaps expect a US pilot to display a different 
emotional disposition towards al-Qaeda terrorists than to Serbian soldiers: 
thresholds of acceptable collateral damage or decisions on appropriate targets 
may be mediated by such emotional factors.  We might question whether the 
abuses at Abu Ghraib would have occurred devoid of the overarching ideological 
context, post 9/11, of the Iraq War?  Third, if passion is perhaps less evident in 
some aspects of Western warfare, it still exerts considerable influence, if only in 
more complex and ephemeral forms, such as through public reactions to civilian 
casualties, and we must remember that war is still a decidedly real and emotional 
experience for those on whom the bombs fall.  The reactions of the people in 
such war zones are crucial, particularly when most modern Western wars are 
fought to shape political conditions in the target state.   Fourth, for all the 
discussion of the predominance of ‘risk-transfer war’228 and stand-off weapons, it 
has been clear in the last decade that Western forces have frequently and 
consistently engaged in intensely up-close and personal forms of combat.  
Perhaps some of the difficulties Western troops have faced fighting insurgents in 
Somalia, Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere has been due to an over-reliance of 
technology: as Coker remarks, ‘they lacked the ‘human factors’ that Clausewitz 
tells us allow armies to prevail in battle: courage and hatred being chief among 
them.’229  
There are of course, countless other factors that may account for the 
prevalence of emotional factors in war.  We might also point to the obvious 
effect of alcohol and drugs, which have been common features of war throughout 
the ages, or the way war waged by irregulars or ‘wild hordes’ often carries the 
stamp of extreme emotional violence, exacerbated by the lack of discipline, 
formal chains of command, or a prominent warrior ethic.230  Popular culture may 
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also act as an irrational influence on war: in Howard’s ‘Reflections’ on World 
War I, he draws attention to the ‘disquieting strain of primitive savagery which 
composers and artists were beginning to tap’231 and that ‘popular emotion…goes 
far to explain why the war, when it broke out, should have been so prolonged and 
so bloody.’232  The irrational influence of The Culture of War is the major theme 
of Creveld’s recent work, leading to the adoption of certain practices and 
behaviour inimical to strategic effectiveness.233   Also, our conception of this 
tendency need not be confined to the effect of passion leading to extremes in 
war; it may also result in mistaken decisions, misspent energies, ill-considered 
interventions, and so forth.  There are more subtle ways in which actors in war 
display emotions and irrational behaviour, but which might constitute important 
variables for understanding any particular conflict.  To explore this concept 
further it is useful to consider the ways in which this tendency relates to other 
concepts and how it pertains to specific groups in war: to the political leadership, 
armed forces, and the people. 
Passion and politics 
In the context of the trinity, the types of forces we have described seemingly 
threaten to alter, ‘if not to overwhelm’ 234  the formulation of sensible and 
reasonable policy or the application of appropriate means.  This point is revealed 
in reverse when Clausewitz states that, ‘Since war is not an act of senseless 
passion but is controlled by its political object, the value of this object must 
determine the sacrifices to be made for it in magnitude and also in duration.’235  
Smith refers to these forces as ‘irrational’ in order to stress the idea that they 
reflect instinctive forces rather than being the products of reason: the apparent 
opposite of some of the ideas we noted in relation to Clausewitz’s conception of 
war as subordinate to policy.  In this sense, strong political leadership is often 
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required to keep popular emotions under control.236  For instance, the political 
leadership might have to resist popular demands to wreak vengeance on an 
enemy, where such a course would not make strategic sense – as Fabius managed 
during the war with Carthage.237  This tendency is something that, at times policy 
may be hard put to control and indeed is often seemingly eclipsed by it.238  In one 
section Clausewitz notes that, ‘Between two peoples…there can be such 
tensions, such a mass of inflammable material’239 that the war can develop in a 
way disproportionate to original political interests.  Policy has to understand that 
when it employs force, the emotional reactions of their own forces and of others 
are highly unstable, variable, and unpredictable.  Policy might wish to fight a 
limited war, but events might lead to a different outcome.  Military realities may 
require substantial use of force, and the resultant effort, might contribute to 
‘political goal inflation’ as the public demands objectives which reflect the 
sacrifices already made. 240 
Not only does policy attempt to manage such passions, but there is every 
reason to believe that it can be overwhelmed by them itself: as Creveld notes, 
‘Nothing would be more preposterous than to think that, just because some 
people wield power, they act like calculating machines that are unswayed by 
passions.’241  The extent to which policy will be able to remain immune from or 
in control of these forces will depend on such factors as the psychological 
attributes of the leadership and the character of the war-making institutions.  
Frederick the Great is a good example of a commander who treated his wars as 
games of power politics, conducted through the calculated application of his 
resources and considered manoeuvring of his forces in pursuit of clear and 
achievable aims (primarily geared towards holding onto Silesia, which was 
ensured by the Treaty of Hubertusburg in 1763 at the conclusion of the Seven 
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Years War). 242   About Frederick, Clausewitz noted that with regard to his 
political objectives: ‘neither vanity, ambition, not vindictiveness could move him 
from his course; and it was this course alone that brought him success.’243  The 
implication here is that to be effective, policy must remain as isolated as possible 
from emotional influences.244   
Yet, of course, not all leaders and commanders show the type of 
composure and controlled reason of Frederick, and those responsible for crafting 
policy can easily be swayed by the types of forces we have described above.  
Clausewitz refers to these as emotions that are not so much stimulated by the 
nature of combat itself, but related to it more obliquely: he mentions – no doubt 
with Napoleon in mind – ‘ambition, love of power, enthusiasms of all kinds.’245  
Napoleon perhaps represents the opposite of Frederick in this respect: although 
he had a rational side, ‘the realistic ruler was dominated by the romantic 
conqueror.’ 246   So, likewise, the failure of Athens occurred, according to 
Thucydides, because they had ‘been seized by a mad passion to possess that 
which is out of reach’ and were ‘daring beyond their power, bold beyond their 
judgement.’247  Also, associated with the type of hubris which led Athens into its 
reckless Sicilian expedition, 248  the impact of overreaching ambition, utopian 
ideology or blinding faith can cause policymakers to make irrational decisions 
that are not suited to political conditions or available means.   
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Passion and the military 
That ‘the military’, broadly defined, does not at first sight warrant association 
with this tendency for Clausewitz (who associated it mainly with ‘the people’) 
may appear counterintuitive: surely it is soldiers, as our discussion has 
emphasised, who are most prone to being inspired with a passionate hatred of the 
enemy?  However, there are powerful reasons why Clausewitz may have reached 
the conclusion he did, derived from a peculiar way of thinking that has become 
deeply embedded in the culture of military establishments throughout history, 
whilst we will also reveal that a proper understanding of On War does 
encompass the military within the concept of passion.   
The notion of the military constituting a passionless realm is evident in 
the tradition or practice of ‘de-personalising and even de-humanising’ soldiers – 
as Clausewitz put it, turning them into ‘automata’ – in order that they are simply 
capable of carrying out orders and to help them, as Keegan has noted, ‘avert the 
onset of fear or, worse, of panic and to perceive a face of battle which, if not 
familiar, and certainly not friendly, need not, in the event, prove wholly 
petrifying.’249  As noted, in the age of Frederick the Great soldiers had to be 
capable of withstanding fire at almost point blank range.  Moreover, those 
soldiers were, as one contemporary put it, largely ‘composed of the slime of the 
nation’250 and foreign mercenaries, so a great effort had to be made simply to 
keep troops on the field and avert mass desertion.251  As Geoffrey Parker notes, 
this is a practice firmly rooted in the western way of war from earliest times 
because, given that smaller Western forces were often pitted against enormous 
‘barbarian’ armies, what Clausewitz described as ‘pedantic order and firm 
discipline’252 was required to ensure formations stood fast ‘without giving way to 
the natural impulses of fear and panic.’253  Activities such as drills and marching 
were designed to instil virtues of self-control and unit cohesion.  As Bourke 
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notes the requirement for emotionless automata was deemed crucial because, 
‘After all, blood-lust, rage and hatred were counterproductive responses, making 
men’s hands tremble when shooting at the enemy.’254 
The extremely harsh discipline and unemotional methodism characteristic 
of the Prussian army in Clausewitz’s time, particularly prior to the reform period, 
would have been common to most soldiers throughout Europe.  The army was an 
institution built around the need to delimit the play of blind emotion (we stress 
delimit because of course there is a balance to be struck: unleashing the violent 
emotions of the troops at the right time can be a crucial factor in battle).  
Nevertheless, it is understandable why Clausewitz perhaps refrained from a 
direct association of passion with the military given the practical requirement for 
strongly disciplined, controlled, and cohesive armies, but also in the objective 
sense that such control has been a feature of armed forces throughout history. 
Yet, the issue is more complex than this and no rigid distinction is 
actually implied in Clausewitz’s conception.  This becomes clear when one 
considers the nature of military institutions as they developed during the 
Napoleonic era.  This was a time when the distinction between the army and the 
people became increasingly blurred.  Where, in the Frederickan age, armies had 
become almost ‘a state within a state’, Clausewitz witnessed the emergence of 
the phenomenon of the ‘nation in arms’ where recognisable distinctions between 
‘the people’ and the army broke down: civilians were soldiers, soldiers civilians.  
Of course, in reality, large elements of the population never became soldiers, but 
often civilians came to identify closely with the armed forces nevertheless (this 
was particularly the case in America, where the nature of the birth of their nation 
entailed a strong bond between the military and the people) and, as stipulated in 
the famous 1793 levée en masse, all citizens were to called upon to support the 
French war effort.  Thus, when Clausewitz speaks of the people, we should not 
be misled into conceiving of a neat sociological distinction or one that might 
apply today, with small professional armed forces highly isolated from wider 
society.  The emotions of the people not only acted as powerful forces acting on 
politicians in the form of public opinion, but as a force directly embodied in the 
military instrument in the form of the civilian in arms. 
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Even if this is understood, we may take Clausewitz’s association of 
passion with ‘the people’ more literally.  All soldiers, statesmen, and so on, by 
necessity, are drawn from ‘the people’ – they are not an alien breed simply on 
account of their profession, regardless of whatever responsibilities or modes of 
behaviour they inherit in such roles.  To claim that they are not susceptible to 
similar emotional forces as attributed to ‘the masses’ is surely mistaken and 
tantamount to social stereotyping.  Indeed, the very reverse may be observed in 
the case of leaders overcome with ideological or religious passion and a public 
tending towards restraint and rational moderation (incidentally, a common 
assumption amongst nineteenth and twentieth centuries liberals such as Jeremy 
Bentham in the form of the ‘doctrine of salvation by public opinion’. 255  
Although, as Howard has reminded us, ‘public opinion is not necessarily so 
civilized as Bentham would have wished.’)256    
As the interpretation outlined in this chapter has suggested, this tendency 
is concerned with the distinctly human element of war.  All actors in war are 
human and ‘of the people’ and will thus display elements of this tendency to 
some degree.  Just as all individuals are incapable of living purely by the dictates 
of reason – even Stoics as indomitable as Marcus Aurelius or Senaca257 – so all 
groups of society, be they ordinary citizens, soldiers, politicians, military 
commanders, and so forth, can be swept along by passions: the ‘World 
Controllers’ of Aldous Huxley’s Brave New World do not exist in reality, despite 
all those who have dreamt of such emotionless rational perfection.258  
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Passion and ‘the people’ 
So, despite having established that the play of emotion in war is not confined to 
any one element of society – as a narrow reading of the secondary trinity might 
suggest – Clausewitz nevertheless clearly wanted to stress the extent to which 
this tendency is powerfully expressed through the people, in its more specific 
sense of what we might term, ‘the masses.’  The role of the people in war has 
varied significantly, for contextual reasons, throughout history.  As noted, the 
people were very much isolated from the ‘minute but immaculate’259 armies of 
the eighteenth century, composed mainly of mercenaries, apart from the 
conscription (or kidnap) of some of the ‘dregs of society’ or, as Wellington put it 
‘the scum of the earth.’  The rest of the populace was primarily expected to 
produce food, pay taxes, and had next to nothing to do with war, except maybe 
through small segments of middle-class opinion in the towns or when peasants 
found themselves in the path of a marching army.260  In other times, preceding 
and post-dating that era, the passions of the people have greatly influenced the 
course and conduct of war – sometimes as participants, sometimes as crucial 
constituencies that war leaders have had to respond to or consider in relation to 
their own power, the stability of the state, and so forth.  For instance, during the 
Thirty Years War civilians were deeply involved, either as rampaging murdering 
mobs or as their countless victims.261 
The emotional predispositions and reactions of the people to uses of force 
can have crucial political implications, particularly if those emotions are 
converted into armed resistance of various kinds, but also in the indirect sense of 
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the impact of diminished legitimacy at home and abroad, declining popular 
support, or mass protest.  Populations may also be a powerful force either 
pushing leaders into war or appealing for restraint.  The impact of the people in 
these respects has gained increasing importance with the spread of liberal-
democratic states and mass-media – although as Gray has pointed out, the 
‘strange idea that dictators can ignore domestic constituencies needs to be 
quashed once and for ever’.262  As we stated in Chapter 4, political power is 
comprised of much more than material military prowess and the effective use of 
force should be geared to prevailing political conditions.  In this respect, securing 
and maintaining the support of various constituencies of popular sentiment may 
constitute the difference between success and failure in war: as Jonathan Swift 
once remarked, ‘In war, opinion is nine parts in ten.’263  Clausewitz was well 
aware of this, even if its relative importance has grown in recent times: he noted 
how the centre of gravity – ‘the hub of all power and movement on which 
everything depends’ – might in some cases equate to ‘the personalities of the 
leaders and public opinion.’264       
This is particularly evident, as Clausewitz recognises, in situations of 
popular uprising and insurgency.  In order to offset their material weakness 
against heavily armed state militaries, insurgents will actively seek to shape the 
emotions and ensure the allegiance (or even simply the acquiescence) of the 
population on which they rely to generate support for their cause and undermine 
the legitimacy of the governing powers: as the axiom has it, ‘the population is the 
prize.’  Likewise, in order not to fail, counterinsurgent forces must be mindful 
not to react in ways that further alienate elements of the population through 
indiscriminate reprisals, collective punishment, or the use of vindictive measures 
such as torture or the suspension of normal legal rights.  Often there is a balance 
to be struck, but insurgents will often seek to induce just such a response.  
Insurgent groups often actively seek to instil fear in segments of the population 
knowing that, for their purpose, ‘the worse the better’ because it is generally the 
government that is held responsible by civilians for a failure to protect them, thus 
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draining the latter’s legitimacy still further.265  So, insurgencies are primarily 
conducted within the ‘cognitive terrain’ of the people’s ‘hearts and minds’.  The 
fears and the emotions of the population will tend to determine the outcome – 
which is ultimately about the popular political legitimacy of the government – 
more than any material preponderance of force (although military dynamics of 
course shape peoples’ perceptions).   
A particularly modern manifestation of the impact of popular passions on 
war has been the rise of pressure from populations in Western states to intervene 
militarily in the affairs of other states for humanitarian reasons.  With the growth 
of human rights discourse and a global mass-media presenting round-the-clock 
coverage of conflict and suffering in far-away places, the demand for 
governments to ‘do something’ has greatly increased (albeit highly 
selectively).266  Such pressures lay behind the succession of interventions by the 
‘international community’ after the end of the Cold War.  The outcomes of such 
interventions were extremely mixed, but the point here is the extent to which the 
initial engagement, the method of intervention, and levels of commitment to the 
mission in the aftermath have all been crucially shaped by popular opinion – 
even if, as has been argued, it arouses the emotions of the people only ‘in the 
intense but shallow way that sports do.’267  Often the impulse to do something is 
highly emotional, in the form of moral outrage, guilt, and compassion (bolstered 
by a type of liberal utopianism regarding the possibility of success), and rarely is 
sufficient account taken of the realties and difficulties on the ground.268  Also, 
the same emotions that inspire intervention often end up pushing for withdrawal 
or precipitate ‘exit strategies’ as ‘compassion fatigue’269 sets in, concerns over 
casualties increase, and electorates invariably demand attention on domestic 
issues.  In a common refrain, the impact of the media in such cases is a double 
edged sword. 
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Importantly, the above discussion is not to argue that the masses are 
incapable of reason – in fact, in some cases it might argued that they show far 
more reason that the political leadership – but rather just to reveal the varieties of 
the ways in which the collective emotions of the people can impact on war and 
how their influence can fluctuate according to prevailing conditions.  We need 
also to reemphasise the external aspect of the tendency in the sense that we are 
not concerned solely with the passions of the belligerent populations directly 
involved in war, but also the passions of others affected by or who react upon 
war, and who may crucially impact on outcomes through being entwined in the 
wider political web of war. 
Implications 
Emotion: all bad? 
Many of the examples discussed in this chapter have concentrated on the 
overwhelmingly nefarious types of emotion displayed in war, or that are at least 
considered disagreeable in everyday human relations.  These are indeed the types 
of emotions which Clausewitz emphasises in the trinity itself – violence, hatred, 
and enmity – and they reappear when this topic is brought up in other parts of the 
work.  Yet, as we have suggested, there are some indications that Clausewitz 
held a more balanced perspective with regard to the types of emotion that might 
impinge on war and affect its course in various respects. 
Clausewitz notes that, ‘In considering emotions that have been aroused 
by hostility and danger as being peculiar to war, we do not mean to exclude all 
others that accompany man throughout his life’ because in war, ‘a wide variety 
of passions, good and bad, will arise on all sides.  Envy and generosity, pride and 
humility, wrath and compassion – all may appear as effective forces in this great 
drama.’270  So, a more accurate conception of this tendency would perhaps view 
passion and emotion as neither something wholly good or bad.  Whilst emotion 
might certainly, as we have seen, be a potent destructive, murderous, or vengeful 
force that often causes war to rise to extremes and can be a major mainspring of 
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atrocities, brutality, and ferociousness, there is certainly another side to this 
tendency which is perhaps less obvious at first, but which can be an important 
element of war.   
Humans are, as Clausewitz noted in the quote above, of course capable of 
a wide variety of emotions which we could describe as good, righteous, 
commendable, or whatever else we might like to call them.  It might be thought 
that such emotions are likely to be absent in war, where fighting, fear, and death 
cause all to be pervaded by revenge, hate, and anger.  Yet a closer analysis 
reveals some interesting observations in the sense that war often displays the full 
panoply of human emotions.  Also, the discussion so far has concentrated more 
on the emotions apparent between belligerents, but a full consideration must 
account for the emotions within armed forces, where often quite different 
emotional forces rule, but that represent equally important influences on the 
course of events. 
Intense love for one’s comrades within armed forces is a prevalent feature 
of military history.  Often this might translate into soldiers wishing it had been 
them that died rather than their ‘buddies’, acts of astounding self-sacrifice (the 
image of the soldier diving on the grenade to save others), the way in which 
commanders often come to be seen as surrogate fathers (as Clausewitz 
experienced with respect to Scharnhorst), or the common military maxim to 
never leave a fallen comrade behind.  It is in this sense that Coker can claim that 
militaries, perhaps somewhat counterintuitively, have altruism at their heart.  He 
notes the intersubjective bonds of honour and respect that exist between warriors 
and the way they form a cohesive guild, sometimes even a fraternity; ‘to be 
esteemed by others is to know greater self-esteem as well.’271  Some of the most 
admirable and commendable emotions are revealed in this respect: courage, duty, 
loyalty, truthfulness, and community spirit.   
Also, a number of historical studies have revealed that in many wars there 
have developed far more complex relationships between combatants than may be 
imagined, and which go beyond simplistic assumptions of mutual hatred.  
Indeed, in many cases combatants deny feeling any particular animosity towards 
the enemy, going as far to even feel a certain measure of intimacy, respect, or 
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empathy based on a shared understanding of their common plight.272  So, as 
Coker states, ‘No one is more ruthless in war than Achilles, but no one is more 
aware that his enemies deserve respect.’273  Bourke quotes a telling passage from 
a  World War I soldier’s diary that reveals the tension between the differing 
emotions discussed here: 
 
On the one side you have all the signs of excessive hate and unbridled 
passion that shows the innate madness that still lurks in the human soul.  
On the other you have all the signs of unselfish devotion and kindliness 
of spirit, even towards the man you have just struck in your hate.274   
 
Famously, during that war, a curious phenomenon, was the ‘live and let 
live’ philosophy that developed in certain sectors of the trenches on the Western 
Front despite the overwhelming context of ‘kill or be killed.’  Soldiers came to 
agreements not to fire if the other side would also desist.  There were also 
widespread instances of fraternisation with the enemy, as famously embodied in 
the ‘Christmas myth.’  Another interesting fact that has emerged from the close 
study of a number of wars is the many instances of soldiers who never fired at 
the enemy, even in extreme circumstances, where their own lives would be in 
greater danger as a result.  Bourke quotes a Canadian military instructor who 
stated that, far from concerns about trigger-happiness, ‘The problem is not to 
stop fire, but to start it, and it is far better to have some excess of enthusiasm than 
the present lassitude.’275  Studies conducted during World War II revealed a high 
percentage – sometimes over 75% – of soldiers in combat units who, other than 
in the case of absolute necessity, simply would not fire at the enemy.  It is far 
from clear exactly what accounts for this phenomenon, but one cannot but 
suspect that basic emotions of pity, mercy, and humanity might play a part. 
Ambiguity 
It might be assumed that this tendency of passion and emotion should be 
understood unequivocally as a force pushing war to extremes.  Where it is 
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powerfully present, particularly as embodied in the people’s involvement in war, 
violent emotions can feed into a process of escalation.   We have seen how 
Clausewitz associated such forces with the ‘maximum use of force’, whereby the 
use of force by one side sets of a series of reciprocal actions in which the 
emotions cannot fail to be involved.  The hostile feelings generated – in the form 
of hatred, anger, and revenge – propel war towards its absolute manifestation.  
This association he derived from experience, as he had seen what a great 
difference resulted when, following the French Revolution, the passions of the 
people were powerfully injected into war.  Clausewitz’s discussion is certainly 
biased towards a conception which sees emotion in war as a generally 
intensifying and escalatory force.  The history of war would certainly support 
such a conception. 
Yet, this is not the complete picture in this regard.  Not only should this 
tendency not be conceived as entirely negative, but similarly it can also 
potentially constitute a limiting force on war itself, for instance as embodied in 
popular pressures to limit the violence in war, collateral damage,276 and even 
enemy military casualties.277  Also, popular sentiment may, far from constituting 
a force propelling states into war, be a powerful force restraining politicians from 
the resort to arms.  Anti-war and pacifist sentiment, driven principally by an 
emotional revulsion of war, grew exponentially during the course of the 
twentieth century, primarily following the experience of two enormously costly 
world wars and the prospect of the end of the human race in a third.  This was 
perhaps an aspect of war Clausewitz could not fully foresee given the conditions 
of his age and its prevailing social and cultural attitudes.  Although there have 
always been people passionately opposed to war throughout history, the 
historical norm has largely been one of acceptance of war as ‘part of the natural 
order of things’, even as a virtuous, commendable activity.278  The modern rise of 
anti-war feeling and its specific manifestation in relation to particular wars (as 
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witnessed in the case of the millions of people who came out to oppose the 2003 
War in Iraq on 15 February that year) represents an important factor of this 
tendency exercising a potentially limiting affect on the conduct of war. 
Strategically neutral 
Finally, as will have become clear throughout this chapter, for Clausewitz, from 
a subjective strategic perspective, emotional factors are not depicted in an 
especially negative or positive light: as he notes, for the attainment of some ends 
‘they will have to be stimulated rather than held back.’279  Whether emotions 
constitute a force to be exploited or a genie to be put back in the bottle will 
depend on conditions of the war and the specific objectives in view.   
In some instances passion may greatly aid progress toward objectives in 
the form of strengthened morale, vigorous hatred of the enemy, or the support of 
the people for the cause.  The fortitude, strength, and courage instilled in a force 
inspired by religious devotion or desperate fear might enable it to destroy an 
enemy twice its size.  In this sense, Achilles’ rage, noted above, perhaps did have 
military utility.280  Also, as we have seen, the positive emotions to be found in 
war can often constitute powerful factors promoting group cohesion, altruism, 
and self-sacrifice amongst comrades, all of which can enhance military 
effectiveness.   
Conversely, passion can be a highly detrimental force in war.  Excessive 
anger can lead to irrationalism and is almost impervious to control, as Stoics 
such as Seneca certainly believed.  Seneca considers whether anger might be 
advantageous to adopt because it ‘rouses and spurs on the mind.  Without it, 
courage can achieve nothing magnificent in war’, but concludes that such a 
course would be mistaken because ‘it is easier to exclude the forces of ruin than 
to govern them…for once they have established possession, they prove to be 
more powerful than their governor.’281   Also, emotion can contribute to the 
formulation of unrealistic policies or cause military objectives to be set for which 
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the means do not exist.  Emotional impulses can encourage the use of 
unrestrained force which may prove inimical to stated objectives, for instance in 
encouraging greater resistance from the enemy or by undermining popular 
support for a war.282  Sometimes the emotional moral indignation of terrorist 
groups, such as witnessed in the case of the Red Army Faction, leads them to 
commit the same type of crimes (if not on the same scale), as those they 
condemn.283 
Whilst Clausewitz would have sympathised with Seneca’s injunctions, he 
often stresses the need for a delicate balance of emotions, not their complete 
suppression.  This was particularly the case with his notion of genius, which he 
believed consisted of a mix of emotional qualities, tempered by a strong intellect, 
intuitive understanding, and presence of mind.284  This, in many respects, has 
more in common with Aristotle’s famous discussion of virtue being built upon 
the prudent balancing of emotions in relation to differing circumstances.  As 
Aristotle states in his Ethics: ‘The man who gets angry at the right things and 
with the right people, and also in the right way and at the right time and for the 
right length of time, is commended.’285  Also, Seneca quotes Aristotle as stating 
that ‘anger is needful; no fight can be won without it, without it filling the mind 
and kindling enthusiasm there.’286  This perhaps constitutes what we would today 
refer to as ‘emotional intelligence’: finding and maintaining the right balance 
between emotion and reason.287  In this sense, Clausewitz probably had more in 
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common with Aristotle than a Stoic such as Seneca, but he certainly would have 
sympathised with the latter’s warnings about the capacity for emotions such as 
rage and anger to ‘sweep us on with a force of their own and allow no turning 
back.’ 288  Clausewitz himself urged restraint towards the French following the 
battle of Waterloo. 
Also, for commanders in war, the intelligence required is not one simply 
of logical reason – ‘principles and opinions can seldom reduce the path of reason 
to a simple line’289 – but one of emotional empathy and judgement that is capable 
of reading the likely emotional reactions of the enemy, his own forces, and those 
of other important parties.  Emotion in war is thus something that is not only to 
be actively exploited or tamed, but also a force to be sensitively judged and 
perceived.  The use of force impacts not only on those directly caught up in war 
– the combatants themselves – but also on various external actors, all of whom 
may act so as to greatly transform the political or military landscape.  For 
instance, many conquerors have failed because they did not account for the 
intense emotional reaction of a people deprived of their liberty.  Judging the 
likely reaction of various ‘agglomerations of emotion’ is an inherently difficult 
and complex matter, but those who attempt to understand their power and the 
myriad ways they impact on war stand a much better chance of success.  These 
ideas might also relate to the individual soldier’s effectiveness.  In her book Stoic 
Warriors, Nancy Sherman advocates a ‘moderate and mild stoicism’ 290 
combining aspects of emotion and reason.  She warns about the debilitating 
effects of rage and anger against which the Stoics propose apatheia and fighting 
without anger,291 but Sherman also demonstrates how some forms of emotional 
anger should be cautiously embraced.292 
Thus, this tendency of the trinity is – as noted with regard to the concept 
of friction in Chapter 5 – not something about which commanders should 
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necessarily despair.  The impact of emotions on war is ever-present, but 
strategically ambivalent and context dependent.  The character and extent of their 
particular manifestations, whether in the political leadership, the fighting forces, 
or ‘the people’, will depend on prevailing conditions.  It is for the statesman, the 
commander, and the soldier – in their respective spheres of competency – to read 
those conditions and to, at the opportune moment, seek to tap, promote, shape, 
control, or suppress all the various expressions of hate, anger, revenge, 
compassion, ambition, envy, pity, and love that war’s human actors invariably 
display.  Passion and irrationality are certainly forces that cannot be ignored or 
wished away.   
Reflections 
This tendency has its roots in human nature, and as such is an inescapable feature 
of human activity, yet one that is particularly apt to be displayed to its full in the 
dramatic, heated, and intense context of war.  The use of force in human relations 
stirs emotions, the consequences of which can greatly impinge on the course of 
war.  Those emotions can be understood in both an individualistic and collective 
sense.  They are of a protean nature, capable of manifestation in many diverse 
forms, which history records in abundance.  Passion is not necessarily manifested 
as a malign force, nor one causing a rise to extremes at all times (as often as this 
may be the case).  Passion can equally be a force pushing against war, as 
embodied in powerful pacifist sentiment amongst sections of society today.  
Passion is a universal aspect of war, but is not necessarily always dominant.  
Also, the precise dynamics of passion may be hard to pin down, being as it is an 
intangible, largely ephemeral force.  Nevertheless, it is a very real element of 
war, particularly in its consequences, which are highly unpredictable and liable 
to violent fluctuations and intense expression. 
If passion is not simply the enemy of sensible policy in relation to war, it 
is certainly a force the effects of which policy cannot escape and that sometimes 
the latter is hard put to control, as Seneca so lucidly warned.  Those responsible 
for making policy must either seek to mitigate passion’s worst strategic effects, 
cultivate its beneficial aspects, or harness its potential violent energy in a 
controlled fashion.  Otherwise, hopeless missions will be launched, the bonds of 
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honour between both fellow soldiers and the enemy will wither, whilst the waves 
of hatred will sweep away the walls of sensible policy in a flood of massacre, 
savagery, and excess.       
That concludes our analysis of the three primary tendencies.  We are now 
in a position to provide a description of the trinitarian framework as whole, 
drawing together the analysis of the primary trinity with the secondary and 
contextual levels.  This holistic focus will be the subject of the following chapter. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN  
Interactions: The Trinity as a Unity 
 
 
There is a sequence about the creative process, and a work of genius is a synthesis of its 
individual features from which nothing can be subtracted without disaster.1 
Seneca 
 
Lo, single things inwoven, made to blend, 
To work in oneness with the whole…2 
Goethe 
 
 
The preceding chapters have examined the central elements of Clausewitz’s 
theory.  Now we have a clearer idea of the three separate primary elements that 
comprise the trinity, it is possible to consider how the trinity operates as a whole.  
This holistic perspective is crucial.  Each separate tendency of the trinity does not 
stand-alone and so, the previous three chapters, which have treated each 
tendency in isolation, are largely meaningless until they are brought together and 
their intended dynamic unity emphasised.  Certain valuable insights can be taken 
from an analysis of each, but only when the structure of the whole is understood 
does Clausewitz’s conception of the nature of war become clear.  Also, we must 
seek to understand how the primary tendencies relate, in theoretical terms, to the 
secondary trinity and war’s multiple contexts at the tertiary level.  These 
perspectives are crucial in order to provide a full description of the trinitarian 
framework; and one that can help lessen the potential for misinterpretation.  Not 
until the powerful play of contextual conditions – explored in Chapter 3 – are 
fully incorporated does its timelessness become clear.   
If the analysis of the separate tendencies appeared somewhat partial or 
incomplete this is to be expected.  Also, it should have become apparent 
throughout this study that it is almost impossible to discuss one element without 
simultaneously considering the others: the true meaning of each tendency only 
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fully emerges when the trinity is brought together in its intended dynamic unity.  
It is often the failure to comprehend the whole, in all its complexity, that 
constitutes a major source of mistaken representations of Clausewitz’s theory.  
This chapter seeks to elucidate the structure of the theory as a whole.  It begins 
by considering the key commonalties of the three primary level tendencies.  The 
chapter then moves on to explore the other levels of the trinity and to explain 
how these levels should be understood in relation to the whole framework.  
These levels have been touched on in previous chapters, but their conceptual 
place in the framework needs to be clarified.  Following this, we will consider 
how the trinity must be conceived of as an integrative unity; the dynamic 
interaction between the three tendencies is emphasised.  These points are then 
brought together by examining how modern scientific ideas of nonlinearity, 
complexity, and chaos provides powerful imagery that can significantly enhance 
our understanding of the operation of the trinity. 
Prominent themes of analysis at the primary level 
The analysis in the previous three chapters, regarding the separate primary 
tendencies of the trinity, reveals a number of central themes that can be said to 
characterise all three; by this we mean the common, generalisable attributes that 
pertain to each.  It is important to recap these central issues as a basis for 
understanding how the trinity operates as a whole.     
Unilateral and multilateral perspectives 
The trinity essentially presents a picture of war from the perspective of one actor, 
one ‘side’, perhaps even an alliance in war.  Thus, some have claimed that in 
order to gain a complete perspective of war we have to visualise what we might 
term a ‘clash of trinities’; essentially the idea being that we need to bring 
together the separate trinities of each belligerent group and analyse their 
interaction.  This approach is not without its merits, yet appears to be largely 
derived from conceptions of the trinity based at the secondary level (the 
people/army/government formula; which we will explore below) and fails to 
grasp the complexity inherent in the primary tendencies.  The apparent problem 
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arises because, of course, opposing belligerents cannot share a common 
leadership or armed forces, and they will relate primarily to their own distinct 
populations, although an elision in the latter case might occur during 
insurgencies whereby both sides attempt to secure the allegiance of the same 
populace.  Yet, when conceiving of the trinity from the primary level, as 
Clausewitz intended, it becomes clear that the interactive nature of war is already 
embodied in the trinity: a point that is not initially obvious.   
In the case of each tendency, the analysis does not make sense without 
the existence of an ‘other’.  In each, unilateral perspectives are embedded, and 
crucially dependent in terms of their meaning and fundamental propositions, on a 
multilateral reality (by which we mean two or more entities in conflict).  A 
purely unilateral perspective is certainly possible to a degree.  So, policy can be 
independently formulated based on the aims of the group irrespective of what or 
who stands in the way of achieving them.  Important elements of uncertainty and 
friction are generated internally3 or result from non-human external factors such 
as the weather.  Also genius, creativity, and the imaginative application of 
available means can be directed toward lifeless objects.  People can display 
violent emotions and passion not necessarily caused by or directed at someone or 
something else, and irrational thought and behaviour has internal origins.  Yet, 
all these tendencies do not properly relate to war, or attain the specific form 
which Clausewitz intends, unless an enemy exists and force is a feature of the 
interactive relationship between human groups. 
Policy is meaningless without consideration of the broader multilateral 
political context within which it is inextricably embedded, influenced by, and 
against which it reacts.  In Clausewitz’s work the two perspectives almost at 
times elide because he sees them as being so indissolubly interconnected.  The 
course of any war is importantly shaped, not only by what one or the other side 
hopes to achieve through force, but by the complex interplay, tensions, and 
contortions created by such political interaction.  Many of the most important 
aspects of chance and uncertainty derive from the interaction with other human 
social groups.  War, as Clausewitz stressed, is not action against a lifeless mass 
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or even against an unpredictable, yet controllable nature, but against a thinking, 
living, ‘alert and sentient opponent, who seeks constantly to foil our plans.’4  The 
difficulties of accurately assessing the enemy’s intentions and capabilities are 
exacerbated by the general unreliability of information and by the enemy’s 
efforts at deception and surprise, and the simple fact of unpredictable happenings 
when two independent forces interact in complex, conflictual conditions.  As 
Clausewitz notes, ‘the very nature of interaction is bound to make it 
unpredictable.’5  Arguably the most important source of passion in war derives 
from the interactive use of force whereby – as so powerfully evinced on the 
Eastern Front during World War II – hostility breeds hostility, fear of the other 
heightens group solidarity inflamed by propaganda and dehumanising depictions 
of the opponent, and this situation breeds a spiral of hate bolstered by the 
memory of fallen men and the real and perceived brutalities of the enemy.   
In these respects, all the tendencies draw upon, in differing but related 
ways, one of Clausewitz’s ontological foundations of the trinity: war’s 
interactive nature.  None of the unilateral elements of the trinity make sense 
without an ‘other’ against which they attain meaning.  The nature of war in the 
trinity is presented through the eyes of one actor, whilst simultaneously being 
embedded in and crucially dependent upon the inescapable context of interaction 
with other actors in conditions of violent conflict.  As Bassford notes, war ‘is 
never unilateral.  It is a contest between independent wills, in which skill and 
creativity are no more important than personality, chance, emotion, and the 
various dynamics that characterise any human interaction.’ 6   The trinity is 
unilateral to the extent that it provides an avenue into an understanding of war 
from the angle of one political entity.  The unilateral perspective is crucial for 
understanding war precisely because it is meaningless without being conceived 
of as being comprised of unitary actors who come together in a situation of 
conflicting interests.  Thus, while it may appear contradictory to describe the 
trinity as comprehensive given its unitary appearance, in actual fact, once its 
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dependence on a multilateral conception is understood, the apparent 
contradictions fall away. 
Ambiguity in relation to the rise to extremes 
Extremes in war can take many forms.  The Thirty Years War, the Napoleonic 
Wars, The Taiping Rebellion, and, in particular, the two World Wars would 
perhaps encapsulate what we would generally accept as real-world examples of 
wars that reached extremes – the designation of the latter two as ‘total wars’ 
reflects this understanding.  World War II claimed over 50 million lives, was 
fought over most of the globe, involved countless unspeakable horrors (such as 
the Holocaust and massacres of unarmed civilians), and saw the strategic 
bombing and destruction of entire cities, with the loss not only of thousands of 
people, but also great works of architecture, art, and not to mention written texts, 
including some of Clausewitz’s work. 7   Other than the imagined nuclear 
armageddon of a Third World War (after which, Einstein remarked, the Fourth 
will be waged with sticks and stones) there is no more obvious instance of the 
appalling extremes war can reach.   
Yet, we need to tread cautiously in our understanding of extremes, which 
to a considerable extent depends on our situation or the perspective from which 
we are observing a particular war.  Consider for instance the modern popular and 
misleading concept of ‘low-intensity warfare’ used to designate conflicts short of 
major state warfare.  As Mike Smith shows, such descriptions can be misleading, 
when for instance, the Vietnam War becomes subsumed under such a heading: ‘it 
would be interesting to ask an American combat veteran whether he thought he 
was involved in a ‘low-intensity war’?’8  Just how extreme a conflict may be can 
be highly subjective and even the search for objective means of measurement 
may prove misleading.  So, for instance, it is estimated that America dropped 
three times as many bombs on Vietnam than were dropped by all combatants 
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during World War II.9  Indeed, Clausewitz’s conception of extremes appears to 
have less to do with magnitude, scale, or statistics – although these may be 
inevitable consequences of extremes – and more to do with the character of the 
dynamics of the fighting.  
Clausewitz – believing he had witnessed, in the Napoleonic campaigns, 
war which had ‘attained the absolute in violence’ – was keen to explain how 
extremes in war could be explained, as well as why in other wars they were not 
always reached.  His description of the rise to extremes in Book 1, Chapter 1  is 
an abstract discussion which is part of a dialectical argument.  Clausewitz 
concludes that whether a rise to extremes actually occurs can only be determined 
by war in reality, embedded in its real political, social, and physical contexts: it 
never simply follows the necessity of logical thought processes.  This perspective 
is presented in the trinity, and, as it stands, is entirely ambiguous in relation to 
the rise to extremes.  None of the three tendencies represent forces which if 
prevalent in a particular war will necessarily cause an escalation – they are a 
priori theoretically ambiguous in this respect.  They all can lead to extremes, but 
equally they may exert countervailing and limiting forces.  At the end of each of 
the preceding three chapters we noted the various ways in which this might 
occur, therefore we will not repeat the matter here. 
Not only are the three tendencies individually ambiguous in this sense, 
but the extent to which they constitute one or the other is dependent on a host of 
contextual factors which shape their manifestation in any particular situation.  
Perhaps, given the weight of history, certain tendencies tend to gravitate more 
towards extremes – in particular, we might conclude that forces of passion and 
irrationality are generally more prone than others to cause extremes – but, 
nevertheless all are conditional and dependent on the particular case.  We will 
generally observe great tension, both between and within the tendencies: some 
forces push war towards extremes, other exert a restraining influence.  To 
acknowledge that each can, in certain ways, pull war away from extremes is 
enough to suggest the ambiguity of each and so, of the trinity as a whole.  The 
trinity might usefully be conceived of as a ‘vehicle’, the direction of which is by 
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no means preordained and can only be understood once the specific driver is in 
and moving. 
Strategically neutral 
From a more subjective perspective, a close analysis of the elements of the trinity 
reveals their essentially neutral quality in subjective strategic terms.  At first 
glance, for instance, it may appear that the tendency of chance and uncertainty – 
embodying as it does such concepts as friction and the fog of war – exerts an 
unambiguously negative and debilitating effect on strategic performance.  This 
would be a mistaken conclusion.  Whilst Clausewitz certainly wanted to reveal 
how, objectively, certain factors serve to impede all aspects of military activity 
(like movement in a resistant element), the strategic perspective reveals a 
different story.  Precisely because friction and uncertainty are common to all 
belligerents, great advantages can accrue to those who are able to mitigate its 
worst effects – through inspired leadership, effective intelligence collection, the 
employment of new technologies, combat experience, courage, and high morale 
– and exacerbate it for the enemy – through surprise, deception, and 
misinformation.  From the strategic perspective, the realm of chance and 
uncertainty is one of great opportunity, which people of great capability, 
creativity, and talent can exploit through bold acts, daring stratagems, or 
considered restraint. 
Likewise, policy does not necessarily exert a positive or negative effect in 
terms of strategic performance.  As in any purpose/means relationship, the 
purpose can exert a deleterious affect on achieving rational outcomes.10  The fact 
that Clausewitz believed war should be subject to control by policy, was not to 
say that policy is always wise or a positive strategic force.  For instance, policy 
can be unclear, make unrealistic demands on the military, or the policy itself may 
be mistaken.11  Political interests may impinge on military decision-making, the 
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formulation of appropriate peacetime defence priorities, or the interpretation of 
intelligence, all of which may be inimical to strategic success.  A common recent 
concern, linked to the possibilities created by new technologies, has been 
excessive and damaging political interference in military operations: the problem 
of the ‘long screwdriver’.12  On the other hand, sensible and reasoned policy can 
have a hugely positive impact on strategic effectiveness – in particular, clear 
objectives provide the military with a firm idea of the kind of military operations 
they need to undertake.  In some cases, policy may have to restrain the military 
instrument to prevent an escalation of force which would be strategically 
damaging. 
Lastly, passion is also neutral in its strategic implications.  On the one 
hand, it can lead to wholly unrealistic polices or operations driven by excessive 
ambition, blinding religious conviction, or burning vengeance.  Moral 
indignation and compassion might encourage humanitarian interventions which 
make little strategic sense.13  Emotion can encourage the prospect of hope in 
military situations where there is next to none.  Passion can cause the overuse of 
force where the levels of civilian casualties or subsequent brutalities might turn 
important sections of opinion against the war.  Hatred can blind decision-makers 
to strategic realities, and cause means to come detached from original political 
ends.   But, as Clausewitz knew, such passions could be a most effective strategic 
asset if managed, channelled, and exploited effectively by commanders or 
political leaders.  Also, he drew attention to other noble and positive emotions 
apparent in war, that serve to create bonds of comradeship amongst soldiers and 
engender heightened displays of altruism and self-sacrifice.  Such cohesive 
forces within armed forces can greatly contribute to fighting effectiveness and 
ultimate strategic success, when so much in war, as Clausewitz stressed, is 
dependent on such psychological factors.   
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Context and implications at the secondary level 
Although Clausewitz never employed the terms ‘secondary’ or ‘subjective’ in 
relation to the trinity they are useful ways of considering the level at which the 
primary trinity – politics, chance, and passion – is embodied or expressed in real-
world actors or ‘subjects’.  Jan Angstrom usefully describes the secondary level 
as the ‘operationalisation’14  of the primary trinity.  The subjects Clausewitz 
identifies are, respectively, the government, the people, and the commander and 
his army.  It is quite clear from the text that Clausewitz utilises this secondary 
trinity as an illustrative device to instantiate the more ephemeral forces he 
describes in the primary trinity through examples that would have made sense to 
his contemporaries and perhaps still do to us.15   Perhaps paradoxically, this 
attempt at clarification through illustration has contributed to a great deal of 
misunderstanding; yet this is misunderstanding derived from a failure to read 
Clausewitz carefully.  Some modern commentators have sought to couple each 
tendency too rigidly to each of these social groups or simply ignore the primary 
trinity altogether.  While, for instance, Angstrom is right to point out that his 
secondary trinity ‘was clearly influenced by the political and military context in 
which Clausewitz lived’16 this need not prevent us from seeking a more flexible 
interpretation, and certainly one that is not confined to the modern state. 
 A more flexible interpretation is facilitated by firmly recognising the 
place and role of context in the trinitarian framework.  In Chapter 3 we argued 
that this ‘hidden’ level of the trinity is continually acting upon and within the 
social actors that conduct war (at the secondary level).  As the various conditions 
within which war is fought change over time, actors who engage in war will 
inevitably be shaped by the prevailing circumstances which they themselves 
partly constitute.  So, for instance, the cultural dimension of context will shape a 
group’s leadership form and its policy goals, the character of its fighting forces 
and the creative means it employs in pursuit of those goals, and the attributes of 
the population and the way it responds to developments prior to and during war.  
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Emphasising the importance of context was Clausewitz’s central means of 
overcoming the apparent dichotomy between the universal and particular, change 
and continuity in war.  When we acknowledge the ever-present influence of 
context we see how there is a constant dialogue up and down the three levels of 
the trinity.  The primary level of the trinity distils those timeless elements of war 
which are manifested in a multitude of disparate and varied actors throughout 
history.  Those actors conduct their own particular character and form of war 
(secondary level) moulded by changing social, cultural, political, technological, 
geographical, and economic conditions (tertiary, contextual level).  It is a 
framework that reveals the universals in war – elements that always pertain to the 
phenomenon – whilst allowing for great and permanent change. 
The trinity and the state 
In an important article written in 1995 Christopher Bassford and Edward 
Villacres made clear how a number of studies had employed the ‘trinity’ in an 
incorrect sense.  As they noted, the proclivity to mistakenly describe the 
Clausewitzian trinity as comprised of the government, the military, and the 
people was evident in the work of commentators both supportive and critical of 
Clausewitz’s ideas.17  Unfortunately, there has been no let-up in such studies 
adopting the government-military-people construct and presenting it as the 
essence of Clausewitz’s trinity.  This particular representation of the secondary 
level is indeed a theoretical trinity, and one that can be of great value, but it is not 
ultimately a Clausewitzian trinity. 
The apparent source of such interpretations appears to have been the 
highly influential book written by Harry Summers in 1982, which was a lucid 
and penetrating critique of the American Army’s experience in Vietnam. 18  
Summers’s analysis benefited greatly from his use of the government-military-
people distinctions as it allowed him to explore some of the important ways in 
which relations between these social entities broke down during the war.  
Summers’s work presented a conception of the trinity that was tied to the modern 
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state and its prominent social institutions, and this conception caught on in 
popular interpretations of the trinity.  In particular, when Creveld and Keegan 
embarked on their extensive critiques of Clausewitz’s ideas, they did so almost 
solely on the basis of a derivative conception of the trinity confined to the 
secondary level and, again, to the modern state. 
Similarly, these were highly influential books that caught the imagination 
of many at the time and further consolidated the view that the secondary, people-
army-government trinity represented the Clausewitzian trinity.  Creveld’s 
observations on the apparent demise of the state and the rise of forms of war in 
which the distinction between, for instance, the people and the military became 
almost meaningless appeared to be supported by events in the early 1990s, and 
thus lent his analysis credibility and with it his rejection of Clausewitz.  This 
argument that Clausewitz is historically limited because, both in the past and 
increasingly today, war was not sociologically delineated according to 
recognisable bodies of government, military, and people betrays these authors’ 
reliance on the secondary trinity, but also overstates the extent to which these 
divisions pertained in Clausewitz’s time and the emphasis he placed on them in 
his theory.  Whether Creveld was right to announce the imminent demise of the 
state19 is an argument we will consider below, but it is sufficient to note that 
these studies influenced further generations of scholars who adopted this 
portrayal of Clausewitz’s trinity.  
Thus, for many, On War became synonymous with old forms of state war 
and, so, as internecine, non-state warfare became seemingly more prevalent after 
1989 this entailed that Clausewitz had to be discarded and new approaches 
unveiled.  So Kaldor could state that, ‘As the centralized, territorialized modern 
state gives way to new types of polity emerging out of new global processes, so 
war, as we presently conceived it [through Clausewitz], is becoming an 
anachronism.’20  Much of the analysis contained in such works is of great value 
for students attempting to come to grips with the complexity of modern conflicts, 
but the interpretations of Clausewitz on which they proceed are at best, shaky, 
and at worst, wholly inaccurate.  Instead of returning to and exploring the 
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implications of the primary trinity itself, they appear to base their interpretations 
on the secondary trinity alone which significantly denies the flexibility, wider 
applicability, and relevance of Clausewitz’s theory. 
When Clausewitz wrote On War he no doubt had the modern state and its 
wars at the forefront of his mind and this was to be expected: one of the most 
noticeable features of the history of the few centuries prior to Clausewitz’s era 
was the unstoppable rise and consolidation of the modern state – primarily 
through its war-making capability – as the pre-eminent form of social 
organisation, particularly in Europe.21  But, Clausewitz’s conception of war is far 
more flexible than some commentators presume and can comfortably 
accommodate political entities other than the state.  Kaldor is mistaken to 
confidently assert that Clausewitz’s definition ‘implied that ‘we’ and ‘our 
opponent’ were states, and the ‘will’ of one state could be clearly defined.  Hence 
war…is war between states for a definable political end, i.e. state interest.’22  As 
Echevarria notes, ‘his example of the Tartar tribes illustrates the case for 
nonstates, and puts paid to the mistaken notion that Clausewitz thought only in 
terms of the nationstate model.’ 23   The central point here is that political 
relationships between organised armed groups do not suddenly cease because the 
state is not involved.  It is surely mistaken to claim that contests over relative 
power between self-interested groups disappears when the state is not at the 
centre of the confrontation.  Even a prominent critic of Clausewitz accepts that 
the trinity is ‘easily adaptable to forms of warring social organizations that do not 
form states.’24 
Yet, regardless of the fact that critics were aiming at an illusory target, we 
might well question just how limited the state conception actually is.  The 
dominant and principal agent in world politics today is the state and we might 
well argue that prognostications of the demise of the state are perhaps far too 
hasty.  It appears that, as Isabelle Duyvesteyn has convincingly argued (despite 
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weaknesses in her own interpretation of Clausewitz),25 commentators such as 
Kaldor and Creveld have adopted somewhat mistaken perspectives on some of 
the conflicts which emerged during the 1990s.  Whilst they are certainly correct 
to note the modern prevalence of intra-state conflict, Duyvesteyn’s analysis – 
focusing primarily on African conflicts – has revealed that most of those wars 
(often taken as evidence of the demise of the state) were actually more often than 
not explicitly about the state: belligerents fought in order to wrest control of the 
state.26  Also, as McInnes has noted, Creveld’s belief that interstate conflicts are 
in decline is mistaken given that historically they have been rare events, whilst 
their ratio in relation to intrastate wars has been relatively stable for some time 
preceding the end of the Cold War.27   Nevertheless, again, the trinity is not 
dependent on the state perspective, although this is perhaps its most potent 
manifestation.  As Gray remarks, ‘Recognizable ‘war’ predated, and will 
postdate, the modern states’ system.’28 
Secondary level analogues 
So, the association of the trinity with the modern state was derived largely from a 
misreading of the secondary level in terms of both its purpose and its place in 
Clausewitz’s theory (regardless of whether this misreading was wilful or 
otherwise).  A theory which focuses on the government, army, and people is 
naturally associated with the state, and precludes examination of many other 
forms of conflict.  Three central arguments need to be presented in response to 
this mistaken conception.  In a broad sense, as we have argued, Clausewitz was 
aware of wars that were not fought by modern states.  Second, the secondary 
trinity as an illustrative device should not be confused with the central primary 
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trinity.  Third, accepting these two arguments, it is not difficult to conceive of 
‘analogues’ of the three secondary subjects.  We will focus on the third of these 
points here. 
Whatever the complexity of any war, analogues of the secondary trinity 
will be apparent in some shape or form, even if its precise character is difficult to 
determine: reality is often undeniably messy and complex.  Sometimes, however, 
the dileneations may be fairly clear (for instance war between distinct political 
entities such as modern states, with government decision-making executives and 
professional armed forces clearly separated from the wider population).  In such 
cases, the people, army, government construct may be perfectly applicable (with 
qualification, as rarely are the distinctions so neat, even in Clausewitz’s day: 
consider, for instance, the blurring of the people and army in the Spanish War).  
The secondary subjective trinity can appear greatly differentiated and adopt 
many potential forms, but war cannot make sense without some grasp of the 
basic groups that conduct it or impact upon its course.   
Bassford has convincingly argued that the use of more inclusive terms 
might help avoid misinterpretations.  He suggests a more appropriate term for the 
‘government’ might be ‘leadership’; ‘fighters’ might usefully replace 
‘commander and army’; and ‘popular base’ can substitute for ‘the people’.29  
Gow alternatively suggests ‘political leadership, armed force and political 
community.’30  (The precise terms we use to emphasise the inclusivity of these 
groups is not a matter of great concern).  This approach is to be welcomed as it is 
likely that analogues of these three broad groups will be evident in most 
instances of armed conflict.  As Honig states, ‘Any community will have its 
leaders, fighters and common people.’31  Even terrorist groups generally have a 
designated leadership responsible for setting the political direction of the group, 
they have designated operatives for conducting attacks (often led by operational 
commanders), whilst the group recruits from and attempts to influence certain 
segments of society (however small).  Proceeding from the primary definitions 
we should seek to identify those sections of society most associated with the 
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types of forces being described in the particular case.  Most importantly, we 
simply want to stress that the secondary level does not present a rigid or fixed 
sociological description of war in reality: as war’s contexts change, so too will it.  
Clausewitz’s conception of war’s subordination to policy, for instance, is 
applicable to any form of political entity which establishes goals and possesses 
the means to employ violence to attain its ends. 
‘Mainly’ – translation between the primary and secondary levels 
Aside from problems stemming from the rigid sociological state-centric 
conception of the trinity, another connected problem at the secondary level 
relates to the way in which the primary tendencies translate or correspond to the 
secondary level.  In the previous three chapters we analysed each tendency of the 
primary trinity, and in doing so we revealed the way in which the fundamental 
forces described cross many of the institutional boundaries illustrated by 
Clausewitz at the secondary subjective level.  This has often been overlooked 
and rather a strict correlation proposed.  So, for instance, passion is associated 
solely with the people (or its analogue).  Misinterpretation of this point has 
stemmed from a too literal reading of the second paragraph of the trinity, whilst 
ignoring the enormous implications of one word in the second paragraph of 
Section 28: ‘mainly’ or ‘mostly’ (depending on the translation used).  Clausewitz 
states – in relation to the primary tendencies of passion, chance and politics – 
that, ‘The first of these three aspects mainly concerns the people; the second the 
commander and his army; the third the government.’32  We therefore need to 
break out of these mental confines in order to understand the continued relevance 
and value of the concept in our comprehension of war.   
Again, this does not mean that the people, army, government formula will 
no longer apply in certain circumstances – indeed, it may often be highly 
applicable – but rather our conception of the trinity at the secondary level must 
be highly inclusive and subservient to the primary meaning and the 
circumstances of the particular events being studied.  If we determine that the 
‘people, army, government’ formula is relevant or correct in a concrete case, that 
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should only be because our analysis of a particular war revealed the primary 
tendencies of the trinity operating along the lines of such social distinctions (as 
Clausewitz concluded they broadly did in his day).   
How the trinity should be understood in this respect is made clear by 
Bassford and Villacres when they state that the secondary delineations should not 
be viewed as fixed attributes because ‘each of the three [primary] 
categories…affects all of these human actors to some quite variable extent.’33  As 
Clausewitz stressed, the trinity morphs in its subjective manifestation in different 
times and places because war is ‘more than a true chameleon that slightly adapts 
its characteristics to the given case.’34  Let us briefly return to the elements of the 
primary trinity to remind ourselves of how they can cross the sociological 
divides of people, army, and government (or their more inclusive analogues). 
Clausewitz associated the primary tendency of war’s subordination to 
policy mainly with the secondary social actor of the government.  This was for 
him a quite natural association and certainly still makes sense today, yet it is not 
difficult to conceive of a more inclusive conception of the types of actors this 
tendency relates to.  Simply associating the primary tendency of policy with the 
single social entity of the government (or leadership) is patently insufficient, if 
perhaps entirely appropriate in some cases.  In a way not fully apparent to 
Clausewitz, the spread of democratisation during the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries has greatly expanded the role of the people in policy formulation, both 
in directly shaping it and as a factor governments must account for in decisions 
over the use of force.  We should also note the important role the military often 
plays in shaping policy choices, sometimes actually usurping the reigns of 
power.35  Also, the extent to which this tendency relates to other actors in war is 
revealed when one fully grasps the importance of the conception of war as a 
continuation of politics, as emphasised in Chapter 4.  All actions in war (even at 
the lowest levels) have the potential to impact on political power dynamics in 
their various forms (consider, for instance, the massive political fallout from Abu 
Ghraib resulting from the actions of individual soldiers; even if they took place 
in an overarching context whereby senior members of the administration, such as 
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the Attorney General Gonzalez, believed the new ‘war on terror’ meant some of 
the provisions of the Geneva Conventions were ‘rendered quaint’).36  The idea of 
individual soldiers being invested with considerable potential political 
importance is conveyed in the notion of the ‘strategic corporal’ which has 
emerged in recent years.37 
In many respects it is was quite right for Clausewitz to associate chance, 
uncertainty, and genius most closely with the military sphere of the commander 
and his army.  However, it is clear that the relevance of this tendency at the 
secondary level pertains significantly to other social groups.  Clausewitz 
emphasises the idea that uncertainty is a major consequence of the nature of 
politics: ‘In making war, policy evades all rigorous conclusions proceeding from 
the nature of war, bothers little about ultimate possibilities, and concerns itself 
only with immediate probabilities.  Although this introduces a high degree of 
uncertainty into the whole business, turning it into a kind of game, each 
government is confident that it can outdo its opponent in skill and acumen.’38   
This point is made by Booth who states that, ‘political behaviour is such a 
contingent activity that prediction can never be a science.’39   For Clausewitz, 
war as an act of policy is in many respects a chance undertaking, something of a 
gamble beyond the bounds of purely rational control in which natural judgement 
and intuition are more appropriate than logical reason.  Also, from an objective 
perspective, the multilateral political context is one of the prime causes of the 
unpredictability of war: the consequence of the dynamic interaction of 
independent political units, each with their own variable objectives. 
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That a broader conception of this tendency at the secondary level of the 
trinity is required is evident when one considers the multidimensional and 
complex character of the modern battlespace, where overcoming chance and the 
use of creative talent is increasingly the preserve of actors other than simply the 
commander and his army.  A wide array of organisations, NGOs, aid agencies, 
reconstruction teams, diplomats, and so on, all have a vital part to play in shaping 
political and military outcomes during and after conflict.40  This is particularly 
the case in so-called ‘people’s wars’, insurgencies, humanitarian interventions, 
and post-conflict reconstruction operations, in which securing the support and 
allegiance of populations to the legitimate state authority is often more crucial 
than purely ‘kinetic’ military operations against the enemy. 
In his description of the trinity Clausewitz states that passion ‘mainly 
concerns the people’ because ‘the passions that are to be kindled in war must 
already be inherent in the people.’41  As demonstrated extensively in Chapter 6, 
this association masks the extent to which the military and the political 
leadership are implicated in this tendency’s meaning.  Those responsible for 
formulating policy are as susceptible to being motivated by driving ambition, 
religious dogmatism, or ideological fanaticism.  Military commanders, soldiers, 
and combatants of all descriptions are wont to be swept away in the heat of battle 
by feelings of fear, revenge, anger, and hatred.  Yet, also the powerful, altruistic 
emotional bonds formed between comrades on the battlefield are a notable 
feature of most military institutions through history.  
The essential point of this section has been to reveal that the forces in the 
primary trinity operate regardless of the character of belligerents.  Their 
manifestation will vary greatly at the secondary level, but their essence, their 
spirit, will remain the same.  Their embodiment will generally translate into the 
form of analogues of the Clausewitzian secondary trinity (political leadership, 
fighting forces, and people) but allowing for great differences in actual form in 
different cases.  Also, again, the primary forces cross the divides of these 
dileneations.   So, for instance, a small terrorist cell (with no clear sociological 
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divisions between leadership, fighters, or people) would be just a susceptible to 
all the primary forces.  A similar point applies to leaders who combine both 
political and military roles, such as Alexander, Frederick the Great, or Napoleon.  
It is for analysts and strategists to correctly identify the character and dynamics 
of the social institutions engaged in war at any one time and to contemplate how 
the elements of policy, chance, and passion express themselves in the particular 
case.  Clausewitz simply provided us with the framework to begin such an 
analysis.  Open interpretations, mindful of the emphasis placed on contextual 
factors, can comfortably accommodate the vast range of groups that have 
conducted war throughout the ages. 
The trinity as an integrative and dynamic unity 
As Paret states, Clausewitz believed that ‘war was an activity in which each 
aspect influences and is influenced by others, and this interrelationship extended 
to the social and political matrix of war.’42  In Chapter 5, Book 2 Clausewitz 
states that ‘in war, as in life generally, all parts of a whole are interconnected.’43  
The trinity is intended to reflect precisely this idea.  The trinity is a unity and 
therefore must be comprehended as such.  Importantly, this does not mean that 
the trinity is simply a combination of three elements placed side by side.  The 
whole is not simply the representation of three important aspects of war viewed 
together or simultaneously.  The theory is more complex than this and reflects 
the incredible complexity of war in reality: no such neat divisions of the 
phenomenon would suffice.   
It might be assumed from a basic presentation of the trinity that 
Clausewitz viewed war as a straightforward, ordered, and structured activity; the 
three prominent elements of which can neatly be assessed independently.  This 
interpretation is only further encouraged by a mistaken concentration on the 
secondary elements of the trinity (people, army, and government) which suggests 
war displays a clear sociological division and that the relationships between these 
groups forms the basis for analysis of war’s nature.  This, as Alan Beyerchen has 
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demonstrated would be a misleading reading of the trinity because ‘the drive to 
comprehend the world through analysis, the effort to partition off pieces of the 
universe to make them amenable to study, opens the possibility of being blind-
sided by the very artificiality of the partitioning practice.’44  Clausewitz certainly 
partitioned reality this way in his trinity, but importantly he wanted to stress that 
this was an artificial exercise and, as explained in the paragraphs following the 
substantive description of the trinity, one that masks incredible variation, 
interconnectedness, and dynamism in reality.   
A deeper exploration certainly reveals that the tendencies cannot be 
isolated in any neat manner – the boundaries between them are indistinct.  
Rather, central to Clausewitz’s conception was the idea that ‘the nature of war is 
complex and changeable.’45  As Strachan has noted in his ‘biography’ of On 
War, ‘Unlike many of the other triads which litter On War…this trinity really is 
three elements united into one.’ 46   The importance of a theory capable of 
portraying this idea is evident in Clausewitz’s early notes, such as in his preface 
to an early theoretical treatise written between 1816 and 1818, which states that 
his aim is to ‘investigate the essence of the phenomena of war and to indicate the 
links between these phenomena and the nature of their component parts.’47  In 
the same piece, and at around the time when Clausewitz began to write what 
would become On War, Clausewitz expressed this desire for a unifying theory 
(written in the third person):  
 
Years of thinking about war, much association with able men who knew 
war, and a good deal of personal experience with it, have left certain 
ideas and convictions, and these he has preferred to present in 
compressed form, like small nuggets of pure metal…Perhaps a greater 
mind will soon appear to replace the individual nuggets with a single 
whole, cast of solid metal, free from all impurity.48     
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Absent any other ‘greater mind’ it was left to Clausewitz himself to 
attempt such a grand theoretical amalgam.  The same desire is stated at the outset 
of On War: ‘I propose to consider first the various elements of the subject, next 
its various parts or sections, and finally the whole in its internal structure.’49  
That whole is represented in the trinity, and there are a number of vital points 
that need to be explained in order to comprehend the trinity holistically, as a 
unity, as an integrative and complete concept. 
The idea of the search for the unity of phenomena is clearly evident in the 
culture of the German Movement.  Its philosophical embodiment – that of 
German Idealism – was a powerful and dominant force at the time Clausewitz 
thought and wrote, having being established by Fichte and Schelling, based upon 
the Kantian agenda, and elaborated by Schiller, and consolidated in the work of 
that ‘most powerful of the German idealists,’50  Hegel.  As we have seen in 
Chapter 2, the idealists emphasised the ‘integrative interrelation of all 
phenomena.’51  Karl Ameriks describes how the idealists held that philosophy 
should be a deeply unified and autonomous enterprise, which ambitiously seeks 
to identify the structures that allow for a general and systematic account of ‘how 
all experience, history, and nature hang together.’52  Common to most idealist 
thinkers – in particular Fichte and Hegel – was  a dialectical mode of reasoning, 
employed to transcend apparent contradictions and arrive at ‘synthesis’, based on 
the notion that through overcoming the oppositions inherent in concepts we can 
ascend to a more accurate understanding of reality.  The trinity, although not 
strictly Hegelian, can be seen as the theoretical means of expressing the unity of 
the phenomenon of war – Clausewitz’s ‘final synthesis’ – which he arrived at 
after conducting an extensive dialectical consideration of its central components.  
As Gat notes, whilst many of the ideas were in place to affect the resolution of 
the various inconsistencies in his theory, it was not until 1827, and the height of 
Hegel’s influence in Berlin, that Clausewitz truly realised how best to proceed.  
Following idealist philosophy, in which all ‘contradictions of reality were 
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actually but differing aspects of a single whole’53 he was able to expose war in its 
totality. 
Importantly, all three aspects of the trinity serve to help define the others.  
None of them exist independently and all are in continual tension and interaction 
with one another: no single tendency has full meaning apart from the others and 
no one tendency can be excluded at any point in time.  As Clausewitz states, a 
theory which attempted to ‘fix an arbitrary relationship between them would 
conflict with reality to such an extent that for this reason alone it would be totally 
useless.’54  Their relationship to one another is by no means static, rather their 
relationship is one of dynamic interaction and variation over time.  The extent to 
which any one tendency is manifest at any one time can vary greatly, but none 
are ever completely absent.   
It is vital to stress this point in relation to secondary trinity.  Even if we 
conclude that in a certain war, the people are almost completely absent (as has 
been argued was largely the case in the ‘cabinet wars’ of the eighteenth century), 
this does not imply that passion and emotion will be too.  This is because, as 
explained above, the primary tendencies are not exclusive to the groups with 
which Clausewitz ‘mainly’ identified them.  Passion will be observable in both 
the leadership and the military in various ways and to varying extents.  This is 
little more than a common-sense observation, but one that is apparently denied 
by commentators who adhere to rigid, parochial, and unrealistic interpretations of 
Clausewitz. 
So, each tendency serves in some ways to define the limits of the others.  
For instance, policy, as representative of rational and goal-directed behaviour in 
war, cannot be understood alone: war is also pervaded by great chance, 
uncertainty, unpredictability, and friction, whilst inescapable primary emotions 
impact on behaviour.  In this way, whilst still an important element of war, the 
limits of rationality are exposed by accepting the simultaneous play of such 
forces.  In this respect, policy is hard put to maintain its control over its 
instrument because effectively linking means and ends is hampered by the play 
of chance events, uncertainty derived from psychological effects, and the 
intervention of blinding passion in the heat of conflict.  Equally, however, the 
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tendencies are not necessarily always in competition with one another, but can be 
mutually supportive or beneficially intertwined.  So, effective policy may be 
supported by empathetic understanding, creative imagination, or intuitive 
judgement, combat effectiveness enhanced by rage and anger, and military 
genius composed of a subtle blend of intellect and temperament.  This holistic 
perspective of course gives the lie to characterisations of Clausewitz as a ‘pure 
rationalist’ and underlines the importance of understanding On War first and 
foremost through the trinity, for it is the only point at which all his central ideas 
find their true force as a complex unity.  No idea (not even his famous dictum 
‘war is nothing but a continuation of politics’) can be understood entirely 
independently or as independently superior. 
So, we need to understand the inner workings, and characteristics of the 
interaction between the three separate elements and emphasise the way in which 
they can have varying levels of influence in different wars to the extent that 
certain tendencies almost, at times, efface the others.  From one war to the next, 
and within the same war, the individual tendencies will vary in their relative 
influence and importance.  For instance, at times, political factors will be to the 
fore, whilst passion is less apparent, or at other times the chance and uncertainty 
of the military encounter suffused with myriad emotions will dominate, while the 
influence of policy is seemingly effaced.  In some cases, all three may be 
strongly apparent.  The point is to stress the infinite possibilities involved.  This 
dynamic variable interplay determines the specific characteristics of any war and 
helps us explain why certain wars appear to display varying magnitudes of the 
individual tendencies.  As Bassford has pointed out the trinity conveys 
dynamism not balance or equilibrium.55   The tendencies are in a continuous 
fluctuating, unstable, and shifting relationship and, ‘No one of these three 
elements is continually dominant, not even policy.’56  As Echevarria puts it, none 
of the tendencies ‘are a priori more influential in determining the shape and 
course of actual conflict than any other.’57 
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Imagining the trinity –  nonlinearity, complexity, and chaos 
Drawing together these strands of analysis it is useful to draw upon the insights 
and imagery of modern scientific nonlinearity and complexity theory in order to 
express the nature of the operation of war as encapsulated in the trinity.  This is a 
perspective that has been encouraged principally by Alan Beyerchen, who has 
stressed the importance of metaphor for understanding the concepts Clausewitz 
employs.  He describes the trinity as a ‘striking metaphor of nonlinearity’58 and 
as Christopher Bassford notes, the trinity is a ‘classic model of Chaos, in the 
modern scientific sense.’ 59   So what ideas does the science of nonlinearity 
convey?   
Essentially,  it relates to complex, interactive, and open systems, 
constitutive of many interacting variables, rather than of selective or simplistic 
relationships between a handful.  Such systems display nonrecurring patterns of 
behaviour, and which are highly sensitive to the tiniest alterations in initial 
conditions.  Slight changes in some variables can have wholly disproportionate 
effects leading to radically divergent outcomes.  The overall result is a system 
typified by unpredictability, randomness, and complexity. 
The trinity in its basic form – perhaps reduced to such memorable 
formulas as ‘politics, chance, and passion’ – can be extremely misleading for the 
student of war.  We have already noted some of the reasons for this, such as the 
fact that each single tendency carries within it the weight of a great deal of 
theorising, detailed analysis, and subsidiary concepts.  Moreover, the image of 
the trinity provided by Clausewitz is ‘not one of any kind of Euclidean triangle 
or triad, despite its understanding as such by many readers’60 and as misleadingly 
presented by a number of commentators.61  This is precisely where the imagery 
provided by contemporary science of nonlinearity can be of value.   It presents us 
with means of grasping the intended dynamism of the relationship between the 
tendencies and of the operation of the trinity as a whole.   
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Immediately after presenting the substantive content of the trinity, 
Clausewitz notes that (in Bassford’s translation) the ‘task, therefore, is to keep 
our theory [of war] floating among these three tendencies, as among three points 
of attraction.’62  As Beyerchen explains, ‘when a magnet is released over three 
equidistant and equally powerful magnets, it moves irresolutely to and fro as it 
darts among the competing points of attraction.’63  It is in this manner that war 
will chart a complex and unpredictable course amongst these three ‘points of 
attraction.’  Even though we may be able to anticipate the ‘overall kind of 
pattern’, any sort of ‘quantitative predictability of the actual trajectory’ of any 
war is impossible because even infinitely small variations in initial conditions 
can cause a ‘significantly different pattern.’  War cannot be isolated from all 
possible influences (like the magnet can’t be isolated from the friction of the 
mounts and air).  It is an open system sensitive to differences in initial conditions 
and external influences, which will affect the course the magnet charts between 
the various tendencies.64 
This analogy with the non-linear phenomenon of the magnet certainly 
captures the incredible complexity of many wars, where there may be multiple 
actors interacting in shifting combinations.  Such complexity can seriously 
hamper attempts at any neat analysis.  Nevertheless, the trinity was designed by 
Clausewitz with such complexity in mind – a fact which belies its seeming 
simplicity.  It is the actual application of the trinity in the concrete case which 
remains the challenge for historians, analysts, and strategists.  The relevance of 
the ideas of complexity theory might be particularly pertinent to many modern 
conflicts given the vast array of actors involved, operating in a globalised 
context, with the vast and confusing transnational political webs created as a 
result.  This is combined with the unpredictable and intangible effects of an ever-
present mass media, which filters perceptions and shapes and is shaped by 
popular attitudes.  A growing complex of international legal constraints, national 
‘rules of engagement’, military codes and diverse ethical preconceptions blurs 
the boundaries between acceptable and unacceptable behaviour in conflict.  The 
proliferation of myriad futuristic technologies and high-tech weapons systems, 
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require constant adaptation by combatants to this rapidly shifting material 
environment.   
It should be noted that these insights do not amount to a cause for despair, 
either for the commander or for the student of war.  Nor is the use of the imagery 
of complexity theory meant to suggest that in war all is actually chaos: there are 
of course some prominent linearities and predictable elements in war, such as the 
effect certain weapons will have when they hit their target.  The acceptance of 
the complexity of war is simply a further step towards properly understanding 
the phenomenon under study.  The trinity is an important means of feeling our 
way through that complexity.  It condenses an enormously difficult subject into 
manageable elements that, if grasped, can greatly enhance knowledge on war and 
strategy.  Moreover, the benefits of such nonlinear imagery in the strategic realm 
might be to encourage the vital attributes of adaptability, flexibility, 
responsiveness, and innovation in military institutions. 
The failure to conceive of the trinity in this way may reflect a natural 
human inclination for the reassuring presence of structure, order, and 
predictability in human social affairs – something likely to be sought in military 
establishments as neat models promise prediction and greater control over 
intractable situations pervaded by fear and apprehension.  As Steven Mann has 
argued, ‘our view of reality rests on scientific paradigms’ and the dominant 
outlook is shaped by the physical sciences developed during the eighteenth 
century, with their emphasis on deterministic and linear sequences of cause and 
effect. 65   Undoubtedly, Clausewitz’s theory, as we have seen, employs 
terminology from the physical sciences (centre of gravity, friction etc).  But, 
‘linear systems are often restrictive, narrow and brittle’66 and can cause serious 
paralysis and confusion when developments and events do not fit neatly into the 
existing model.  Beyerchen neatly sums up the potential weakness of linear 
conceptions of war and is worth quoting at length: 
 
We need for our own sake to understand the limitations our imaginations 
places upon us.  Linearity is excellent for the systems we design to 
behave predictably, but offers a narrow window on most natural and 
social systems.  That narrowness sets blinders on our perception of reality 
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and offers a weakness for an opponent to exploit.  But if we know our 
limits, we can maximise the extent and duration of our surprise… And an 
expanded sense of the complexity of reality can help us be more 
successfully adaptive amid changing circumstances.67 
 
The trinity, in its basic form, potentially misconveys the enormous 
complexity of the ideas and concepts that it rests upon.  To paraphrase 
Clausewitz: everything in the theory of war is very simple, but the simplest thing 
is incredibly complex.  It would be very easy to fall into the trap of believing that 
the trinity offers a useful short-cut to an advanced understanding of war.  The 
argument might run that, being that Clausewitz spent a lifetime studying the 
phenomenon of war, given his great intellect, and his deep and varied experience 
in war, the fact that he boiled the theory of war down to half a page of prose 
saves us all a great deal of effort.  Undoubtedly, Clausewitz’s theory does save 
the student of war a great deal of effort in a number of respects (to the extent that 
we do not have to start from the beginning, from first principles), yet what this 
perspective ignores is the underlying complexity of his theory, of the nature of 
the relationships between and within the elements of the trinity. 
Reflections 
So, to conclude, this chapter has sought to draw together the various strands of 
analysis presented in the previous chapters and to reveal the operation of the 
trinity when conceived as a whole.  It has demonstrated that there are certain 
levels and characteristics of the trinity that must be properly understood if an 
accurate comprehension of the meaning and explanative power of the theoretical 
framework of the trinity is to be grasped.   
The three primary tendencies taken together present a picture of war from 
the perspective of the individual belligerent, yet one that is crucially dependent 
on war’s multilateral context.  All three are also inherently ambiguous both in 
terms of whether they cause a rise to extremes in war or the extent to which they 
are strategically beneficial or harmful.  Concrete statements in those respects can 
only be made according to their precise manifestations in unique circumstances.  
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The primary objective tendencies are expressed through history in their variable 
subjective forms – of a political leadership, fighting forces, and populations – 
and whilst certain of the primary elements may relate mostly to certain of these 
social groups the connections are by no means rigid or deterministic.  It is the 
impact of context – the tertiary level in the framework – which explains the 
changing character of war as represented at the secondary level.  Changing 
conditions shape the forms and structures of social entities, whilst providing the 
broad historical, political, cultural, economic, legal, technological, and 
geographical environment within which war takes place.     
Finally, we emphasised the crucial intended unity of the trinity: no one 
tendency of the trinity can be understood alone, because war will always display 
all three elements simultaneously as they interact in a variety of fluctuating, 
dynamic, competing, and mutually supporting ways.  The result is a conception 
of war that is nonlinear, complex, and inherently unpredictable.  War is always 
comprised of an interplay between the three primary elements, in all their 
internal complexity, and the relationship between them is constantly shifting in 
random and unexpected ways. 
Conclusion 
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
Conclusion and Reflections 
 
 
This thesis has argued that Clausewitz laid the basis for a comprehensive and 
fundamental theory of the social phenomenon of war.  It has demonstrated that in 
its basic form the trinity can be perhaps more misleading than edifying, 
particularly if read in isolation and without an appreciation of his wider work.  
But, placed in context, the trinity can serve a number of purposes for the scholar 
of war.  The thesis has also argued that much that has been written about On War 
has really missed the point of the trinity and some of the underlying assumptions 
made by Clausewitz.  There are good reasons for this.  In its existing form the 
text is imperfect, incomplete, and at times perplexing to the modern mind.  An 
early death prevented Clausewitz from fully developing his ideas.  Perhaps, had 
Clausewitz lived, his work would be less prone to basic misunderstandings, but 
we should perhaps be cautious in that regard.  Misunderstandings derive simply 
from a failure to read the text thoroughly or to comprehend its central ideas in 
their proper historical context.  In short, we need to be aware of the times and 
conditions in which Clausewitz lived and worked.   
Moreover, it has to be doubted whether Clausewitz would ever have been 
finally satisfied with his work.  In accordance with his overarching dialectical 
approach to the subject, he wrote ‘organically’,1 constantly reworking concepts, 
testing propositions in the light of new experiences or historical evidence, and 
was never content to let his mind rest on one perspective or one idea.  Had 
Clausewitz lived until today no doubt he would still be redrafting On War, and 
perhaps he would have made a hopeless doctoral candidate, unable to ever accept 
his work as finally complete!  These observations, rather than being redolent of a 
confused mind, reveal a thinker who had grasped the fundamental truth about his 
subject and the study of it: no final word, no pithy theory will ever truly capture 
the essence of the phenomenon.  This is why, as Gray maintains, we should treat 
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On War ‘as a living document.’2  Clausewitz would have known his theoretical 
trinity was partial, simplistic, and liable to being overwhelmed by the currents of 
history.  Yet, it was precisely his recognition of these dangers that enabled him to 
at least produce a conception of war that has stood the test of time better than 
most other attempts to produce general theories.   
Certainly, many important ideas or themes – such as the idea of 
politically limited war – were not followed through as thoroughly as Clausewitz 
may have wished, yet we must base our interpretations on the work we have 
today and on what we know about its genesis and growth.  So, in some respects, 
this thesis has attempted to take up the baton from other scholars in an attempt to 
determine where Clausewitz was going and what he was trying to express 
through the trinity, whilst considering his ideas in the light of the development of 
war since his time, and in relation to some prominent critiques of his ideas. 
Put differently, this study has sought to add a ‘layer of interpretation’ in 
order to reveal the somewhat hidden depths and continued relevance of many of 
the ideas on which the trinity is based.  If read and understood with an 
accommodating, flexible, and open mind, the trinity is capable of helping us to 
understand the essential dynamics of conflict even today, whether we are 
concerned with state warfare, such as the Gulf War of 1991, or a terrorist 
campaign, such as that waged by the Algerian F.L.N.  It cannot, of course, tell us 
anything substantive about such conflicts, but rather encourages consideration of 
the essential dynamics that underlie any situation of organised violence waged 
for political ends.  The value of this lies primarily in the fact that these essentials 
can so often be lost in the welter of overpowering images and the inordinate 
confusion of the ‘here and now.’  In this sense, the trinity forces us to separate 
what at first sight appears utterly chaotic and attempt to appreciate the 
fundamental dynamics of war.  Reality is often chaotic, but equally, in historical 
perspective, there is an underlying consistency to such complexity; if not 
‘method behind the madness’, then perhaps continuity behind the confusion.    
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Realising a new interpretation 
The trinity is certainly not the final word on war, but it is perhaps the most final 
word we have available to us.  In order to add weight to these propositions we 
have explored the central aspects of each tendency in greater detail and attempted 
to reveal their prominent features, whilst proposing where and how we might 
reconsider certain aspects of the terminology employed by Clausewitz or 
consider alternative perspectives in relation to certain concepts.  Rather than 
claiming to have identified a grand new theory of war, this thesis constitutes a 
form of consolidation or ‘modernisation’ of the Clausewitzian original.  It has 
attempted to synthesise a rich body of secondary literature concerned with 
Clausewitz’s ideas, as well as re-examining, in some detail, the central 
components of Clausewitz’s theoretical framework. 
In order to achieve these aims, a number of methods have been adopted.  
A central concern has been to situate Clausewitz’s ideas in relation to pre-
existing thought on war and to consider some of the notable contextual 
influences on the development of his ideas.  As a number of prominent 
interpreters have argued,3 Clausewitz must be understood historically; that is, he 
must be placed in the historical context of early nineteenth century Europe and, 
in particular, Counter-Enlightenment Germany, where great currents of thought 
were crashing up against one another in a great swell of intellectual awakening 
and new ideas.  Clausewitz’s theoretical approach was powerfully shaped by 
what he deemed to be the various strengths and weaknesses of existing 
approaches to the subject, and also by a number of philosophical schools of 
thought.  His detailed study, critical analysis, and interpretation of countless wars 
in history – particularly those from the time of the Wars of the Austrian 
Succession (1740-48), but supplemented by much broader historical knowledge 
– allowed him to extrapolate those more permanent, integral aspects of war 
otherwise shrouded by thousands of fleeting impressions.   
This was undoubtedly bolstered by his more personal experiences, which 
gave him an invaluable direct knowledge of the intense psychological forces, 
inescapable friction, and countless dangers of conflict.  Such things are 
incredibly difficult for non-practitioners to grasp, and which cannot ever be 
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entirely portrayed, even in realistic training such as ‘battle inoculation’, in the 
most poignant writing, nor even in powerful art such as Francisco de Goya’s 
Disasters of War or evocative poetry such as Wilfred Owen’s Dulce Et Decorum 
Est.  The experience of war – its effects on the mind and spirit, in all their variety 
– is something only those who have faced it will ever truly understand. 
A basic supposition of this thesis is that the trinity does not stand-alone, 
but rather must be understood as comprising and representing countless other 
ideas in Clausewitz’s work.  As Bassford and Villacres state, ‘it would be a 
mistake to approach the trinity concept as a discrete, bite-sized nugget of wisdom 
that can somehow be extracted from the larger work.’4  This holistic approach 
has meant that we have drawn upon ideas throughout On War and some of 
Clausewitz’s other works in order to add weight to the interpretation.  In addition 
to these approaches, we have sought to draw together a wide range of excellent 
secondary scholarship, as well as examining Clausewitz’s ideas in the light of 
modern critiques.  Consideration of the latter compels us to defend Clausewitz’s 
ideas where contradictory perspectives suggest he may have been mistaken.  
They also help us determine those areas where the concepts and terms employed 
are perhaps limited or detract from their wider applicability.  Finally, certain 
ideas have been illustrated with reference to historical examples drawn from a 
wide range of periods in order to add flesh to what are otherwise somewhat 
abstract notions.   
Explicit case studies have consciously been avoided in this study, partly 
due to the constraints of time and space, but more fundamentally for the reason 
that the trinity is not ideally suited to serving as a neat construct for strategic 
historical analysis.  Indeed, Clausewitz did not shape his historical studies around 
it – he notes that ‘it would be wishful thinking to think that any theory could 
cover every abstract truth, so that all the critic had to do would be to classify the 
case studied under the appropriate heading.’5  As we have stressed, the trinity is 
intended to nourish the intellect, and which, as Clausewitz puts it, ‘accustoms the 
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mind to these truths’.6  It is not meant to be employed as a rigid framework, 
whereby the historian’s task would be simply to compartmentalise facts and 
events into three distinct areas of reality and consider their relationship.  
Clausewitz himself makes this point in On War when he states that ‘in the same 
way as these truths are better served by a commander who has absorbed their 
meaning in his mind rather than one who treats them as rigid external rules, so 
the critic should not apply them like an external law or an algebraic formula.’7  
Such an approach would confuse as much as clarify in terms of our 
comprehension of the workings of the trinity.   
In fact, this has often been the fate of studies that have attempted just this; 
often encouraging an arbitrary division according to secondary manifestations 
rather than a focus on the complex interplay of the crucial primary forces (which 
are much harder to map and neatly differentiate between).  Also, consideration of 
two or three detailed wars might over-emphasise specifics, whereas this thesis 
has attempted to convey more general factors in order to convey the broad 
applicability of the framework.  This is not to say that detailed historical case 
studies cannot contribute to our understanding of the trinity – quite the reverse in 
fact, and as Clausewitz stressed, history (and moreover, intensive, critical, 
detailed history) is all that theory has to draw upon.  Yet, the careful study, 
space, and time required to achieve this objective is beyond the bounds of this 
study.  Rather, this thesis perhaps lays the foundations upon which further in-
depth comparative historical research could commence. 
An overview of the trinitarian framework 
Here we will briefly draw together some of the central conclusions of this study 
to provide a comprehensive overview of the foundations, content, and 
overarching dynamics of the theoretical framework of the trinity. 
In the introduction we established that the trinity rests on three central 
ontological suppositions, which Clausewitz believed were basic to any 
understanding of war, but which he did not explicitly state in the passage 
outlining the trinity.  These three areas are so central to Clausewitz’s entire 
                                                          
6
 Clausewitz, On War, p. 181. 
7
 Ibid., p. 196. 
Conclusion 
 370 
approach to his subject that the trinity cannot be understood properly without 
grasping their ever-present underlying influence – to adopt a metaphor 
Clausewitz employs in On War, they are like the colour an artists gives to the 
underpainting which determines the tone of the canvas.  First, Clausewitz’s 
understanding of war is humanistic; it places humans with all their quirks, 
vanities, ambitions, fears, hopes, and dreams at the centre of the phenomenon.  
Second, throughout, Clausewitz emphasises ‘the duel’, the fact that war is always 
a ‘continuous interaction of opposites’8 between two or more belligerents – it is 
not an ‘exercise of the will directed an inanimate matter’, but against an ‘animate 
object that reacts.’ 9   Third, fighting and combat lie at the heart of the 
phenomenon, no matter how rarely violent engagements actually occur.  These 
basic foundations significantly shape many of the ideas that are to be found 
within the trinitarian framework.    
Whilst apparently commonsensical, all three foundations have often been 
marginalised or ignored in some existing conceptions of war.  Military 
institutions have a tendency to seek answers to problems in technological elixirs, 
diverting attention away from human realities.  This has particularly been the 
case in the modern West where the existence of casualty averse publics have 
prompted the search for ‘risk-free warfare’ through the application of stand-off, 
precision weapons.  Some belligerents get so caught up in devising and 
perfecting their own operations that they forget there is always a living and 
thinking enemy always attempting to frustrate our plans.  From that basic fact so 
much of war’s paradoxical nature derives,10 not to mention the passions that are 
fuelled through the violent confrontation with ‘the other’ who is trying to kill us.  
The belief that wars can be won without fighting, perhaps through political 
positioning, clever manoeuvre, or shrewd stratagems, hides the fact that such 
successes are crucially dependent on the threat or prospect of the clash of arms: 
all outcomes in war are ultimately decided by calculations in relation to the 
consequences – whether political, psychological, or material – of the use of 
force.  War, in Clausewitz’s conception, is predicated on these foundations.  Yet, 
in order to arrive at an accurate theory, Clausewitz required sound methods 
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which would enable him to avoid the pitfalls he believed earlier thinkers had 
fallen into.  With no dedicated social science methods textbooks to consult, 
Clausewitz developed a remarkably sophisticated and rigorous approach to the 
formulation of theory.   
Rejecting both the stereotypically partial, dogmatic, and mechanistic 
Enlightenment approaches and the somewhat fantastical, exaggerated, and 
fatalistic Counter-Enlightenment outlook, Clausewitz struck a middling course of 
his own.  Rather than seeking any fixed doctrine or final conclusions, Clausewitz 
forcefully expressed the limits of any theory of war.  Nevertheless, he believed 
that by employing clear concepts free of jargon, by approaching the subject in the 
spirit of scientific endeavour, and through a constant dialectical debate with his 
subject, sound theory could elucidate war’s internal structures.  Clausewitz was 
particularly conscious of ensuring that his theory remained anchored to reality 
through the testing of logical propositions against both history and personal 
experience.  A direct consequence of this self-imposed criterion was the 
recognition that, always and everywhere, war is ‘intertwined with psychological 
factors and effects.’ 11   Whilst incorporation of such factors only made the 
theorist’s task more problematic,12 any theory that ignored such forces would 
conflict with reality to such an extent as to be rendered useless.   
Moving beyond the depiction of war as either an art or science, 
Clausewitz – whilst accepting insights from each could help elucidate certain 
ideas – maintained that war is ‘part of man’s social existence’13 and is most akin 
to that from which it is born: politics.   Perhaps most importantly, it was 
Clausewitz’s desire to bridge the divide between universal and particularist 
theories, knowing full well that the former could lead to empty generalities and 
the latter to doctrinal principles that would soon be rendered obsolete by change.  
The trinity can be seen as the fruit of his theoretical labours, the final synthesis 
which he arrived at after years of intense study and historical analysis.  The three 
tendencies represent those timeless elements of war, which, whilst varying in 
their relative importance over time, and from one war to the next, will be 
apparent in any war, in any age.  So, what were those universal elements?  
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First, Clausewitz drew attention to the rational thread that runs through 
war in the form of the unifying and overarching influence of policy, whereby 
belligerents seek to tailor their available resources and means to their ultimate 
ends through appropriate strategies and tactics.  The influence of policy feeds 
into calculations regarding the costs, both material and psychological, 
communities are willing to pay given the value of the war’s object and the effort 
required.  Although policy is never ‘tyrant’, can change dramatically as 
circumstances develop, and may not always be deemed ‘reasonable’, the 
subordination of war to policy emphasises that no military victory is complete in 
and of itself.  But there was another less obvious, but fundamental implication of 
war’s subordination to policy, which is that war is inescapably and inextricably 
embedded in the wider interactive political realm, of which policy is but one 
element.  Clausewitz held that war cannot be conceived as an autonomous 
phenomenon, but was the continuation of politics, understood as an endless, 
multilateral, and dynamic process.  Politics was for Clausewitz the ‘womb of 
war’, and thus the main lines that run through war are fundamentally political.  
Yet, this wider multilateral perspective exerted a paradoxical effect on war which 
emphasised to Clausewitz the limits of policy control.  He understood that war, 
far from simply being a rational instrument, is also a continuation of the chaotic 
and unpredictable realm of the political, which is beyond the control of any one 
group. 
Second, war is pervaded by chance and uncertainty.  The sources of this 
uncertainty lie primarily in war’s interactive nature, the physical conditions 
within which war takes place, and the human condition.  War is always 
conducted against an enemy with its own independent will who will never 
passively submit, but will be constantly seeking to outwit, deceive, and destroy 
its opponent with whatever means and ways it has available.  Chance happenings 
pervade war, either as a result of the surprise moves of the enemy, the impact of 
external factors such as the weather, or as result of the limits of the human mind 
to foresee all potential possibilities. The surprise moves, both political and 
military, of third party actors also adds to this chronically unpredictable 
environment.  The uncertainty that results is exacerbated by the countless 
intangible factors involved and the inescapable ethnocentric blinkers that cloud 
objective analysis of enemy intentions and capabilities.  These are factors that 
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even sophisticated technology cannot negate; information and intelligence in war 
is inevitably insufficient, imprecise, partial, and prone to exaggeration and 
political manipulation.  Combined with the effects of relentless danger, fear, and 
physical and mental exertion, these factors coalesce to form a ‘general friction’ 
which makes war so much more difficult than it may appear on paper.  Yet, this 
realm of uncertainty and chance is not necessarily cause for outright despair 
because it also an environment of great opportunities and possibilities, which 
requires the creative, determined, and bold genius to command and steer 
experienced and courageous forces through the ‘uncharted sea, full of reefs.’14 
Third, contrary to the way in which Clausewitz has often been 
represented, he stressed the ever-present potential for irrational and emotional 
behaviour in war – in particular such hostile feelings such as hatred, revenge, and 
animosity.  Whenever force is present in human relations, the feelings cannot fail 
to be involved, whilst any putative level of civilisation is no safeguard against 
capture by such feelings of hatred and enmity, which are common to all humans, 
and especially prone to expression in situations of conflict.  Yet, throughout his 
work, Clausewitz recognises other potential sources of passion and irrationality, 
and it becomes clear, upon close study, that these forces can potentially effect all 
actors in war.  Ultimately, war is an activity in which rational behaviour can very 
easily be overwhelmed by the emotions.  Yet, emotions in war are not only of a 
negative or nefarious kind, but the extremes of virtuous emotions such as intense 
love, altruism, and self-sacrifice can exist within military institutions and a 
surprising level of mutual respect and empathy may exist between the 
combatants on opposing sides.  All such ‘moral forces’ can variably impinge on 
military effectiveness. 
All three primary tendencies contain some common attributes.  They each 
present a picture of war from the subjective point of view of an individual 
belligerent in war, yet the interactive and multilateral nature of war is inherently 
implied in each case.  All three tendencies are essentially ambiguous in relation 
to the rise to extremes.  Also, in strategic terms the three tendencies are neither 
necessarily positive or negative influences, but rather are dependent on the way 
in which they are handled or exploited by belligerents.  
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The three tendencies manifest themselves – at the secondary level – in 
different times and places due to the changed conditions in which different 
societies conduct their wars.  It is a theory that consciously aims to account for 
the often rapidly and dramatically changing conditions in which wars are fought 
and which greatly impact on the character and form of belligerents.  The 
secondary subjective trinity is intended as a means of capturing the manifestation 
of the three primary forces in relation to particular historical wars.  The primary 
tendencies are generally expressed through social actors in the form of a political 
leadership, fighting forces, and popular base.  Policy, chance, and passion are 
typically associated, respectively, with these three social groups, but a closer 
examination reveals the varying impact of all three within all these social groups. 
Ultimately, the trinity has to be conceived of as a unity – as an indivisible 
and integrative whole – in so far as none of the primary tendencies make sense in 
isolation and none is a priori more important than the others.  As Clausewitz’s 
final synthesis, the trinity is intended to convey the inextricable interaction of the 
central forces operating in war.  Moreover, this unity – of three things in one – is 
not of a static or equal nature, but one that is constantly morphing and 
fluctuating, displaying dynamism and constant change in their relationship to one 
another.  Clausewitz employs the nonlinear scientific metaphor of a weight 
suspended over three magnets to convey the sense in which war charts a 
complex, unpredictable, and random course between these three points of 
attraction.  Thus, we can consider the whole framework as expressing a complex 
system of dialectical and constantly shifting relationships between the three 
central forces as manifested in the specific belligerents involved (including their 
societies and other relevant actors), whose specific form, behaviour, and situation 
is shaped by historical conditions which are themselves constantly in flux. 
As soon as one delves deeper into the separate elements of the trinity it 
becomes almost immediately apparent that any strict delineation between them is 
necessarily arbitrary and an insufficient reflection of the complexity of reality.  
Just as no human can be neatly compartmentalised into rational, creative, and 
emotional sides, nor can war in its vast complexity be so partitioned.  The trinity 
is in some respects a grotesque simplification of reality, yet, as this thesis argues, 
a necessary one for understanding a phenomenon that could so easily escape the 
bounds of our mental capacity.  The trinity was Clausewitz’s attempt to impress 
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upon students of war that the three elements at its heart reflect the reality ‘that 
these dynamic forces are ever-present and constantly interacting in the everyday 
world.’15 
As a number of commentators have noted, there are a great many topics 
associated with war which Clausewitz ostensibly leaves out of his discussion.  
On War is short on technology, economics, morality, law, or naval matters.  Yet, 
equally of course, Clausewitz says absolutely nothing about air combat, nuclear 
weapons, or space-warfare.  These examples impress on the reader that 
Clausewitz could not have written about everything to do with war, and nor was 
that his intention.  The trinity establishes a framework of essentials and is 
designed to be flexible enough to accommodate fundamental change in war’s 
subjective manifestations in the concrete case, as shaped by the continual 
interplay of changing conditions, whilst remaining firmly anchored to the 
fundamental forces that drive all forms of human conflict: politics, chance, and 
passion.   
For any of those forces to be absent, war must necessarily become 
something else, for these elements are integral to its very nature.  They radically 
alter in their form, relative influence, and relationship with each other from one 
war to the next and in endless ways within the same war; at times certain 
elements may dominate, whilst others are pushed into the shade.  Nevertheless, a 
theory that ignored any one of them ‘would conflict with reality to such an extent 
that for this reason alone it would be totally useless.’16  Even for commanders 
who believe war can be approached as an autonomous activity and attempt to 
achieve victory for victory’s sake, war can never, in reality, be isolated from its 
political context or the political purposes for which force is applied.  No matter 
how technologically advanced the armed force, how professional its intelligence 
agencies, or how meticulous its staff planning, when war is considered in the 
whole, there are far too many contingent factors, intervening variables, 
inescapable intangibles, and insurmountable unknowns for uncertainty or chance 
to ever be banished.  War is fought by humans and where violence enters into 
social relations, passions are inevitably stirred – whether virtuous or sinister – 
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and this is not to mention the countless other emotional well-springs and sources 
of irrational behaviour.     
A basis for dialogue 
In the introduction we noted the apparent divide in the literature between 
Clausewitzians and anti-Clausewitzians that has emerged in recent years.  This 
thesis has not in any sense attempted to conclusively bridge the apparent divide.  
Rather, it has attempted to provide a firmer basis for a more consistent and 
accurate dialogue between students of the nature of war, and to contribute to our 
understanding of Clausewitz as a theorist of war.  Almost all discussion on the 
nature of war and strategy commences, either wittingly or unwittingly, against 
the backdrop of purportedly Clausewitzian ideas and utilises terminology and 
concepts first fully developed by Clausewitz.  The flood of studies in recent years 
claiming there is something decidedly ‘new’ about contemporary war – whether 
due to the effects of globalisation, the media revolution, or new forms of 
insurgency and terrorism – has led many commentators to return to Clausewitz, 
and ultimately to the trinity. 
On the whole it appears that the claim of novelty in contemporary war 
tends to rest less on objective observations of what went before, than on the ideas 
of Clausewitz, who is sometimes taken to be the chief interpreter of a dying 
breed of inter-state war.  Likewise, those who claim that war has not changed do 
so on the grounds that Clausewitz essentially got it right.  The central problem 
here lies not in the fact that Clausewitz is utilised as a theoretical starting point 
for all such discussion, but that his ideas are often distorted and mistakenly 
presented in order to add weight to a particular argument.  If Clausewitz 
represents all that purportedly went before, then any thesis claiming the onset of 
a new era of warfare can only benefit from knocking Clausewitz from his 
pedestal.  So, this thesis commenced on the assumption that greater sense can be 
achieved in the wider debate on the nature of war if we can better understand the 
chief theory on which the contested claims are made.  This meant returning to 
Clausewitz’s central theoretical device – the trinity – extrapolating its central 
conceptual components and their meaning, and suggesting ways in which they 
allow for much greater flexibility of interpretation than is commonly allowed. 
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Yet, crucially, this study certainly does not conclude that the trinity can 
explain everything.  Analysts of contemporary conflict – whether of individual 
wars (ongoing or historical), conflicts in certain geographical regions, or in its 
myriad forms, from guerrilla warfare to large-scale interstate wars – can provide 
students with detailed descriptions and observations of the events, causes, trends, 
and dynamics that comprise these conflicts.  These specialist studies are 
indispensable and in no way do we argue that Clausewitz should supplant them.  
These authors have revealed the extremely complex and varying character of 
wars that have emerged in recent decades; wars that appear in many respects 
radically divergent from traditional interstate wars prominent throughout the so-
called ‘Westphalian era’ and which were undoubtedly the dominant type about 
which Clausewitz wrote.   
Whether all the features of these wars are as novel as some proclaim – for 
instance, some commentators such as Münckler see parallels between these wars 
and earlier forms of conflict such as the Thirty Years War of the seventeenth 
century17  – need not worry us greatly; the central point being that historical 
experience has of course revealed radically different forms of war.  Clausewitz 
wrote at a time dominated by wars fought between the armies of sovereign states.  
That he witnessed, and even lectured on emergent forms of guerrilla conflict and 
‘people’s war’ cannot hide this fact.18  His historical studies provided him with 
an awareness of different types of war, but the emphasis of his work was on 
interstate war, and more specifically its Napoleonic manifestation.  To expect 
Clausewitz to be able to explain, in any detail, twenty-first century warfare is 
ridiculous.  Clausewitz knew nothing of the United Nations, humanitarian aid 
organisations, 24 hour mass media, or laser-guided precision munitions: he was 
no nostradamus.  Essentially, the central problem is the one that Clausewitz 
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himself grappled with: how to distinguish between the universal and the 
particular.   
As explored in Chapter 2, Clausewitz’s theoretical approach emphasised 
the limits of what he was attempting to achieve and what he believed possible in 
any theory of war.  He understood better than any existing thinkers, the profound 
difficulty of making truly timeless observations on a subject as vast and complex 
as war; when the details and particularities of the wars of each age were 
inevitably shaped by unique factors.  This recognition of extreme particularity 
almost led Clausewitz to the relativistic conclusion that no general statements in 
theory were possible about war – indeed, he stated that each age would have held 
to its own theory of war.  Clausewitz would no doubt have sympathised with 
those scholars who highlight the unique aspects of contemporary conflict.         
Yet, as we have seen, Clausewitz was driven by an intense professional 
desire to determine whether certain general propositions could be made with 
regard to the subject; to explore if there did in fact exist an underlying essence to 
the phenomenon of war, elements universal to all forms of war across the ages.  
His notably ‘quasi-modern’ and rigorous theoretical standards provided him with 
the means of carrying out this endeavour.  He was ever attempting to establish 
the bounds of generalisable insights without succumbing to observations of 
meaningless banality.  He understood that to achieve such an undertaking he 
would require not only a detailed comprehension of the dynamics of particular 
wars, but also a sense of how wars differed throughout history.  In a manner 
largely unprecedented in military theory, Clausewitz truly began the process of, 
as he put it, ‘thinking about the subject for years on end and testing each 
conclusion against the history of war’,19 delving beneath the surface of war in an 
attempt to distinguish the essential from the incidental, the timeless from the 
particular.  This thesis has argued that the trinity is the culmination – albeit 
incomplete – of this endeavour and we have defended, through a detailed 
analysis, those elements which Clausewitz identified as timeless aspects of war.   
The trinity is a framework that is intended to convey dynamism, 
flexibility, change, and complexity.  This, to many readers, may not be initially 
apparent, but becomes clear based on a wider reading of the text and once his 
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theoretical objectives and guiding methods are appreciated.  In the light of these 
observations, we should approach the trinity as Clausewitz explicitly intended us 
to: as a guide to judgement and education, not a prescriptive theoretical manual 
with which any war can easily be understood or, indeed, fought.  This point 
cannot be overstated.  It is hoped this thesis has made clear why such 
representations simply do not convey the depth, richness, and complexity of 
Clausewitz’s thought.  Clausewitz was highly conscious of the fact that great 
contextual change could render irrelevant any static, dogmatic, or prescriptive 
theory, as was the fate of many of his contemporary theoretical competitors.  In 
stark terms, he had seen the once incredibly successful Prussian army of 
Frederick the Great smashed on the battlefields of Jena-Auerstedt, precisely 
because of an inability to adapt their method of warfare to changed conditions.  
Reflections 
Clausewitz’s On War is an immensely difficult work to comprehend.  For many 
it will raise as many questions as it answers.  Much of it is largely impenetrable, 
particularly for the uninitiated.  It should be approached with caution, but also 
with relish, confident of the fact that one will emerge from a close study of it 
with a firmer and sounder understanding of war.  To fully comprehend its ideas, 
some knowledge of the broad context in which it was written is valuable.  
Perhaps more important is an understanding of the unfinished status of the text.  
The consequences of a failure to at least contemplate these factors has, as we 
have seen, led to many distortions of Clausewitz’s ideas, that are simply not 
justified in reference to the text.  In these respects, Clausewitz must approached 
with caution.  Nevertheless, those willing to take time to understand these 
problems, can find in On War and most notably, in the trinity, powerful concepts 
and ideas which speak across the ages and that express certain truths about the 
subject.  It is regrettable, but alas perhaps inevitable, that Clausewitz’s ideas have 
been distorted and misrepresented beyond what any considered appreciation of 
the text will withstand.    
What is both fascinating and rewarding for the student of Clausewitz is 
that once one attains a grasp of the trinity, when reading through almost any 
scholarly history of war, one is stuck by Clausewitz’s presence on almost every 
Conclusion 
 380 
page (and sometimes not so metaphorically, but explicitly!).  This is testament to 
the inherent validity and enduring power of his ideas.  Perhaps the central reason 
for this was Clausewitz’s perceptive insight into the basic realities of human 
nature, particularly as they are wont to be expressed in times of war.  Along with 
such thinkers as Thucydides and Machiavelli, Clausewitz achieved that so 
difficult task of seeing through the almost blinding effect of the present, into the 
fundamental and essential continuities of the human social condition.  Not all his 
insights achieved this standard: Clausewitz was not only a philosopher of war, 
but a practical man writing to better understand the exigencies of his time, hence 
much of On War is inevitably time-bound.  Yet, crucially, there are also those 
sections, paragraphs, even sentences which are treasures for all time.  
Clausewitz’s theory was one capable of constant accretion in the face of 
relentless historical change.  In this study we have not attempted to assert any 
definitive conclusion, either with regard to what exactly Clausewitz said or as to 
the nature of war.  Our understanding of this difficult subject is constantly 
evolving, reacting to events and new interpretations of history: the debate 
continues.  The implications of the changing forms of war during the twenty-first 
century will no doubt continue to generate intense and rigorous study, not to 
mention heated scholarly battles, but as Clausewitz taught us, we should pause 
before being overawed by appearances and impressions, whilst remaining open 
to the fact of change in human social and political relations.  Hence, this thesis 
does not masquerade as anything approaching the final word on Clausewitz; and 
no last word is possible, primarily because Clausewitz himself had not stopped 
thinking about the subject when he died; it does however add to the existing 
debates on war, strategy, and how older texts can be revisited, revised, and 
interpreted. 
On War is not a textbook with all the answers about how we should think 
about war.  Rather it is an invitation to study an immensely complex 
phenomenon for which there are no quick and easy answers.  Nevertheless, the 
basic forces conveyed in the trinity will continue to operate in all their endless 
variety because, ‘All wars are things of the same nature.’  It is perhaps apt to 
close with the opinion of one of the finest scholars of war, and of Clausewitz, in 
our own age: 
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What is remarkable…is how much of what Clausewitz had to say did 
outlast his time and remain relevant, not only under military circumstances 
transformed out of all recognition, but for a readership far broader than the 
officers of the Prussian Army whose education he primarily had in mind.20 
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APPENDIX I 
Alternative Translations of the Trinity 
 
Michael Howard and Peter Paret Translation 
‘War is more than a true chameleon that slightly adapts its characteristics to the 
given case.  As a total phenomenon its dominant tendencies always make war a 
paradoxical trinity – composed of primordial violence, hatred, and enmity, which 
are to be regarded as a blind natural force; of the play of chance and probability 
within which the creative spirit is free to roam; and of it element of 
subordination, as an instrument of policy, which makes it subject to reason alone. 
The first of these three aspects mainly concerns the people; the second the 
commander and his army; the third the government.  The passions that are to be 
kindled in war must already be inherent in the people; the scope which the play 
of courage and talent will enjoy in the realm of probability and chance depends 
on the particular characteristics of the commander and the army; but the political 
aims are business of government alone. 
These three tendencies are like three different codes of law, deep-rooted 
in their subject and yet variable in their relationship to one another.  A theory that 
ignores any one of them or seeks to fix an arbitrary relationship between them 
would conflict with reality to such an extent that for this reason alone it would be 
completely useless. 
Our task then is to develop a theory that maintains a balance between 
these three tendencies, like an object suspended between three magnets. 
What lines might best be followed to achieve this difficult task will be 
explored in the book on the theory of war.  At any rate, the preliminary concept 
of war which we have formulated casts a first ray of light on the basic structure 
of theory, and enables us to make an initial differentiation and identification of 
its major components.’ 
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J. J. Graham Translation 
‘War is, therefore, not only chameleon-like in character, because it changes its 
colour in some degree in each particular case, but it is also, as a whole, in 
relation to the predominant tendencies which are in it, a wonderful trinity, 
composed of the original violence of its elements, hatred and animosity, which 
may be looked upon as blind instinct; of the play of probabilities and chance, 
which make it a free activity of the soul; and of the subordinate nature of a 
political instrument, by which it belongs purely to the reason. 
The first of these three phases concerns more the people; the second, 
more the General and his Army; the third, more the Government.  The passions 
which break forth in War must already have a latent existence in the peoples.  
The range which the display of courage and talents shall get in the realm of 
probability and of chance depends on the particular characteristics of the General 
and his Army, but the political objects belong the Government alone. 
These three tendencies, which appear like so many different law-givers, 
are deeply rooted in the nature of the subject, and at the same time variable in 
degree.  A theory which would leave any one of them out of account, or set up an 
arbitrary relation between them, would immediately become involved in such a 
contradiction with reality, that it might be regarded as destroyed at once by that 
alone. 
The problem is, therefore, that theory shall keep itself poised in a manner 
between these tendencies, as between three points of attraction. 
The way in which alone this difficult problem can be solved we shall 
examine in the book on the ‘Theory of War’.  In every case the conception of 
War, as here defined, will be the first ray of light which shows us the true 
foundation of theory, and which first separates the great masses and allows us to 
distinguish them from one another.’ 
Bassford Translation 
‘War is thus more than a mere chameleon, because it changes its nature to some 
extent in each concrete case. It is also, however, when it is regarded as a whole 
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and in relation to the tendencies that dominate within it, a fascinating trinity—
composed of:  
1) primordial violence, hatred, and enmity, which are to be regarded as a 
blind natural force; 2) the play of chance and probability, within which the 
creative spirit is free to roam; and 3) its element of subordination, as an 
instrument of policy, which makes it subject to pure reason. 
The first of these three aspects concerns more the people; the second, 
more the commander and his army; the third, more the government. The passions 
that are to blaze up in war must already be inherent in the people; the scope that 
the play of courage and talent will enjoy in the realm of probability and chance 
depends on the particular character of the commander and the army; but the 
political aims are the business of government alone.  
These three tendencies are like three different codes of law, deep-rooted 
in their subject and yet variable in their relationship to one another. A theory that 
ignores any one of them or seeks to fix an arbitrary relationship among them 
would conflict with reality to such an extent that for this reason alone it would be 
totally useless. 
The task, therefore, is to keep our theory [of war] floating among these 
three tendencies, as among three points of attraction. 
What lines might best be followed to achieve this difficult task will be 
explored in the book on the theory of war [i.e., Book Two]. In any case, the 
conception of war defined here will be the first ray of light into the fundamental 
structure of theory, which first sorts out the major components and allows us to 
distinguish them from one another.’ 
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APPENDIX II 
Military Historical Overview of the Napoleonic Era 
 
 
That the French Revolution engendered a ‘revolution in war’ 1  is now, with 
hindsight, largely beyond dispute and indeed, was recognised at the time by 
Goethe, who witnessing the battle at Valmy in 1792 declared the beginning of a 
‘new era in the world’s history.’2  Important developments in military affairs had 
taken place during the final decades of the old regime such as the separation of 
forces into ‘divisions’ as suggested by Pierre de Bourcet, the improvements in 
artillery introduced by Jean-Baptiste de Gribeauval, and the shift in preference 
for battlefield formations from l’ordre mince to l’ordre profonde advocated by 
theorists such as the Count de Guibert.3  These developments later came to be 
known collectively as the ‘Napoleonic inheritance.’4  The events of 1789 ‘swept 
aside the aristocratic hindrances to these new ideas’5 which were injected with a 
potent new dynamism, whilst also subsumed and overshadowed by the military 
implications of the revolution in political culture.  It took the genius of Napoleon 
to make practical use of these transformations and turn them into the extensive 
military strategic victories which served as the basis of a vast French Empire and 
a continental sphere of influence. 
Allied with this injection of popular enthusiasm for war was the 
epiphenomenon of rapidly increasing troop numbers that, by 1815, had vastly 
changed the scope and magnitude of war.  Although by the summer of 1792 there 
were 400,000 men under arms as a result of the universal call to arms earlier that 
year, the supply of volunteers began to run dry so that by early 1793 the National 
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Convention decreed the levée of 300,000 men.6  The subsequent uprising in La 
Vendée in March and the protracted war against the Austrians and Prussians on 
the eastern front led the radical ‘Committee of Public Safety’ to introduce the 
levée en masse in August which decreed that until peace was established, ‘all 
Frenchman are on permanent requisition for military service.’7  This shift from 
voluntarism to forced conscription8 essentially amounted to a ‘declaration of total 
war’9 and enabled the French army to grow to unprecedented levels, encroaching 
on a million men in 1794.10  As the threat of foreign invasion receded troop 
numbers declined, yet it was this principle of total mobilisation of society for war 
– consolidated in the Jourdan-Delbrel law of 1798 establishing universal 
conscription – which allowed Napoleon to conscript over two million men 
between 1800 and 1814 as the basis of his Grand Armée.11  This also probably 
explains Napoleon’s lack of concern with losses as he could simply replace the 
dead with an endless supply of cheap reserves.12  Yet this does not excuse the 
heartlessness of a commander who could inspect the ‘field of Borodino after the 
battle, rubbing his hands and radiant with satisfaction as he counted five dead 
Russians to every one French corpse.’13   
The processes outlined above were by no means smooth and 
unproblematic.  Not everyone was swept up by the patriotic euphoria.  Peasants 
in the provinces, lacking the national consciousness found in the cities, often 
resisted conscription and indeed, the rising in La Vendée was largely a reaction to 
the levies. 14   Such resistance largely explains the drift towards forced 
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conscription.15  Subsequently, the demands placed on the food markets due to 
feeding the new mass armies and the social impact of conscription contributed to 
considerable internal dissent.  Mutinies, desertion, and draft dodging were 
widespread, which led to increasingly draconian measures to counter such 
‘traitors.’  Forcible induction, summary executions of deserters, and 
indoctrination by ‘political commissars’ were commonplace practices designed 
to ensure a steady flow of lambs to the slaughter – a grim precursor to the 
extremes witnessed between 1914-18.  Such policing and repression, rather than 
popular enthusiasm, perhaps better explains how Napoleon could lead 600,000 
men into Russia in 1812 and return a year later with just 60,000.16  However, 
such difficulties do not change the fact of the clear drift towards ‘total war’ 
facilitated by this destructive combination of patriotism and mass conscripted 
manpower which rendered the limited Frederickan wars of the Eighteenth 
century more or less obsolete.   
Another area in which we can perceive important changes in the character 
of war during Clausewitz’s lifetime is in that of military organisation and tactics.  
As noted above, reforms in ‘organisation, staff planning, artillery, and battle 
tactics’17 had taken place prior to 1789, however, the leaders of the Republic, and 
primarily Napoleon, substantially built upon and perfected these earlier 
developments.  The organisational reforms advocated by Bourcet were expanded 
on by the ‘organiser of victory,’ Lazare Carnot, in the 1790s who consolidated 
the divisional structure of the army.18  Napoleon took this further and in 1800 
introduced the corps d’armée – essentially, self-contained all-arms forces of 
around 30,000 men – which allowed an even greater degree of organisational 
mobility and flexibility,19 ease of supply, and decentralisation and dispersal of 
forces.20  Organisational reconfigurations on such a grand scale were only made 
possible by the development of an intricate staffing systems – the basic model for 
the notorious German General Staff, which itself was proscribed by the terms of 
the Treaty of Versailles after Germany’s defeat in 1918. 
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The lack of any meaningful technological advances in this period meant 
most tactical developments were extensions of earlier ideas.  Artillery was given 
a much greater role, building on Gribeauval’s reforms, culminating in 
Napoleon’s lighter and more mobile ‘super batteries’ of standardised guns.21  The 
ordre mixte advocated by Guibert became the favoured tactical formation 
whereby infantry formations would smoothly transform from firing line to shock 
column.22  Operationally, these tactics were combined to achieve Napoleon’s 
decisive offensive aim of ‘attacking the enemy’s main strength directly; closing 
with and destroying an opponent’s main force in the field’ 23  using speed, 
flexibility and overwhelming firepower. 
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